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
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Labour and The Family in Canada, 1941-1986

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Abstract

This paper argues that the expansion of corporate capitalism since the turn of the century and the corresponding proliferation of the wage labour market have transformed the way the family reproduces labour, and created contradictions for the family with respect to the problem of labour maintenance and labour renewal. As corporate capitalism expands, an increasing segment of domestic female labour is being converted into wage labour, and along with it, the rising dependency of the family on the wage economy. In this process, the family finds it necessary to increase its capacity to earn wages as a means to maintain the labour power of its members on a daily basis; in so doing, the process of labour maintenance becomes contradictory to that of labour renewal since the two compete on the same financial resources and since the continuation of wage labour relationship does not rely on generational labour renewal. The strategies followed by Canadian families in expanding on the earning capacity and reducing fertility and family size may be seen as adaptive mechanisms in response to the contradictions created by the wage economy.

Like the family in other advanced capitalist countries,¹ the Canadian family in recent decades has experienced profound changes that are sometimes attributed to the influx of women into the paid labour force. These changes are evident in the reduction of family size, the decline of fertility, the postponement of first pregnancy, and the emergence of different forms of cohabitation and household arrangements (Romaniuc, 1984; Ram, 1990). The persistence of these family-related trends have alarmed demographers and policy-makers about the potential long-term effects on the demographic and economic structures of Canada, among which is the tendency towards an increasingly aging population and a shrinking cohort for the future labour force (Health and Welfare Canada, 1989). Changes in family patterns and behaviours have also prompted social scientists to debate the future of the family as a social institution (Winch, 1970; Zimmerman, 1972; Spanier, 1989; Bane, 1976), especially concerning the demise or continuity of the infamous nuclear family or the conjugal family that is often associated with the advent of industrialization (Goode, 1963; Winch and Blumberg, 1972). Although much of the controversy centres around what constitutes the modern family and its variants, the thrust of the debate is influenced by the normative assumptions of the "structural-functional" framework. Accordingly, the family is the basic social unit that links individuals to society, and it does so by performing many important functions for individuals, although some of these functions are taken over by other social institutions in industrial societies (Nimkoff, 1965; Winch, 1971).

The debate over the nature of the modern family and its future prospect is guided by limited theoretical perspectives² which in the main assume that the family is essential to individuals in two senses. First, the family life cycle (Duvall, 1957; Glick, 1977) is a natural process which is partially akin to the biological process of maturing and aging, although the sequence of certain specific developmental stages may vary from individual to individual. Second, the family as a social institution, albeit with a wide range of structural and functional complexity, is useful or functional to individuals in many ways (Winch, 1971). From such a vantage point, the conjugal family system is a natural or logical correlate of industrialism because it is pragmatic to individuals in industrialized societies (Goode, 1968). The theoretical emphasis on the usefulness of the family to individuals and on the natural developmental sequence linking the cradle to the grave leads to a logical

concern about the future of the family when improved economic opportunities and increased ideological permissiveness seem to have widened individuals' options and lessened their dependence on marriage and the family. Meanwhile, fundamental questions related to how productive relationships shape the form and content of the family tend to be overlooked. Specifically, the way in which the family is constituted under capitalism and how capitalist production transforms family relationships necessitates a theoretical understanding of the social relationship of the family and capitalist production. However, such investigations would fall outside the domain of traditional theoretical frameworks as long as they are preoccupied with the function of the family for the individual, and how individual freedom and choice determines the future of the nuclear family and its variants.

The paper argues that one useful way to study the family under capitalism is to examine it as a social institution which furnishes capitalist production with labour power. Given certain essential features of capitalism, such as the commodification of labour power that is premised upon free labour and market relations, the family is best conceptualized as an institutional arrangement within which labour power is reproduced for the capitalist labour market. In other words, the commodification of labour power under capitalism is not possible unless labour is first reproduced. In doing so, the family is engaged in two separate but related processes of labour reproduction: that which pertains to the maintenance of labour power of the family members and that which concerns the renewal of labour power. The former can be referred to as the reproduction of labour power on a day-to-day basis, and the latter, the reproduction of labour power on a generational basis. The basic argument of this paper is that the capitalist mode of production imposes structural constraints on the way the family reproduces labour, and that many of the changes in the family in recent decades can be interpreted as consequences as the family responds to the exigencies of capitalism and the problem of labour reproduction.

The Problem of Labour Under Capitalism

One of the characteristics of capitalism is the commodification of labour power on a universal basis. As Marx (1967: 170) puts it, "labour power takes in the eyes of the labourer himself the form of a commodity which is his property; his labour consequently becomes wage-labour... it is only from this moment that the produce of labour universally becomes a commodity." The

continuous buying and selling of labour as a commodity presupposes certain conditions. First, labour must be free in the sense that the owner of labour-power must own it as a free person and is willing to offer it for sale in the market. Second, the fact that the employer is paying a wage for the seller of labour-power means that the buyer is only paying for its short term use for as long as labour-power is needed. Third, before labour as a commodity can be sold, it must first of all be produced, and over time, as existing labour-power deteriorates due to aging and death, a new generation of fresh labour must be reproduced.

Marx (1967: 171) explains the problem of labour production and the cost associated with it as follows: "If the owner of labour-power works today, tomorrow he must again be able to repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and strength. His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state as a labouring individual." This subsistence cost constitutes what Pentland (1959: 450) calls the "overhead cost of labour". One of the features of the capitalist market is that employers are not responsible for the overhead cost of labour since they can hire and fire workers to suit the uneven development of capitalism. As Pentland (1959: 450) argues, "the capitalist market represents a pooling of the labour supplies and labour needs of many employers, so that all of them may benefit by economizing on labour reserves." The condition of wage labour in the capitalist market, that is, the buying of labour-power as a commodity on a short-term basis, is optimized for employers through the creation of what Marx (1967: 628-640) calls "the relative surplus population or industrial reserve army", which ensures that there is a continuous abundant supply of labour to satisfy beyond the labour demand of employers. Marx (1967: 628-633) lucidly argues that the capitalist accumulation process continuously produces a surplus population through the increasing use of machinery and the adoption of technological innovations in production. The deployment of technology and machinery is made possible through capital accumulation originated from labour, but over time, it also changes the technological composition of capital. Since with the growth of capital, the rate of accumulation can be hastened by reducing the proportion of labour, or that component which Marx (1967: 629) refers to as the "variable constituent". Hence, although the labour component of capitalist accumulation increases in absolute terms with the growth of the total capital, it does so in diminishing

proportion. Consequently, as Marx (1967: 631) puts it, "the labouring population therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus-population; and it does this to an always increasing extent." The growth of the industrial reserve army is also facilitated by displacing peasants from the agricultural sectors in the early stage of capitalism (Marx, 1967: 673-712), and in later stages, by drawing female labour from the family into the industrial sector, and by recruiting immigrant and migrant workers (Pentland, 1959; Burawoy, 1976). It becomes clear that the process of capitalist accumulation generates its own surplus population, and at the same time, through the mediation of the state, creates the favourable conditions to ensure that an additional supply of labour is structurally regulated to exceed the pooled labour demand of employers. Under these conditions, employers can shift the overhead cost of labour to the market, which is eventually borne by workers' family, and partly subsidized by the welfare state of the advanced capitalist countries. The condition of wage labour also means that workers and their families are structurally compelled to be responsible for the maintenance of labour-power. Those families which fail to maintain the labour-power of its workers will eventually have deteriorated labour-power to offer to the labour market which remains competitive as long as surplus workers are continuously produced by the production process and other social processes. Hence, the contradiction facing the family in the capitalist market is that resources must be continuously expanded into reproducing the labour-power of its members so that it can be offered to the market as a quality commodity to maximize its price; in so doing, the family is locked in a vicious cycle to have to generate more wages in order to divert increasing resources to labour reproduction.

Since labour reproduction includes not only the maintenance of labour power on a day-to-day basis, but also its renewal on a generational basis, the overhead cost of labour must also include the cost of child rearing, or the raising of a new generation of workers. As Marx (1967: 172) explains, "the sum of the means of subsistence necessary for the production of labour-power must include the means necessary for the labourer's substitutes, i.e., his children, in order that this race of peculiar commodity-owners may perpetuate its appearance in the market." Under capitalism, that part of the overhead cost of labour related to labour renewal is also borne by workers'

families. But unlike the pre-capitalist economy in which the cost of labour renewal was met by pooling the labour of family members, the family in the capitalist market meets this cost by pooling the wages that family members bring home, and by relying on the unpaid labour of women performing domestic work. When members of the family are unemployed, the family is often compelled to rely on family savings and state subsidies in various forms of welfare payments. In this way, employers under capitalism can shift the burden and the cost of labour reproduction to the family and the state. It becomes apparent that the cost of labour renewal creates an additional burden on workers' families, as they have to use their wages to support the costs of labour maintenance and labour renewal.³ In advanced capitalist countries like Canada, as more women enter the paid labour force, the contradiction between the competing cost of labour maintenance and labour renewal is also sharpened. As the pressure to increase the family income attracts many women into the paid labour force, the resulting dual incomes of the workers' family also increase its financial capacity to meet the costs of labour maintenance as well those related to child rearing or labour renewal. But this capacity can only be sustained as long as an additional member of the family is in the labour force to earn the extra wages. However, as this financial capacity increases it also puts women in a difficult situation of not being able to withdraw from the labour market after childbirth since doing so would reduce their subsequent financial capacity. The second contradiction for the family under the capitalist market is that as an additional member of the family enters the labour force and increases the family earnings, it puts the family at a higher consumption level for labour maintenance, and also makes it increasingly difficult for the family to be able to incur the additional cost of labour renewal while at the same time, having to sustain the opportunity cost resulting from the withdrawal of an adult member, ususally the wife, from the labour market. Consequently, the imperatives for the family to sustain the cost of labour maintenance and of labour renewal in the capitalist market also create economic disincentives for the family to engage in raising children. As the pressure of declining fertility begins to threaten the ability of many advanced capitalist countries to replace its population through the natural process, the state revises policies of immigration to recruit immgirant workers, and adopts various publicly funded programs, such as child subsidy

and day-care grants, to encourage the family to procreate by paying for some of the costs of labour renewal.

The foregoing analysis provides the framework for understanding the family under capitalism. Changes in the family in Canada in the past fifty years can be seen as strategies adopted by family members as they try to respond to the conditions of labour in the capitalist market.

The Shift from Family Economies to Family Wage Economies

The latter half of the nineteenth century is a watershed in Canada in terms of how the labour force and labour relations were organized. It was a period when the pre-industrial system of family economies gave way to family wage economies (Gaffield, 1990). In the former system, most productive activities took place within the household which was basically a self-sufficient unit in which household members participated collectively in the production and consumption of goods and services.⁴ In the latter system, family members sold their labour for wages outside the home, and pooled together wages instead of labour as a means to maintain the family (Gaffield, 1990). The emergence of family wage economies presupposes the development of a wage labour market and the corresponding development of capitalist production.

Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, the general shortage of labour⁵ created a form of labour organization that was characterized by what Pentland (1981: 24-60) calls "personal labour relationships". In such a system, employers assumed a large part of the overhead cost of labour as a means to safeguard the supply of labour. In addition to offering continuous employment to workers even when work was intermittent, employers maintained paternalistic relationships to workers in providing them with personal favours and rewards. In return, employers expected submissiveness and loyalty from employees that sometimes lasted from generation to generation (Pentland 1981: 34-46). The system of paternalistic, or personal, labour relationships, albeit one that emerged in a wide variety of forms, was evident in the agricultural system of New France, and was prevalent during the fur trade between the mercantile companies and the traders and canoeemen. From the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, personal labour relationships were present in many industries including timber manufacturing and iron processing (Pentland, 1981: 33-60).

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, a capitalistic labour market began to emerge in Canada (Pentland, 1959, 1981). This development was facilitated by a sustained demand for labour through the construction of transportation systems, especially railways⁶, and at the same time, a continued supply of labour through immigration from Europe⁷ (Pentland, 1981). In Western Canada, the shortage of free white labour necessitated the recruitment of Chinese and other Oriental workers as contract labour, especially between 1881 and 1885 when the Canadian Pacific Railway was constructed (Li, 1988). Oriental labour on the west coast enabled various pioneering industries to develop and provided the labour reserve for the development of a wage labour market (Li, 1988).

The transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist economy was characterized not only in the way labour relations were organized in the labour market, but also in the manner by which the family was constituted. The main feature of the pre-capitalist family was the interdependence of household and enterprise; the household-enterprise organization, or the family economy (Gaffield, 1990), was prevalent in the farm family⁸ and was also found in the urban artisan family in nineteenth century Canada (Smith, 1981). Hamilton (1978) has theorized the pre-capitalist family as one in which there was little separation of production from consumption, work from home, housework from work, and public life from private life. It was also characterized by low productivity despite production being highly labour-intensive (Gaffield, 1990). These conditions necessitated the household members to pool the labour to maintain the family, although there was a clear gender division of labour with women carrying the burden of domestic chores as well as participating in production (Kohl, 1982; Fairbanks and Sundberg, 1983; Smith, 1981).

The capitalist labour market in Canada was further expanded as a result of the consolidation of corporate capitalism⁹ between 1900 and 1913 in the United States and Canada (Clement, 1977). The increase in industrial production resulted in a higher demand for labour which was met by immigrant workers as well as surplus labour drawn to urban centres. For example, over three million immigrants came to Canada between 1896 and 1914 (Statistics Canada, 1983: A339-350). Meanwhile, for the first time in four decades, Canada experienced a gain of immigration over emigration, with a net increase of 567,000 immigrants for the period between 1901 and 1911 (Statistics

Canada, 1983: D498-511). The net gain in immigration, although in smaller magnitudes, was to persist for two more decades¹⁰ (Statistics Canada, 1983: D498-511). At the same time, urbanization began to intensify at the turn of the century. For example, in 1901, only about 37 per cent of the Canadian population was located in urban areas, but by 1911, it was increased to 45 per cent; by 1921, it rose to 50 per cent (Statistics Canada, 1983: A67-74). The increasing urban population provided the needed labour for the expansion of capitalist production, and created a concentrated consumer market for manufactured goods. The growth of the non-agricultural sector was evident in the decade between 1901 and 1911. Of the total increase of about 1 million workers in the labour force¹¹ for this period, about 80 per cent of the increase went to the non-agricultural sector; by 1911, those engaged in agricultural pursuits declined to 34 per cent from 40 per cent in 1901 (Statistics Canada, 1983: D1-7).

The Growth of the Capitalist Labour Market and the Supply of Family Wage Labour

The entrenchment of the capitalist labour market by the end of the nineteenth century and the consolidation of corporate capitalism at the beginning of the twentieth century brought about a continuous expansion of the wage labour force that persisted throughout the century. According to Canadian censuses, in 1911 the Canadian labour force had 2.7 million individuals; by 1941, it increased 1.5 times to 4.2 million individuals.¹² In the next 45 years, it multiplied threefold from slightly over 4.2 million (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1941: 670-673) to 12.8 million people (Census of Canada, 1986: 1.1-1.12). Much of the increase in the labour force was a result of the expansion of the wage labour market. For example, in 1911, there were 1.3 million wage or paid workers in Canada, which made up half of the labour force; by 1931, the number of paid workers had almost doubled to 2.5 million, or 63 per cent of the labour force; and by 1961, paid workers had doubled again to 5.4 million, or 83 per cent of the labour force (Table 1). The wage labour market continued to grow in the 1960s and 70s so that by 1981, paid workers were over 10 million in number and constituted 94 per cent of the Canadian labour market.

Table 1 about here

The growth in the labour market could not have come about unless there was additional labour available. Between 1941 and 1986, the Canadian population increased from 11.5 million to 25 million people (Statistics Canada, 1983, 1986), which undoubtedly made available a larger pool of labour for the labour force. Notwithstanding a change in the dependent population, especially the growth of the elderly¹³, the population growth would at best roughly account for two-thirds of the labour force in 1986, since the labour force had tripled between 1941 and 1986. However, the remaining increase was due to a larger percentage of women participating in the labour force since the beginning of this century and especially since 1941.

The labour force participation rate of women was less than 20 per cent in 1921 and 1931; it climbed slowly to 23 per cent by 1941 (Figure 1). From then on, the female labour force participation rate rose dramatically, especially in the 1960s and 70s. In contrast, the male labour force participation rate peaked in 1941 and began a gentle decline from 85 per cent in 1941 to 77 per cent in 1986. However, for women, by 1971 the participation rate was 40 per cent; by 1986, it was 55.9 per cent. If the same female participation rate in 1941 were to persist in 1986, there would have been roughly 3.2 million fewer women in the 1986 labour force, which accounted for 37.6 per cent of the total increase in the labour force from 1941 to 1986. In sum, the growth of the Canadian labour force in the 45 years between 1941 and 1986 would have been substantially slower had it not been for the recruitment of female labour from the family to the labour market.

Figure 1 about here

Among women, the labour force participation rate increased more rapidly among certain age groups. Figure 1 shows that prior to the 1940s, the labour force participation rate for women hovered around 20 per cent. In the late 1940s, the participation rate for women began to climb dramatically. However, much of this increase had to do with the sharp rise in labour force participation for women between 25 and 44 years of age since the 1940s, and also the sudden upsurge in labour force participation for women between 20 and 24 years of age since the late 1960s. It would appear that since the end of the Second World War, there has been an intensification in recruiting women in the prime reproductive ages into the labour force.

When the marital status of women is taken into account, Ram (1990: 36) shows that married women living with their husbands, especially those with some children under 6 years of age, tend to have experienced a sharp increase in labour force participation. Ram's data, based on unpublished statistics from Labour and Household Surveys conducted by Statistics Canada, indicate that the labour force participation rate of married women living with their husbands jumped from 36 per cent in 1971 to 52 per cent in 1981 and to 58 per cent in 1986, while that of those with children under 6 years of age increased even more from 27 per cent in 1971 to 47 per cent in 1981 and to 58 per cent in 1986 (Ram, 1990: 36). These data suggest that being married does not reduce the likelihood of women in the labour force; in fact, married women with children, irrespective of the children's ages, tend to have a higher participation rate than women of all ages combined.

There is further evidence to indicate that when women did enter the labour force in record rate, they did so mainly as wage workers. The last column of Table 1 provides the number of female paid workers expressed as a percentage of the total female labour force between 1911 and 1981. The data show that since 1921, 80 per cent and over of the female labour force has been paid workers. For men, paid workers made up between 54 to 63 per cent of the male labour force for 1921 to 1941; it was not until 1961 and after that the percentage of paid workers was over 80 per cent. Figure 2 plots the percentage of paid workers for men and women between 1945 and 1988 using annual labour force data. The graphs clearly show that over 80 per cent of women in the labour force have been paid workers since 1945, whereas for men, the percentage of paid workers climbed steadily from about 65 per cent in 1945 to over 80 per cent by the mid-1970s. Figure 2 would support the claim that women had been more proletarianized than men (Cuneo, 1985) in the sense that women were more likely than men to be wage-earners in the labour market. The same figure also shows that the capitalist labour market had grown to full maturity in the past 45 years so that by 1988 over 90 per cent of men and women in the labour force were paid workers.

 Figure 2 about here

The rate with which previously unpaid female labour in the family has been converted into wage labour has intensified the labour supply for

capitalist expansion. Figure 3 shows that women made up over 40 per cent of the labour force in 1986, when back in 1941, they only constituted about 20 per cent of the work force. Certain sectors, in particular, had benefited from the massive recruitment of female workers. Indeed, the "administrative revolution" which Lowe (1980) refers to could not have come about had it not been for the feminization of clerical work, which provided a labour solution to the changing structure and labour process in major Canadian offices.

Figure 3 about here

Several factors have contributed to the expansion of the wage labour market since 1941, among which is the net growth in population. However, the net population increase alone is insufficient to explain the growth of the capitalist labour market. Two other factors have to be taken into account: the first one has to do with a growing segment of the labour force becoming paid workers; the second one is that an increasing percentage of working age women has been entering the work force as wage workers.

Response Strategies of the Family to the Wage Economy

The expansion of the wage labour market to the extent that paid workers made up over 80 per cent of the Canadian labour force since the mid-1960s and over 90 per cent since the mid-1970s has meant that few families can escape its effects. Wage labour has transformed the fundamental way in which the Canadian family organizes its productive activities. For most Canadian families, the principal method by which the family reproduces the labour of its family members is to rely on earning wages in the labour market, with which the family buys consumer goods and services needed for the family. The family typically no longer engages in the production of goods it consumes, nor does production takes place within the family as in the pre-capitalist family economy. Instead, the family under capitalism produces wage labour which is used in a production process outside of the family. Thus, the family in the wage labour market has become the producer of wage labour and the consumer of commodified goods and services. In this way, the family under advanced capitalism provides the maximum utility to the capitalist economy: on the one hand it reproduces wage labour needed for capitalist production, and on the other, it sustains the demand of consumer goods produced in capitalist production. In this sense, the capitalist production sets the

structural parameters within which family relationships are transformed, and within which family members devise their strategies with respect to the problem of labour maintenance and labour renewal.

The reliance on the wage economy has also meant that the ability of the family to purchase goods and services is largely dependent upon its capacity to earn. The propensity to maximize family earnings is guided by two considerations: the pressure to maintain the family and to improve upon the standard of living, and the desire to accumulate for future consumption, especially when family income-earners may not continuously stay in the labour market due to prospective unemployment, post-natal care, illness or eventual retirement. For low-income families, the expediency in maintaining the family on a day-to-day basis on limited income would outweigh the desire and reduce the ability to accumulate for the future.

In the past 45 years, Canadian families, like those in other advanced capitalist countries, have responded to the pressure of the wage economy in two major ways. The first is to maximize the family's earnings by increasing the number of wage earners, and the second is to economize on the actual and opportunity cost of childrearing by having a smaller family.

According to the 1986 Census of Canada, there were 6.7 million census families which were made up of two types: husband-wife families with or without never married children living under in the same dwelling, and lone-parent families with one or more never married children living in the same dwelling (Ram, 1990: 42-43). Among the census families, 5.9 million or 87 per cent were husband-wife families or conjugal families, which also included common-law types of living arrangement. In 1986, 55 per cent of conjugal families had both husband and wife in the labour force; families with one employment income recipient made up about one-quarter of all husband-wife families (Table 2). The data in Table 2¹⁴ show that since 1961, husband-wife families with only one employment income recipient declined drastically from 70 per cent in 1961 to 35 per cent in 1971, and further to 28 per cent in 1981. At the same time, the most rapid increase in husband-wife families in which both husband and wife were employment income recipients occurred between 1961 and 1971 when this type of family rose from 20 per cent in 1961 to 54 per cent in 1971, and remained over 50 per cent in 1981 and 1986. These trends reflect the financial pressures facing Canadian families since the 1960s and

the need for many husband-wife families to have to rely on both husband and wife as wage-earners in the labour market.

Table 2 about here

The consolidation of the corporate economy and the subsequent conversion of previously unpaid domestic labour into wage labour on a massive scale have created new contradictions for the family. Prior to the emergence of the wage economy, the problem of labour maintenance and that of labour renewal were inseparable in the family, since the integration of the family and the enterprise necessitated the reproduction of labour on both levels. In other words, in the family enterprise, it was just as important to feed and shelter the household members as it was to raise enough children to generate the needed labour for the future. The advent of corporate capitalism separated production from the family, and along with it, the question of labour maintenance from that of labour renewal. Under corporate capitalism, the family becomes increasingly engaged in wage labour as a means to maintain the family and the labour power of its family members. However, the capacity to maintain labour power for the purpose of selling it in the labour market and the very continuation of wage relationships for individual family members do not depend on the ability of the family to reproduce for the next generation. On the contrary, the demands arising from generational labour reproduction compete with the priorities of day-to-day labour maintenance as family members have to allocate their financial and other resources, largely contingent upon wages, to both ends. Under these circumstances, the commitment towards generational labour renewal becomes contradictory to the need of day-to-day labour maintenance. Hence, as a larger and larger segment of the adult population, especially of the female population, becomes wage-earners, family members adopt the logical response by delaying or minimizing the efforts and the costs associated with childbearing and childrearing.

Figure 4 shows the dramatic shift in the total fertility rate¹⁵ and in the size of household and the family. The total fertility rate fell from 3.5 in 1921 to 2.8 in 1941, and rose again as the post-war prosperity brought about a period of baby-boom. It has been suggested that although economic fluctuations are not primary determinants, they exert conditioning influences on fertility (Kirk,

1960; Romaniuc, 1984). Thus, the post-war baby boom that ended in the late 1950s can be attributed to the economic prosperity in the post-war years, which enabled many North America families to use a single wage, usually the husband's, to support the family. For the same reasons, Oppenheimer (1980) has argued that the economic slowdown and rising inflation of the 1960s deterred the cohort of labour force entrants in the U.S. from getting married early, and when they did, resorted to having a smaller family. These explanations would account for the interruption in the otherwise steady decline in fertility and household size since the turn of the century. However, they are unable to explain why the overall trend of fertility and family size has been declining since the expansion of the wage labour market that began around the turn of the century. Since 1961, the total fertility rate began a steep decline from 3.8 in 1961 to 1.8 in 1976. From then on, the decline slowed down and remained around 1.7 in 1981. Data on the average size of the household and the family also correspond to the fertility pattern. Since 1921, the number of persons per household had shown a steady decline from 4.6 in 1921 to 4.0 in 1951. For about a decade from 1951 to 1961, the size of the household stabilized around 4 and 3.9 before it declined sharply to 3.5 in 1971 and to 2.9 in 1981. The statistics on the average size of the family also reflect the changing fertility rate. The size of the Canadian family dropped from 4.3 in 1931 to 3.7 in 1951, and bounced back to 3.9 in the late 1950s as the total fertility rate peaked before falling rapidly to 3.5 in 1976, and further to 3.1 in 1986. Undoubtedly, although fertility pattern is a major factor which determines the average household size and family size, other changes related to cohabitation practices, marriage and divorce rates, and life expectancy also play a part.

 Figure 4 about here

In the process of adjusting to the wage economy, lone-parent families encounter additional difficulties relative to husband-wife families. By 1986, lone-parent families had risen to 854,000 or 13 per cent of all census families from 347,000 or 8.4 per cent in 1961. In the absence of the spouse, there is considerable pressure for the head of lone-parent families to stay in the labour market. Since lone-parent families are predominantly headed by women¹⁶ (Ram, 1990: 52), they face an exceptionally difficult situation in

having to reproduce the wage labour needed to earn an income, and at the same time not being free from the burden of childrearing. The structural difficulty in resolving this contradiction probably accounts for the fact that the poverty rate was exceptionally high among female-head lone-parent families. In 1987, for example, the poverty rate was 57 per cent among single-parent mothers of all ages who had children under 18 years of age, and 81 per cent for single-parent mothers between ages 16 and 24 with children under 18 years of age (National Council of Welfare, 1990: 58).

There are also other response mechanisms of Canadian families which can be interpreted as attempts to resolve the basic contradictions brought about by the wage economy. For example, since the 1960s, the average age of first marriage for Canadians has been on the rise (Ram, 1990: 18-19). Likewise, since the end of the baby-boom period, there was a decline in the first-order fertility for women between 15 and 24 years of age, but a rise in the first-order fertility for women in older age cohorts. At the same time, the percentage of childless ever-married women between ages 15 and 29 rose from 20 per cent in 1961 to 41 per cent in 1981 (Ram 1990: 26-28). These trends indicate that Canadians have been marrying at a later age, and when they do, they tend to have few children and to delay having the first one.

Concluding Comments

This paper has provided a fresh interpretation to the changing Canadian family patterns in the post-war decades. The central theme of the paper is that changing labour relationships in the family is predicated by changes from early capitalism to advanced capitalism. One of the significant changes in the proliferation of corporate capitalism since the turn of the century has been the expansion of the wage labour market on a full scale. As a result of this expansion and the corresponding demand for wage labour, a large segment of labour hitherto vested in the family has been converted to wage labour. As Canadian families responded to the wage economy by increasing their supply of wage labour to the wage labour market, they are faced by the contradiction in the labour process of having to reproduce labour on a day-to-day basis and labour on a generational basis. It has been argued that since under the conditions of the wage economy the daily maintenance of wage labour and the continuation of wage relationships for individual family members are structurally not dependent on reproducing labour power for the next generation, the process of labour maintenance becomes contradictory

to that of labour renewal since both compete on the same financial resources mainly supplied by family earnings. Consequently, the changes in the Canadian family with respect to increased women's participation in the labour force, and to decline in fertility rate and family size can be seen as adaptive mechanisms given the contradictions created by the wage economy.

It is difficult to predict how Canadian families might react to future changes of corporate capitalism. But given that the dependency on wage labour is integral to capitalist accumulation, and given that the fertility rate remains below the natural replacement level, one likely source from which more wage labour can be secured is to intensify further the conversion of domestic labour into wage labour. Since the labour force participation rate for women is around 56 per cent and that for men is 78 per cent (Figure 1), it would seem logical that both corporate employers and the state would want to improve upon the financial incentives for women to enter into the labour force. These incentives would include a greater pay parity between men and women, and an improvement of job advancement for women. These forces are likely to intensify the growth of the wage labour market especially for women, and along with it, the even greater dependency of the Canadian family on the wage economy. If this is the case, it is highly unlikely that the trend of declining fertility will be reversed.¹⁷ At the same time, the threat of a shrinking work force due to declining fertility would eventually threaten capitalist accumulation. Whether the state and corporate employers will resort to social programs to absorb the cost of generational labour reproduction, in the form of subsidized daycare, tax incentives, or extended paid maternity leave, will depend in part on whether alternative labour sources can be secured elsewhere, such as through massive immigration or exportation of production units outside the country to where labour supply can be assured.

Endnotes

- ¹ A capitalist economy has the following general characteristics: (1) production consists of commodity production, that is, destined for sale; (2) the means of production are generally privately owned; (3) production is for an unlimited market regulated by competition; and (4) the aim of capitalist production is to maximize profit and capital accumulation. Advanced or monopoly capitalism, also sometimes referred to as corporate capitalism (Clement, 1977), is characterized by: (1) the decline in free capitalist competition and a rise in concentration and centralization of ownership; and (2) the export of surplus capital to underdeveloped countries through monopolistic firms (Mandel, 1979: 44-46, 59-66).
- ² A useful summary of the major conceptual frameworks of the family can be found in Broderick (1970), in which he lists five major ones under the labels of "institutional", "structural-functional", "symbolic-interactional", "situational", and "family developmental", and also other theoretical options (Broderick, 1970).
- ³ The institutional arrangement of migrant labour can be seen as one way to economize the cost of labour maintenance and renewal for employers in advanced capitalist countries. The system of migrant labour institutionally differentiates and physical separates the processes of renewal and maintenance so that the low wages of migrant workers are used to support both the migrant workers in the country where they work and their family forced to leave behind at the country of origin (Buroway, 1976). This arrangement is cost saving for employers because substantial costs of labour renewal is being externalized to an alternative economy; migrants workers are able to provide for themselves and their family despite low wages because of lower cost of living in the home country. Over time, a reserved pool of migrant labour is being reproduced in the migrants' country of origin with a lower level of wages that otherwise would be insufficient for native-born workers to do the same. An example of such a form of labour organization is the use of Chinese labour in western Canada during the latter half of the nineteenth century, whereby the Chinese workers were paid about half the wages of white workers, with which they also supported their families in China (Li, 1988).
- ⁴ See Laslett (1965, 1972) for a comparative analysis of household economies in England prior to industrialization.

- 5 One indication of chronic shortage of skilled labour is that in New France, wages were generally double that of France (Pentland, 1981: 27).
- 6 There were 30,000 miles of railroad tracks in Canada in 1860; between 1860 and 1900, 163,000 miles of track were added. The construction activities created the demand for metal products and locomotives, and helped the rapid development of the modern factory system in Canada (Clement, 1977: 45).
- 7 Between 1867 and 1895, about 1.5 million immigrants came to Canada, mostly from Europe (Statistics Canada, 1983: D498-511). However, Canada also suffered a net loss of immigration due to out-migration, mainly to the U.S., in the second half of the nineteenth century (Timlin, 1960). For example, the net loss for the two decades between 1871 to 1891 was only 100,000, as compared to a net loss of 114,000 for the ten-year period between 1861 and 1871, and 162,000 for the period 1891 to 1901 (Statistics Canada, 1983: D498-511). It would appear that the main contribution of immigration to Canada in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in terms of building the industrial labour reserve, was to replenish a large part of the outflow of labour. It is also true that waves of immigrants were being recruited in times of shortage specifically for large construction projects, as for example the building of the canal system in Eastern Canada (Pentland, 1981).
- 8 The predominance of the rural population in nineteenth century Canada tends to support the claim that the vast majority of the population lived on farms (Gaffield, 1990: 26). For example, the rural population in Canada was 80 per cent in 1871, 74 per cent in 1881, and 68 per cent in 1891 (Statistics Canada, 1983: A67-74).
- 9 Aside from economic concentration and other changes, the shift to corporate capitalism involves a change in the form of property relations from individual ownership to corporate ownership of the means of production (Smith, 1981).
- 10 The net gain of immigration over emigration was 63,000 for 1911 to 1921, and 42,000 for 1921 to 1931 (Statistics Canada, 1983: D498-511).
- 11 The estimation of the labour force for 1901 and 1911 is based on data for gainfully occupied persons 10 years of age and over; the gainfully occupied data exclude Indians engaged in fishing and trapping.
- 12 See sources at the bottom of Table 1.

- ¹³ The Canadian population 65 and over increased from roughly 6 per cent in 1941 to 11 per cent in 1986 (Health and Welfare Canada, 1989: 20).
- ¹⁴ The column percentages in Table do not add up to 100 because the two categories are not totally exhaustive; husband-wives families with no employment income recipients and those with two or more employment income recipients other than husband and wife are not included in the table.
- ¹⁵ The total fertility rate in a given year is the number of children a woman would have if she were to go through her entire reproductive years in accordance with the reproductive pattern set by all women of that year.
- ¹⁶ Female-headed lone-parent family accounted for 80 per cent or over of all lone-parent families since 1976. Based on calculations from statistics provided by Ram (1990: 52), in 1976, there were 82.7 female-headed lone-parent families; in 1981, 82.3 per cent; in 1986, 81.9 per cent.
- ¹⁷ For a summary of the various theoretical positions on projecting fertility, see Romaniuc (1984). One perspective which suggests a future rise in fertility is advanced by Easterlin (1978) who argues that the relative supply of a new cohort of labour force entrants, as measured by the scarcity and abundance of young male adults, determines the economic position of the cohort, which in turn, is correlated with the total fertility rate. Hence, Easterlin predicts that as the supply of future cohorts of young workers shrink, their economic position would improve and thus would stimulate marriages and births. Easterlin's argument is based largely on a equilibrium model of supply and demand of labour, and also on a consumer choice model of fertility. To date, there is an absence of evidence to substantial Easterlin's predictions.

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


Figure 1: Labour force Participation Rate of Women and Men, Canada 1921-1986

Sources: Data for 1921-1941 are from Series D107-122, Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition, 1983, Statistics Canada. Data for other years are based on Appendix Table 4.1 in Bali Ram, New Trends in the Family, Catalogue 91-535E, Ottawa; Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

Notes: Data from 1921-1941 exclude Newfoundland. For "Total Adult Male" and "Total Adult Female", data are based on those 10 years of age and over for 1921 and 1931; and 15 and over for 1941 and after. Comparable data for females, 35-44 are not available for 1921-1941.





Figure 2: Paid Workers as % of Labour Force, Canada, 1945-1988

- Sources: 1945-52 The Labour Force, November 1945-July 1958. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1958, Reference Paper No. 58, Table 6. The figures are based on data for the last month of the year, unadjusted seasonally.
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Notes: *Number of female wage workers as per cent of total number of women in the active labour force.

**Number of male wage workers as per cent of total number of men in the active labour force.



**Figure 3: Per cent Women in Selected Occupational Groups
Canada, 1941-1986**

Notes: ^The occupational groupings are based on the 1961 Census occupational classification for 1941 and 1951, and on the 1971 Census occupational classification for 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1986. 1941 figures are based on gainfully occupied, while the remaining years are based on the labour force.

*For 1961-1986, the professional and technical category includes occupations in natural sciences, engineering and mathematics, social sciences and related, religion, teaching and related, medicine and health, and artistic, literary, recreational and related. For 1941 and 1951, recreational occupations were classified with the service occupations.

**1961-1986-transport equipment operating occupations.

***The primary occupation category for 1961-1986, includes farming, horticultural, animal husbandry, fishing, hunting, trapping and related, forestry and logging, and mining and quarrying occupations. For 1941 and 1951-farmers, farm workers, loggers and related, fishermen, trappers, hunters, miners, quarrymen and related.

****Includes for 1961-1986, processing occupations, machining and related, product fabricating, assembly and repair, construction trades, materials handling and related and other crafts and equipment operating occupations.

Sources: 1971 Census of Canada, Statistics Canada, 94-716 Vol III Part 2, pp. 1-1-1-8;
1986 Census of Canada, Statistics Canada, 993-15, pp. 1-1-1-18.




Figure 4: Total Fertility Rate, Persons per Household and Persons per Family, Canada, 1921-1986

Source: Data are based on Appendix Tables 3.1 and 5.1, in Bali Ram New Trends in the Family, Catalogue 91-535E, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada. The original data of the table come from Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics, Catalogue 84-204, various years. Data for "Total Fertility Rate" are based on annual vital statistics; data for "Persons per Household" are based on quinquennial and decennial census statistics.

TABLE 1

Paid Workers by Gender, Canada, 1911-1981

Year	TOTAL		MALE		FEMALE	
	Number	As % of Labour Force	Number	As % of Male Labour Force	Number	As % of Female Labour Force
1911	1367557	50.21	1124383	47.67	243174	66.66
1921	1853406	58.41	1459127	54.38	394279	80.44
1931	2476444	63.06	1947957	59.73	528457	79.36
1941	2816798	67.13	2117357	62.96	699441	83.98
1951	4085151	78.87	3011322	74.68	1073829	93.60
1961	5366977	82.92	3781520	80.36	1585457	89.76
1971	7674525	87.08	5005385	86.90	2669140	87.42
1981	10389370	94.13	6101415	94.74	4287655	93.13

Sources: 1931 Census of Canada, Volume I, Table 82, p. 1285 and Volume V, Tables 8, 9, 10, pp. 16-19; 1951 Census of Canada, Volume IV, Table 2, p. 2.1-2.2 and Volume V, Table 14, p. 14-1; 1971 Census of Canada, Volume III, Part I, Bulletin 3.1-3, Catalogue 94-703, Table 9 and Bulletin 3.1-13, Catalogue 94-713, Table 39; and 1981 Census of Canada, Volume I, Catalogue 92-929, Employment Income: Distributions.

Notes: The labour force includes those 10 years of age and over for 1911-1931; 14 years of age and over for 1941-1951; 15 years of age and over for 1961 and after.

Table 2

Employment Income Recipients in Husband-Wife Families, Canada, 1961-1986

	1961		1971		1981		1986	
	Number of Families	%	Number of Families	%	Number of Families	%	Number of Families	%
Husband-Wife Families with One Employment Income Recipient	2,646,007	69.63	1,651,190	35.85	1,596,405	28.45	1,467,335	24.95
Husband-Wife Families with Both Husband and Wife being Employment Income Recipients	741,486	19.51	2,488,665	54.04	2,946,530	52.51	3,238,135	55.07

Sources: 1961 Census of Canada, Catalogue 93-520, Volume II Part 1, pp. 89-1 to 89-2; 1971 Census of Canada, Catalogue 93-725, Volume II, Part 2, pp. 111-1 to 111-8; 1981 Census of Canada, Catalogue 92-936, Volume I, pp. 94-1 to 94-10; and 1986 Census of Canada, Catalogue 93-117, pp. 7-1 to 7-28.

KINSHIP IN CANADA: AN OVERVIEW
WITH PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE 1990 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY

Thomas K. Burch¹

Introduction

This report consists of three sections: 1] an introduction to the demography of kinship; 2] a review of recent literature on kinship patterns in Canada; 3] a portfolio of graphs with commentary, based on data from the 1990 Canadian General Social Survey.

The large-scale empirical investigation of Canadian kinship may be said to have begun with the 1985 and 1990 General Social Surveys. Together they constitute a rich vein of detailed empirical information, only a little of which has yet been mined.

This report has focused on the 1990 GSS because it is more recent and contains more interesting data on kinship. But more remains to be learned from the 1985 survey, which contains items not included in 1990.

By the same token, answers to some important questions on kinship cannot be found in either survey. For example, neither contains information on close non-nuclear relatives such as first cousins, aunts/uncles, and nieces/nephews, kin which may well figure importantly in the interaction and support networks of Canadians. Similarly, data on various kin fail to distinguish kin from a first marriage [for example, natural siblings] and kin acquired as a result of divorce and remarriage [for example, step-siblings]. Divorce and remarriage increase kin numbers over and above those one would have in their absence. But little is known about the quality of these relationships, and their potential for providing social and psychological support.

The substantive focus of this report is on the existence or number of kin and on patterns of face-to-face interaction, especially as these are affected by distance. In a sense, this material deals with the raw material of kin-based support systems, by telling us how many close kin [at least nuclear kin] Canadian have at various ages, how close by or far away they are on average, and how often respondent sees them. If a respondent has no or few close kin, or if those kin are living at a considerable distance from respondent or if he/she almost never sees them, then the likelihood of their constituting a support groups is small. As will be seen later, these conditions hold for a substantial minority of Canadian adults.

¹. Assistance from Sulaiman Bah and Janette McDougall is gratefully acknowledged.

Analyses of actual help patterns among kin and of their determinants have not been undertaken for this report. These remain important topics for future investigation, as do the roles of friendship and of formal social services as possible substitutes for close kin relations. These non-kin sources of support of all kinds seem likely to assume increasing importance in the future, as continuing below-replacement fertility rates reduce the number of kin of the typical Canadian.

Notes on the Demography of Kinship

An individual's kin refers broadly to the set of persons to whom he or she is related by 'blood' or marriage. Rough equivalents in English are relations or relatives. The somewhat archaic term blood relationship can be thought of more precisely in terms of biological descent. A 'blood' relative is someone from whom I am directly descended [e.g., my mother's father's father] or who is directly descended from me [e.g., my daughter's son's daughter], or someone with whom I share a common ancestor [e.g., my first cousin who shares with me at least one grandparent].

Relatives by marriage include in-laws, or in the case of remarriage following widowhood or divorce, a large variety of possible relatives -- half-siblings and step-children or step-parents to mention only the most common.

No society or no individual is aware of or recognizes the complete set of kin -- the numbers are too large and the links too obscure. If one accepts the common view that the human race originated with a few individuals in one or at most a few different places [for example, the Adam and Eve myth], then all human beings are kin, and each of us has over five billion relatives. In fact some population geneticists have estimated that two people picked at random from anywhere in the world are at least fiftieth cousins [Shoumatoff, 1985]. The reasoning is straightforward and instructive. In order for A and B not to be first cousins, they must have totally distinct grandparents, four persons in all; in order not to be second cousins, they must have totally distinct great-grandparents, eight persons in all, and so on. In order for A and B to have distinct great-great-...great-grandparents fifty-one generations ago [about 1500 to 1800 years] we would require a human population many times greater than the current 5.4 billion.

Practically speaking, all human societies limit the reckoning of kin to a much smaller number, either tracing descent only through one line [in the past, usually the paternal line -- father, father's father, father's father's father, etc.], or simply focusing on 'close relatives' -- parents/grandparents, siblings, children/grandchildren, aunts/uncles, nieces/nephews, and first or second cousins -- regardless of line of descent. The latter

approach is typical in Canada, although presumably there is great variation across families and individuals. In a family that has been in one locale for several generations, with good family and church or government records and perhaps an amateur genealogist, the average member may be able to trace his or her relationship to third and even fourth cousins, and be aware of the line to common great-great-grandparents. In other cases, one's ties to second cousins or great-aunts may be only vaguely known if at all.

Knowledge of kin, of course, does not imply that the relationship is important either practically or emotionally. Contact and communication may be minimal [the proverbial long-lost uncle in Australia]. Kin may be estranged; parents sometimes 'disown' children, and vice-versa; persons 'disappear' to start a new life, or sink into vagabondage or homelessness; siblings may barely be on speaking terms. Within some legally defined limits [e.g., parental responsibilities for children, laws of inheritance], to some extent we choose our kin and define our own kinship network.

If some kin are not known and other, known kin are largely ignored, it also is true that persons who are not close kin are treated as though they are. In anthropology, the technical term for this practice [at least when it is institutionalized] is fictive kinship. Formal adoption of a child is perhaps the most common example. In some traditional Catholic societies, the relationship between a 'godparent' and 'godchild' acquired social and economic significance, rather than just being a religious formality [compadrazgo].

More informally, people often define and treat one type of relative as another [e.g., very young cousins are treated as nieces or nephews, very old cousins as aunts or uncles; see Pullum, 1987]. Or people to whom one has no close relationship at all are informally treated as such ['I think of him as a brother'; 'He was a father to me.'], as kith are turned into kin.

The social construction of kinship sometimes also blurs the distinction between life and death, with departed kin occupying as important a place as the living. Oriental ancestor worship is an example, as is the cult of the dead in some traditional 'Catholic' societies.

In sum, descent and affinity [relationship through marriage] provide the sexual and reproductive raw materials for human kinship systems and behaviour. But that raw material is defined and shaped through processes of both social and individual definition. The old adage had it that 'Blood is thicker than water,' meaning that blood ties are stronger than marriage ties. In the modern world, it may be that individual preference is as thick as either.

In the last twenty years, demography has made substantial

progress in quantifying the raw material of human kinship systems. That is, models have been developed to show the relationship between various demographic regimes [of fertility, mortality, marriage, divorce and remarriage] and the number of kin of various types an individual may have at various stages of her or his life. Some of the earliest work in this field was by Lotka [1931], but the modern developments were due to Coale [1965], Burch [1970], LeBras [1973] and, more comprehensively, by Goodman, Keyfitz and Pullum [1974].²

In a classic 1931 article, Lotka set forth a simple formula for calculating the proportion of persons who would be orphaned by a given age a ³:

$$\Theta = 1 - l_{a+v} / l_v \quad [\text{Eq. 1}]$$

where a refers to age, v refers to the mean age of childbearing [for men or women, depending on whether the calculation is of so-called maternal or paternal orphans], and l_x is the ordinary life-table function. For an individual, the probability that his or her mother will survive to his or her age a is simply the probability that the mother will survive a years from her age at the time of birth, that is, from age v to age $a + v$. 1 minus that survival probability is the probability of orphanhood.⁴ If the assumption is made that paternal and maternal mortality are independent, then the proportion of 'complete' orphans [that is the loss of both mother and father] can be estimated as the product of the proportions of maternal and paternal orphans by the ordinary rules of probability for independent events.

The substantive importance of Lotka's formulation is that it demonstrates the dependence of orphanhood on the level of mortality and the average age of childbearing, but not on the level of fertility, the number of children per woman. This is true only on average but not necessarily for every individual. Clearly last-born children are more apt to be orphaned by a certain age than their first-born sibling. Like many deterministic, analytic models in demography, his orphanhood model gives only averages, not variances.

². The best overview of this field is contained in Keyfitz's 'The Demographic Theory of Kinship,' Ch. 10 in the second edition of his Applied Mathematical Demography, 1977.

³. The Greek letter theta presumably stands for the Greek word for death, thanatos.

⁴. Eq. 1 is presented as an approximation. A more accurate formula involves integration across all ages of childbearing of the mother generation.

His model also alerts us to the fact that in contemporary society, with male childbearing later than female and with excess male mortality, the proportion of surviving fathers is apt to be much lower than the proportion of surviving mothers.⁵ It also alerts us to the fact the recent trends toward later childbearing will tend to increase the proportions orphaned by a given age, unless they are offset by future decreases in mortality.

Lotka made some other kin-number calculations [for example, the average number of living children of women of a specified age; see Lotka, 1931, pp. 61ff.] but the systematic development of formulas to estimate numbers of kin of most major types is due to Goodman, Keyfitz and Pullum [1974]. Formulas are presented for total kin and living kin at a given age of ego for: daughters; granddaughters; great-granddaughters; mothers; grandmothers; great- and great-great grandmothers; sisters; nieces; maternal aunts; first cousins. The calculations all relate to a one-sex, stable population model, and thus are not reflective of the situation that would be found cross-sectionally, for example, in a sample survey.

Keyfitz [1986] has used this approach to estimate kin numbers for Canada based on mortality and fertility as of 1971 and 1981.

While these calculations do not directly describe current reality, they have helped clarify many of the key interrelations between demographic factors and kin numbers. Most importantly, they have verified and quantified a key proposition in kinship demography [obvious after the fact, but not fully appreciated]: with the exception of direct ancestors [parents, grandparents, etc.] the average number of kin at a given age is strongly dependent on the prevailing levels of fertility in the recent past [that is, within the lifetimes of persons currently living].

A somewhat more flexible approach to estimating and projecting kin numbers, based on microsimulation, has been pioneered by Hammel and Wachter [1979; see also Reeves, 1987]. This approach has not yet been applied to Canada.

Canadian Kinship: A Review of Literature

Kinship structure in Canada has been subject to many changes in recent years, due to such demographic trends as low fertility, population aging, rising divorce, remarriage and cohabitation, and

⁵. The term orphan can be used in a technical or legal sense to refer to a person of any age. But we don't tend to think of a fifty year old whose mother has died as an orphan. In contemporary analyses, for example of aging, the focus is on survival rather than death of the parent.

continuing geographic mobility. In comparison with the United States, however, little empirical research on contemporary kinship structures has been carried out on Canada. Until recently, most research has relied on data from small samples on select populations.

The 1985 General Social Survey marks a turning point in this respect. Analyses of these data have dealt with kin availability, interaction with kin and help to and from kin. Many of these analyses have focused on the elderly, since they are perceived as a sub-group greatly in need of support.

The 1990 General Social Survey added a distance variable to many of the series of questions about specific kin, allowing for the notion of availability of kin to be refined to take account of geographical proximity.

A central theme of previous research is that of declining kin numbers as a consequence of low fertility. Gee [1990],, using census and vital statistics data, examined demographic indicators for four birth cohorts -- circa 1860, 1910, 1930, 1960. She shows that the overall estimated number of siblings declined by more than one-half from 1860 to 1960, with somewhat smaller declines in young adulthood [around age 20] and middle age [around age 50]. Her calculations also show an average number of children surviving to age 20 of 3.3 for the 1930 cohort, compared to only 1.6 for the 1960 cohort.

As noted above, Keyfitz [1985] has used Goodman/Keyfitz/Pullum stable population equations to estimate kin numbers for Canada based on 1971 and 1981 fertility and mortality rates. Declining fertility over the period is seen to have marked effects on all kin numbers except for those pertaining to ascendants in a direct line [parents, grandparents, etc.].

Not all demographic trends have had negative impact on kinship. Matras [1989], using the Statistics Canada series of historical life tables, shows that the prospect for joint survival of spouses has improved markedly between 1921 and 1981. For a couple marrying at age 25 [both spouses], the probability of joint survival to 55 is calculated as 0.66 in 1921 versus 0.83 in 1981, and 26 percent increase in joint survival chances.

More recently, however, these improved chances of joint survival have been offset to some extent by the rise in divorce, a phenomenon which affects the two sexes differently. Men are much more apt to replace a terminated marriage by marrying again [see Burch, 1990].

Stone [1988] has used GSS 1985 data to identify the most common patterns of family and close-friend ties. For all Canadians over 15 years of age, the most common pattern consists of a couple

with a child for close friend [more often a child], all sharing the same household. The household has a larger network consisting of at least one parent, at least one sibling, at least one other relative seen recently, and at least one close friend. In this most common pattern, there is no child living outside the home. The second most common pattern adds this key kinship tie.

Stone also examined the percentage of the population with fewer than two of five possible active family ties [a tie is termed 'active' when the respondent has seen a person at least monthly or contacted that person by phone or letter at least weekly]. Respondents 80 and over reported the largest percentage with two or fewer active ties -- 32 percent, or nearly one-third. Those 15-24 reported the lowest percentage -- 5 percent.

Looking at help patterns involving persons 55 and over, Stone finds that respondents with higher educational levels consistently give and receive more help than others, a relationship he speculates may be a reflection of income differences associated with education. He also finds that the elderly [as defined above] consistently receive more help from kin than from friends or neighbours, in such activities as grocery shopping, housework, meal preparation, yardwork, money management, and personal care.

Reliance by the elderly on informal sources of support has been documented by Chappell [1985] and by Chappell and Havens [1985]. They found that over 55 percent received informal help, compared to only 15 percent from formal sources. Among the 15 percent receiving formal assistance, 80 percent also received some informal help. Chappell [1986] emphasizes the point that, contrary to a common stereotype, only a small minority of Canadian elderly [about 7 percent] are in long-term institutional care.

Thompson [1989] studied the social support networks of 334 elder residents of the Capitol Regional District in British Columbia. By and large, he found strong networks, with 57 percent reporting 20 or more network members. Health status was an important determinant of the perceived adequacy of networks, with those in poor health expressing a desire for more social support. The modal network member was female, married, not employed, and known to the respondent for twenty years or more. Most lived within driving distance of respondent, and about 1/3 within walking distance, suggesting the importance of proximity for social support network formation. Slightly more than half of the network members were reported to be non-relatives.

A. Matthews [1991] has argued that '...the quite focused "nuclear family" orientation of much of the sociology of aging is

rather delimiting and not reflective of "real life".⁶ In past research [1980; 1987] she has found evidence of strong evidence of involvement of siblings in the social support systems of the widowed. Her most recent study [1991], of 661 elderly Canadians, finds that never-married respondents were most likely to rely on siblings for assistance. Substantial proportions of the formerly married relied on children, but the never-married relied on themselves, siblings, other members of the extended kin network, and, less frequently, friends and neighbours. She suggests that lack of availability of children leads the elderly to substitute others for their social support networks.

Wolf, Burch and B. Matthews [1990] used GSS 1985 data to examine relations between kin availability and the living arrangements of older, unmarried women. They find that number of living children has a strong positive effect on the probability of living with children rather than alone, and a strong negative effect on the probability of living with siblings rather than alone.

A novel finding is that the number of average number of grandchildren per child has a significant negative effect on the probability of living either with a child or a sibling rather than living alone. They note that number of grandchildren may reflect crowding versus opportunities for co-residence in children's households, but also hypothesize that older unmarried women may wish to be in a position to entertain all their grandchildren, without risk of appearances of favouritism.

Regarding the future, they speculate that the effect of lower fertility on the living arrangements of older unmarried women will be equivocal, since such women will probably have fewer living children with whom they might live, but those children's households also will be less crowded.

For every category of kin availability, the majority of women lived alone. But when the woman had no children, a greater percentage live with siblings or others. In the future, there may be a shift away from living with adult children towards living with siblings, other relatives, or even non-relatives. The latter possibility would seem to be more likely for women who have had increasing experience with non-family living -- with roommates, common-law partners, etc.

Wolf et al. note the probable importance of geographic location of kin as a factor affecting living arrangements, but GSS

⁶. For many sociologists, the term nuclear would include siblings. Matthews apparently uses it more narrowly, as implying an exclusive focus on an elderly person's relationship with his or her children.

1985 contained no data on this point.

A series of studies of a small sample of 454 elderly residents in London, Ontario [DeWit, 1986; DeWit, Wister and Burch, 1988; Frankel and DeWit, 1989] has explore the relationships between distance and intergenerational ties. Distance emerges as by far the strongest predictor of frequency of contact of all kinds between the elderly respondent and his/her two children who live the closest. Types of contact include face-to-face visits, telephone, letters and overnight visits. At small distances, face-to-face contact and telephone calls predominate. As distance increases, these are partially replaced by letter-writing and overnight visits. It is hypothesized that at various points on the distance continuum, substitutions occur between various kinds of contact. Further research is called for to uncover the points at which substitutions occur and how they may influence qualitative aspects of intergenerational contact.⁷

Several papers by Connidis [1989a, 1989b, 1989c] have contributed to an increased understanding of the role of sibling relationships in later life. Study of a sample of 400 elderly persons in London, Ontario [not the same sample used by DeWit et al.] revealed increased contact with siblings by widows after the death of their husbands. Distance again emerges as a key factor: respondents living close to their siblings see them more often and are more apt to confide in them those who live farther apart. A multivariate analysis [1989b] shows complex interrelationships among various sets of variables. Marital status is associated with geographic proximity [pairs in which one sibling is single are most apt to live close by]. Connidis comments: '...the relative salience of the sibling bond to single individuals, and perhaps childless persons also, may determine, in part, how near to their siblings they live' [1989c, p. 439]. Sex of siblings also is important, with sisters seeing each other more often, having more telephone conversations, and discussing more important matters.

The role of marital dissolution in relationship to kinship interaction is explore by Gladstone [1987], with data from 80 grandmothers from the Toronto metropolitan area. Looking at changes in visitation [with grandchildren] patterns following divorce or separation in the middle generation, he found that the parent with custody often moved closer to her/his parent [the grandmother in this case], resulting in more frequent contact between parent, grandchildren and grandparent.

An irony of contemporary family patterns is that divorce,

⁷. Unfortunately, this point cannot be pursued effectively using data from GSS-1990, partly because of the character of the distance measure, but mainly because telephone calls and letters are lumped together in the same question.

assuming it is followed by remarriage, often serves to increase kinship ties, thereby increasing the possibility of extended family relations which have otherwise decreased due to low fertility. Remarriage yields step-siblings and step-parents, half-siblings, step-grandparents, etc. Less is known, however, about the quality of these relationship by comparison with 'natural' relationships. A Canadian study by Hobart [1988], with data from 232 remarried couples and 102 first-married couples from a large city, found that husbands in a 'blended' family reduced their attachment to children from prior marriages. Hobart suggests that this is a mechanism for reducing tension in the current marriage. No information is reported on the role of geographic distance in these relationship.

As noted earlier, prior to GSS-1990, nationwide data on distance and kinship patterns have not been available for Canada. A U.S. study by Crimmins and Ingegneri [1990] used the 1984 National Health Interview Study [N=11,497] to study these relationships. Not surprisingly, a multiple regression analysis showed distance between parent and closest child was the most important determinant of frequency of interaction. Number of children also was an important factor. Being separated or divorced showed a significant negative relationship with frequency of interaction, as did residence in an urban versus rural location.

Distance from kin in general must be a function of past migration of the kin involved. Since parent-child or sibling pairs typically reside in the same household at some point in their lives, the observation of a large distance between them at some later point implies that one or both of the pair must have migrated at least once. By contrast, a short distance implies nothing, since it may be associated with no moves or some combination of moves [for example, a reunion of immigrants as a result of later immigration of a parent].

The literature on migration, distance and kinship reflects this ambivalence. Some of it has emphasized the role of kinship systems in promoting migration and directing it towards locations in which the migrant already has some relatives. Other research has viewed migration as disruptive of close kinship ties [Morrison, 1990]. The latter possibility would seem relevant to Canada, given high rates of immigration/emigration and of internal migration, and the large distances between major metropolitan centres, in which the majority of Canadians now live.

Canadian Kinship - 1990

The following graphs provide a sample of some of the descriptive information on Canadian kinship available in the 1990 General Social Survey. The charts are arranged in a meaningful order, but each chart and its accompanying commentary are intended

to be more or less free-standing and self-explanatory.

Most of the relationships shown are of relatively low order. Descriptive conclusions regarding the relationship between kinship patterns and other factors remain subject to qualification or refinement, after appropriate multivariate analysis.

* * *

Kinship and Social Support: Some Qualifications

Taken as a whole, the data presented above suggest the continuing importance of kinship in the day-to-day life of the average Canadian. Most Canadians can claim several close relatives throughout their lives -- typically six or more among the kin categories included in GSS-1990. A majority live close to some of their kin, and see them frequently.

But there are important exceptions. Among respondents ages 65 and over, for example, roughly one in five lack an adult child living within 100 km. An additional 30 to 35 percent have only one such child. Insofar as kin support for elderly persons typically is provided by their children, these respondents are at risk of deprivation in this regard.

A more comprehensive picture of 'kinship deprivation' is provided in the following table. This indicates the number of Canadians who either have no close relatives on whom they might depend, or, if they do, fail to see any of these relatives at least once a month, described as low kin support. For persons ages 25-49, the tabulations relate to siblings or parents; for those 50 and over, they relate to siblings and children. In addition to percentages, the table shows estimated population figures in each category.

Age Group	Number With Low Kin Support	Percentage
25-49	1,467,166	14.2
50+	938,052	14.7

In other words, among Canadian over age 25 approximately 2.5 million have relatively little contact with nuclear relatives on whom they might depend for support.

It is possible that some of such respondents are supported by their nuclear kin despite the lack of frequent contact [though financial assistance, telephone contacts, etc.], or that they are supported by non-nuclear kin or close friends. Further analysis of GSS-1990 data can shed some light on these issues.

But the figure does suggest as an important hypothesis that a substantial minority of Canadians will fall through a social safety net based on kinship.

* * *


[A1]

This figure shows the survival curve for mothers by age and sex of respondent, which is in accord with demographic expectations [there is little if any difference in the age of women at the birth of their girl and boy babies]. There is a hint of slightly higher reported maternal survival by female respondents, but the apparent differences are not large and are of doubtful statistical significance.

Since parents in GSS are defined to include adoptive and step-parents if they actually raised respondent, the close correspondence of the two curves suggests that there is no marked difference between men and women in the perception of maternal identity.

* * *

Maternal Survival by Age and Sex of Respondent



[A2]

The General Social Surveys in 1985 and 1990 are the only two sources for national level empirical estimates of kin numbers. Keyfitz [1986] has prepared detailed analytic estimates, but these are based on 1971 and 1981 stable population models [females only], and thus are not comparable to current, cross-sectional data such as that contained in the General Social Surveys.

Burch and Selvanathan [1987] have prepared analytic estimates of parental survival for 1985, for purposes of comparison with GSS-1985 estimates, but other kin were not included in the exercise.

This graph presents a comparison of maternal survival curves from the two General Social Surveys and from Burch and Selvanathan.


The two GSS curves are in close agreement. This is as it should be since changes in the mothers' past mortality experience would not have been very great over a five-year period. The proportions for respondents 40-44 and 45-49 seem relatively high, or, alternatively, those for respondents 30-34 and 35-39 may be relatively low. The high reported maternal survival for those ages 45-49 is due primarily to female respondents. It is not known whether this result is due to random variation, or whether there is some other explanation.

The analytic estimates for 1985 are somewhat lower than either GSS, especially at ages fifty and over. Since these analytic results involve considerable estimation of input data [estimates of cohort mortality and mean age of childbearing for women and men back into the late 1800's], there is ample scope for error. The most likely explanation for the discrepancies, however, is that the analytic estimates pertain only to natural parents, whereas GSS data can relate to adoptive or step-parents as well.

Overall, the agreement of the GSS curves suggests the generally high reliability of the data. The near agreement of GSS and the analytic estimates suggests validity. These results tend to increase one's confidence in the GSS data on other aspects of kinship.

* * *

Maternal Survival by Age of Respondent By Region of Birth of Respondent's Mother



[A4]

This figure shows parental survival by age of respondent. Parental survival is the complement of orphanhood, to use the older term. A persons whose mother is not surviving is a maternal orphan; whose father is not surviving, a paternal orphan; a person who does not have at least one parent surviving is a 'complete' orphan. With the decline in rates of orphanhood early in life, attention has shifted to issues of old-age dependency in the later years, for example, are one's parents alive when one is 60? To speak of a sixty year-old 'orphan' seems strange, and thus an increasing tendency to look at survival.

The figure demonstrates dramatically the differential in parental survival by sex of parent. At ages 45-49, for example, approximately 70 percent of respondents report that their mother is living, compared to less than 40 percent for fathers. This is due chiefly to two demographic factors: a] a tendency for men to marry later and to marry younger women; fathers are on average older than mothers at the birth of their children; b] higher rates of male mortality throughout life.


Parental dependency on older respondents is chiefly a matter of mothers. By ages 60-64, the percent with surviving fathers has dropped below 5 percent, while the percent with surviving mothers remains at about 20 percent.

Most Canadians have at least one parent surviving well into middle-age -- almost two-thirds as late as age 50.

An interesting future consequence of current fertility trends [especially the delay of childbearing to later ages -- by past standards], is that future parental survival levels may be lower than those observed for contemporary Canadians. Whether this will happen or not depends on future trends in mortality, that is, on whether future mortality gains are large enough to offset higher average ages at childbearing.

* * *

Parental Survival by Age of Respondent Mother, Father or Either Parent Surviving



[A5]


A individual has four natural grandparents, but can acquire more through remarriage following divorce or widow[er]hood in either the parental or grandparental generation. GSS-5 has limited the reference of questions on grandparents to the parents of the persons identified as 'mother' or 'father' in previous questions. That is, no effort has been made to include all possible step-grandparents.

This figure shows the average number of living grandparents by age of respondent, with the average number of living parents included for comparisons. Already at ages 15-19, the average respondent reports only slightly over two grandparents, and this number drops off sharply to about one by ages 25-29 and nearly zero by ages 45-49.

There is a good bit of variation around these averages, of course. And, surviving grandparents differ by type. A respondent's mother's mother is most apt to be surviving at any given age of respondent, father's father least apt, due to the differentials in ages at childbearing and in mortality for men and women.

* * *

Average Number of Living Parents and Grandparents By Age of Respondent



[B1]

Instructions to interviewers in GSS-90 defined siblings as follows:

For this section, 'brothers' and 'sisters' includes any half-, step-, adopted and full brothers and sisters. A step-brother/sister is the son or daughter of the respondent's step-parent but not the son or daughter of the respondent's natural mother or father. Half brothers and sisters share one parent in common with the respondent and have one different parent. Full brothers and sisters have the same father and mother as the respondent [p. 76].

In the series of questions on siblings, no distinction is made among the various types.


This inclusive definition makes some of the resulting data on siblings difficult to interpret. Full siblings, for example, tend to be acquired early in one's life, whereas step and half-siblings are acquired following a parent's remarriage, often later in life. Step-siblings may or may not share or have shared the same household, depending on specific custodial arrangements following a divorce and remarriage. In general, it seems unlikely that relationships between step-siblings are as close or of the same quality as those between full-siblings, but little is known on the topic.

This figures shows total siblings [that is siblings ever born, excluding those who were stillborn or died shortly after birth] and living siblings by age of respondent. The average number of total siblings climbs steadily with age, from a low of approximately two at ages 15-19 to five at ages seventy and above. Between ages 35 and 50, the number decreases slightly, possibly due to the relatively low birth rates just prior to the post-World War II baby boom. The decline in total siblings for persons 35 and under reflect fertility decline over the last decades, although in the case of the youngest ages it is possible that their parents have not yet finished childbearing. But, as noted above, some of the rise in number of siblings with age may have nothing to do with fertility trends, but rather may reflect the progressive acquisition of step- and half-siblings as one's parents remarry following divorce or widow[er]hood.

The curves for total and living siblings diverge steadily with increasing age as mortality takes its toll. By around age 80, the average respondent has lost 3 of his or her 5 siblings.

It interesting to note that persons in their middle years have more siblings on average than do younger adults, that is persons 25 and under -- 3.5 on average versus less than three. Clearly the below-replacement fertility rates of recent years are showing their effects. It is impossible to know how many additional siblings [primarily step-siblings following parental remarriage] these younger cohorts will acquire in future years.

Total Siblings and Living Siblings By Age of Respondent




[B2]

The curves for average number of living siblings by age show no systematic differences by sex of respondent. This is in accord with demographic expectations, since one's siblings are equally likely to be male or female, so that sex differences in mortality are evened out.

By the same token, the close correspondence between these two curves, especially in the middle years where step-siblings appear to be numerically important, suggests an absence of differential perception of step-sibling relationships by men and women. That is, men appear as likely to report a step-sibling as a sibling as are women, in contrast to the frequent stereotypical view that 'women are more interested in kinship than men.'

* * *

Average Number of Living Siblings By Age and Sex of Respondent



[B3]

This figure shows reported total siblings by approximate year of birth of respondent along with the period total fertility rate for that same year.

The fertility curve shows the familiar pattern -- a steady decline from early in the century to a low point in the late 1930's, a steep rise to the late 1950's [the post-World War II baby boom], and then a sharp decline to all-time low levels [the rate decline even further following 1975 or so, the last date relevant to respondents in the 1990 GSS].


The curve for total siblings follows the same general downward trend as in fertility, but fails to mirror it exactly. The closest correspondence is for the years 1960 to 1975, the period of sharply declining fertility. As noted in comments on the previous figure, these young cohorts may acquire additional siblings later on. The parents of a person born around 1960 are apt to be in their late twenties or early thirties, with plenty of time for divorce and remarriage in accord with current trends. It is also possible that a young first child could acquire a younger sibling as a result of planned late childbearing of his/her natural parents.

The two curves correspond fairly closely for the oldest cohorts [born around 1905 to 1920]. The largest divergence is for persons born between 1920 and 1940. The parents of these respondents would have been among the first Canadian cohorts to experience the high divorce rates beginning in the late 1960's; the respondents' acquisition of step-siblings may account for much of the discrepancy. Another possible explanation is that the sibling 'deficit' due to low fertility has been masked by immigration of adults of regions that did not experience the Western drop in fertility of the 1920's and 1930's.

The current relationships between fertility and siblingship clearly are complicated. Better explanation and interpretation would require much more detailed analysis than is possible here.

* * *

Reported Siblings and Fertility By Approximate Year of Birth of Respondent



[C1]

This graph shows the average number of living children by age and sex of respondent. GSS instructions to interviewers defines children as '...any step-children and adopted children the respondent has raised, and natural children the respondent has given birth to or fathered [regardless whether he/she raised these children]' [p. 78].

There is a clear tendency for women to report slightly more children than men. This difference is observed at almost all ages up to age 70, and thus would not seem to be simply a reflection of the fact that women generally get an earlier start on childbearing due to earlier marriage [for example, we expect women at 21 to have had more children than men at that age because the women have been married longer on average]. But it may reflect this indirectly. At any given age of the parent, a man's children are on average slightly younger than a woman's. For example, at age 50, with a female average age at childbearing of 27, a woman's children would be 23 years old; with a male average of childbearing of 30, a man's children would be 20 years old, with a slightly higher proportion surviving.

Presumably some of the observed difference also may reflect a tendency for men to exclude children they may have fathered, either because they are unaware of the fact or fail to define known children as theirs. It is impossible, of course, for a woman not to know she has borne a child, and less likely that she will fail to report it is a survey such as this. It is possible that she would not know whether a child given up for adoption is still living or not.

It might be expected that the gap would narrow or even disappear in middle life, since under past and current custody arrangements following divorce, men are more apt to assume responsibility for the raising of step-children. More men than women remarry after divorce, and more women than men bring to remarriage children from the previous marriage. Much more empirical and analytic work is needed to clarify these issues.


The most important feature of this graph is the rise in living children by age to a high of approximately three at ages 55 to 75. Clearly persons in this age range are favoured in terms of possibilities for support from adult children in their old age. More recent cohorts apparently will have fewer children to call on for support when they in turn reach old age.

For the youngest cohorts, say those under 30, future childbearing will be expected to raise the average number of children and living children. And some step-children will be acquired. But for some cohorts, for example those between 40 and 50, it seems unlikely they ever will reach the levels of living of children of those 55-75.

This is one specific manifestation of the general axiom that lower fertility means fewer kin.

* * *

Average Number of Living Children By Age and Sex of Respondent



[C2]

This graph shows the average number of grandchildren reported by respondents by age and sex. The term grandchildren is not further defined in GSS-5 instructions to interviewers, but presumably any child of a reported child would be so considered. Thus, this number would include children of adopted or step-children whom the respondent claims.


This graph is in many ways a modified reflection of the earlier graph on living children. Thus, the dip in number of grandchildren for respondents 75-79 reflects the dip in number of living children for the same age group, which in turn reflects the low fertility rates of the Great Depression.

The gap between male and female respondents seems to have widened compared to that for living children, an amplification over the generations that might be expected. That is, either of the mechanisms cited above to explain the greater number of living children could operate doubly [although the issue is not entirely straightforward, since some of the children of female respondents are males, who would be expected to undercount their children; their mother might thus undercount her grandchildren; more data and more analysis would be needed to sort out these relationships].

Recent low fertility rates would be expected to lower the number of grandchildren of younger respondents compared to those now at older ages, but cohort [time] and age cannot be sorted out in this graph, and much of the relevant fertility [for example, that affecting the grandchildren of respondents in their 50's or early 60's] lies in the future.

* * *

Average Number of Grandchildren By Age and Sex of Respondent



[D1]

This graph looks at total 'close' kin available to Canadian adults at various ages. 'Total' kin refers to living parents, living siblings, living children, living grandparents, and grandchildren [presumed living, but the questionnaire did not specify]. 'Nuclear' kin refers to parents, siblings and children only. GSS-5 did not collect information on other kin who might often be considered close [for example, aunts/uncles, nieces/nephews, or close cousins].

Total kin increases steadily with age, with the exception of the dip at ages 75-79 and 80 plus, to high values around 10. This increase is primarily a reflection of increases in living grandchildren, which reached approximately 5 for these ages.


The curve for nuclear kin shows a markedly different pattern, rising to a high of slightly under 7 kin in mid-life [ages 30 through 65] and then declining sharply as parents, siblings and even children die off.

Again, it should be noted that this age profile from cross-sectional data confounds age effects and cohort effects. In particular, it is not clear whether respondents in the lowest age groups will ever reach the levels shown for the middle-aged groups, due to recent low fertility rates.

In terms of social support to respondent from nuclear kin, the graph suggest some irony in the fact that those most apt to be dependent -- very young adults and very old adults -- seem to have the smallest number of nuclear kin. Of course, they may have other close kin not reflected in the nuclear kin curve. By the same token, those respondents with the largest number of nuclear kin, who may depend on respondent for social support, are those who are at their peak years in terms of experience, income and other personal assets useful in providing social support. The general shape of the nuclear kin curve reflects the possibility that persons in late middle-age may be squeezed between dependent older and younger persons. Detailed analysis of GSS-5 data on help patterns among kin will be necessary to learn more about gross and net flows of assistance.

* * *

Average Number of 'Total' and Nuclear Kin By Age of Respondent



[E1]

This graph shows the distribution of adult Canadians by distance of their residence from that of their mothers. The tabulation pertains only to respondents not living in their mother's household [the majority, except in the youngest age groups] and whose mother is living.


The distance variable is not a true metric [ratio or interval scale]. The questionnaire provided a limited number response options identified in terms of time or distance, with 100 km equated to one hour travel time by car. In effect, the result is a frequency distribution for grouped data, but there is no specific information as to the width of intervals. For example, it is not known what are the upper and lower limits for the category labelled '400 km.' In graphic terms, the result would seem to be to exaggerate the relative number of persons in the highest distance categories, where the interval widths are almost certain wider; in analytic terms, we are prevented from calculating interesting summary measures such as means and medians.

The data can be usefully summarized, however, in terms of broad categories of distance. For example, this graph shows that a total of approximately 3/5 of adult Canadians live 'very close' to mother, where this is defined as 100 km or less [that is, one hour or less driving time]. By the same token, a substantial minority [almost 1/5] live 'very far' from mother, where this is defined as 1000 km or more within Canada, or outside Canada.

The distribution reflects the dual facts that a) Canada's population is highly concentrated and regionalized; and b) much of the mobility affecting Canada's population has been long-distance mobility, whether immigration/emigration or inter-metropolitan internal migration [for example, Toronto to Edmonton or Vancouver].

* * *

Distribution of Adult Canadians by Distance from Mother




[E2]

The proportion of respondents living within 100 km of their mother shows a slight downward tendency with age, but is within 50 to 70 percent for all age groups. It is at a minimum during middle age [say, ages 35-55 of respondent] when independence from parents is well-established and parental dependency, due to extreme old age, is not yet so great a factor.

* * *

Distance from Mother by Age of Respondent



[F1]


This graph shows the proportion of respondents who live 100 km or less from mother, classified by the number of moves [by respondent] within the ten years preceding the survey.

It suggests that recent mobility is only slightly related to distance from one's mother. About 70 percent of respondents with no moves within the last ten years live within 100 km, compared to slightly less than 60 percent for those who have moved two or more times. Thus, recent mobility has increased distance but not very greatly on average. Apparently, many moves captured by this question are short-distance or local moves.

* * *

Distance from Mother by Number of Moves in Last 10 Years

All Respondents



[F2]

Physical mobility or migration can either increase or decrease an individual's distance from specific kin or from all kin on average. Much depends on motivation and circumstances. In the first portion adult life, marriage and labour-force considerations may predominate in migration decisions. By later life, after retirement [one's own or one's spouse], other reasons, including family reasons, may play a larger role.

This figure illustrates the point by giving the percentage of moves for which respondent reported a motivation to be closer to family members. Total moves and 'long-distance' moves [200 km or over] are distinguished.


Of total moves, only 10 percent or less are described as being made for reasons of proximity to family members. For long-distance moves, the percentages are appreciably higher, reaching approximately 40 percent for those 80 and over. Clearly, for some of the 'old elderly' in Canada, long-distance migration plays an important role in family reunification.

Young adults appear to migrate for family reasons more frequently than do middle-aged persons, but this may reflect primarily moves to join a spouse or partner.

* * *

Percent Moving to be Closer to Family by Age Group

All Moves and Long-Distance Moves



[G1-G4]

The next series of graphs illustrates the continuing validity of one of the leading generalizations in kinship studies, namely, that distance from kin is an important determinant of frequency of face-to-face interaction. In multivariate analyses, controlling for other relevant variables, it is the single most important determinant.


This strong distance gradient is seen in all four of the graphs -- pertaining to frequency of seeing father, mother and children. The estimates for child relate to one of respondent's children under 15 and one over. The latter estimates are conservative, since the so-called reference child often was identified as the one whom respondent so most often [if respondent couldn't chose, the oldest child was chosen].

For respondents living within 10 km [about 6 minutes] of mother, the vast majority [80 percent] of respondents report seeing their mother at least once a week. The corresponding percentages are 65 for father, over 70 for the reference child under 15, and 85 percent for reference child 15 or over. In all four cases, however, the percentage reporting weekly contact falls off sharply, approximately 10 percent or fewer at distances of 200 km or above, approaching zero percent at the highest distances.


Moderate frequency of contact [for example, once a month], as would be expected, tends to rise in the middle distances and categories and then to fall off. Overall, relatively few report never seeing the specified kinsperson, but the proportion is appreciable for distances of 1000 km and over within Canada or for kin outside Canada, reaching approximately 40 percent for mother, father and young children. In the case of adult 'children,' of course, the face-to-face contact may be the result of a decision to travel either by the child or the respondent. For younger children, the child's parents often would have to accompany him or her. Thus, face-to-face contact with older children generally is more frequent.

* * *


Frequency of Seeing Mother By Distance



Frequency of Seeing Father By Distance




Frequency of Seeing Reference Child > 14 By Distance



* Child >14 seen most often outside home

Frequency of Seeing Reference Child < 14 By Distance



* Child < 14 seen most often outside home

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(1) *FAMILIES AND THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURE*
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A Report Submitted to the Demographic Review Board

by

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by the Minister of National Health and Welfare

FAMILIES AND THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURE

Introduction

This report concerns the role of the family in transmitting culture from parents to children. First, I describe the continuing importance of the family as the primary socializing agent for children. Children learn a wide range of culture at home, implicitly as well as explicitly, and early in life. Such learning sinks deep and has long-range consequences for success in school, later success in working life, and for the later development of the child's own family and friendships. The family's impact on culture also has important societal consequences, most notably the perpetuation and inheritance of inequality.

But second, I argue that the family's continuing cultural role is less important than it used to be, because of the rising strength of rival sources of culture. There are three especially remarkable rivals: education, which has become steadily longer and more consequential in people's lives; the marketplace, which has penetrated lives more and more and earlier and earlier in the life cycle; and social networks, which now include smaller proportions of family members, in part because of demographic trends.

And third, I discuss the historical variability of culture and family effects on culture given macrostructural changes such as labour market opportunities in young adulthood.

The report draws on two main sources of information. First is the scholarly literature, cited selectively not comprehensively. Second is a recent qualitative study of my own. 41 employed, native-born residents of Toronto gave long accounts of their current cultural tastes, knowledge, and practices, as well as accounts of their cultural training in their families of origin. The respondents were a quota sample designed to tap older (roughly 45-55) and

younger (roughly 25-35) workers, both men and women, at various class levels as defined by Wright (1985). For further details see the attached copy of my recent article (Erickson 1991).

1. The Persisting Importance of the Family

Family sociologists have long discussed the important role of the family in transmitting culture. Sociologists of the old structural-functional school listed socialization as one of the major functions of the family, for example. More recently students of class and education have addressed considerable attention to the work of Bourdieu (e.g. Bourdieu 1984) who takes up this old theme in a newer and more critical way. Bourdieu argues that families teach culture in the broadest sense: knowledge, tastes, habits, expectations, scripts for behaviour. Since this teaching begins very early, in the home, and mostly implicitly, the things taught seem simply natural to those who learn them, while things learned later and more consciously are never quite so comfortable and cannot be put to social use quite so naturally and convincingly as those learned at home. Since culture varies by class, and the culture of higher classes has higher prestige, the consequences are great. Children of middle class families enter the school system with a culture that appeals to their teachers and stamps them as "good" students; they have high expectations and positive orientations concerning school; they "naturally" like and value what schooling can offer. Thus class advantage is reproduced in education, while education seems to be meritocratic since students are rewarded for their effort and performance. Class advantages continue in later life, as those with a higher status form of culture seem more distinguished and more compatible to those who allocate higher status jobs (since gatekeepers are themselves characterized by higher class culture). Bourdieu thus argues that high status culture is *cultural capital*, or a form of capital that can

be invested in careers with great profit given a suitable opportunity, just as economic capital can be.

There is considerable research support for much of this argument. Even quite young children learn the differing, class-linked prestige and "value" of jobs, possessions, and practices (Baxter 1976; Baldus and Tribe 1978). Cultural background, including ethnicity, has a substantial effect on school success (Farkas et al. 1990). In particular, a taste for higher status culture and a cultivated self-image foster better grades, higher levels of educational attainment, and marriage to a more highly educated spouse (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985). Key values, such as giving greater weight to the extrinsic or intrinsic rewards in a job, pass from parents to children and then help shape the child's educational career and early work career (Lindsay and Knox 1984). Parents also tend to transmit personality traits such as self-direction, which parents acquire in part through their class-differentiated work, and which have effects on the child's educational success and work trajectories (Miller et al. 1986, Kohn and Schooler 1983). Besides cognitions, tastes, values, personality traits, and expectations, parents pass on material cultural benefits such as study resources in the home, and these too are class-linked (Teachman 1987). Cultural transmission is thus a key part of the still substantial link between parents' class and child's (e.g. Boyd et al. 1985).

Cultural transmission in the family also helps to maintain ethnic cultural differences, and the occupational segregation that goes with them (Breton et al. 1990). And it helps shape family patterns of the future, as parents reproduce the parenting they received, modified by their own current resources and stresses (e.g. Lenton 1990).

Thus the persisting importance of the family in transmitting culture has considerable impact on how people meet their needs, as individuals and as family members. The culture of the family of origin affects a person's education, work, and the work and education of a spouse if any; education and occupation have considerable consequences for resources such as income, wealth, knowledge of formal support structures, access to good informal support in social networks, and personal coping skills such as self-direction and mastery (e.g. Lin 1982, Fischer 1982, House et al. 1988, Mirowsky and Ross 1990, Wellman and Wortley 1990). And culture learned at home helps to shape how people define their needs and resources in the first place.

The Toronto study helps to expand, illustrate, and qualify some of the arguments above. Table 1 shows the relationship between father's class and the child's level of various forms of cultural capital. By and large, children of the command class fathers (that is, children of managers or owners) tend to have more knowledge of various cultural genres: they know more about critically respected books and artists, more about current and classic films, and more about current Toronto restaurants. They also have more concrete, well-articulated plans for their future work (Concreteness) and were more articulate and self-confident in the interview overall. These forms of knowledge are useful resources, for they help people to seem well-informed, cultivated, and interesting; and they give people a wider range of topics which they can discuss with potential friends or acquaintances, thus helping them to build wider social networks. Wider networks, with a more diversified set of contacts, provide access to a wider range of resources and hence help in getting a job, in doing a people-oriented job, and in getting informal support (DiMaggio 1987).

Further, families do seem to play a modest role in passing on high status culture through family socialization. Table 2 suggests that people have wider knowledge of books, films, artists and restaurants in adulthood if they had more exposure to the fine arts in their early family lives -- and they do not seem to benefit in the same way from other family activities such as popular entertainments or sporting activities.

But there are two important qualifications here. First, family activities (at least as our respondents remember them) have much less effect on adult cultural capital than does the respondent's education, and cultural capital is more closely related to one's spouse's education than to one's parents' (Table 2). This suggests that family training does matter (since it matters greatly to educational attainment) but the most important direct source of culture is education itself -- including its extracurricular side, such as the people one meets and marries. The second qualification concerns the role of culture (however acquired) in careers. The Toronto study found that people working in the private sector made very little use of high status culture on the job, though they did use command of specifically businesslike culture to the extent that they had it, and high status culture did affect their interactions in leisure life where cultural expression is more acceptable (see Erickson 1991). This does not mean that families are unimportant; many of our very articulate business-like respondents had command class parents, and I suspect that they gained a good deal of their business culture from their families.

On the whole, then, families retain an important role in passing culture on to children. The impact seems greatest for education and for the private life of family and friendship, so far as high status culture goes. High status culture has less direct importance for careers than

Bourdieu argues is the case for France, but command of business culture does matter to careers in Canada, and families can be invaluable tutors in these matters.

2. The Reduced Role of the Family

While the family remains important in passing on culture, and always will so long as families rear children, the relative importance of the family has declined as the impact of other sources of cultural influence have grown.

2A. The Growing Role of Education

In this century, each Canadian cohort has been better educated than the one before it, and education has become more important to the quality (prestige) of the first job that people get, with family variables becoming less important over time (e.g. Boyd et al. 1985). This has happened in part because the real skill demands of jobs have increased (Hunter 1988). It has also happened because employers find education a useful criterion for simplifying choices of whom to hire or promote, as well as a way to legitimate choices, especially in firm-internal labour markets of the kind found in core sectors. Education also serves as a handy market signal for desired attributes such as middle-class orientation to work and ability to work in bureaucratic settings. Since education is in fact important to work trajectories, parents encourage their children to get more education than they themselves obtained, and each cohort is more educated on the average -- but the children of higher classes do better in the educational contest, so the relative position of the classes is inherited even while all stay in school longer (Bourdieu 1984).

While the rising levels of education are in part inflationary as well as occupationally necessary, the years spent in school are still real experiences which provide an ever-

lengthening source of culture other than the family. In particular, late high school and post-secondary training comes (for most people) in the critical formative period of youth (roughly 18-25). It is then, during the transition from youth to adulthood, that people experience the wider world freshly and acquire the orientations that will shape their culture and colour all the rest of their experiences in life (Mannheim 1952). Schooling provides explicit culture in the classroom but also implicit cultural training in extracurricular activities and in social networks of peers. The tastes and behavioural repertoires acquired at this stage tend to become a long-run part of one's life.

The importance of the formative period has been shown for politics (Jennings 1987; Roberts 1986; Schuman and Scott 1989) and also for other forms of culture such as taste in music (Holbrook and Schindler 1989). Often schooling plays an important part of the picture, as in protest generation people politically formed by protest experiences with a campus base. The Toronto study tells a similar story in more qualitative terms. Respondents were asked how their own tastes compared to those of their parents, and what accounted for any differences. Many reported that their own tastes, while partly influenced by their parents' tastes, were different in many ways, and the most commonly cited reason for change was new culture encountered for the first time through educational experiences. Another oft-cited reason for change was one's friends, many of whom (especially for the younger respondents) were met in school or college or university.

On a more whimsical note, I have also done an analysis of the importance of culture in romantic relationships at various ages, as reflected in themes in "companion wanted" ads in the Toronto Star. Younger advertisers, whose tastes are still in the formative period, are the

least likely to mention their tastes or those desired in a partner; looks and personality seem more important to them. But older respondents, who have invested more in their cultural repertoires and who have become more attached to them, mention tastes more often. This too suggest both that tastes have consequences for one's life, and that tastes are largely shaped in early adulthood.

2B. The Growing Role of the Market.

Many forms of cultural consumption that were once home-made are now purchased. The market provides a far greater variety of possibilities than before, far more vigorously promoted, to a population with less time to produce directly and more wealth to use in consumption from the market. Indeed, to a large extent consumption has become a major mode of cultural expression as people actively use and shape market opportunities: consumers are not passive recipients of advertising but observe, judge, discuss, choose, and personalize their acquisitions (e.g. McCracken 1990).

Market experience begins early as children encounter advertising, family shopping trips and allowances. Many adolescents have substantial allowances and a large minority of them have part-time jobs; they are marketplace consumers on a significant scale. Young adults become even more substantial consumers, often making their first major investments in transit, housewares, housing and so on. Thus even early in life, and especially in the most formative period, people today are learning of cultural opportunities in and through the marketplace as well as in the family and in schooling. And the options for learning are very diverse compared to the ones their parents encountered, so they often acquire tastes their parents have not developed.

For a taste of these changes in tastes, let us consider food -- not just for the pun of it but because food is important as a pleasure for many, as a major expenditure for all, and as a part of one's social life. First let us consider past practices as reflected in the Toronto respondents' memories of a typical family meal when they were growing up. The most remarkable theme is much greater *uniformity* in the past. About three-quarters remember the same meal: meat, potatoes, precisely two or three vegetables, a dessert, and (if not Jewish) a glass of milk. This is what respondents call a "regular" meal, a "normal" or a "real" dinner. The twelve exceptions to this uniform pattern fell into three groups: (1) three people who gave insufficient information on this topic, (2) two people who had over-worked parents who simply fed the family as quickly as possible, and (3) six people with immigrant parents who ate the "regular" meals for their ethnic groups.

This past uniformity contrast sharply to the multiple levels of variety in meals at home today. At one level, people simply eat a much greater variety of foods. Many still eat "meat and potato" meals but few do so exclusively. The employees and supervisors tend to be the least adventurous but even some of them add barbecues, omelettes, pasta and rice dishes, Italian food, or cabbage rolls. Managers and employers add a still wider variety of foods to the once-standard meal. At another level, people procure their home meals in a wider variety of ways: they bring home frozen or packaged dinners from the supermarket, send out for Chinese or pizza, or use restaurant take-out of various kinds. Less often do they actually make food from scratch, and some of them never eat dinner at home at all.

At yet another level, perhaps a deeper cultural level, food has acquired a new range of more varied meanings and is eaten for more varied reasons. People describe remembered family meals in (again) uniform descriptive/evaluative terms. The standard meal was:

healthy

(for example: healthy, balanced, really good for you, good food, well-rounded)

complete

(for example: full meal, full course meal)

home-produced

(for example: home-made, home-grown, home-cooked, prepared)

simple

(for example: simple, just regular, not fancy, straightforward, relatively bland)

good

(for example: mom was an excellent cook, pleasant, well-prepared, good food)

People describe these remembered meals with obvious affection and pleasure, but they work with a different set of cultural options today. Their descriptions of current home meals show a new set of goals. People may still want a healthy meal, but using new definitions of healthy: less meat, something light. Lacking a resident home-maker to prepare meals at length, they describe "simple" meals in the new sense of fast, easy, and not requiring great cooking skills that people lack time to gain or practice. Variety has become not only common practice but a goal in itself: many have no typical meal and expressly desire great variety and novelty in what they eat. Some have learned to give food no value at all, and report that they do not like food, do not care about it, even resent the time it takes to consume it.

These new goals amplify if we turn to meals prepared for guests and meals consumed in restaurants. For guests, people now have a much wider range of ways to display their culture. Again the variety includes modes of producing the food (with varying degrees of purchase from the market, from totally home-prepared to sending out). Variety also includes the menu, from the once-standard meal to a rich array of options: tenderloin in hazelnut-cream sauce (recipe learned at a cooking class), family potlucks combining several ethnic cuisines, fish and seafood instead of meat, Italian dishes (now a new kind of standard meal in fact), etc., etc. Some hosts pride themselves on offering the same good and simple food they eat every day, some are proud of offering classic haute cuisine, or nouvelle cuisine, or Asian or Italian, or something really new, or something very pretty to look at, etc., etc.

For restaurant meals, variety becomes still more important. Again and again people firmly denied that they had a favourite restaurant: they want to keep trying new ones. They often denied there was such a thing as the best restaurant in Toronto: there are so many good ones good in so many different ways. They valued different things in restaurant meals: good value for money, "authentic" ethnic food, something too elaborate to cook at home, or the same meal they liked at home, or something they had never had before, or the luxury of a past century (lobster and champagne), or the service or the physical setting or just the saving of time in a very busy life.

It is also important to note the changing nature of family meals as social occasions. Again the remembered past is uniform: the whole family met for dinner and ate together. ("You either showed up or you were dead"). Today, people have busy and different schedules; they often eat different things at different times in different places.

One persistent theme in all these changes is the role of the marketplace as the consumer's marketplace. People have learned new tastes and practices in a more pervasive marketplace that offers and teaches more varied options than their parents had. The marketplace includes a wide variety of cookbooks, cookery columns in the media, restaurants, restaurant reviews, and shops supplying raw or prepared food materials. All these influences towards variety are amplified by food experiences abroad, thanks to growing levels of tourism, as well as ever-increasing local imports of foreign foods thanks to immigration.

Another persistent theme is the marketplace for labour. More family members now spend more time at work, leading to pressures for faster foods, more purchased foods, and fewer family meals as family social occasions. In particular, women are now working at far greater rates than our respondents' mothers worked (Jones, Marsden, and Tepperman 1990). Without a homemaking mother there is often no-one to labour over those healthy, home-made, complete meals -- and no-one to round up the family to eat "all together at the dining room table." Thanks in large part to both consumption and labour markets, family relations have changed as much as family collations.

A final theme is the changing nature of class differences in the family meal. The Toronto data support Mennell's (1985) description of "diminishing contrasts, increasing varieties". We have already seen the great increase in variety, but should more clearly note the diminished nature of class contrasts. Superficially, it may seem that the families of the past were much alike, all eating their meat and potatoes and veg as a family unit. But the very sameness of the standard meal made class contrasts more obvious, for meals could be judged on a single standard which made income differences quite evident. The most central and

costly element, the meat, might be the best roast or the stringiest stew, the loin or the butt, the breast or the neck. When the defining element of a meal is meat, the cost of the cut defines the family's prosperity and class aspirations quite clearly. Today, there are many ways to make a highly-valued kind of meal. It is possible to replace expensive ingredients with skill, political or health correctness, efficiency or some other less expensive good thing. Families use increasingly complex mixes of these possibilities, with the mixes drawn from a wider range of sources less tightly tied to class and income than before. Families in different locations still differ, but in more complex and overlapping ways in a more complex society.

2C. *The Growing Role of Social Networks*

Simmel (1955) describes the profound changes in social networks that came with modernization in the West. Formerly, people lived in relatively small, homogeneous, closed units. The people they knew were much like themselves and much like each other, one person's set of contacts was much the same as his or her neighbour's, and people belonged to few distinct formal or informal groups. But modernization brought an increasingly complex social structure with more differentiation of social institutions and social settings, more specialization of roles including occupations, more layers of more powerful governments, and more variable connections among the many groupings to which people could belong. Personal networks became more complex, including more affiliations to more varied groupings: neighbours, fellow students from various schools, coworkers from current and former jobs, members of voluntary associations, and so on. Networks also became more individualized since each person could have a unique combination of affiliations.

These changes contributed to the long-run rise of individualism. The complexity of networks contributes to individual autonomy because the network provides some potential supporter for any view or taste the person might consider, and because the management of so many different contacts stimulates cognitive complexity and personal autonomy (Coser 1975). The uniqueness of networks also helps to make each individual a unique blend of influences received.

One of the kinds of influence received is of course cultural influence. The more varied the tastes of the people one knows, the more one learns at least a little about a lot of cultural forms. In turn, the richer one's cultural range the more one can expand variety in one's network by finding something in common with people met (DiMaggio 1987). Table 3 shows that this argument does hold for the Toronto study. Respondents reported whether they knew anyone at all in each of several classes (Wright, 1985, plus selected classes of culture-producers such as professional musicians) and whether they knew anyone at all in each of a selection of economic sectors or industries. They reported separately whether they knew any women or any men in each category. The greater the number of classes or sectors in which a person had contacts, the richer their knowledge of books, artists, films, and restaurants (Table 3, Panel A).

As Bourdieu (1884) argues, sectors (which he calls fields) vary greatly in the extent to which general cultural knowledge is useful and prevalent. Therefore I separated out what I judged to be the more culturally intensive sectors: media, entertainment, universities, and governments. Knowledge is strongly correlated with the number of cultural sectors to which a

person has links. Links to personal care sectors, or other sectors, had generally insignificant correlations with knowledge of genres.

The relationship between network diversity and knowledge of genres holds even after controlling education (an important source of both culture and network diversity) (Table 3, Panel B). Important though education is in shaping culture today, culture continues to change after education is over. Social networks serve as a form of continuing education in culture throughout life.

Another notable feature of Table 3 is the cultural importance of women. In most cases, knowledge is more strongly related to the number of classes or sectors reached through women than to the number reached through men. The traditional gender division of labour includes more stress on financial success for men and more stress on decoration and cultivation for women; this division of labour still holds to some extent. If so, it suggests yet another way in which two-earner families are reducing the cultural influence of parents. The female parent often used to be both the cultural specialist and the resident homemaker for substantial periods of time. Now that mothers typically face a double day of labour, their time and energy for cultural training must be reduced, and children must learn more from other caretakers (nannies, daycare workers etc.). Most of these caretakers are women, so the female cultural specialization is being maintained, but the family influence on children reduced.

The historical trends in social networks must have meant a rise in their cultural influence and hence a weakening of the cultural imprint left by the family of origin. More autonomous people more easily drop and add tastes according to their current wishes and situations; people with wider and more diversified networks have more new and varied taste

possibilities from which to choose. Further, even as networks have grown and diversified and become more influential, the kinship component of networks has changed with changes in demographic trends.

Rates of birth and death have fallen in Canada for many decades now. As a result, family trees have become "taller and narrower" -- taller because people live longer, so there are more families with three, four, or even five generations living at the same time; narrower because parents have fewer children, so there are fewer kin of the same generation. For example Gee (1990) compares people born in 1860 versus those born in 1960 in Canada. The earlier cohort had a larger number of siblings ever born, surviving to age 20, or surviving to age 50. Now it is kin of the same generation who are likely to be especially useful culture sources in adulthood, for they are the kin likely to be in the same life cycle stage as oneself, hence faced with the most similar and self-relevant experiences and cultural resources. But these kin are now few in number. True, kin of older generations now live longer, and parent-child relationships continue to be solidary on many dimensions (Rosenthal 1987). But solidary contact with parents in one's adulthood adds little to the important cultural impact that parents had early in one's life; indeed parents and children may diverge in their orientations as they grow older (Miller and Glass 1989).

The relative impact of family members is also lessened by rising rates of divorce (Phillips 1991) (which usually reduces contact with one parent) and remarriage (which provides a wider and more contradictory set of cultural messages from multiple parents and step-parents). And even when family members are alive, in intact relationships, and sharing

consistent orientations, they may be too far away for powerful cultural influence: geographic mobility is high.

It is thus no wonder that the Toronto respondents report learning many of their tastes from their friends and acquaintances, and report developing tastes different from those they grew up with. The non-kin portions of social networks have become larger, more diversified, more conducive to personal autonomy and individualized choice, richer in cultural options and stimulation; and at the same time the family portion of social networks has become smaller, less similar in life cycle stage and life concerns, and often farther away.

3. Historical Variations in Sources of Culture

In a changing society like our own, each generation encounters a unique set of prevailing cultural fashions as it enters the formative period of early adulthood (Mannheim, 1952). To some extent the tastes of parents are rejected in favour of the tastes of one's peers, and each generation acquires its own mix of cultural practices. One can see evidence of this in the Toronto study (Table 4). The audiences for museums, ballet, opera, classical music, plays, sporting events and the circus are a little older, while the audiences for the zoo, jazz, modern dance, rock music, movie theatres, parks and camping are a little younger, for example. But I know of no evidence that this pattern of change has changed itself; replacing the old-fashioned taste of one's stodgy parents is just what one's parents did themselves.

However, there do seem to be strong historical variations in the extent to which each cohort adopts the high status culture which Bourdieu thinks so critical to class inheritance. Table 5 shows simple scatterplots for the Toronto respondent's age (on the X axis) and knowledge of various genres (on the Y axis). From Bourdieu's point of view, one might well

expect to see higher levels of high status cultural capital in younger age groups. After all, class competition has driven up years of education; the same competition should drive up high status culture if this culture is indeed a resource in the struggle for class position.

Parents should make ever-greater efforts to "give their children all the advantages," to "help them improve themselves." But we have seen above that high status culture may not be of much direct use in gaining higher class position, at least in Canada. And knowledge of genres does not in fact rise steadily as age drops; instead, knowledge peaks for those in their forties. Bourdieu is most correct for knowledge of critically acclaimed books, and this is just the kind of knowledge most closely tied to the formal education, which we know has in fact grown steadily in extent and in relevance to success in one's working life.

Mannheim's emphasis on the historical specificity of generational experience is more useful here than Bourdieu's implication of a steady inflationary trend. Mannheim leads us to ask whether those in their forties a couple of years ago, when the interviews were done, had early adulthoods that gave special encouragement to learning high status culture in multiple forms (not just in the forms strictly necessary to formal education). And indeed they did. Their formative periods were largely in the 1960's. Education was expanding in volume and also in terms of the cultural richness of offerings, both curricular and extracurricular. The labour market was a welcoming one in general, with high employment and high pay levels, even for new entrants. Moreover, there was a boom in specific labour market sectors with some emphasis on culture or on the kinds of social network skills that wide culture enhances. Jobs abounded in education, in culture production, in social services, in government agencies. The "sixties generation" had relatively rich opportunities to become cultivated and to use this

culture in reasonably prosperous careers. Earlier generations spent less time in less enriched schools. Later generations faced a tougher labour market with a higher proportion of attractively rewarded jobs in more businesslike sectors.

I must frankly admit at this point that I made up the tests of knowledge of cultural genres, and I am in the forties myself. I may simply have asked the kinds of questions that my own cohort finds valuable and easy to answer. But I do not think this is the case. First, the items on the tests of knowledge do not seem so generation-specific (see details in Erickson 1990). Second, a very different study, based on a national sample of the United States, shows very similar patterns. Some 17,254 Americans reported their performing arts consumption, visual arts consumption, their visual arts production, and their viewing of arts on television. For white respondents, artistic activity rose from those aged 18-31 to those aged 32-51, and dropped again for those aged over 51 (DiMaggio and Ostrower 1990:767). Most of those who came to adulthood in the sixties were in the 32-51 age group by 1982, that is they were in the most artistic of the age groups reported.

This cohort pattern cannot be just a matter of trends in family socialization. These respondents also reported early home socialization in the arts, such as whether their parents took them to museums or concerts, and this home socialization was highest for the youngest and lowest for the oldest respondents. Influences other than the family must have been at work, and I suggest that educational and labour market influences are the most likely candidates, in the United States as well as in Canada in this historical period.

The pattern for black respondents was somewhat different. Artistic activity generally rose for younger respondents, especially among the more educated. This suggests a long-run

convergence with white patterns of culture, especially for those best able to succeed in a white-dominated world. But the more educated in the middle age group (including the sixties generation) are the leaders in consumption of black musical forms that were popular in the Civil Rights Movement. Blacks, like whites respond to historical influences as they form their tastes, but blacks have had a different history. DiMaggio and Ostrower give an interesting discussion of black-white differences and the complex reasons for them in the special context of American race relations.

In summary, families were and are important sources of culture, but culture also varies strikingly in response to the particular historical circumstances of early adulthood for each generation and for each subgroup within a generation. The most important circumstances include education and prospects for working life, as well as political involvements for those highly involved. These circumstances are not usually linear in their changes over time and so we cannot sum up their impact as simply as the growing role of education, consumption, and social networks as teachers of culture.

Conclusions

I have described a number of rivals to the family as a teacher of culture; for the most part these rivals have grown steadily in their influence and they will probably continue to grow. Children of today and tomorrow will start life without a resident home-making parent, and will get much of their training from day care workers in early years and from teachers for long years afterwards. These children will become active consumers on a modest scale when very young, and will work and spend more and more extensively as they grow, becoming deeply familiar with the marketplace and its lessons before they are adults. They will build

large and diversified networks including many people with varied tastes including many different from those of their parents. They will have few kin of their own age and life cycle stage to enhance the cultural influence of family ties. They will (like all cohorts in a changing social world) enter adulthood under conditions different from the formative conditions their parents met in their time, and the children will pick up the newly prevailing cultural trends instead of their parents' tastes.

Nevertheless, the role of the family will stay important. For families will continue to have a great deal of influence on the earliest, most unquestioned, most pervasive orientations. These orientations will continue to make a profound difference to the way children approach the rival influences, for example to the expectations children have of schooling. And the family will also affect the *kinds* of rival influences children encounter. Parents choose the daycare centre, the home location and hence the neighbourhood and school, and the jobs the children can accept; hence the parents indirectly choose the marketplace and network experiences the children are likely to have.

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TABLE 1

MEAN LEVELS OF CULTURAL CAPITALS BY FATHER'S CLASS

FATHER'S CLASS	BOOKS	FILMS	ART	CAFES	CONCRETENESS	<u>N</u>
Bourgeoisie	12	14	13	15	3.9	9
Petty Bourgeoisie	10	12	8	8	1.9	8
Manager with BA	13	15	10	12	3.2	6
Manager without BA	9	11	7	10	3.0	2
Supervisor with BA	12	13	8	13	3.0	1
Supervisor w/o BA	8	13	8	10	2.9	8
Middle Employee	9	12	10	12	3.0	1
Simple Employee	6	11	6	8	2.0	4

TABLE 2
EARLY LIFE AND CURRENT CULTURAL CAPITALS

	BOOKS	FILMS	ART	CAFES	CONCRETENESS
FAMILY ACTIVITIES					
Fine Arts					
Ballet	.28	.43*	.20	.18	.27
Classic Music	.01	.18	.32	.36	.26
Art Gallery	.15	.27	.26	.12	.02
Museum	.09	.28	.14	.03	-.01
Other	-.04	.23	.04	.20	.20
Entertainment					
Zoo	-.10	-.13	-.19	-.05	.17
Circus	.24	.13	.25	.40*	.26
Other	-.05	.01	.06	.24	.14
Sportive					
Sport Events	-.10	-.16	-.06	-.16	-.05
Camping	.09	.16	-.20	-.20	-.00
OWN ACTIVITIES					
Music Lessons	.17	.49*	.34	.20	-.24
Other Lessons	.02	-.03	.04	-.00	-.05
School Sports	.20	.15	.22	.16	-.28
School Clubs	.11	.11	-.00	.07	.09
School, Other	.11	.21	.15	.10	.18
EDUCATION					
Father's	.26	.30	.22	.34	.34
Mother's	.15	.05	.29	.26	.14
Own	.62**	.54**	.49**	.50**	.39*
Spouse's	.71**	.83**	.51	.55	.32

NOTES: Pearson correlations with pairwise deletion;
1-tailed Signif: * - .01 ** - .001

SCHOOL	Respondent's years of formal education
BOOKS	Books heard of or read
FILMS	Movies heard of or seen
ART	Artists heard of
CAFES	Restaurants heard of or been to
CONCR	Concreteness (clarity and detail) of plans for expected and preferred work ten years from now

TABLE 3

NETWORK DIVERSITY AND CULTURAL CAPITALS

PANEL A: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS

NETWORK DIVERSITY	BOOKS	FILMS	ARTISTS	CAFES
Classes via Women	.51**	.51**	.50**	.54**
Classes via Men	.32**	.44**	.38**	.51**
Cultural Sectors via Women	.49**	.57**	.56**	.64**
Cultural Sectors via Men	.36**	.47**	.58**	.58**
Caring Sectors via Women	-.03	.07	.10	.29*
Caring Sectors via Men	-.03	.14	.09	.40**
Other Sectors via Women	.07	.03	.12	.27
Other Sectors via Men	.03	.05	.09	.21

PANEL B: CORRELATIONS CONTROLLING EDUCATION

NETWORK DIVERSITY	BOOKS	FILMS	ARTISTS	CAFES
Classes via Women	.33**	.37**	.34**	.36**
Classes via Men	.09	.30*	.20	.35*
Cultural Sectors via Women	.38**	.49**	.46**	.53**
Cultural Sectors via Men	.21	.37**	.47**	.47**
All Sectors via Women	.29**	.34**	.37**	.47**
All Sectors via Men	.08	.25	.32*	.44**

NOTES

CARING SECTORS: large department store; hotel, motel or restaurant; barber or beauty shop; hospital.

CULTURAL SECTORS: magazine; TV or radio; newspaper; entertainment; university; federal government; provincial government; local government.


OTHER SECTORS: construction; garment factory; manufacturing; bank; insurance; real estate; transportation.

TABLE 4

CURRENT CULTURAL PRACTICES BY AGE DECADE

	<u>20's</u>	<u>30's</u>	<u>40's</u>	<u>50's</u>
PROPORTION WHO:				
Can play an instrument	.50	.25	.33	.67
PROPORTION ATTENDING				
IN LAST YEAR:				
Classical Music	.28	.40	.89	.50
Jazz	.39	.40	.44	.17
Opera	.11	.00	.22	.33
Rock Concert	.61	.80	.44	.17
Cabaret	.33	.40	.33	.33
Ballet	.22	.20	.44	.50
Modern Dance	.33	.40	.22	.17
Play	.50	.80	1.00	.83
Circus	.11	.20	.33	.17
Ontario Place	.56	.75	.63	.40
Sports Event	.44	1.00	.88	.60
Pub or bar	.78	1.00	.88	.80
Park	.78	1.00	.63	.60
Campground	.67	.00	.00	.40
ATTENDANCE FREQUENCY				
Private art galleries	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.0
Art Gallery of Ontario	1.7	2.4	2.7	1.8
Royal Ontario Museum	1.6	1.8	2.5	1.5
Ontario Science Centre	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.8
Metro Zoo	2.4	1.6	2.1	2.0
MEAN NUMBER OF:				
Books in home	174	170	1095	240
Movies in theatres	2.5	1.6	1.2	.3
Movies on TV or VCR	2.3	6.3	4.0	2.5
MORE ON SPORT				
Proportion sports fans	.78	1.00	.50	.83
Self-rated knowledge level	2.3	2.4	2.0	1.8
PROPORTION DINING:				
With guests at home, more				
than once a month	.59	.40	.22	.57
Out, weekly or more often	.56	.80	.78	.43

PLOTS OF KNOWLEDGE OF GENRES BY AGE



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What is good taste good for?

BONNIE H. ERICKSON *University of Toronto**

Bourdieu affirme que le capital culturel est utile lorsque l'on veut obtenir une situation de classe supérieure, particulièrement dans certains secteurs, et n'est en fait qu'une seule chose: une culture de condition supérieure. Mais son argument, établit pour une France centralisée, est moins valable pour le Canada plus subdivisé. Cet article étudie les idées de Bourdieu sous tous leurs aspects pour un échantillon quota de Torontonien(ne)s. Les résultats suggèrent qu'un capital culturel de condition supérieure existe à Toronto, mais qu'il a peu d'effet sur les relations de classe au travail, où le véritable capital culturel dirige la culture d'entreprise qui domine les entreprises privées. La culture d'entreprise est aussi répartie en classes et pourrait jouer un rôle dans la reproduction de classes qui est très similaire à ce que Bourdieu revendique comme culture de condition supérieure.

Bourdieu argues that cultural capital is useful in gaining higher class location, especially in some sectors, and is essentially a single thing: high status culture. But his argument, developed for centralized France, is less suitable for more subdivided Canada. This paper explores Bourdieu's ideas through a quota sample of 40 Torontonians. Results suggest that high status cultural capital does exist in Toronto, but has little part in class relationships at work, where the true cultural capital is command of the business culture which dominates private enterprises. Business culture is also class stratified, and may play a role in class reproduction which is quite similar to that which Bourdieu asserts for high status culture.

Part of the recent rise of interest in cultural studies is the widespread influence of Pierre Bourdieu. Social scientists on several continents have responded to his work on culture, education, and class. The present paper addresses just one key topic from Bourdieu's rich oeuvre, that is, the role of

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cultural capital in class relations at work. Bourdieu has written extensively on this question, most notably in *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984), for the case of France; parts of his argument have been tested elsewhere (e.g., Katsillis and Rubinson 1990 and references therein); but very little work exists for Canada. Thus, it is useful to explore some of the critical arguments with qualitatively rich data from a pilot study of Toronto, as is done here.

CULTURE AND CLASS: THEORETICAL ISSUES

While Bourdieu uses the term 'cultural capital' in many senses and gives it many theoretical roles (Lamont and Lareau, 1988), I shall emphasize the term's most central use in *Distinction*: cultural capital is command of high status culture. This includes tastes and practices of all kinds that signal high status to others; it includes knowledge of fine arts, preferences for elegant food or furniture, possession of cultivated goods, and stylishness in the display of any of these. Cultural capital is a product of past class trajectory, a reflection of current class position, and a resource in the ongoing struggle for class location.

People first begin to acquire culture in their families of origin, and the culture learned here is especially important because it is the most natural and hence the most convincing kind of signal to others. Those who choose their parents prudently have the use of possessions (like reference books and study space) and acquire traits (like wide vocabulary and a taste for reading) which help them to succeed in the school system. In turn, education expands cultural capital, especially the officially approved high status culture of great books, masterpiece paintings, and so forth. Socially, people with similar culture are likely to meet and likely to find each other attractive, so cultural capital is also useful in building networks of people who themselves have cultural capital and hence are likely to be from equally high class backgrounds. These networks both reinforce the learning of useful culture and provide useful contacts. As the beginning of work life approaches, cultural capital helps people to know of and value better jobs and to believe they can get them. And cultural capital is indeed an advantage in getting jobs: better jobs are controlled by higher ranking people, who tend to have high status capital and to look for people who are like themselves. Cultural capital marks a person with an attractive air of distinction, makes the person seem well educated and capable, and provides the higher classes with a common language for easier and richer communication.

To be capable of these effects on life chances, cultural capital must logically have several characteristics. It must be widely accepted as worthy but not widely possessed, so that those who have it gain esteem and those who lack it feel disadvantage. It must be apparently neutral and legitimate so that its role in class relations is not too obvious. At the same time, it must be rather strongly related to class so that it can in fact function as a means of excluding lower class people from higher class positions.

This argument raises both general and specific questions. First, two central general questions: just what is cultural capital, especially when we come to do research? and what is its actual role in the everyday world of class re-

lationships? Lamont and Lareau (1988) provide a useful discussion of these questions, pointing out that Bourdieu provides a rich but also confusing variety of definitions and operationalizations of cultural capital, and provides much data on the cultural correlates of class but nothing much on how culture is actually used in the micropolitics of class interactions.

The present study assumes that class relations occur in their most direct and consequential manner as work relationships (Kemper and Collins, 1990, and references therein). The question then becomes: does cultural capital help in getting work done in a way that enhances current class and future chances? does it facilitate work itself, or self-presentation? does it enter the world of work at all and if so how? With this kind of focus, it makes sense to define cultural capital as the knowledge of high status genres, for knowledge is the one form of cultural capital that can most easily be brought into work relationships and used or displayed therein. Most possessions must be left at home. Tastes, values, and attitudes can be partially disguised or faked, especially by high status people who are skilled manipulators of their apparent feelings (Hochschild, 1979). For example, one of our respondents (#3, explained below) was very knowledgeable about restaurants, had been to many of them for business reasons, and had articulate comments on them. But her knowledge, very useful in her work, was not her taste. She said, 'I am not interested in meals. It's a waste of time. If someone could invent a bandaid to put on my arm to ingest the nutrients daily, that's what I'd do.'

Further, there are more specific questions about how the general argument may apply to societies other than France. Again Lamont and Lareau (1988: 161-2) raise some useful questions. They point out that the United States has relatively high mobility, regionalism, ethnic diversity, political decentralization, and relatively weak high culture traditions. Thus high status culture may be less clearly defined and less important to class boundary maintenance than in France. The Canadian case could be even more fragmented than in the United States, given our relatively recent and rapid modernization, bilingualism, multiculturalism, and weak traditional involvement of business in the arts (Tippett, 1990). To a large extent the Canadian business world has evolved rapidly, powerfully, and independently of the major institutions which produce, disseminate, and legitimate high status culture. For example, Canadian business leaders have a powerful position in the network of ties among elites, but very skimpy ties to academics (Williams, 1989). Departing somewhat from Lamont and Lareau, I argue that the relative independence and power of the business world has allowed it to develop its own business culture, and this culture plays much the same role on the job that high status culture is supposed to play in France. High status culture also exists (nourished in part by the educational system) but plays its part in leisure relationships rather than in class relationships at work.

This study therefore explores several questions. Is there in Toronto a form of high status culture which has the essential features of Bourdieu's cultural capital? If so, people should have very unequal knowledge of various genres; these forms of knowledge should be interrelated, since each is one

facet of the same underlying cultural capital; these forms should all relate clearly to education, class, and sector; and people should experience them as legitimate, thus feeling enhanced if they have much knowledge and diminished if they have little. Is there another important form of culture, a culture of and in business? If so, it should appear in people's discussion of their work and work relationships, it should be related to class position, and it should be rather weakly related to the high status culture which is carried by different institutions. The most crucial question is that concerning work relationships: to what extent does culture appear within them, and which culture appears? To some extent I shall consider ties away from work as well, since social relationships with people from work are an alternative potential means of displaying high status culture in many forms.

This paper will discuss four questions about culture and class in Toronto:

- 1/ Can we observe a Toronto analogue to cultural capital in the sense of high status culture?
- 2/ Is cultural capital unidimensional or are there multiple forms?
- 3/ Does cultural capital increase with class and with the cultural intensity of economic sectors?
- 4/ What is the role of cultural capital in the micropolitics of work?

These specific questions touch on only part of Bourdieu's arguments concerning culture as a facet of class relationships, class struggles, and class reproduction. This paper emphasizes culture as an individual resource and the workplace as an immediate setting. Meanwhile Bourdieu embeds such matters in a wider argument including historical struggles over the nature of cultural capital, institutionalization of culture as a form of class selection and exclusion, and other more macrostructural concerns which should be addressed in future work.

RESEARCH METHODS

Three graduate students (Scott Davies, Suzanne Leblanc, and David Tindall) conducted interviews with a quota sample of 40 people chosen to vary in age, gender, and class as defined by Wright (1985) (see Table 1). Less systematically, we also tried to include representatives of various sectors.

The quota sample was not a random one, but we did try to gain diversity by recruiting respondents from chance contacts or the acquaintances of acquaintances rather than our own close contacts (who would be an inbred and atypical group). The sample is too small and too haphazard to test hypotheses or provide meaningful statistical tests, so I provide only descriptive tables and qualitative materials. The goal is to develop and enrich an argument, to tell a story that is convincing in the coherence of 40 accounts but not by any means final. To help the reader locate respondents in the sampling scheme, all quotes and details are given with the respondent's ID number. By clerical error, there is no respondent 33.

All respondents were native-born, currently in the labour force, and working in the private sector. We restricted the sample to the native-born in order to minimize complications of variation in ethnic culture, which is itself a form of cultural capital in ethnically controlled sections of the

TABLE 1
THE QUOTA SAMPLE

Class	ID Number	Gender	Age
Bourgeois	3	F	41
	24	F	37
	37	M	37
	40	M	42
Petit bourgeois	2	M	46
	12	F	31
	13	M	64
	18	F	28
	32	F	46
	32	F	46
Manager with B.A.	1	M	28
	29	M	28
Manager without B.A.	19	F	26
	22	F	46
	27	M	32
	27	M	32
Supervisor with B.A.	4	M	25
	20	F	26
	26	F	27
	28	F	43
	34	F	40
	35	M	43
	35	M	43
Supervisor without B.A.	9	F	26
	10	M	26
	30	M	50
Expert employee	6	M	40
	21	F	53
	36	M	28
	38	M	50
Semi-expert employee	7	F	31
	8	F	25
	16	F	35
	17	M	29
	26	F	25
	31	F	59
Employee	5	F	25
	11	F	55
	14	F	26
	15	F	25
	23	M	27
	39	M	58
	41	M	29

Toronto economy (Reitz 1990). Only the dominant anglo-conforming culture is under investigation here, and the very limited ethnic and racial variation in our sample is ignored. We insisted on including only people who were currently working so that their work relationships were ongoing and

their class position easily defined. And we limited ourselves to the private sector because class relations are clearest and starkest there, and business culture most well-developed and dominant.

The most crucial and difficult problem in sample design was: what to do about class? Bourdieu is notoriously intricate and elusive in his discussions of class, and his research measures are no model since he used available ones (primarily occupational categories) that are clearly not ideal from his point of view. In discussing the sources of habitus (one's general cultural orientation from which all specific cultural tastes and practices spring), he emphasizes 'a space whose three fundamental dimensions are defined by volume of capital, composition of capital, and change in these two properties over time' (Bourdieu, 1984: 114) but the first two dimensions get the most attention (e.g., pp. 128-9). Volume of capital is a vertical dimension ranging from the highest classes to the lowest, from the cultivated and prosperous in high level positions to the poor and ill-educated in the lowest ranking work. Composition is a horizontal dimension representing the degree of emphasis on cultural versus economic capital in the kinds of work people do.

I decided to make a rough translation of these dimensions into more clear cut and well-established measures by using Wright's (1985) class categories and economic sector. Sector is the horizontal dimension. People have more use for cultural capital in more culturally intensive industries, including artistic producers and professions and services. Some of these use culture directly and all work in areas where productivity is hard to define and interpersonal relations are vital, so that making a good personal impression is important. High status culture is less obviously useful in manufacturing, technical, retail, and hospitality work. Wright's class categories provide information on three vertical dimensions, that is, the control of three kinds of exploitable resources: economic, organizational, and educational. In terms of economic resources, those who own companies are bourgeois (if they have employees) or petit bourgeois (if they have no employees or only one). In terms of organizational resources, managers control the most (they make substantial decisions about people and budgets), supervisors control less (they overlook the work of others), and employees control none. Finally, educational resources are certificates that can be converted into profits. Wright differentiates managers or supervisors with B.A. degrees from those without them, and differentiates three levels of skill qualifications among employees (roughly professionals, skilled or qualified workers, and mere employees). All three forms of inequality have some parallels in Bourdieu's work, and two (the economic and educational) are very similar to his economic and educational capital. We included questions copied from Wright and used his coding instructions to define class.

To explore the role of culture or cultures in the micropolitics of class, we asked respondents about their relationships with people at work: with those above, those on the same level, those below, and those outside the firm. We asked how important good relationships were to getting the job done or to having an enjoyable work day; how the respondent tried to keep relation-

ships good; and whether these efforts included sociable parts of the work day (like lunch or a drink after work) or talking about things besides work. We also asked (at a later point) what interests people shared with those at work.

I acknowledge that this approach is best for identifying overt uses of cultural capital in conversation and conscious awareness of cultural capital as a form of interests in common. People may signal their cultural status, or respond to the culture of others, in more subtle ways that need to be studied through fieldwork rather than interviews. However, the approach used in this research does reveal the kind of culture used openly in conversations with co-workers, with social contacts outside of work, and with the interviewers; and these practices are prominent important features of relationships.

Since the measurement of cultural capital and business culture is a complex matter, and their very existence is at issue, these topics are dealt with in detail in the next section.

CULTURAL CAPITAL IN TORONTO: KNOWLEDGE OF GENRES

I tried to measure cultural capital through knowledge of four genres: novels, artists, films, and restaurants. Admittedly this choice of genres is arbitrary and debatable, as any choice always must be if Bourdieu is right. He argues that the very nature of genres, their importance, their prestige, and their role in class relations are all contentious matters inescapably part of class struggles. But the chosen four make a reasonable choice since all appear prominently in Bourdieu's work, and all seemed likely to be class stratified in Toronto. At the same time they vary interestingly in their status, formal recognition in schools, and form of production.

Literature and art are two of the most prominent and respected forms of high culture. But which novelists and which artists become the shining examples of these genres? Prosperous Canadians have traditionally preferred the work of dead male foreigners for their conspicuous consumption, and similar biases affected early educational and art institutions (Tippett, 1990). To explore these trends among some present-day Torontonians, I asked them about a selection of classic and contemporary, male and female, and Canadian and foreign writers and artists, all of which have had a good deal of serious critical attention. Again, of course, this selection has its arbitrary side.

For literature, respondents reported whether they had heard of or read each of a set of novels (Table II). After scoring (0 for no familiarity with a book, 1 for having heard of it, 2 for having read it) the responses were treated to a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation, accepting any factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. I first asked whether knowledge of books was about one genre or many. At first the answer seemed to be 'many' since I found three interpretable factors which explained a useful 60 per cent of the variance. But these factors are levels of knowledge, as Table II shows by ordering the books from the least to the best known. Factor 2 represents very well-known books that are sanctified classics and often

TABLE II
KNOWLEDGE OF BOOKS

Title	% of sample who have:		Factor
	Heard of book	Read book	
1. The Golden Notebook	16	5	1
2. Bred in the Bone	24	13	1
3. Kamouraska	32	11	3
4. Sunshine Sketches	37	29	1
5. The Handmaid's Tale	50	11	1
6. The Stone Angel	55	34	1
7. Two Solitudes	58	26	2
8. Sophie's Choice	78	21	3
9. Out of Africa	79	16	3
10. Pride and Prejudice	72	29	1
11. For Whom the Bell Tolls	82	47	2
12. Oliver Twist	97	63	2

Cronbach's alpha:

.86 for all items (summed)
 .72 for odd-numbered items
 .77 for even-numbered items

TABLE III
KNOWLEDGE OF ARTISTS

Artist	% who have heard of artist		Factor
	Heard of artist	Read artist	
1. Berthe Morisot	5		3
2. Helen Frankenthaler	8		4
3. Marie Cassat	13		4
4. Michael Snow	32		1
5. Joyce Wieland	32		3
6. Mary Pratt	34		3
7. Georgia O'Keefe	37		3
8. Cornelius Krieghoff	42		1
9. Harold Town	45		1
10. A. J. Casson	55		1
11. Degas	61		1
12. Henry Moore	61		1
13. Emily Carr	68		3
14. Salvador Dali	76		2
15. Group of Seven	87		2
16. Andy Warhol	87		2
17. Pablo Picasso	90		2
18. Robert Bateman	90		5

Cronbach's alpha:

.91 for all items (summed)
 .83 for odd-numbered items
 .81 for even-numbered items

required reading, factor 3 includes books with movie versions so that the books are much heard of but not so much read, and factor 1 includes more current books and Canadian classics required in more advanced classes if

TABLE IV
KNOWLEDGE OF FILMS

Title	% of sample who have:		Factor
	Heard of film	Seen film	
1. Seven Samurai	27	16	2
2. The Seventh Seal	32	11	2
3. Un Zoo la Nuit	46	14	1
4. I Heard Mermaids Singing	54	24	1
5. High Noon	70	49	2
6. The Magnificent Seven	72	36	4
7. Moonstruck	92	54	1
8. Snow White	92	70	5
9. Gone with the Wind	97	84	4
10. The Godfather	100	78	3
11. Rambo	100	62	3

Cronbach's alpha:

.55 for all items (summed)
 .42 for odd-numbered items
 .01 for even-numbered items

at all. Being a Canadian novelist seems to be a greater handicap than being alive or a woman. Identification with a small region is a handicap (even in that region), given the international mass-marketing strategies of modern publishers, and the high-volume strategies of large book stores.

For art, respondents only reported whether they had heard of an artist (scored 1) or not (scored 0) (see list in Table III). Factor analysis identified five factors accounting for 75 per cent of the variance; again these factors make qualitative sense but also form steps on an ordered ladder of knowledge. Factor 5 is the ubiquitous Bateman, factor 2 includes equally well-known artists often mentioned in the mass media as well as art curricula and institutions, factor 1 includes men officially established as good artists and good investments, factor 3 includes somewhat less widely known women, and factor 4 still less widely known women. Unlike the case for authors, being Canadian is no handicap to fame. Much of the market for art is localized, through both private and public galleries with mutually profitable links to selected Canadian artists. Many corporations show good citizenship by buying and displaying Canadian art (Tippet, 1990). But these same strong local purveyors of art are often male-dominated and female artists seem to pay the price.

Movies have a more ambiguous cultural standing than literature or art. Some movies are considered works of art, some popular culture, some trash and so forth. Movies rarely appear in formal curricula, yet they are a major component of extracurricular student life. For an eclectic set of movies, we scored 0 if the respondent had never heard of the movie, 1 if she or he had heard of it, and 2 if he or she had seen it. Factor analysis produced five factors accounting for 74 per cent of the variance. From most to least well-known (Table IV) these are: current Hollywood hits, older Hollywood, a children's movie, two current Canadian films, and foreign-language classics.

Unlike the factors for other genres, these factors may be sub-genres as much as levels of knowledge of films in general. Movies pushed by large studios and theatre chains are as inescapable as the classic great books one must read in school, while other movies are only known to the true movie buff; but this is a weak trend.

Turning to restaurants takes us even farther from the high culture built into education and into the realm of everyday practices. Here we scored 0 if the restaurant was unknown, 1 if the respondent had heard of it, 2 if the respondent had been there. Three factors account for 67 per cent of the variance. Factor 3 includes two restaurants intensively mass-marketed for something other than cuisine (economy, the view), factor 2 includes fairly well-known large restaurants with larger and somewhat more distinctive menus than those in factor 3, and factor 1 includes small restaurants with distinctive cuisine meant to be very good of its kind. The more refined the restaurant's pretensions, the less well known it is and the less mass marketing it can afford or benefit from.

Thus, each genre is publicized and sold in a distinctive way which shapes a different basis for more popular or more exclusive knowledge. Yet each genre (possibly excepting films) also has a clear, essentially unidimensional ordering from the widely known to the recondite examples of the form. This is evidence that knowledge of these genres is a form of cultural capital, of unequally distributed knowledge of socially defined forms. There is further evidence in the respondents' more detailed reactions. Those who knew a lot about a genre discussed it happily, showing pleasure and providing a good deal of additional information about their likes and dislikes and critical opinions. Those who knew little showed boredom, discomfort, and even a sense of moral inferiority. One person said at the end of this phase of the interview: 'Christ, I lead a boring life'. Another later commented that he felt he knew very little and should have known more. Not only do these reactions show that cultural capital has real status value in Toronto, these reactions also serve as a warning to researchers about ethics. It is hard, but important, to help respondents avoid experiencing cultural quizzes as tests which some must fail.

Given these results, I summed the scores on each item to make a scale of knowledge of each genre. This simple procedure produced scales with good reliability and construct validity overall. For reliability, see the Cronbach's alpha values (Tables II-V). The alpha of .55 for films is poor, suggesting either that films concern multiple genres or that my selection of films was unfortunate. But the other alpha values are very good. Indeed, the items are coherent enough that a smaller set (such as the odd or even ones) would still be useful, if interview time is limited. Turning to questions of validity, the four measures are quite strongly intercorrelated (Table VI) which supports the claim that each is one facet of the overall knowledge of high status culture. Moreover, each is related to years of formal education, with education's effect greatest for books (rooted in curricula) and least for restaurants (which have the least direct connection to formal schooling). It is therefore

TABLE V
KNOWLEDGE OF RESTAURANTS

Restaurant	% of sample who have: Heard of it	Been there	Factor
1. Arlequin	33	15	1
2. Stelle	32	18	1
3. Luigi's Trattoria	38	26	1
4. Courtyard Cafe	64	44	2
5. George's Spaghetti House	69	44	2
6. Winston's	82	36	1
7. Top of Toronto	85	41	3
8. Fran's	85	72	2
9. Captain John's	87	44	2
10. Macdonald's	100	85	3
Cronbach's alpha:	.84 for all items (summed) .73 for odd-numbered items .65 for even-numbered items		

TABLE VI
CORRELATIONS OF EDUCATION AND CULTURAL CAPITALS

	Education	Cafes	Books	Films	Artists
Cafes	.50				
Books	.66	.53			
Films	.55	.61	.76		
Artists	.57	.83	.75	.71	
Concreteness	.28	.33	.15	.14	.19

reasonable to call these measures of cultural capital. But is knowledge of high status culture the only sort of cultural capital to consider?

CULTURAL CAPITAL IN TORONTO: THE LANGUAGE OF BUSINESS

As respondents talked at length about their past, present, and future work, they showed dramatic differences in expression. Some sounded articulate, informed, forceful, convincing; some sounded voiceless and adrift. Scott Davies developed a useful indicator of this variation by coding answers to questions about expected and desired work ten years ahead, and how these futures might be constructed. He coded levels of concreteness from 1 (no clear goal or plan) to 5 (detailed, coherent accounts of objectives and methods for gaining them). Concreteness is not just a matter of specific bits of knowledge, such as vocabulary, but of the overall relationship between the speaker and the business world, as shown in the ease and convincing skill with which the speaker can discuss that world and his or her future path within it. The rest of the interview material suggests that people who could speak well on this topic also spoke impressively about other aspects of work and business life. Their expert command of business language is it-

self a form of cultural capital, and a form directly useful as a resource in careers.

Business culture is of course wider than language and self-expression alone. If business culture is as distinctive and important as I argue here, it needs measures just as wide-ranging as those developed for high status culture (and overviewed in Lamont and Lareau, 1988). But language in the wide sense used here, that is, the overall command of a culture suggested by the way language is used, is a reasonably good first indicator of cultural distinction. Our use of it is somewhat parallel to the discussions of language use in academic settings in Bourdieu and Passeron (1990: 118-9, 130, 133-4). It is also the practical choice for this exploratory study, since our richest source of material is what people said to the interviewer and what they reported saying to others.

The business-based form of cultural capital is probably taught in business families and work settings more than in schools, and when taught in schools, is more familiar to and readily mastered by the students who got a head start in their families. Thus, education is only mildly related to it, and it has almost no connection to knowledge of genres (Table vi). Concreteness is most closely related to restaurant knowledge, which is itself often acquired through power dining as part of work.

Command of business culture even has some of the evaluative force of high status culture, that is, people sometimes feel inadequate if they lack it. One respondent (#36) felt that he failed to handle work relationships effectively, failed to make a good impression in spite of doing good work, and he was taking classes in business self-presentation in an effort to build up his weak business culture. Many others in Toronto feel a similar need and provide a market for numerous firms or courses that promise to do your colours, dress you for success, make your accent correct or your speech more impressive, or otherwise repair deeply rooted cultural gaps in short order at modest cost.

Thus there is no single cultural capital in Toronto. Knowledge of genres and command of business culture are two distinct forms, and (as noted above) minority ethnic cultures provide still more forms deliberately neglected here. There can be no 'cultural capital' in the singular in a society with such strong ethnic, institutional and regional separations.

CLASS, SECTOR, AND CULTURAL CAPITALS

In Bourdieu's model, cultural capital is a resource in the struggle for class location, and an especially useful resource in the more culturally intensive sectors. So people should have more cultural capital if they are in higher classes or in artistic and service sectors rather than manufacturing, hospitality or retail sectors. But this argument, developed for cultural capital in the sense of knowledge of genres, should alter for command of business culture - which is a resource in any private sector.

Table vii shows all five cultural capital measures by respondent's class and sector. Knowledge of movies has little to do with class, perhaps because movies are a mere entertainment somewhat below the highest level of cul-

TABLE VII CLASS, SECTOR, AND CULTURAL CAPITALS									
Mean Levels of Cultural Capitals, by Class (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)									
Class	Cafes	Books	Films	Artists	Concreteness	Sector	Mean Levels of Cultural Capitals, by Sector	Cafes	Books
Bourgeois	16 (2)	14 (7)	13 (4)	14 (2)	4.0 (1)	Artistic production	14 (4)	18 (5)	17 (3)
Petty bourgeois	14 (7)	12 (7)	14 (4)	12 (8)	3.8 (2)	Professional	13 (1)	16 (5)	15 (2)
Manager with B.A.	11 (5)	9 (1)	13 (1)	9 (2)	1.0 (0)	Business services	14 (5)	9 (4)	13 (3)
Other manager	9 (3)	8 (3)	13 (1)	7 (7)	3.0 (2)	Social/medical services	10 (7)	10 (6)	12 (4)
Supervisor with B.A.	13 (4)	11 (7)	16 (3)	11 (5)	2.6 (2)	Technical	10 (0)	2 (0)	11 (0)
Other supervisor	10 (3)	7 (5)	12 (3)	7 (3)	1.0 (0)	Hospitality	12 (1)	7 (4)	13 (1)
Expert employee	11 (4)	14 (4)	14 (2)	10 (5)	4.3 (1)	Manufacturing	8 (3)	9 (4)	12 (3)
Semi-expert employee	9 (4)	8 (4)	11 (5)	8 (4)	2.8 (1)	Retail	8 (6)	9 (2)	11 (3)
Employee	7 (3)	8 (5)	12 (3)	7 (4)	2.2 (1)				
Mean Levels of Cultural Capitals, by Class (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)									
Class	Cafes	Books	Films	Artists	Concreteness	Sector	Mean Levels of Cultural Capitals, by Sector	Cafes	Books
Bourgeois	16 (2)	14 (7)	13 (4)	14 (2)	4.0 (1)	Artistic production	14 (4)	18 (5)	17 (3)
Petty bourgeois	14 (7)	12 (7)	14 (4)	12 (8)	3.8 (2)	Professional	13 (1)	16 (5)	15 (2)
Manager with B.A.	11 (5)	9 (1)	13 (1)	9 (2)	1.0 (0)	Business services	14 (5)	9 (4)	13 (3)
Other manager	9 (3)	8 (3)	13 (1)	7 (7)	3.0 (2)	Social/medical services	10 (7)	10 (6)	12 (4)
Supervisor with B.A.	13 (4)	11 (7)	16 (3)	11 (5)	2.6 (2)	Technical	10 (0)	2 (0)	11 (0)
Other supervisor	10 (3)	7 (5)	12 (3)	7 (3)	1.0 (0)	Hospitality	12 (1)	7 (4)	13 (1)
Expert employee	11 (4)	14 (4)	14 (2)	10 (5)	4.3 (1)	Manufacturing	8 (3)	9 (4)	12 (3)
Semi-expert employee	9 (4)	8 (4)	11 (5)	8 (4)	2.8 (1)	Retail	8 (6)	9 (2)	11 (3)
Employee	7 (3)	8 (5)	12 (3)	7 (4)	2.2 (1)				

ture. But the other four measures all vary with class. The bourgeois respondents score roughly twice as high as the proletarian, and between these extremes, higher organizational position or educational certification goes (on the whole) with higher cultural capital. As expected, the picture varies a little when we turn to sector. Those in artistic/professional/service sectors have more knowledge of genres (even movies) but have little if any advantage in concreteness.

Cultural capital varies with class and sector in Toronto much as Bourdieu found for France. But this does not show cultural capital is a resource for social location. To explore this issue, we turn to the role of cultural capital in the micropolitics of work. First, we will consider class relationships in multi-person firms, and then the somewhat different situation of the petit bourgeois freelancer with no co-workers.

CLASS AND CULTURE AT WORK

Businesslike Bourgeois

One of the ruling principles of Toronto business culture is that business should be maximally businesslike: efficient, expert, hard working, with no time wasted on anything irrelevant. Cultural exclusion is most clearly in the self-perceived and self-reported interests of the bourgeois, who want maximum efficiency for maximum profit and see any 'wasted' time as a direct personal loss. Thus, they allow culture (other than business culture itself) to enter just in the forms and the amounts that are strictly necessary in their eyes. Perceived necessity varies somewhat with the cultural intensity of the firm's sector.

An example of very low cultural intensity and minimal cultural intrusion is the co-owner of a firm producing medical software (respondent #37). He feels that a technically superior product and specialized knowledge are all that matter, hence there is no need for socializing with employees or clients, on or off the job. He sets an 'all work' tone for his firm, which an employee (#36) confirms: 'work work work ... keep your distance'. A shade less purely business like, the owner of a law firm (#40) does work that he thinks of as technical and expert, with a very small role for smooth interactions. He thinks that good relationships with subordinates consists of giving them clear feedback about their work performance, with an occasional 'how's the family', while client meetings include 'some nonlegal conversation ... to break the ice' but 'doing the job is the main concern' in good client relations. In short, a minimum ritual token of politeness suffices; the rest is all business. The owner of a small publishing house (#3) reluctantly allows more social and cultural expression because it is essential. Social contacts with her employees 'overlap with jobs - go out to lunch to discuss projects that about overlap'. Talk does include things other than work 'because topics to write about are inspired; otherwise if I had my way we wouldn't waste the time'. Finally, the co-owner of the most culturally intensive firm (#24) provides career counselling for dismissed executives. The work intrinsically demands extended discussions with clients, and the owner stresses the value of good

relationships within a small firm. She is the most open of the owners in allowing peripheral topics into work day discussions; yet the topics are limited (she likes to 'show an interest in their personal lives without becoming nosy'). The pervasive limitation of discussion, which varies only a little across these four cases, is a matter of choice not cultural necessity. Both our most all-business employer (#37) and our least (#24) discuss a wider range of topics with their intimates.

Such practices leave little scope for cultural displays at work, and there is even less opportunity away from work: owners rarely see work contacts in leisure time. For example #24 does not see employees away from work ('we don't have quite enough in common, and I think we all realize that it would be a little too close for comfort') and limits corporate clients to lunches and phone calls ('everyone's personal time is too valuable and too limited'). Her comments are typical: people routinely report they have nothing in common with those in different class levels, and even where they have class in common, they still want to defend private time from the heavy demands of work.

Believing that culture unrelated to business should not waste time at work, the bourgeois use their power to exclude it. Thus, knowledge of genres can be of little if any overt use to them or to others who deal with them. Command of business culture is another matter: all the bourgeois respondents are very articulate and confident and probably respond favourably to the same businesslike manner and competence in others.

Finally, I have discussed differences between the four bourgeois in terms of the cultural intensity of their economic sectors. Another possible source of variation is corporate culture, rooted in the particular history and personnel of a firm as well as its sector. For example, the law firm owner (#40) describes a very businesslike firm, but below we will hear of another law firm with much more room allowed for cultural expression.

Managers and Supervisors

Managers and supervisors have three different kinds of class relations within organizations: upward, downward, and across.

Managers and supervisors get their jobs in part because they share the business culture of their superiors. But for that very reason, they neither need nor expect much interaction with those above them. As respondent #1 says of his superior, he has 'not much to do with him ... if I'm doing my job there's not a lot of reason to have communications with him'. While there were a couple of exceptions, these closer ties were close before the work relationship began, or involved one unusually collegial small law firm. For most managers and supervisors, playing by the same rules as bosses means seeing bosses little and sticking to business when they do; the very culture the two classes share, divides them.

Looking downward, none of our managers and supervisors boss people who in turn boss others. Being at the bottom of the organizational command class, a major part of their work is getting the most out of employees and they stress the importance of good relationships for this purpose. 'You have

only in leisure life. No wonder individuals protect their leisure from work intrusions as firmly as businesses protect their work time from cultural intrusions.

Turning to the question of variations by sector, once again the managers and supervisors follow the bourgeois lead. The degree of cultural expression at work is higher in more culturally intensive sectors where culture is in fact part of work. But only the minimal, essential forms of culture are allowable, so even people in artistic sectors use just the knowledge of strictly relevant genres, even though they have extensive knowledge of others. Thus people in publishing (#3, #34) work with and talk about publications far more extensively than people in other sectors. But, as a manager in a small publishing house says (#34), things are 'very job oriented ... it's a business'. Beyond business discussions there are just some 'icebreakers ... "how's the family?"' and she sees no common interests with co-workers beyond a love of books. A copywriting supervisor in a large department store (#35) reports extensive discussions of periodicals, magazines, and current art (all part of his work), but otherwise 'it's mostly business here. It's not one of those really social places, not a lot goes on'. His work group discusses music a little now, and used to discuss books: it 'depends on the current crop of people'. These evanescent cultural expressions are minor, impermanent features of a primarily business scene; again this respondent has more cultural capital than he sees reason to display at work.

Employees

The three levels of employees must be treated separately given their very different volumes of cultural capital (Table VII) and working conditions.

As professionals, expert employees value the intrinsic aspects of their work and have an appetite for friendly interaction with those who share that work. But as employees in profit-oriented firms, they regretfully accept the prevailing rules as a given to which they must adapt. A corporate information specialist (#38) in a large, engineering-oriented firm describes the prevailing 'strictly business' rules and the necessity of going along ('you have to fit into a mold') but regrets the cultivated conversations he had in earlier jobs in more cultural organizations. Correspondingly, he has some intimates from earlier jobs but none from his current one. For an employee lawyer (#6), relentless work is more readily acceptable because it is a fair price for eventually moving up to bourgeois status as a partner, and perhaps a well-known as well as prosperous litigator. He reports 'there's not much time to chat ... it's busy! Law firms are sweat shops' and his interests shared with people at work are 'only professional'. His only intimate from work was a friend before a colleague, and got him his current job. For a software programmer without such prospects (#36, noted briefly above) the absence of social life at work was an entirely regrettable loss. He speaks enviously of a friend who has 'thank God it's Friday' parties weekly, having fun and getting to know her co-workers. Not only would social life at work be fun, he feels, but it would help his career by letting him show his good qualities to his employer. None of his intimates are co-workers.

to try and motivate them' (#35), 'if they don't respect me they won't do it' (#10), 'everyone helps each other so we must get along' (#9). But at the same time they want to build good ties with as little wasted time as possible - and in any case they do not think that they have much in common with the people they supervise. Thus good relations involve little more than being pleasant in manner and talking a little about universally acceptable subjects. One manager (#22) relies on 'being open for suggestions, don't tell them what to do, ask them how they're doing ... sometimes talk about things outside work'. The most common conversational gambits are: how's the family, how was your weekend, what about the weather, what about those Bluejays. This suffices to show some attention to the employee as a fellow human being, and to make work time more agreeable, but it allows no room for detailed cultural displays. Once again, cultural capital as knowledge of genres is excluded.

Looking across at their peers, managers and supervisors can in principle see people with both business culture and class location in common, hence reasons for more extended socializing at work or away from work. But this generally does not occur. First, some have no accessible peers: six of 13 have no-one at their own level at their own work site. Second, if they have peers they may be too busy and work-oriented to talk widely at work and may never discover any outside interests they have in common. This can be true even when they work in superficially friendly teams, but work in a task-centered mode that leaves no room for cultural displays. Of the eight who do have accessible peers, two have no sociable contact during the work day; three see each other for a lunch or a beer after work but never away from work; two see each other infrequently, often at a low-investment occasion such as a ball game. Just one person (#25), a member of an unusually collegial small law firm, reports intensive social life with peers. They lunch almost daily. 'If any of us has a party or a barbecue, all are invited. We also go to baseball games, movies, dinner, the opera.'

Her case contrasts with the more typical one in which people explicitly prefer to leave their work, and their work colleagues, behind when they enter their own time. We can see this separation of work and private life from the other end as well. Respondents described up to five intimates, that is, people with whom they had discussed important matters. Of all those named, just eight were co-workers. Of those eight, four were named because the 'important matters' discussed were business-related, and two were close contacts before the work relationship began, so only two were general friendships that began in the workplace. People do pick up some friendships with work colleagues, and these accumulate over time, so managers and supervisors reported another nine current intimates who were met through earlier work experiences. But overall, it is rare for current co-workers to be close away from work, so once again cultural communication is simply not happening.

For all those in ownership or management, work tends to be hard and highly focussed, with little room for expression of one's full self. Wide ranging discussions, intimate relationships, and cultural expression are possible

One expert employee (#21) has richer work ties: 'we're all friends and we have a support group' which is a useful informal supplement to the inadequate formal communication channels. Contacts away from work are only occasional, but do occur, and she met two of her intimates through her workplace. It is notable that her workplace is the least private enterprise and most bureaucratic one in her class fraction: she is a hospital administrator. Aside from this rather special case, expert employees in private firms have extensive cultural capital but almost no chance to display it at work. Instead, they show narrowly defined professional skills and businesslike behaviour.

Semi-expert employees are a very mixed group and exemplify most of the themes already described. A partially qualified accountant (#17), intent on upward mobility, limits talk to sports and pleasantries so he can have ties just good enough to get the job done. An ophthalmic dispenser (#8) and a financial planner (#16) both have little work contact with peers or bosses and friendly but very limited talks with a large number of clients. None see much in common with people at work, none have intimates from work. Some others have ample opportunity to talk to co-workers, but do not share any range of interests with them. A sous-chef (#7) working with her hands is free to talk about feminism with colleagues, but other topics must wait until she sees her intimates; a credit union clerk (#31) talks frequently to her one co-worker but almost entirely about work. Thus most semi-expert employees have little chance to share common interests or little of common interest to share. Cultural capital is something in common for those who have it, but cultural capital is shrinking as we go down the class scale. Instead, we increasingly find that people have interests that are hard to share because they involve friends and family (who become interesting to others only after a strong tie has been established) or because they involve minor genres with small audiences (like photography or needlework).

Again there is an enlightening exception. Of the six semi-expert employees, just one (#26) has two intimates from work – a job she likes, in a small publishing house with a supportive climate for interaction. 'It's a team effort; I mean we're all independent, but in such a small place, you have to talk to each other.' Few people, even in the other small firms in our sample, have this combination of intrinsic value for work, ample contact time, and some shared interests.

Proletarian employees often do readily Taylorized work and four out of seven have no chance to talk much with anyone except perhaps an unreciprocative boss. An executive secretary (#5) sees a little of her boss at work and less of anyone else; a school bus driver (#11) works apart from other adults; a corner store clerk (#14) talks daily to her boss about work and exchanges pleasantries with customers; a department store clerk (#39) has no chance for social life with fellow employees who are all on different schedules. None of these see interests in common with co-workers or have any co-workers as intimates. One (#39) has some knowledge of genres, but none have openings for the use of such knowledge at work.

Where employees do have a chance to communicate, they may lack cultural capital. If they have it, they may only share it with their superiors,

who may or may not be willing and appealing social partners. Two employees do get along well with their bosses but have little to do with peers. A courier (#23) in a small firm has low scores on all our cultural capital measures but also has a father who owns two companies. He sees his boss regularly after work, discussing business and politics, but has only brief daytime contacts with fellow couriers and clients. An educated, underemployed mat cutter (#15) also has friendly ties with her boss, but prefers not to make much use of ample opportunity to talk to her peers. 'I mean I'll spend whole days with my walkman on not talking to anyone. In fact being friendly can cause problems – you get some unwelcome advances ... we have nothing in common'. On the other hand, a factory worker (#41) also has a fairly high level of cultural information (especially concerning photography and artists) and his conversations with his intimates range widely. But he has no social contacts with management 'and we're all very happy with that arrangement'. He dislikes management (understandably), refuses to show the 'attitude' necessary for promotion, and in general firmly rejects both bosses and their business culture. At the same time, he reports only one interest in common with co-workers: drugs. So he sees them away from work, shooting pool and visiting each others' homes, but he includes none among his intimates and prefers non-work friends to get 'other outside inputs'. Many working class people do share more interests than this, but the interests shared are not typically high status cultural capital.

In short, proletarians have limited chances and reasons to display cultural capital and build relationships on the job. Often they have limited human contacts. Some of their contacts are on the other side of the great divide between command and obey classes, a gulf usually seen by both sides and regretted by neither. Where contacts are feasible, employees often have little cultural capital to use. The minority who have some capital feel estranged from the majority by it.

Petit Bourgeois

While those in multiple-member firms use little non-business culture and build few social relationships, the petit bourgeoisie use abundant culture to maintain large client networks – but the culture they use is not high status knowledge of genres.

All the petit bourgeois respondents are freelancers who must cultivate large networks of clients and potential clients. As a result, they are both the most frequent and the most articulate users of culture. For example, a freelance journalist (#12) and marketer (#2) both say they are completely dependent on contacts for work and must continually sell themselves. To do so they do not rely on high status culture, nor on any level or genre of culture. Instead they keep up a broad smattering of knowledge in order to *personalize* cultural displays to suit the interests of each potential client. 'I present myself and my work in a way I think they want. You can't just be one box package for everybody ... It really involves being all round' (#12). 'I find it's good to try to know a little something about everything. You don't have to be an expert, but be able to hold a conversation at a party. And re-

member things – what so and so likes ... not how about those Leafs, politics, the weather. Those things are stairways to mediocrity' (#2).

These 'stairways to mediocrity' are of course just the topics cited above as commonplaces within organizations. But organization members either deal with other members in relationships that are given, or else they deal with outsiders but sell a company product that is more standardized or easily evaluated than a freelancer's services. In either case, the relationships need only be smoothed for the job to get done. It is most useful to draw on culture that anyone can use and enjoy, easy and undemanding common currencies. For marketers selling themselves in a competitive marketplace, the common is not good enough to distinguish them from competitors. Yet they cannot afford to distinguish themselves through what Bourdieu calls distinction, because they can only use the forms of culture acceptable to clients.

Further, even freelancers may sell themselves without much use of any culture but business culture – because the self they sell is a business self. A freelance consultant in human resource development (#13) gives employee seminars meant to increase their productivity. Dealing with his employees, his 'conversations are all business-related ... I'm here to work so I work' and he tries to make a favourable impression through 'the kind of behaviours that demonstrate that I am organized, rational, with a set of ethical principles, committed to what I do, trustworthy, and honest'.

CULTURE IN WORK AND LEISURE RELATIONSHIPS

Hardly anyone uses much high status cultural capital while working in private enterprise in Toronto. Each class has a different set of reasons for not using cultural capital, each uses a somewhat different cultural strategy instead, and all these reasons and strategies reinforce each other. Moreover, all these reasons and strategies encourage people to *not* build close ties at work or extend work ties to become close ties away from work. Table VIII gives a more quantitative summary of the qualitative trends discussed above. Again we see that owners minimize sociability at work, managers and supervisors cultivate (superficially) friendly ties with subordinates, and some non-owners (fewer than half) have some social contact with peers at work. But most work ties have no social frills at work, and very few include social contacts away from work. This social separation of work and private life reflects the exclusion of most non-business culture from working time and also reinforces this exclusion. The lack of contact away from work cuts off the richest opportunity to share culture in the field of private life where culture is most fully expressed.

SUMMARY: WHAT IS GOOD TASTE GOOD FOR?

Culture does matter in careers, but cultural capital in the sense of high status culture is of little direct usefulness. Instead, people get along and get ahead by knowing the basic premises of business culture. One premise is the exclusion of culture that 'wastes time' and the (often reluctant) tolerance of culture necessary for getting the job done. Often the necessary, al-

TABLE VIII
CLASS AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS WITH WORK CONTACTS

Panel A: Sociable Contact During the Working Day

Respondent's class	Proportion having contact with:		Superior	Outsider
	Subordinate	Equal		
Bourgeois	.25	.25	.00	.25
Petty bourgeois	.20	.00	.00	.00
Manager, B.A.	1.00	.50	.00	.50
Manager, no B.A.	.33	.33	1.00	.00
Supervisor, B.A.	1.00	.50	.67	.33
Super, no B.A.	1.00	.00	.67	.33
Upper employee	.00	.25	.00	.00
Middle employee	.17	.50	.67	.17
Simple employee	.00	.43	.43	.00

Panel B: Social Contacts away from Work

Respondent's class	Proportion having contact with:		Superior	Outsider
	Subordinate	Equal		
Bourgeois	.00	.25	.00	.00
Petty bourgeois	.00	.00	.00	.00
Manager, B.A.	.00	.50	.00	.00
Manager, no B.A.	.00	.33	.00	.00
Supervisor, B.A.	.00	.33	.50	.17
Super, no B.A.	.33	.00	.00	.33
Upper employee	.00	.25	.00	.00
Middle employee	.17	.17	.00	.33
Simple employee	.00	.43	.43	.00
Whole sample	.05	.25	.18	.10

lowable culture is the minimal common denominator needed to smooth working relationships, the kind summed up in banal inquiries such as 'how's the family?' and how was your weekend?' More culture is allowed if directly required (like knowledge of books in publishing). A wider range is allowed if it helps a freelancer to woo a client, but this range is eclectic and sometimes superficial, not a range of distinguished command of high status genres.

High status culture does play some part in the more socially distinguished segments of the Toronto elite, as any inspection of social columns will show. Thus, the one respondent who does get real mileage out of high status taste is a freelance fund raiser (#32) who maintains her vast and high status network in part through the opera and so on. The distinguished and prosperous are often potential donors. People at this level are hard to reach, and our sample does underrepresent their milieu and the role of cultural capital within it. However, we note that the elite is small – and much of the business elite is not especially distinguished. High status cultural capital also plays some part in particular firms that include it in their corporate culture, but this is not the dominant pattern.

So what is good taste good for? Directly, it is good for the enjoyment of private life. But good taste also comes from some of the same sources that

teach business culture: good taste comes from good families, good education, good friends, good work histories. So good taste can be a market signal for command of business culture, which is very useful indeed. It also tends to go with a wide-ranging exposure to many genres, providing a resource for sociable chat with many kinds of people. If the exposure to multiple genres is superficial, this is of little consequence: the use of cultural knowledge is usually superficial too. After all, one cannot spare the time for deeper exchanges: 'it's a business'.

Indirectly, good taste has some role in careers. High status culture helps people to build high status networks, which provide contacts useful in getting jobs and in doing many kinds of work. Being cultivated also helps people to be articulate and self-confident, very useful traits if melded with business knowledge. We are not arguing that cultural capital has nothing whatsoever to do with success, but rather, that the most immediately useful and consequential form of culture is business culture.

DISCUSSION

If we are right, and high status culture is not of great direct importance in class location in Toronto, how much of Bourdieu's argument must change? Perhaps very little. Business culture may be just as effective a means of class reproduction, if not a more effective one. Its absence from most formal course work makes family origins all the more important. We note that many of our respondents seem to echo the business culture of their parents, that two thirds of self-employed Americans had self-employed parents (Steinmetz and Wright, 1989), and that bourgeois or management positions are often inherited directly rather than through education (Robinson and Garnier, 1985). At the same time confidence and ambition do further educational careers, and the skills fostered by education do contribute to business culture to some degree, so the educational system in general plays a part although a lesser one than for high status culture. Some portions of the educational system play a more direct and powerful part in teaching business culture, for example, studying business at Canadian universities enhances support for the dominant (pro-business) ideology (Baer and Lambert, 1990). The development and use of business culture can fit into individual trajectories in much the same way that Bourdieu argues for high status culture.

Perhaps more important, business culture can be an even better means of 'symbolic violence,' the process in which a dominant class establishes its own culture as the right and natural way, and thereby obscures the fact that the dominance of its culture reinforces its dominance as a class. What could be more natural and appropriate than being businesslike in the business world? This is not class reproduction, surely; it is efficiency, practicality, market necessity, merely and inevitably business. So if people lack this culture, they are not fit and qualified for high position, and this is their own inadequacy rather than any structural obstacle. People do not know, or forget, that work life is conducted differently in other countries, or in cultur-

ally deviant settings such as some co-ops and communes. The definition of natural and inevitable and correct business behaviour has been left to the business world itself, and the definition that has come to prevail just happens to suit the stated interests of those who control businesses.

But one thing does have to change, and that is Bourdieu's emphasis on cultural capital in the singular. He identifies many forms of this capital (for example tastes and possessions) but sees these as manifestations of the same underlying high status culture. The value of this culture varies between social fields, and the culture's contents vary over time, but at a given time cultural capital is cultural capital. While this may be true for centralized France, it is not true for segmented Canada. The field of private enterprise has one dominant culture, business culture, which is cultural capital in that setting. High status culture is the cultural capital of other fields, most obviously academic; Italian culture is essential capital in parts of the construction industry. Much work remains to be done on the origins and nature of dominant cultures in major components of Canadian social structure, as well as on cultural/institutional conflicts such as the business versus academic understandings of the purpose and proper content of education.

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Cultural studies, a sociological poetics: institutions of the Canadian imaginary

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JOHN D. JACKSON *Concordia University**

La poésie sociologique est définie comme problématique pour la sociologie critique de la culture afin de considérer l'avenir du rapport du doublement entre les cultures vécue et officielle à travers les institutions de l'imaginaire canadien anglais. On propose des critiques de la CBC, du développement de la politique culturelle, et des Études canadiennes comme école de pensée.

A critique of the official definition of Canadian culture is presented. Given the distinction between lived and official culture, the question posed is, 'how do we theorize the relations between these two levels for an entire society?' Based principally on Bakhtin's concept of 'dialogism' with references to Dumont and Rioux, a sociological poetics is advanced as a theoretical device for unravelling 'the Canada'. It is argued that cultural studies defined as a sociological poetics must negate any definition of the one Canadian culture or representations of the one Canadian society. Lines of inquiry are suggested with respect to the CBC and Canadian studies as cultural industries.

Culture in Canadian society is presented as the sum of its parts: bilingual, two nations or one nation plus an added culture from a 'distinct society' as well as more than 40 different ethnic groups defined and presumably privileged by a multicultural policy that according to many leads to slow and unyielding encounters with folklorization and racism (Bannerji, 1990). Five great regional cultures are also factored into the equation. All are caught in insurmountable conflicts between centre and periphery under which an almost macabre manipulation is being carried out of aboriginal peoples who are pleading more and more desperately for political, ecological and cultural sovereignty. Within each of these contexts women remain particularly vulnerable to a most insidious form of violence given the absence of cultural, legal, and political controls over their own bodies.

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FINANCIAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN COUPLES:
BREADWINNER FAMILIES AND DOUBLE INCOME FAMILIES

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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA (1991) as represented
by the Minister of National Health and Welfare

FINANCIAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN COUPLES:
BREADWINNER FAMILIES AND DOUBLE INCOME FAMILIES

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Summary: In recent decades there has been a striking change in the relative frequency of breadwinner families and double income families in Canada. Effects of this change on the handling of incomes inside the household need to be clarified. In the study reported here patterns of financial management are described and analyzed for co-resident couples, in three types of families surveyed in Winnipeg in 1988. It is shown that a principal lesson to be learned from sociological research into Canadian families today is an appreciation of differences. Conclusions are drawn about the effects of wives' employment for social equality and social divisions.

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FINANCIAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN COUPLES: BREADWINNER FAMILIES AND DOUBLE INCOME FAMILIES

INTRODUCTION

The report of the Demographic Review entitled Charting Canada's Future states that the most striking change in Canadian families over the past 25 years was the increased proportion of wives working outside the home. In 1961 the distribution of Canadian families by type was dominated by the so-called traditional family (or breadwinnnner/homemaker family), with both spouses present and only the husband working. By 1986 the dominant family type was the double income family, with both spouses present and both spouses working (Health and Welfare Canada, 1989:14).

The nature of this change needs to be understood, in order to evaluate the possibilities that it contains for social progress as well as the issues that it raises for family policy. As an example of the latter, it has recently been noted that the relative decline in the number of families with only one earner, combined with changes to the Income Tax Act, has contributed to a shift in the impact of income taxes since the mid-1960's (Morrison and Oderkirk, 1991). The present report deals with a limited set of issues, that are most relevant to current themes of the Demographic Review.

They include the following topics:

1. Patterns of decision-making within families, including patterns reflecting inequalities and power differences.
2. Consequences for social policy arising from the relationship between needs, resources and transactions within families.

Today the extent of inequality between families and within families are both recognized as important criteria by which social progress should be judged, particularly insofar as they affect the quality of life of women and children. This includes consideration of the effects that different kinds of household economies have upon their members, recognizing that different individuals are not always affected in the same way and that some members may benefit more than others. These issues will be discussed with special reference to the social distribution of home ownership.

RESEARCH ISSUES

Most discussions of breadwinner families and double income families in Canada have focused on the linkage between family and work, and especially on the relationship between unpaid housework (or "domestic labour") and paid employment. There is another issue that also merits attention. This concerns the manner in which family members deploy the financial resources that are acquired from paid employment, in order to meet their needs. It is important to know more about this issue because a long term shift has taken place in the resource base of Canadian families, away from domestic production for use and toward participation in market transactions mediated by money. That shift is still continuing

today, with the increased participation of wives in the labour market being an obvious example.

Within families, how needs are met is affected by the nature of the transactions between family members. Those transactions are embedded in structures of family relations, about which we know surprisingly little. The particular focus of the present study is the relative claims that members of co-resident couples make upon the distribution and management of financial resources inside their households. Those claims constitute forms of possession (Cheal, 1990: 308).

Possession is an effective claim or entitlement to hold a resource, and to control and benefit from its use. The distribution of these entitlements among family members deserves to be better understood (Brannen and Wilson, 1987; Wilson, 1987; Cheal, 1989; Pahl, 1989; Phillips, 1989). For instance, they may be means by which relatively privileged individuals exercise domination over things, and through them over people. Such domination within families is likely to be related to larger patterns of inequality, including gender divisions. In this latter connection, particular concern has been expressed about the status of dependent housewives in breadwinner/homemaker families (Eichler, 1973). It would therefore be interesting to know the degree to which patterns of household financial management in fact vary between breadwinner families and double income families. Eichler (1988: 209) has stated that: "It would be extraordinarily desirable to have some reliable information on how individual members within Canadian families actually spend their money, who manages and who controls the money, and what effects can be discerned with respect to money control depending on whether a family belongs to the two-earner type of family or to the breadwinner type of family".

Household financial decision making takes many forms, and the variety and complexity does not permit easy classification (Laurie and Sullivan, 1991). Nevertheless, it is possible to describe in general terms the forms of possession which are of most interest for studies of historical changes in household economies.

Social scientists have traditionally conceptualized financial entitlement in families primarily in terms of income pooling. Although there has been relatively little research done on this issue, pooling is generally considered to be essential to the functioning of families and to be related to positive family characteristics, such as marital satisfaction and affective involvement with children (Friedman, 1984; Coleman and Ganong, 1989; Wilk, 1989). Pooling is an important factor in the quality of family life, because different members often contribute different kinds and amounts of resources to the household economy, and because some members are highly dependent upon specific contributions from others. That is notably the case for relations between parents and young children, and it can also happen in relations between husbands and wives. The breadwinner/homemaker family is an extreme example of this, in which the husband contributes a "family wage" and the wife contributes domestic labour and personal services.

One observation that has sometimes been made about pooling in households is that possession of particular resources is assigned to certain individuals, who are the recognized "resource keepers" for their families (Wallman, 1984). In practice it seems that the incidence as well as the form of specialized resource keeping varies according to socio-economic position. The extent of specialized possession also seems to have changed over time.

Zelizer (1989) notes that specialization in household financial management - which is exemplified by the system of housekeeping allowances given to homemaker wives by their breadwinner husbands - was most prominent in the USA in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She claims that in the 1930s a new cultural ideal of family finances emerged among the middle classes, which emphasized common access by wives and husbands to money held in joint bank accounts. This was considered to be a more equitable arrangement for pooling resources, which was appropriate to a more democratic family structure. In recent years it seems that the dominant pattern of financial management in the upper middle class in America may have changed again. Hertz (1986) concludes that when husbands and wives both earn large incomes they may decide not to pool them. Instead, they hold their money separately. She argues that this represents a further shift in relationships between the spouses, toward greater equality in individual autonomy of action. Hertz considers this to be an emergent pattern among dual career families.

Clearly there are grounds for believing that patterns of household financial decision making have altered over time, and that these changes are related to the changing position of women in the labour market and inside the family. However, we currently lack reliable demonstrations of such patterns for Canada. More generally, the nature of the available ethnographic and historical evidence is such that it cannot easily be articulated with findings about demographic processes, that are derived from large data sets for national populations. The present study is intended as a first step towards overcoming these problems, through a quantitative analysis of types of families that were surveyed in Winnipeg in 1988. Since this is an exploratory study, methodological procedures deserve some attention.

DATA AND METHODS

In 1988 a small random sample survey of the population of Winnipeg was conducted by the Winnipeg Area Study based at the University of Manitoba, with the author as principal investigator (see Appendix A).¹ The main theme of the Winnipeg Area Study in that year was resources within households, and more specifically the moral economy of sharing in families. Survey items included questions on spousal relationships and on the management of family finances. The research focus of the survey was on intrafamily transactions, and especially transactions between husbands and wives. Data from this survey are being used for detailed study of household

economies, and as well they permit defining a variety of family types.² The major limitation to this database is the small number of cases available when fine-grained specifications of analytical factors are applied.³

TYPOLGY AND EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT

The purpose of the present study is to compare breadwinner/homemaker families and double income families, with a view to detecting important differences between them. However, a straightforward comparison of these two types may not in fact reveal all the important differences that exist, because the category of double income families is itself very diverse. Some double income families have demographic and social characteristics that are more like those of breadwinner families than they are like those of other double income families. That is because the phenomenon of wage earning for wives is not simply a matter of getting more money through having two incomes. Wives' employment also involves defining the meanings of work for women, in relation to the meanings of their roles in family life (Lowe, 1989). As a result, employed wives participate in the labour market in a variety of ways. Some of that variety needs to be taken into account in any empirical research on current economic practices in families.

For present purposes double income families will be subdivided into two types, namely dual earner families and dual career families. This procedure generates a threefold classification of families, as recommended by Dandurand (1988: 138-141).⁴

Contemporary Breadwinnnner/Homemaker Families

The standard image of the breadwinner/homemaker family is that it consists of an independent married couple, in which the husband works full-time for an income to support his family, whereas the wife is not employed outside the home but works as an unpaid caregiver on behalf of her husband and children. Defined in this way, breadwinner families constitute a distinct minority of living arrangements in Canada today (Boyd, 1988; Hofley, 1990).⁵

The image of the traditional breadwinner/homemaker family described above is a conceptual ideal type, from which we can expect to observe some divergence in every historical period. Certainly in the present there are several reasons for thinking that contemporary breadwinner families do not always conform to earlier cultural ideals. For example, in Canada today cohabitation outside marriage is no longer unusual (Turcotte, 1988). There is no reason to suppose that breadwinner families are completely absent from common law relationships, and since the significance of the legal form of marriage is increasingly blurred in practice, common law breadwinner families should not be overlooked.

It is also the case that male employment patterns have been affected by changes in the availability of work. Not every

Canadian male who wants to earn a wage is able to obtain employment. Furthermore, men who are employed may find that part-time work is all that is available to them during certain periods. For these reasons, contemporary breadwinner families are defined as follows:

- a) A couple, both partners present, married or unmarried, and;
- b) The male partner is currently employed full-time or part-time, or is unemployed and looking for work, and;
- c) The male partner has mostly been employed full-time over his lifetime, and;
- d) The female partner is not currently employed, either full-time or part-time, and;
- e) The female partner's current work situation is "keeping house".

Dual Earner Families

Although breadwinner/homemaker families may seem to be logically opposed to the concept of double income families, life course patterns show a more complex picture. Wives in traditional families may work outside the home, usually part-time and usually for short periods, due to financial necessity when the breadwinner is unable to earn an adequate family wage. In Canada, approximately a quarter of employed women work part-time and women's work histories are more variable than those of men, being interrupted by family-related events (Parliament, 1989; Robinson, 1987). As a result, for many employed wives the pattern of participation in the labour market is different from that of their husbands. The concept of the dual earner family used here is intended to recognize that fact. Dual earner families are defined as:

- a) A couple, both partners present, married or unmarried, and;
- b) The male partner is currently employed full-time or part-time, or is unemployed and looking for work, and;
- c) The male partner has mostly been employed full-time over his lifetime, and;
- d) The female partner is currently employed full-time or part-time, or is unemployed and looking for work, and;
- e) The female partner has been employed equally full-time and part-time, or mostly part-time, or mostly not in the labour force, over her lifetime, and;
- f) The family is not a contemporary breadwinner/homemaker family.⁶

Dual Career Families

Viewed from one angle, recent changes in women's work lives appear as a move away from traditional female roles. Viewed from another angle, they appear as a move toward typical male roles. From this latter point of view, it has sometimes been suggested that what is happening in contemporary families is a trend toward the "symmetrical family", in which men and women have identical roles

inside and outside the household (Young and Willmott, 1973). The evidence for and against such a trend has been hotly debated (Lupri and Symons, 1982). However, one thing at least is clear. The symmetrical family in which husbands and wives are both equally committed to full-time occupational careers and also share domestic chores, has become a new cultural ideal to which many middle class women, at least, aspire (Dandurand, 1988). This model of family and work is the basis for the definition of dual career families employed here:

- a) A couple, both partners present, married or unmarried, and;
- b) The male partner is currently employed full-time or part-time, or is unemployed and looking for work, and;
- c) The male partner has mostly been employed full-time over his lifetime, and;
- d) The female partner is currently employed full-time or part-time, or is unemployed and looking for work, and;
- e) The female partner has mostly been employed full-time over her lifetime, and;
- f) The family is not a contemporary breadwinner/homemaker family.

Family Types: Distribution and Characteristics

As expected, double income families constitute the dominant family type in Winnipeg (see Table 1). Dual earner families and dual career families together make up just over half (52 percent) of all households containing married or unmarried couples. By comparison, breadwinner/homemaker families (22 percent) are a distinct minority today. Equally striking is the extent to which the dual career family is now the dominant type of double income family (36 percent of all families, and 69 percent of double income families).

Table 1. FAMILY* TYPES IN WINNIPEG, 1988

<u>Family Type</u>	<u>Winnipeg</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
Breadwinner/Homemaker	22	67
Dual earner	16	49
Dual career	36	110
Other**	26	82
Total percent	100	---
Total N	---	308

* Couples, married and currently living together, or cohabiting in a common law relationship or as live-in partners

** Includes retired (14 percent)

Given the ways in which these three family types have been defined, there are obvious differences between them. In breadwinner/homemaker families 31 percent of respondents stated that they had no personal income at all, whereas all respondents in double income families reported having some income. Among double income families, dual earner families and dual career families differ on the value attached to members' incomes. In dual earner families 98 percent of respondents stated that there was a "main income earner" in the household, whereas 70 percent of respondents in dual career families made the same statement. In this respect dual earner families are much closer to breadwinner/homemaker families than they are to dual career families. In breadwinner/homemaker families 97 percent of couples were identified by respondents as having a main income earner. It therefore appears that the general category of double income families obscures a substantial difference in the meaning attached to earnings, which confirms the value of employing a threefold typology.

HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING

Breadwinner/homemaker families, dual earner families, and dual career families differ with respect to the way in which money is acquired. But do they also differ with respect to the way in which money is handled? That possibility will now be examined with special reference to the research issues mentioned above. Those issues all involve the problem of the relationship between the individual and the family. Are some families better able to provide for their individual members than others? To what extent do contemporary families function as economic units, or have they become atomized so that individuals are now the basic decision making units? Do the interests of some individuals have priority in household decision making, and who benefits the most? And how far do individuals put the interests of other family members before their own economic self interests?

All of these questions give rise to a set of broader sociological questions. They are: How is the individual enjoyment of financial resources shaped by family interactions? Is that changing? And if so, why?

Collective Responsibility or Individual Responsibility

Information from crosscultural and historical studies of household economies suggests that the emergence and expansion of commodity production in modern societies has resulted in the commodification of family relations. That is to say, family processes which increasingly depend upon market transactions mediated by money are more and more effected by them (Cheal, 1987). In particular, it seems that individuals become more oriented towards the egocentric

pursuit of self interest, and they become less committed to traditional forms of collective provisioning such as familial pooling (Anderson, 1971; 1980). It therefore appears that a long term shift is underway in family relations, from a moral economy of mutual aid to a political economy of the rational calculation of utility (Cheal, 1989). The individualism of the latter does not preclude extensive economic cooperation. But where such cooperation does occur it is likely to be as a result of the negotiation of relative costs and benefits between autonomous agents. If an historical transformation of this sort is taking place in urban Canada, then it would be interesting to know how it is related to the changing presences of different family types.

In double income families women as well as men participate in the labour market. The additional income makes possible increased consumption through the purchase of goods and services, that again involve market exchanges. A question that may therefore be asked about double income families in general, and especially about dual career families, is whether they have individualistic relational cultures, in which individuals prefer to handle their money separately for purposes of personal consumption rather than using it to help others meet their needs.

Evidence from the Winnipeg Area Study indicates that the overwhelming majority of people living in families recognize that they have collective responsibilities. However, in most cases that recognition is tempered by a sense of individual responsibility, that limits the extent to which people are prepared to sacrifice their own interests for others. There is also a suggestion in the data that people living in breadwinner/homemaker families are more collectivistic, and people living in dual career families are more individualistic.

Couples in Winnipeg state an overwhelming preference for seeing their individual incomes as collective resources. Winnipeg Area Study respondents who had an income in 1987 were asked if they felt it was their own income or a family income. Almost all (98 percent) of members of breadwinner/homemaker families said that it was a family income; 94 percent of dual earner family members said that it was a family income; and 93 percent of dual career family members also said they considered it to be a family income.

Stronger differences between the three family types appear in responses to a question asking people if they spend more time thinking about other people's needs than about their own. Fifty (50) percent of respondents in breadwinner/homemaker families either agreed or strongly agreed. However, only 41 percent of respondents in dual earner families agreed or strongly agreed; and just 37 percent of respondents in dual career families agreed or strongly agreed that they spend more time thinking about others' needs.

Money Pots: His, Hers and Theirs

Collective responsibility and individual responsibility are encouraged and facilitated by different kinds of financial

arrangements. Collectivism is reinforced by the use of unsegregated financial instruments, such as joint bank accounts. On the other hand, individuality is more easily achieved through having a personal bank account. At issue here are important questions concerning the degree of economic and social differentiation in contemporary families, that deal with the choices people make about family unity and personal liberation (Cheal, 1992). Is "family money" treated as a fungible resource, or is it divided into "special monies" to which husbands and wives have separate entitlements?

In Winnipeg four out of five couples have a joint account at a bank or similar financial institution (i.e. credit union or trust company). This is the case for all three family types. However, a detailed investigation into banking practices reveals some interesting differences.

Many people in Winnipeg (76 percent of those who use a chequing or savings account) use more than one such account. These multiple accounts are used to handle different kinds of money, that come from different sources or that are intended for different purposes. Analysis of money management in families therefore needs to go beyond the simple presence or absence of a joint account, to include the various ways in which individuals use different accounts.

All three family types that were investigated in the Winnipeg Area Study have almost identical numbers of joint accounts, averaging 1.6 per respondent. However, they differ in preferences for having additional personal accounts, which range from a mean of 0.5 per respondent in breadwinner/homemaker families to a mean of 1.2 per respondent in dual earner families. As a result, the relative importance of joint accounts in money management is very different between the three family types. For 63 percent of individuals in breadwinner/homemaker families their only account with a financial institution is a joint account. In contrast, maintaining only joint accounts is practiced by less than half of individuals from dual career (48 percent) or dual earner (44 percent) families. Least likely to report having individual accounts are women in breadwinner/homemaker families, and most likely to report having individual accounts are men in dual earner families (means of 0.2 and 1.4 respectively).

Joint accounts are clearly very important for financial transactions between couples in Winnipeg, outnumbering personal accounts by a mean of 1.5 to 0.9 per respondent. As noted, they are especially important in breadwinner/homemaker couples (with means of 1.6 joint accounts and 0.5 personal accounts per respondent).

Table 2. CHEQUING AND SAVINGS ACCOUNT USE FOR THREE FAMILY TYPES

	<u>Joint Accounts Used (Means)</u>	
	<u>Both Deposit</u>	<u>Both Withdraw</u>
Breadwinner/Homemaker	0.7	1.3
Dual earner	1.1	1.5
Dual career	1.3	1.4

Significantly, joint accounts appear to be used not only to create a family fund, but also for the purpose of internal financial redistribution. In dual career families the mean number of accounts into which both partners make deposits is similar to the mean number of accounts from which both partners make withdrawals. This suggests that the partners access their joint accounts in similar ways. The situation is not the same in dual earner families or, especially, in breadwinner/homemaker families. In the latter families joint accounts appear designed to facilitate shared use of a family wage, through asymmetric deposits and withdrawals (see Table 2).

Entitlements to hold money, such as in a bank account, and to engage in consumption by withdrawing money to purchase goods and services are useful indicators of participation in financial resource management. However, they do not tell us everything we need to know about variations in financial practices. That is because family members may exercise their financial rights frequently or infrequently, depending on the extent to which they are involved in actual day-to-day decision making.

Financial Resource Flows

In survey research it is not possible to observe daily financial activities. However, it is feasible to record the major ways in which incomes are used. In the 1988 Winnipeg Area Study a number of questions were asked about financial resource flows in couples. The concept of financial resource flow refers to the continuous process by which money or other financial resources; a) flow into the household (for example, in the form of individual incomes); b) flow through the household (where they may be subdivided, pooled, redistributed, etc.); and c) flow out of the household (usually, but not exclusively, through the purchase of consumer goods). There are numerous variations in this process, which may be an interesting fact in itself. For present purposes it is useful to describe certain general features of financial resource flow that pertain to issues of social inequality. These features are defined as three factors, referred to here as control, access, and agency.⁷

Control

An interesting issue from the point of view of concepts of the individual and the family is the way in which earnings are handled, and how this may be related to current trends of individualization (Jones, Marsden and Tepperman, 1990; Cheal, 1991). To what extent do individuals with independent incomes living as couples retain personal control over their incomes?

Table 3. PERSONAL CONTROL OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME BY FAMILY TYPE

<u>Control</u>	<u>Family Type</u>		
	<u>Breadwinner*</u>	<u>Dual earner</u>	<u>Dual career</u>
	%	%	%
Low	14	15	8
Medium	53	50	73
High	33	35	19
Total percent	100	100	100
Total N	43	48	107

* Respondents with no income excluded.

In this study personal control over individual incomes was measured as ranging from low (the individual's earnings are managed by another household member) through medium (management of individual income is shared with another household member) to high (the individual is virtually solely responsible for managing his/her own income). In a clear majority of families some control over individual income is ceded to others, and medium control is the modal situation (see Table 3). However, there is an interesting difference here between family types. In dual career families practically three quarters of respondents report having medium control over their individual incomes, whereas the proportion having a high degree of control is comparatively much smaller. We noted above that members of these families are somewhat more individualistic than others, and the lesser degree of personal control here is not likely due to altruistic motives. Rather, it is probably the result of a balanced reciprocity of income control, that is negotiated between individuals whose incomes are close in size. Presumably this balancing is on occasion reinforced by situational definitions which preclude identifying any one person as a main income earner.

Access

We have seen that conditions exist for substantial income sharing in families of all types, that are facilitated by the widespread use of joint accounts and that are made possible by individuals relinquishing some degree of control over the day-to-day management of their earnings. These micro-sociological characteristics of families are important from a macro-economic point of view, as they are part of the social construction of consumption (Cheal, 1990). They help to generate the circulation of money that is needed for extensive participation in the market transactions of a consumer society (Langlois, 1990).

Unlike the situation in single person households, control over individual income gives an incomplete picture of financial participation in couples. That is because in a couple each individual potentially has access not only to her/his own income, but also to the income of another person. This is a particularly important consideration in breadwinner/homemaker families, where housewives who have no income of their own depend upon access to a family wage supplied by the man.

Table 4. ACCESS TO TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY FAMILY TYPE

<u>Access</u>	<u>Family Type</u>		
	<u>Breadwinner</u>	<u>Dual earner</u>	<u>Dual career</u>
	%	%	%
Minimum	19	25	19
Medium	6	6	13
Maximum	75	69	68
Total percent	100	100	100
Total N	64	49	107

The best global measurement of financial participation in families is achieved by taking into account each individual's overall access to total household income from all sources. As viewed from the point of view of the respondent, degree of access to total household income ranges from a minimum (where the majority of household income is managed by someone else) to a maximum (where the respondent either manages most of the income him/herself, or joins in using a common fund into which the majority of household income is put).

In Winnipeg the majority of families of all types engage in substantial income sharing, whatever their other differences may be (see Table 4). Breadwinner /homemaker families appear to engage in the most extensive income sharing, which enables these families to function under conditions of great income inequality. Perhaps the

most interesting finding here is that the proportion of respondents in breadwinner/homemaker couples who report having only minimum access to household income is no greater than in dual earner or in dual career couples. It is also worth noting that the proportion of female partners who have only minimum access to household financial resources is slightly lower overall than that for male partners. The relative frequency of having only minimum access to household income is lowest of all for women in breadwinner/homemaker families (16 percent).

Agency

Access to the resources that are necessary to get things done is an important precondition for agency, that is to say the capacity of individuals to act as agents who construct their own lives (Giddens, 1979). However, the ability of individuals to get things done does not depend only on their own resources. It also depends upon the compliance of others, and therefore to some degree upon power relations. It has been argued that the balance of power in social life is influenced by inequality in access to resources, and that this includes economic power in families (Blumberg and Coleman, 1989).

In the 1988 Winnipeg Area Study the level of inequality of financial resources within households was coded into three categories. Entitlements to household income were considered to be equal if; either, members had equal access to a common fund into which incomes were paid, or incomes were divided and apportioned equally. A low level of inequality was judged to exist if there was some specialization of entitlements (e.g. each managing his/her own income, or each managing a designated portion of the total household income) and as well the amount of money available to each member was somewhat different. A high level of inequality was considered to exist when income entitlements were specialized and they also differed greatly in amount (e.g. at the extreme, one resource keeper handles all the household's financial resources).

The most striking finding about economic agency in Winnipeg families is of their dualism. Families in Winnipeg are polarized between virtual equality and high inequality (see Table 5). This pattern exists for all family types, but with significantly different results by type. The majority of dual career families are egalitarian with respect to income possession, whereas the majority of breadwinner/homemaker families and, especially, of dual earner families are highly inegalitarian. Once again, it is worth pointing out how very different dual earner families and dual career families can be.

Table 5. ECONOMIC AGENCY BY FAMILY TYPE

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Family Type</u>		
	<u>Breadwinner</u>	<u>Dual earner</u>	<u>Dual career</u>
	%	%	%
Equal	44	33	52
Unequal	5	6	9
Highly unequal	51	61	39
Total percent	100	100	100
Total N	64	49	107

SOCIAL ISSUES

From the information presented in this report we may conclude that there is considerable, if uneven, economic cooperation in families of all types. Contemporary Canadian families continue to act as viable economic units in most cases, although often in very different ways. Yet this does not mean that all families are equally successful in achieving their goals. Nor does it mean that all families automatically benefit every member in the same way, or to the same degree. These points will be considered briefly here with respect to home ownership, considered as a form of domestic property.

Property

Property is a set of publicly recognized rights to use a thing as well as, in most cases, rights to exclude others from using it (Macpherson, 1978). Domestic property includes rights to buildings and land, tenure rights for tenants, and rights to income to maintain a home (Fletcher, 1976). The distinctive focus of the present study is on the microstructural analysis of property relations within households.⁸

Property rights whereby some people have preferential use of a thing, whereas others can be denied use of it, inevitably produce inequalities of opportunity and of condition. The principal social issues here therefore usually concern the nature and extent of stratification (Hollowell, 1982). The stratification approach has been applied to studies of social divisions in the ownership of domestic property such as housing, although such analyses have not often taken into account family type or gender (Saunders, 1978; Pratt, 1982; Harris, 1986). Pratt (1986) reports that there is an association between home ownership and double income households in Canada, and that in a small Vancouver sample one third of renters

rejected both home ownership and dual wage earning because it compromised their vision of the ideal family environment.

Ownership of assets acquired before marriage, or inherited during marriage, is relatively unimportant for most married couples in this study compared with the homes they have purchased together out of current income. It is therefore to be expected that breadwinner/homemaker families, dual earner families, and dual career families will not have the same probabilities of acquiring property. The average (mean) gross household income of breadwinner/homemaker families in Winnipeg in 1988 was \$43,127; that of dual earner families was \$50,420; and that of dual career families was \$51,065. Not surprisingly, these three family types are also unequal with respect to home ownership. Among breadwinner/homemaker families, 73 percent live in homes that are owned by a member of the household. Ninety (90) percent of dual earner families, and 84 percent of dual career families live in dwellings that are owned by a household member.

Contemporary breadwinner/homemaker families in Winnipeg differ from other families in their milieu not only with respect to levels of home ownership, but also with respect to their internal distribution of property rights. In Canada, matrimonial property relations are on the whole egalitarian (Hobart, 1975). In particular, the majority of privately owned residences are jointly owned by couples. However, the prevalence of this arrangement is not the same for all types of families. It is at its highest among dual career families, and it is lowest among breadwinner/homemaker families. Ninety five (95) percent of home owning dual career couples in Winnipeg own their homes jointly. By comparison, 90 percent of home owning dual earner couples, and 87 percent of home owning breadwinner/homemaker couples are joint owners.

Sole owners of houses may be men or women, but this form of ownership is gender related because it is structured by position in the family. Male homeowners are more likely than female homeowners to be sole owners (12 percent vs. 6 percent). Among male homeowners in breadwinner families in Winnipeg 19 percent are sole owners. In dual earner families 9 percent of male homeowners are sole owners. And in dual career families only 5 percent of male homeowners are sole owners.

DISCUSSION

The present study has described three family types - the breadwinner/homemaker family, the dual earner family, and the dual career family - between which there are significant differences. This study reinforces the conclusion, which has been expressed in many other places, that today we can no longer talk about the family, but we can only talk about families in the plural (Vanier Institute of the Family, 1981; Cheal, 1991).

In the current environment of social pluralism it is important to take account of historically determined differences, and to keep in mind that policies which are designed to assist one type of

family may not benefit other types of families (Eichler, 1987:76). Talking about breadwinner/homemaker families and double income families, and the trend toward the latter, Eichler has stated that:

Nevertheless, we will continue to have a mix of both types of families for at least another generation. It is likely that many families will shift from the one type to another.... In other words, it is highly likely that we will continue to live in a society where different families conform to different economic patterns. This being the case, it is highly important that any policy analysis clarify whether a particular policy or programme serves a breadwinner type of family, a two-earner type of family, neither, or both. (Eichler, 1988:139).

It deserves to be more widely understood that claims which are sometimes made, that double income families are the new norm, can be dangerous (Moore, 1989). That is because the implicit assumption that family life can be described by one simple trend may lead to the neglect of other types of families, both in policy research and in policy formation. Breadwinner/homemaker families still exist in Canada today. It is therefore necessary to understand what the economic and social conditions are of women in those families. This point has been illustrated in the present report for patterns of home ownership. The implications of those patterns for future research into economic effects of changing forms of family will now be described.

In recent decades there has been a large change in the proportional distribution of breadwinner families vs. double income families in Canada. From the evidence presented here it seems possible that this change has had two related effects. First, since double income families have higher levels of home ownership, and their patterns of ownership are more egalitarian, the trend toward this type of family should have encouraged the diffusion of property rights, benefiting both men and women but especially the latter. Second, this progressive development appears to have a contradictory effect upon families which maintain more traditional social forms. Since contemporary breadwinner/homemaker families have lower levels of home ownership, and their patterns of ownership are less egalitarian, the trend toward double income families must have created a relative deprivation for individuals in these families, and especially for women. Among female partners in dual career couples in Winnipeg 87 percent are homeowners, and in dual earner families 83 percent own their own homes. In breadwinner/homemaker families 78 percent of female partners are homeowners.

CONCLUSION

The effects of changing patterns of work upon comparative resource possession deserve greater attention. This should include recognizing the opportunities that exist for greater equality between women and men, and also the possibility of greater inequality among women.

NOTES

1. The 1988 Winnipeg Area Study was directed by Raymond F. Currie, who also contributed his expertise to the questionnaire design. He does not bear any responsibility for the conclusions or interpretations presented in this paper, which are the author's own.
2. Computer assistance was provided by Glen Koroluk and Jo-Ann Trudeau.
3. More extensive analyses of the issues raised here would require a large database, such as might be produced by a national panel survey of households (Bernard et al., 1988).
4. Dandurand (1988) proposes three types of families, which she calls the "homemaker/provider family", the "double income family" and the "symmetrical family". These three types correspond to the "breadwinner/homemaker family", the "dual earner family" and the "dual career family" described in this study.
5. In Winnipeg in 1988 only 14 percent of households containing more than one adult fit the description of a traditional breadwinner family. The proportion counted as living a traditional family life is increased somewhat - to 18 percent - if the past work experiences of people who are presently retired are also taken into account.
6. The operational measures of contemporary breadwinner/homemaker families, dual earner families and dual career families used here are not mutually exclusive for the small number of cases (n=8) in which female partners are currently unemployed and looking for work and also describe their current work situation as "keeping house". How these ambiguous cases should be classified depends on which of these two criteria the respondent herself considers to be most important. In the absence of that information these cases were assigned to the breadwinner/homemaker category, on the grounds that keeping house is currently the most salient work experience.
7. The reliability of the measures for control, access and agency was tested by including identical questions in the 1988 Edmonton Area Study. Gratifyingly, the frequency distributions of the three financial resource flow variables were very similar for the two populations, which suggests that the analysis reported here is robust (see Appendix B).
8. For a description of the microstructural approach in sociology see Risman and Schwartz (1989).

APPENDIX A

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Population Sampling

The population for the 1988 Winnipeg Area Study was designated as all dwelling units that were listed in the 1987 assessment file for the city of Winnipeg. The list was up to date to within one percent of the existing dwellings in the city. A systematic random sample of 753 addresses was selected for personal interviewing from a computerized list of addresses compiled by the Environmental Planning Office, City of Winnipeg, for the 1987 assessment. Nursing homes and temporary residences were excluded from the sample. A second sample of 100 addresses was also selected, and randomly ordered. This second sample was used later as the source of replacement when necessary.

The household was the primary sampling unit. Gender, age and residency were the selection criteria used to choose a respondent within each of the households.

Interviewing

A random predesignation of each household as either male or female was recorded on the front of the interview. Interviewers were instructed as follows:

1. If the person answering the door was of the gender specified for that address, only that person could be interviewed.
2. If the person answering the door was not of the gender specified for that address, the person was asked to choose an individual of the appropriate gender in the household. No guidelines were to be given by the interviewer for this selection. No substitutions were permitted if the selected person refused.
3. If there was no individual of the specified gender living at the address, the respondent could only be the person who answered the door.
4. An eligible respondent was someone 18 years of age or older, and who resided at that address.
5. Interviewers were instructed to visit a residence at least eight times before listing it as a noncontact.

Success Rate

Addresses were replaced in 87 cases. They were replaced if the household was known to be vacant during the survey period; or no contact was made with the household in spite of a minimum of 8 visits; or if the respondent was judged to be ineligible.

Ineligible respondents included those with limited or no knowledge of English; addresses that were not residences; or cases of respondent incapacity, i.e. deaf, ill, too confused to understand questions.

The final sample consisted of 732 residences (753 planned minus 21 that were not replaced due to time constraints). Interviews were completed in 528 residences, for a response rate of 72.1 percent of eligible households.

APPENDIX B

FINANCIAL RESOURCE FLOW VARIABLES: WINNIPEG AND EDMONTON

Table B. 1. PERSONAL CONTROL OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME* BY CITY

<u>Control</u>	<u>City</u>			
	<u>Winnipeg</u>		<u>Edmonton</u>	
	%	N	%	N
Low	10	34	9	26
Medium	53	183	54	159
High	37	126	37	111
Total percent	100	---	100	---
Total N	---	343	---	296

* Respondents with no income excluded

Table B. 2. ACCESS TO TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY CITY

<u>Access</u>	<u>City</u>			
	<u>Winnipeg</u>		<u>Edmonton</u>	
	%	N	%	N
Minimum	21	77	21	64
Medium	17	64	14	44
Maximum	62	233	65	201
Total percent	100	---	100	---
Total N	---	374	---	309

Table B. 3. ECONOMIC AGENCY BY CITY

<u>Agency</u>	<u>City</u>			
	<u>Winnipeg</u>		<u>Edmonton</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>
Equal	37	139	39	122
Unequal	14	54	12	37
Highly unequal	49	181	49	150
Total percent	100	---	100	---
Total N	---	374	---	309

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ORIGINS OF THE MODERN FAMILY, CHANGING SEX
ROLES, AND DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR IN CANADA

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Introduction

It is apparent that World War II has brought about dramatic changes in the family life of most of the Western countries and Canada is no exception to this. Apart from the many other factors, many of the changes can be traced to the participation of women in the labour force. Statistics show that the labour force participation of Canadian married women has increased considerably since World War II, from 4.5% in 1941 to 20.8% in 1961, to 37% in 1971, to 50.2% in 1981 and to 54.7% in 1985. With such a large number of women working away from home, the problem of managing a family naturally demands major adjustments. The employed women have been finding less and less time to handling the household work which normally belonged to them.

The relations between families and their effect on the Canadian economy have naturally to be studied to understand the effect that has been brought about by World War II. In this context, we have to examine the problem from a historical perspective since the diversity of Canadian family economic patterns is the outcome of a number of complex factors observed since their early settlement. In order to appreciate the changes in the current economic position of women, it is necessary to understand the past, since these changes are possibly responses to new social and economic constraints. An examination of the changes undergone by the family over the decades may reveal the development of the wage-labour economy and how industrialization affected the Canadian social organization.

The purpose of this paper is to review the changes in housework patterns in selected western countries, including Canada, over the decades. One would like to understand the extent of participation between the husband and wife in domestic chores both in the modern families and the traditional ones. An

explanation of the changing levels of participation in housework on the basis of other factors such as attitudes towards familial sex roles and perceptions of domestic skills, will be attempted. Other factors such as race, religion, education and income and their effect on sex role attitudes in the home will also be examined.

It may be argued that any attempt to understand the division of labour at home in the traditional and the modern families must be done by the use of a comprehensive theoretical framework. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that symbolic interactionism can be used as a theoretical approach for the explanation of different levels of participation between the spouses in domestic work. How socioeconomic and cultural factors account for the varying sex role in household work are also explained. Traditional and modern attitudes are found to be responsible in varying degrees for the spouse's family roles. The extent to which an individual participates in the housework points out their traditional or modern family attitudes.

Origins of The Modern Family

A historical perspective is helpful in understanding the Canadian families and economics before one can examine the more recent relations between families and the Canadian economy. This is because diversity in Canadian family economic patterns is not only a modern phenomenon but is affected by a complex set of factors that have arisen through the early years of settlement. The making of a modern family has undergone considerable differences from the concept of the nuclear family considering of fathers, mothers and children and cannot any longer be taken as a pre-given unit but a set of relations constructed in history (Gilding, 1991).

The meaning of family has undergone conflicting connotations in the course of the 20th century, in view of the many changing social practices. While in mid-twentieth century, the nuclear family was considered as the most widespread, the increasing practices of divorce, informal cohabitation, children born out of wedlock and new reproductive technology have introduced new complexities in its meaning. There are households, including children born out of wedlock adopted by 'respectable' families, others including aging parents and lodgers, broken families where women brought up children on their own, men and women living with homosexual partners, and so on, which reflect the conceptual limitations of the old definition. Birth control, which was regarded as a threat to 'the value of the family as the basis of social life' around 1900, had been described as a feature of American life by social scientists by the 1950's. They even made a distinction between large and small families and recognised divorce as a new threat to the family, resulting in 'broken families'. The idea of 'one-parent families' was made by the 1960's as a consequence of these broken homes. Statistics Canada recognised the growth of informal cohabitation and illegitimate births in the 1970's and included unmarried couples and illegitimate children in their definition of family. The 1970's also saw the new reproductive technology come into existence, necessitating a new legal definition involving the evaluation of the relative significance of egg, sperm, womb and post-natal care. The definition of family has come far away from the nuclear concept (Gilding, 1991).

The process of industrialization affected the roles of men, women, and children and also helped transform the social organization. In Canada, the structure of the family following industrialization underwent substantial

changes due to urbanization and increasing use of machinery for production in place of handicrafts. The contributions of men, women and children to the Canadian economy in its pre-industrial setting, was largely replaced by those of factories and agricultural businesses, where women and children had relatively little part. This development amounted to a social reorganization and contributed to new ideals, new legislation, and new institutions, all of which related to the place of the family in society (Gaffield, 1984).

The economic role of the family underwent a profound change following industrialization. Whereas men, women and children contributed to the economy and the material security of the family by doing the work associated with their age and gender before industrialization set in, the growth of the manufactories and the trend towards centralised production made them take more and more, a supplementary aspect of the economy. This led to wage labour in place of collective labour and family economics to family wage economics. This meant the family economy consisted of pooled wages instead of pooled labour of the family members. Employment outside the home often drove several family members to go to contribute to the family's security and this interdependency of the family members continued to make the families as economic units (Gaffield, 1984).

The separation of home and work began with the growth of manufactories. The emergence of wage-labour economy contributed to it and work took the meaning of wage labour only. Domestic chores such as cooking and cleaning did not come under the definition of work any more but only paid employment (Tilly and Scott, 1978).

Housework in the traditional families was recognised as an important part of the family economy, and levels of domestic participation of the

spouses in the traditional families and the modern families became matters of interest. The allocation of housework and an explanation of the division of household tasks involves many factors, including attitudes towards familial sex roles and perceived housework skills. The role of changing sex roles in the traditional and modern families is a subject of great interest and is taken up for discussion next.

Changing Sex Roles

The role of a wife and mother has been regarded in Canadian society as one of prime importance, to the stability of home and the society. The Canadian 'ideal' was a mother devoted full time to her husband and children, rather than one working outside of the home. Although this ideal is not in conformity with the proportion of working women in Canadian society, these ideals still provide a role model, as seen in media advertisements, and school books.

However, noticeable changes have taken place in the role behaviours of women in the last two decades and these changes are not restricted to any specific subgroups in the population. The greater educational achievements and the increasing employment among them have created reduced desire for early marriage and parenthood. The seventies have shown this trend and the acceptance of the non-traditional gender-role to a marked degree.

It is not clear, however, whether women adopted the non-traditional attitudes due to changing gender roles or whether the latter resulted in the adoption of non-traditional attitudes. There is a probability that "prior attitudes affect subsequent employment and work experience shapes often sex role attitudes" (Macke et al., 1978). The studies of causal priority of either attitudes or behaviour have not given definite answers.

Evidence points out that women are as capable as men in achieving higher degrees and publishing papers and an American study (Graham 1970: 1285) claimed that women doctorate holders had somewhat greater academic ability than their male counterparts. There is, however, a counterclaim by an Australian report (Bramley and Ward, 1976: 21-22) that married women had difficulties combining home and work roles as well as doing research. However, there is a possibility of role conflict in the women against the commonly held belief that those working outside the home fulfil generally low status positions. Sometimes, women themselves place limitations on their own career prospects due to sociological constraints and psychological ones as well (Jones and Lovejoy, 1980). An Australian study found that relationships between attitudes and perceptions are influenced by age, sex and marital status. Older and married male respondents, in general, were found to hold negative attitudes towards women academics (Jones & Lovejoy, 1980).

Although in a recent study of 318 Australian women, the majority still showed preference to the traditional role, some women wanted alternatives, which were few in view of their desire to satisfy the traditional family demands first. There are still indications in a more recent study clearly showing a trend away from tradition. The attitudes towards household duties, divorce and job equality show a greater liberalism in women than in men. Both women and men felt that the same grounds for divorce should apply for both and that divorced men should be required to pay alimony towards support of their children, if their wives lacked the capability (Rowland, 1980). The entry of women into traditional male occupations was welcomed by men but the women did not agree so readily for men's entry into the traditional female

occupations. Regarding the question of job equality there was general agreement.

The sharing of domestic duties such as cooking meals and washing dishes etc. was agreed to by both men and women but there was some conflict of opinion among the women about men staying home and caring for the children, while their wives went to work. It was unacceptable to men indicating opposition to any radical role-reversal, although about 26.8% of men did agree to this suggestion (Rowland, 1980).

The working wife does seem to affect the spouse's attitude towards division of labour in the domestic context. It makes it difficult for him to oppose sharing of household duties, and indeed, compels him to change his views about their relative roles in the family. The higher her earnings and the more dependent the family is on them, the more likely are the changes in their attitudes. The change in the woman's role may have gradual but permanent effects on the order of current sex role attitudes and current employment behaviour. A recent study shows that the wives' current employment status and earnings affected the perceptions of the husbands' decision-making powers, while they had no effect on the wives' perceptions. There is further evidence to show that more than the wives' current employment status, it is the wives' earnings that affect the perceptions of the husbands' decision-making power. The longer their work attachment and the higher their earnings, the less housework they do relative to that done by their husbands (McDonald, 1990).

One comes to the conclusion based on the above findings that attitude and behaviour changes have their basis in practical rather than ideological grounds. Nicely developed ideologies occur mainly among intellectuals and

academics (Converse, 1964). Wives take up market work because the family needs money and the husbands do some housework to keep the home going. It is this that brings about approval of wives' employment and any idea that it causes children harm takes the back seat.

However, where issues less closely related to women's employment are concerned, men's attitudes suddenly change. For example, men are not likely to change their attitude towards abortion, although for family comfort, they accept the women's market work. Practically speaking, it is not necessary that decision-making become more equal between the spouses consequent on women's labour-force participation. It is possible that in order that decision-making and division of labour become more equal, changes other than sex-role attitudes have to occur in their lives, that force them to face these problems. A divorcee, for example, used to decision-making on her own for a long time may continue to do so even after her remarriage (Social Faces, Sept. 1981).

It is interesting to note that the household behaviours and attitudes are no more affected by wives' work attachment and earnings, than by their current employment. This means that married couples have a fair amount of reluctance towards changing the household norms and behaviour. For a husband in any case, the tendency to maintain the household norms should be overwhelming as he has a lot to gain by having a woman catering to all his household needs. Whether this means that the current division of household duties remains fixed for all time is a question for future investigation.

Another important recent inquiry concerns the role of religion on sex-role attitudes. There is enough evidence to point out that the strongest factor in defining the attitudes and behaviour relating to home, community,

as well as social and political issues is religious devoutness (Morgan, 1987). A greater devoutness to religion leads to greater leaning towards traditionalism in sex-role attitudes. It has been concluded by Thornton and Friedman (1979) by a study over a 15 year period (1962-1977), that the changes in sex-role did not affect all religious groups equally, the fundamentalists showing greater conservatism and traditionalism in sex-role attitudes than the others. The same survey found that Jewish women showed a differential shift relating wholly to decision-making. By 1977, practically all Jewish women disagreed with man's role as a decision-maker in the family. The shift towards equality was more noticeable in relation to universal items of role segregation and division of authority within the home than to particular aspects such as sharing of housework or the propriety of outside the home activities for mothers. These were further affected by age, education of the respondents and their husbands, and those who were working (Thornton & Friedman, 1979).

In a more recent study of Thornton et al. (1983), an 18-year (1962-80) panel study of women and their children are subjected to comparison of attitudes across generations. The investigation covers the extent to which the mother's education, work, fertility, marital history, age, religion and religiosity influence their own attitude and those of her children, as well as the extent of change, the sex-role attitudes produce in education, employment, fertility and religiosity. The results show that on the whole, the women are less traditional in 1980 than in 1977 and this trend may likely continue. A decrease in the trend towards rejection of all specialization and division of labour is indicated and women's labour force participation appears to influence, as well as, be influenced by sex-role attitudes. Women

who believe that their role is centred about home are less likely to take up paid employment, while outside work tends to change sex-role attitudes. It was interesting to note that having a large family did not strengthen traditional attitudes; if anything, they lead to a desire for a greater involvement of the husbands in housework and childcare and put pressure for the weakening of traditional patterns of specialization. The children's attitudes were influenced modestly by the mother's own attitudes and her experiences and behaviour. The intergenerational analysis leads to the observation that young people today approached adulthood with very different conceptions of what is appropriate and desirable than their parents (Thornton, 1983).

Another study of American sex-role attitudes (1972-75) by Cherlin and Walters (1981) indicated that white men exhibited as much change in the egalitarian direction as white women between 1972 and 1978, and by 1978, the white men's sex-role attitude resembled those of white women and they also became more consistent between 1972 and 1975. This consistency was not the result of liberal-conservative political attitudes either. Black men and women's sex-role attitudes showed no significant changes between 1972 and 1978 (Cherlin and Walters, 1981).

Division of Labour Among Modern and Traditional Families

The traditional notions of male and female roles faced a challenge with the emergence of the feminist movement in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The notion of paid employment for men and the unpaid domestic role for women, which was the traditional pattern, and which formed the 'natural' division of labour, was strongly opposed by the feminists and with more and more women taking up work outside home, the traditional sex roles were no longer

appropriate. The emergence of the feminist movement brought about the realization that the role of wife, mother and domestic servant should not constitute women's entire universe (Oakley, 1974).

Domestic labour became a focus of attention among the feminist and non-feminists alike and it came to be realised that until the unpaid work at home came to be acknowledged as having an equal status as work done in market economy, there could be no equality among the sexes. Even with an increased participation of men in household work, it rarely comes close to that of women. If some fathers take up a more active role in parenting, would such changes in distribution of power mean a net loss of power for women? Such questions arise if men try to appropriate an area previously held by women. As long as women's position in the labour force is mostly in the lower status jobs, there is no power gain in the public realm to compensate for men's appropriation of domestic control. Thus women may add a new dimension of patriarchal control in their lives. The only sphere where such appropriation of control, is not possible for men is one of childbirth (Oakley, 1974).

According to Baker and Bakker (1980), men who wish to assume more domestic responsibilities face some structural problems. Even if men are under some pressure to loosen the traditional role of primary breadwinner, there are still expectations of this kind from them and they are rewarded for success in the labour force. This puts the men in a peculiar situation where in spite of their desire to change, they are not allowed to. "The priorities and values of other people affect even personal arrangements and lack of institutional support makes such personal changes difficult" (Baker and Bakker, 1980:552). A decision by the Canadian men to pursue non-traditional

roles in the family may result in their giving up the rewards like money and power.

Hunt and Hunt (1977) have argued that sexual equality can never obtain in a dual-career family, because the institutional constraints work in opposition to it. The present labour force-family structure is based on a single male income model in which the two-income family cannot function smoothly. They further argue that in the present socio-economic system the dual-career family is intrinsically problematic. They feel that entrusting greater household responsibilities to men will not make the dual-career model workable. The explanation of the difference in domestic work among the working couples was explained by Scanzoni (1978) by the use of the exchange theory. He opined that there was a greater sharing of household work by the husbands, when their wives were employed. All the same, wives still did most of the housework. This was corroborated by Blumstein and Schwartz (1983), who made a study of the U.S. Couples. They felt that while the husbands contributed more to the housework, if their wives had paying jobs, most of the housework was still done by the wives. Schwartz attributed this to the fact that men do not respect unpaid work. "Men's own self-respect is in part derived from their success in the world of (labour force) work and while they may say they have as much respect for a wife who stays at home, they in fact do not." (Schwartz, 1983: 139). Their conclusion was that an employed woman received greater respect from their men and also won more power in the family. A comparison of homosexual male and female couples shows that the power distribution favours the individual with higher earnings and that a successful partner need not have to do housework. Blumstein and Schwartz (1983) explain the difference in the attitudes of men and women in these

words: "Married men's aversion to housework is so intense, it can sour their relationship. The more housework they do, for whatever reason, the more they fight about it. If this pattern continues into the future, it will be a major barrier to the reorganization of husbands' and wives' roles (146)."

In trying to decide whether the division of housework between husbands and wives, followed the principle of "adaptive partnership" or that of "dependent labour", Messner et al. (1975) employed the time-diaries method and found that the support for the adaptive partnership was little. According to their study conducted in Vancouver. "As wives' job hours increase ... their hours of regular housework decline without being made up for, because their husbands' housework remains at the low level of some four to five hours a week; and ... despite the successively more compressed hours of housework, the wives' total work load increases a great deal, while their husband's decreases slightly (430)". Thus, there was no compensation in domestic labour for the wife's reduced time due to her employment and no adaptive partnership. They further added that, "in view of the small and selective contribution of their husbands, (wives) can anticipate doing it for the rest of their lives.Surprisingly, even the typically masculine household chores, such as fixing things around the house...were reported by only 28 percent of the husbands on a workday or weekend day. However, together with major construction work, it was the only type of domestic work in which the portion of men was greater than that of women. ...In an item by item comparison, the weekend record suggests that women with paid work revert to full level of housework as jobless housewives. In house cleaning, particularly they make up for time lost and spend virtually as much time as unpaid housewives do during the week. There is no noticeable change in

husbands' regular housework items on weekdays, in response to the necessary reduction in their wives' housework time (and) husbands do little more housework on weekends remain(ing) indifferent to the burdens of their wives' paid work (431-433)".

It was also noticed that husbands' contribution to housework did not change either due to the wives' paid employment or due to the presence of children. Their contribution to the increased work on account of the children under 10 years was only 20%.

Support to the study of Messner et al. (1975) also came from Clark and Harvey (1976), who also used the time-diaries method, in comparing their results on Canada with those on other Western countries. They found that Canadian men are more traditional in their attitude to housework. They also tried to correlate housework with other factors such as marital status and presence of young children. They found that married females with children who were employed, worked shorter hours than those with no children. There was no difference between married men with and without children. Unemployed men who were married spent ten percent less time than single unemployed men, in housework. Single or married, the unemployed men belonged to the least working group of all categories of men and women. It may therefore be concluded that marital status does not affect the workload of men or women. Both the Vancouver and Halifax studies lead to the conclusion that adaptation in the family housework is mostly done by the wives. These findings are also supported by Lupri and Mills (1987).

Shaw's (1983) study of men and women in Halifax to understand the perceptual difference between them towards housework is summarised in these words: "The reason for this gender differences in meaning may well relate to

the fact that household labour is closely associated with the female gender role and as such, is thought of as 'women's work'! The finding that men perceived more freedom of choice in their participation in housework activities and reported that they evaluated or judged their own performance in these tasks to a much lesser extent than women, supports the contention. Moreover, the only activity that was perceived more often as work by males.... was gardening, which is not normally associated with the female gender role (336)". This explains the behavioural effects due to attitudes towards housework.

Theoretical Perspective

A major shortcoming in literature is that there is little explanation of the division of work on the basis of social science theory but only descriptive studies. Understanding and comparing the results of the many studies are difficult unless a theoretical approach is developed. Although a reward-cost approach or Marxist-feminist approach has been adopted in some studies, a systematic theoretical perspective is lacking. The only explicitly discusses the usefulness of theoretical perspective to understand the division of labour is due to Birchwood (1989), where the application of symbolic interaction to this problem has been dealt with. The Birchwood study deals with division of household work in the Winnipeg area. The following discussion of the theory of symbolic interaction is to large extent based on Birchwood's study.

A symbolic interactionism perspective with emphasis on gender socialization, which allows the demonstration of links between personal decisions and the attitudes in the larger society; while studies referred to this gave their empirical findings about husbands' reluctance to housework,

no explanation was offered about wives' acceptance of this inequality. The effects of social expectations on the husbands' participation or the variations between households to distinguish the microlevel and the macrolevel approach were not dealt with. A consideration of roles and their interaction was made by Pleck (1977), but he failed to link the commitment and definition of these roles to individuals. While the roles may be clear, the different levels of commitment to these roles and their differing understanding of them have to be taken into account (Mackie, 1987; Shaw, 1988 and Stryker, 1959).

Symbolic interactionism, is a social psychological approach, which allows one to recognize the relevant societal factors and shows how these factors are translated to individual decisions and subsequent behaviours. The integration of these two conceptual levels is particularly appropriate for the study of household division of labour (Mackie, 1987). A brief description of these concepts may be given below.

Symbolic Interaction Perspective

This is the most frequently used approach to family studies in American sociology (Hill and Hansen, 1960).

This perspective addresses two principal questions (Stryker, 1959):

1. The problem of socialization ie. how one acquires the values, the norms and attitudes of the social group in which one lives and hence is also a developmental problem continuing from infant through every stage of life
2. The development of personality which concerns the organization of persistent behavioural patterns and how they are affected by social relationships.

The concepts relevant to the study of the division of labour in the household arise from the assumption that humans do not react directly to the physical environment, but the environment is mediated through symbols ie. a symbolic environment. A person's action in a given situation may therefore be represented in symbolic terms. This process is called definition of the situation.

Defining a situation involves using of symbolic categories. When symbols represent generalizations of behaviour towards objects, they are called categories. Where a single term is used to classify many different objects, one does not respond to objects in an unique way, but in categories for various purposes. The categories imply as to how behaviour is organized.

Socially recognized categories are positions. The example of categories are mother, father, teacher, and child. Positions help to organize behaviour towards the actors or person's categorized. There are expectations of each position and persons behaviour according to these expectations. Role refers to the expectations of behaviour associated with a particular position. Positions are related to some other positions. For instance, father is related to son, child is related to teacher, etc. and similarly every role has other related roles.

The important social identity is gender. Other identities which support gender identity are also important. That is why women place more emphasis on marriage, parenthood, family and housework, while work outside home is more important for men (Mackie, 1983). According to symbolic interactionism, achieving gender identity is not simply conforming to the dictates of socialization. Individuals may differ in varying degrees in embracing the norms of the society. The extent of rejection or acceptance of social

expectations is important. Moreover, the type of socialization may differ between families, ethnic groups, social classes, etc. (Mackie, 1987). For instance, those families which are associated with lower social class may resist the assimilation of a "modern" value system and beliefs. Rather, they are more likely to protect traditional values and consequent retention of the old ways of thinking for a longer period. This phenomenon may be reflected in a number of ways such as in attitudes towards the rights of women and how the children should be raised. In short, we want to emphasize that in studying the influence of gender socialization on behaviour, it is important to account for the effects of the background characteristics on gender socialization. Socio-economic and cultural factors are important contributors to an individual's varying sex role expectations in the family. These expectations determine the extent of modernism or traditionalism in attitudes towards family roles. In other words, persons with modern family role attitudes will tend to have a more equal distribution of housework than those with traditional family role attitudes. It is because men's gender identity is closely tied in avoiding with any behaviour perceived as feminine, the above tendency is stronger for husbands than for wives. But, women's gender identity is closely linked to household chores (Mackie, 1987) and hence women continue to perform most of the housework even when they work outside of the home. A man who is traditional in his attitude would consider himself as less competent in housework, and similarly, a woman who subscribes to a traditional definition of her gender identity will tend to perceive herself as more competent at housework than her husband. These perceptions are consistent with their gender identity.

Research Implications

In relation to distribution of power inside the household, Waring (1988) comments: "Power politics are not confined to the household, though the balance of power beyond the household simply magnifies the gender social relations of reproduction inside the household" (1988: 177). The everyday activities of women in the household are comprised of economic activity and time use which are based on gendered divisions. In this connection, Waring (1988) argues that the method of national accounting is highly inadequate. She criticizes the overwhelming economic assumption that women, who constitute 50% of the population do not work, and in the process questions the traditional concept of 'production' and 'work'. According to Waring's analysis, which is perhaps the best in repudiating the system of national accounting, the value of unpaid work in the household, as well as environmental and conservation issues, should be included in national accounting. As an illustration of the latter, a living tree, which provides shade, oxygen and carbon dioxide has no value associated with it, whereas it becomes of value when chopped down. This is the kind of logic in our current system of national and international accounting (Sonius, 1989).

Thus, these existing definitions and the concept of production, are accompanied by biological determinism. Household work and childcare activities of women are regarded as extensions of her physiology. According to Waring, all the work that goes into creation of life and the labour of childbirth are regarded as an activity of nature, rather than an interaction of women with nature. Ironmonger (1989) advocates that all the unpaid housework done by everybody, especially women, should have an imputed value, which should be added to the total cost of goods produced and services rendered, in calculating the GDP and as part of national accounting.

Ironmonger's study shows that Australian households are found to produce about three times the output of Australia's entire manufacturing industry; and ten times the GDP of their prestigious mining industry. This type of research will have enormous social policy implications, leading to greater childcare provisions and extension of vocational training, now restricted to 'working' population in Canada.

Women's increased participation in the work force since World War II has forced them to manage their responsibilities at home as well as, their family responsibilities. These family responsibilities often bring about interruption and sometimes, termination of their work. Since the 1960's, a two-peak pattern has been noticeable in the participation of Canadian women in the work force. The first peak is found to conform approximately prior to 25 years or the main child-bearing age and the second to after 40 years, when women returned to work force as their children became older. This, however, shows some changes in recent years due to the availability of day-care facilities for children.

Although both the employers and the Government have started to recognize the link between rigid workplace practices and family dysfunction, there is still a need for greater awareness that some of the workers' family obligations also devolve on them, on hiring a worker. The employers still need to be convinced about the cost-benefits and the importance of work and family life to every individual. A serious attempt is needed to understand the reciprocal impact of work and family life.

As stated earlier, there is a lack of appropriate theoretical approaches to the study of division of labour in the household. Failure to develop satisfactory theoretical framework has led to researchers using a variety of

approaches. This general approach may appear to be useful as it allows one to incorporate the many aspects of the various approaches. But the aims of the different approaches could be misrepresented by separating or omitting essential concepts of each approach. Birchwood (1989) is an exception to this trend. He outlines symbolic interactionism and the concept of perception in a social-psychological approach. This approach seems to be promising as it allows one to account for both the individual and larger societal characteristics which would affect the household division of labour. Birchwood deserves credit for introducing the theory of symbolic interactionism in his research, but he fails to operationalize it successfully. For his social-psychological interpretation to be convincing, it would be necessary to directly measure those attributes and model them as intervening variables. The problem is that his study is based upon data source without measurements of the key theoretical variables. The questions that need to be answered are the following: through which mechanism does socialization process act on sex role behaviour? How and under what conditions does socialization alter one's sex role attitudes? What dimensions of one's personality affect sex role behaviour? In other words, we argue that socialization is a multidimensional concept that cannot be reduced to either race, religion or national origin categories. It is not a bag of norms producing automatic responses, nor is it a quality one has or lacks. Like any interesting sociological factor, it is variable and relative, not reducible to male/female categories. The socialization perspective would allow us to identify differences in beliefs, values and norms about household division of labour and sex role attitudes. It is possible that these differences depend upon the context and the social

environment in addition to socio-economic background characteristics; that is, as a response to the "outside" world (eg., Natives) and as a response to the groups' own needs and traditions in a given situation (eg., immigrants). On the other hand personality variables include self-esteem, self-concept, and so on. The psychological factors associated with these variables will influence the sex role behaviours. It is possible to argue that groups and individuals experience social and cultural changes of a different degree at different points in their history. Therefore, the interpretations of symbolic interaction perspective must be within a dynamic framework of socio-cultural and historical conditions.

Symbolic interaction perspective suggested here is an integrated approach. It is easy to see that different forces, economic, cultural, social and psychological all interact in determining gender role behaviour. "Psychological variables shape the individual's reaction to external forces and stimuli; sociological variables shape the group's reaction to and control over individual behaviour, while the whole process proceeds in a roughly economic cost-benefit "expectations" framework. In any given situation it is possible that one set of forces may dominate and over shadow the others. Social norms may dominate individual utilities in societies with very little margin for error ecologically speaking, whereas, in a less confining environmental situation, "norms" may be freely ignored and rapidly lose meaning" (Robinson and Harbison, 1980: 228-229).

A thorough understanding of the household division of labour in traditional (eg. Natives) and modern families requires a qualitative approach. In addition to thorough in-depth interviews, an anthropological type approaches such as participant observation, to appraise extensively the

subjects life styles, cultural values, norms and beliefs.

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(3) CONCEPTUALIZING "FAMILY"

A Research Project on
Conceptualization and Historical Development
for
The Demographic Review Secretariate
July 1991

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Conceptualizing "Family"

Introduction

Understanding "family" has become increasingly difficult as family patterns change and even multiply; but that understanding is critical given the dilemmas many people now face in their family lives.¹ This paper is an attempt to open discussion on the various ways in which "family" is conceptualized. We first review some frequently used definitions of family, both the common-sense ones in popular use and the more analytical conceptualizations of social scientists. These, we think, tend to foreclose interesting questions rather than generate them. Next, we propose our own conceptualization, which is scarcely novel but will provide some insights and raise some critical questions. As well, we discuss the contradictions wracking families today, in light of historical changes. Finally, we propose some measurement considerations for future research and policy development.²

Conceptualizing the Problem

i. Common-Sense Assumptions

When people use the term "family" they usually assume that what they mean by it is clear. And yet, depending on the context, the term has a variety of different meanings. An adult man who talks about working to support his family probably means his wife and young children. The adult woman who plans to stop work to have a family is referring to children. The university student going

home to spend the holidays with her family likely means her parents. Someone who explains that his family was killed in the holocaust probably means an extended kin group while someone else who describes a group of friends as "my real family" is identifying those who give significant emotional and personal support. At the same time, when a play or film is advertized as "family entertainment," the implication is that few people will find anything offensive in it. When politicians claim to support "family values" they usually mean something quite different from gays and lesbians who claim "we are family too".

These diverse usages show how slippery the term is. We suggest that the complexities, contradictions and confusions surrounding the way "family" is used derive from several, often poorly understood, issues. Perhaps the most important of these issues is that because almost everyone is a member of a family and lives for significant periods of time in a family, people tend to assume that they know very well what "family" means. Getting married, having children in the context of marriage, and living as a nuclear family are so widely accepted in Canadian society as the way people should live that they often seem natural. This is so even when, at the same time, many of these same people who grew up in nuclear families, and assume them to be "natural," are living as adults in very different arrangements. It is also true for people who grew up in very different family forms, but dismiss their own experience as unusual or atypical. For many people, the pattern of marriage and nuclear families is so taken for granted, it is

difficult to question.

Even more problematically, there is often a confusion of common-sense ideas, moral judgements and actual practices. The fact that the majority of people marry and live as couples, for example, reinforces for many people the idea that families should be based on heterosexual monogamous couples. Such beliefs may easily lead to moral assessments that those who do not live in such relationships are inferior, or immoral, or to be pitied.

The ease with which people accept marriage and nuclear family forms comes in part from the way ideas about marriage and "the family" are central to common-sense ideologies. The belief that biology is a "given," that it determines various social phenomena -- such as personality and behaviour, as well as institutions like "the family" -- is strong in this culture. The nuclear family appears to follow "naturally" from the biology of reproduction.

That family relationships are often so profound emotionally and deeply tied to unconscious feelings reinforces common-sense and moral standards to dissuade us from interrogating our assumptions about family. Studies of family are rendered even more difficult and complex by the fact that it is widely believed that family relationships are private and personal and thus not ready subjects for investigation. In addition, the fact that interpersonal relationships are in some ways both hard to regulate and unnecessary to regulate has meant that policy analysts and academic researchers have tended to restrict family research to those areas where families are seen as dysfunctional, or problematic.

Finally, people easily assume the nuclear-family form because "the family" subsumes within it a number of complex realities in a deceptively simple way. To understand the meaning and significance of family requires untangling the various realities subsumed under marriage, family, ideologies of family, and the actual ways in which people relate to each other and organize their personal lives. It also involves recognizing that while marriage and family appear ordinary and even natural, they have a history and, to be understood, must be subject to rigorous analysis.

ii. Sociological Analyses

The multiple usages, contending definitions and confusions around the concept of "family" in everyday popular usage are too often reflected in the confusions and contradictions in the sociological literature. Given that "the family" is such a central feature of contemporary social life, and given that family life has undergone enormous change in recent decades, the relative lack of attention to this institution by sociologists (Nett 1988:1) is surprising and disconcerting.³ Indeed, with the exception of feminist studies, the bulk of social-science research either largely ignores the topic or pursues it in ways that have hardly changed since Parsons (1955). For the most part, "sociology of the family" research takes for granted that families are differentiated on the basis of age and sex (Luxton 1983, Coward 1983). In this ideal type of family women as wives and mothers provide emotional nurturance, men as husbands and fathers are breadwinners and both co-operate to produce and raise children, to provide each other

with their primary (or only) sexual intimacy, and to form family households which are considered the basic organizing units of society. While contemporary (non-feminist) work recognizes that housework and child care are significant work, and that the increasing participation of women in paid labour alters family life, little of this work goes beyond such common-sense assumptions.

The numbers of books and articles published annually that are specifically on family life are very small in comparison with those published on gender relations or women. So, while social histories of family organization have proliferated, there remain very few studies of current patterns of family life.⁴ Indeed, it seems that the truly exciting work that is now being done on family life is that by social historians concerned with the full range of family affairs (like Mitterauer and Sieder 1982 and Hanawalt 1986), on the one hand, and psychologists and psychoanalysts pursuing an understanding of the psychic dynamics among family members (like Miller 1983 and Benjamin 1988) on the other. While the breakthroughs feminist theory has brought to our understanding of gender relations have transformed our approach to the study of family life, feminist social scientists tend to study gender relations, and not family patterns.⁵

Family is central to the lives of individuals and the functioning of society, carrying out (as we will argue) work basic to social reproduction (producing the next generation of citizens and workers, maintaining adults' labour power, transferring wealth

and privilege) and producing intersubjectivity -- the initial sense of personal identity and emotional connection that entices us to join the human community. Yet this intimate institution is in crisis. The most immediate and common crises involve the impossible balancing acts facing households when women work outside the home (Hochschild 1989) and the devastating dependency of women who work full time at home as wives and mothers (Luxton 1980). The critical nature of these and other problems in family life, as old gender patterns are being challenged, is confirmed by the appearance of "the family" as a central issue in the political arena -- in a way it has not been since the suffragist movement (the last time women fought their confining role). For the debates about abortion or the public provision of day care have been, at bottom, about two contending visions of family organization (Harding 1981, Petchesky 1985, Ross 1979).

Sociologists' understanding of social structure provides insight beyond the grasp of common sense, and even that of disciplines such as economics and psychology, which focus on the individual. Nevertheless, economists apparently have been more concerned with family recently: their "new home economics" is one of the only new theoretical perspectives developed for analysing family (Folbre 1983). However, with its emphasis on individuals' choices, abstraction from social structure and social context, and avoidance of issues of power, this application of economic models to the household is closer to fantasy than reality. That some sociologists writing about family life are toying with this

perspective (see, for example, Berk 1980) is disturbing, especially in light of what we know about family life: in two-earner households women's and men's relative bargaining power -- and not rationality -- dictates the distribution of work and responsibility, and women's time is so constrained as to make a mockery of the notion of choice. The disutility of economists' rational-choice models of family life places new responsibility on the shoulders of sociologists and anthropologists to better theorize "family."

A Short Review of Commonly Used Definitions

Standard definitions of "the family" tend to center on a number of typical characteristics, in order to identify a kind of social unit, rather than focus on social relationships involved in specific activities and bearing special emotional significance. The former tendency makes apparent sense in the case of governments, which need to count and classify their populations in terms of requirements for social services, and even social scientists when their chief concern is classification. Accordingly, Statistics Canada's definition of a "census family" is: "A husband and wife [including common-law couples] (with or without children who are unmarried), or a lone parent with one or more children who have never married (regardless of age), living in the same dwelling unit." This is differentiated from an "economic family" which is a group of two or more persons who are related to each other by blood, marriage or adoption, and who live in the same

dwelling. In both definitions, if a woman and man live together, they are treated as if married, regardless of their legal status (Statistics Canada 1984 viii - ix and Table 4).

In restricting "family" to people related by blood or marriage, and by insisting on co-residence, this definition excludes people in relationships involving the same dependency and daily caring relationships who also consider themselves a family. Lesbian or gay partners living together as a married couple; elderly siblings sharing financial resources and providing each other necessary daily support; and people in other types of relationships who share material resources, provide daily support services, and have deep emotional connections are all excluded. As Margrit Eichler (1988) has argued, this definition, when used to establish eligibility for policies supposed to support families, can threaten the welfare of individuals and undermine the economic bases of families (e.g., the "married exemption" for income taxes excludes same-sex couples) or, when used to set policy on access to loved ones, can separate needy people from those who give them care and support (e.g., visiting rights in hospitals).⁶

To return to definitional matters, it is generally problematic to specify relationships determined by blood or marriage and exclude some social relationships of exactly the same nature.⁷ Anthropologists (see, e.g., Sahlins 1976, Goody 1976 and the review by Collier et al. 1982) have shown persuasively that family and kinship are social creations, and not products of biology: even in the simplest human societies, biological ties do not establish

domestic groups (of mutual support and nurturance of children); and through human history, the composition and organization of families and households has varied tremendously. Logically, then, social functions and not biological relations should be focused on to locate "family."

Some sociologists -- Beaujot (1986) in Canada, borrowing from Americans Nye and Berardo (1973), for example -- also use a variant of this definition: "two or more people related by blood, marriage or adoption and residing together." Again, blood or legal relationship, and common residence, establish "family." The problem here is that past social convention stands in place of analysis. Accepting biology and law as determinant of social relations is inadequate, yet not surprising when no activities or functions are specified, or seen to constitute these relationships. Similarly, equating family and household is more reflective of ideology (i.e., that we all live in nuclear-family households) than social reality (Bernandes 1985).

A definition of "family" that has been widely used is that of anthropologist George Murdock (1949): "A social group characterized by common residence, economic co-operation and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults." Meant to be universally applicable, this definition still excludes familial patterns common to some societies (e.g., the Nayar, to use the most obvious and extreme) and suffers from most of the problems

plaguing the two definitions above. Its virtue is that it gets at the social activities family relationships involve -- economic cooperation and reproduction.

A Canadian sociology text defines "family" as "[t]he socially-sanctioned cohabitation of a man and a woman who have preferential or even exclusive enjoyment of economic and sexual rights over one another and are committed to raising the children brought to life by the woman." Despite its problems, the definition includes the notion of caring for children and, thus, economic collaboration. As well, commitment is mentioned -- certainly of the essence in terms of the emotional content of family bonds.*

Different Perspectives on Family

As catholic as they try to be, these definitions all suffer from the problem of ethnocentric (and classist, heterosexist and racist) exclusion of certain types of functioning families. Reflecting the influence of Bronislaw Malinowski and his student Talcott Parsons on family sociology, these definitions suffer from the same problems that pervaded structural-functionalist sociology in the 1950s and 1960s. In order to discover regularities and patterns in a complex social world, Parsons (1955) abstracted from detail and constructed highly general models of social reality. For him, "the family" involved a man and a woman in a basic division of labour (and thus heterosexuality must be central to family). As well, in an attempt to understand causal

relationships, Parsons emphasized the connections among different "parts" of society. Indeed, he stressed the functional fit of institutions such as "the family" with other spheres of social life, such as the economy -- which explained stability, but failed to predict change.

Parsons even argued that the organization of family life typical in the 1950s was functional: the sexual division of labour is the best allocation of the work, according to Parsons, because in all small groups a "task leader" and an "emotional leader" are both necessary and likely to emerge. While it was astounding to label the work women do -- specifically, the provision of child care, socialization of children, and maintenance and management of the household -- "emotional" and not "instrumental," Parsons's work was even more offensive in its blatant rationalization of the gender inequality inherent in the division of labour to which he referred. Moreover, by asserting that the family form predominant among white middle-class Americans was functional and natural, he paved the way for those who insisted that other family forms -- especially native, black and working-class families -- were "deviant" or inadequate.

Parsons's work, influential though it was -- and somewhat commendable in its attempt at grand theory -- has been soundly criticized and largely dismissed (see Morgan 1975). Because his theme of functional fit could not predict the changes that are now so evident in families, but more importantly, because he assumed that what was functional (or good) for society was good for the

individual, Parsons's conceptualization had to be abandoned. Moreover, sociology had to reconceptualize "family" as soon as feminist theorists made a public issue of the private oppression of full-time housewives (Friedan 1963, Luxton 1980). Insisting that women's experience of marriage was very different from men's, that housework was isolating, unrewarding and predicated on economic dependency even though central to the economy, and that there was a power differential central to marriage (which too often was expressed through male violence against their wives), feminist social scientists irrevocably transformed sociology's depiction of family life (Thorne and Yalom 1982, Nett 1988, Mandell and Duffy 1988).

Thus, the definitions of family commonly used and reviewed above represent familistic ideology, or hegemonic sets of ideas about family that affect us all. They represent that ideology, rather than get behind it: for the most part, North Americans believe that relations of marriage and blood are the only ones that truly involve (and can involve) commitment to people's welfare, and are best suited to raising children; they also believe that nuclear family households are autonomous. But, in focusing on characteristics assumed to be normative, they invariably omit certain groupings functioning well in the areas families are assumed to monopolize.

Surveying the variety of family patterns excluded in these definitions, many sociologists today conclude that there is no such thing as "the family." In other words, people's experience of

family life, the kinds of families they live in, are infinitely varied. This conclusion, of course, ignores activities these different types of families might all be involved in; it ignores the commonalities that establish the institutional nature of "family."

It is a short step from this conclusion to the argument that "the family" is essentially only a symbol system or ideology (Gittins 1985:70, Collier et al. 1982, Barrett and McIntosh 1982). That is, some social scientists -- especially feminists -- argue that beliefs and related rules about mating, sexuality, gender and age relations constitute family in all societies (Gittins 1985:70). In short, for these writers, "the family" is a set of ideas, and we are all subject to a hegemonic (or dominant) ideology about families. Specifically, "familism," which sees the nuclear family as universal and necessary, constitutes an ideology that characterizes western capitalist societies (Barrett and McIntosh 1982).

Equating "family" with familistic discourse is problematic, however. While it is true that symbol systems make social life meaningful, and so profoundly shape our lives, it is also the case that there is a material reality that must be understood. There are social processes and social relations involved in "family" that cannot be reduced to sets of ideas.

Another reaction to the inadequacies of old definitions of "family" is that by influential American family sociologist John Scanzoni and his associates (1989). In the book *Canadian family*

sociologist Lyle Larson (1991:98) says "could well be the orienting conceptual work in the 'family' area of the nineties", Scanzoni et al. essentially propose abandoning all notions of family as an institution to the study of "sexually based primary relationships," which focuses attention on human agency and development. Unfortunately, in reducing "family" to one type of relationship, these sociologists have thrown out all social-organizational considerations -- such as how sexuality and reproduction are systematically organized in this society -- and thus lost insights unique to sociological analysis of "the family" as an institution. Clearly, the diversity of families presents a conceptual problem to sociologists intent upon retaining notions of social organization, or the sense of pattern in social life.

Identifying the Complexities

The term "family" contains several different meanings. The word comes from the Latin "famulus" meaning servant, which became "familia" meaning the servants of a house or the household -- that is, the body of persons who live in one house or under one head, including parents, children, servants (Oxford Dictionary 1967:673). By implication, the term encompassed the dual meaning of those who lived in the same household and those whose collective work maintained that household (Flandrin 1979). This was its original (late fourteenth century) meaning in English.'

By the late fifteenth century, the meaning of "family" was extended to describe a lineage or kin group that shared descent

from a common ancestor, rather than a household (Flandrin 1979). Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the term increasingly came to be used differently by the aristocracy and the newly emerging bourgeois class. The aristocracy continued to use the term to mean lineage, a practice perpetuated today among the upper class (as in the British use of the phrase "the Royal family"). A similar usage is sometimes applied to wealthy capitalists where a kin group has extensive corporate holdings such as "the Bronfman or Reichman families". In contrast, the bourgeois class increasingly used "family" to refer to the married couple and their children as distinct from other household members who were (usually) servants.

Through the nineteenth century, as capitalism developed, "family" was increasingly distinguished from "work" and for men the idea developed of working to support a family (Hall and Davidoff 1987). In this meaning, family referred primarily to the small kin group with whom one had close personal ties and intimacy, usually those who have at some time lived together in one house (parents, siblings, spouse, children). In the twentieth century, the terms "nuclear family" and "extended family" emerged to express the distinction between the now dominant notion of small kin group involving the married couple and their children and the increasingly subordinate meaning of a large kin group. In the various everyday usages of the word "family," we hear echoes of all the earlier meanings.

The term "family" now encompasses a number of overlapping

though distinctly different types of relationships and conveys multiple meanings of kinship, co-residence, and emotional intimacy. Some of these are legally constituted. "Family" is a legal term that carries particular definitions and entails specific legal rights and obligations for certain legally designated people. Those who are not included in the definition of family are excluded. Parents are required to provide material support and emotional nurturing for their children and in return are normally entitled to custody of, or access to, those children. Other people who may have deep emotional relations with the children are not recognized in law. Thus, a divorced father's lover, who may have lived with the children on a daily basis and cared for them, has no legal claim, while the father's parents do -- even though they may never have met the children. Similarly, because workers' families are entitled to certain benefits, a wife of only weeks may be entitled to a widows' pension while a same-sex lover of twenty years is not. As well, state-regulated institutions such as schools or hospitals use marriage and family relations to determine which people will be informed and consulted about the experiences of someone in the institution. Thus, critically ill patients may find that family members with whom they have little contact are admitted to their rooms and entitled to make significant medical decisions, while the friends who actually provide daily support, and who know best the patient's wishes, are excluded. Finally, even when someone designates an heir in a will, the "immediate family" have some legal grounds to challenge that will and claim a

right to the inheritance.

Other aspects of family relationships are normatively regulated. That is, social conventions and notions of respectability adhere to certain types of sexual relations, some child-rearing and socialization practices, and some cohabitation arrangements. For the vast majority of people, "family" (however defined) constitutes the social relationships within which basic socialization occurs, at least during the formative infant and early childhood years. Thus, family relations are the most fundamental emotional and social relations within which intersubjectivity develops. As a result, at the most basic level, the "self" is formed in relation to family. Thus, norms about family are deeply instilled in us all (Miller 1983, 1986).

Complicating formulations on the meaning of "family" is the way in which the various relationships involved in family are changing. While there have always been dominant norms and practices, embedded in law and reinforced in a myriad of ways such as religion, as well there have always been those who did not conform, either by deliberately flaunting convention or by simply doing something else. However, throughout the twentieth century, the numbers of people actively and openly challenging prevailing family conventions have dramatically increased. And many of their challenges have altered formal legal and social policies by legitimating a greater diversity of practices.

One of the central relationships encompassed by the concept of families is marriage. Marriage is a relatively precise term

referring to a heterosexual relationship between a woman and a man that is socially and legally recognized and privileged. In the early part of the twentieth century, social norms and conventions around marriage were so strong that almost anyone violating them was subject to severe social pressure. Changing social practices and shifting ideologies have produced, by the end of the century, a climate in which a greater diversity of practices is tolerated. This loosening up allows some people greater choice in how they live: more gays and lesbians are "out;" women who have children without being married are no longer socially ostracized, and increasing numbers of women deliberately opt to be single parents; people who are single are less likely to be regarded with suspicion. However, marriage remains one of the most significant and most privileged interpersonal relations. And it is central to ideas about family. Precisely because it is so privileged it also carries enormous emotional weight: getting married and staying married remain for many people vitally important commitments so taken for granted they seem a natural part of life.

Other practices embedded in law have been challenged. One of the most significant is the legal and social subordination of women to men. For example, in the nineteenth century married women were subordinate to their husbands in law. Their property became their husbands', their children were subject only to the father's authority, they could be beaten by their husbands or committed to institutions by them, and they could make no decisions without their husbands' approval. All of these male powers have been

removed from law. Until recent years, however, men had the legal right to sex with their wives regardless of their consent, and marriage could be terminated if either partner (especially the woman) had sex with any one other than their legal spouse; and a woman was not entitled to welfare benefits if the authorities suspected she had a male lover, who was automatically assumed to be obligated to support her.

Another social practice embedded in law concerned legitimate sexuality, conception and child birth. While male privilege meant that men could engage in a variety of sexual relations with little fear of sanction, there were strong conventions about what kind of sexual behaviour was acceptable. Homosexuality was illegal until 1969 in Canada and heterosexual, monogamous sex between a married couple was the only publically acceptable practice. The sanctions for women who violated those norms were often severe and children born "out of wedlock" were legally illegitimate and subject to financial and social penalties.

As former practices are challenged, and legal regulation and social norms change, a situation develops in which there are extensive and widespread disagreements about what is appropriate. Behaviours that previously remained hidden, and a source of embarrassment or shame, become increasingly tolerated, although many people still find them problematic or offensive. Increasing numbers of women are now having children without being married. Teenage girls increasingly keep their children rather than give them away for adoption. Women and men are increasingly open about

having sexual relationships outside of marriage. Gays and lesbians are fighting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. And once homosexuality was no longer illegal, they organized and fought for various legal rights such as benefits for same-sex partners, custody rights, access to medically assisted insemination, etc. Divorce is increasingly easier to obtain and is no longer a major social shame. Women are entitled to welfare benefits even if they have a male lover. All children are now legitimate.

This increased diversity in actual practices and in what is socially acceptable has generated considerable confusion. For example, the previous legal assumption that a man was obligated to support his wife and their children became increasingly problematic as married women flooded into paid jobs. Family law no longer holds the man automatically responsible for supporting his wife and children, but women's relatively poor position in the labour market means that with divorce many women still need the continuing support for which often they are technically ineligible. Legal rights to custody of children have always been disputed. In the nineteenth century fathers had sole rights. Women challenged that and in the early twentieth century, in conjunction with prevailing notions that mothers provided the ideal care for children, women tended to get custody. More recently, in conjunction with increasing demands that fathers be more actively involved in child care, men have reasserted their demands for custody. In response, the courts have implemented policies revolving around a notion of

the child's "best interests;" but this policy change in no way has reduced disputes over custody (Smart and Sevenhuijsen 1989).

Similarly confusing, while it has become increasingly acceptable for people to not marry, to divorce, to live common law and even to have same-sex partners, there is still a powerful norm that restricts people to either being single or in a couple. Multiple intimate sexual groups (known in some societies as polygamous relations) are taboo. Housing stock, hotel rooms, and spousal benefits all are structured around single people or couples. For example, houses are simply not built with four or five "master bedrooms" and most hotels could not accommodate and would not tolerate a request for a room for five adults. While some workplaces have acknowledged same-sex partners for spousal benefits, none would recognize two or more spouses. Similarly, the lovers of a parent often have great difficulty getting formal recognition from schools, doctors, and other authorities that they are in practice parents of the child. Friends of a parent who may actually be very intimately involved in child care have no recognized claim to parenting. Thus, while acceptable family practices have widened considerably, especially in the last thirty years, there are still deeply embedded legal, social, political and economic conventions that constrain people's behaviour.

There is a widespread assumption that families are changing. Many people firmly believe that there used to be something called "the traditional family," and that current changes are causing this family to "break down". However, as social historians have

demonstrated, there has never been "the traditional family," and the idealized relationships described in this way have never been the predominant or widespread form (See Mitterauer and Sieder 1982 for a summary of social-historical evidence that directly addresses this issue).

Untangling the Confusions

In untangling the different meanings inherent in the concept of family, it is important to distinguish between a specific set of relations and the ideology of "the family." When a woman tells us that she works to support her family, we can investigate exactly whom she includes in that term -- whether her children, her mother, and her younger sister who is still in high school, or just some of these people. But when people talk about "the family," they move into the realm of ideology -- that is, a complex system of ideas and meanings given to the concept of family. And when people contend that "the family" is being destroyed, they evoke the mythical "traditional family," which purportedly provided a huge range of services and products to its members, unlike families today, which are purported to be highly unstable because they are based solely on emotion.

We suggest that one of the most effective ways of untangling these various confusions and contradictions is to examine the history of contemporary family forms, and simultaneously to investigate the differences between prevailing ideologies of family and actual practices. Such a study reveals what family

encompasses, and the various changes in family forms demonstrate what is at stake in "the family."

The dominant social and cultural practices constructing family in contemporary Canadian society have their main roots in the new social formations that developed during the first through the third centuries AD in Europe. These societies, which eventually became European and then North American nation states, were formed out of an intermixing of the Roman Empire, the Germanic tribes people, the various peoples living throughout the region, and the Judeo-Christian religious ideologies and practices developing around the same period (Anderson 1974).

It may seem silly to reach so far back in time to understand contemporary difficulties in conceptualizing "family." But the past remains with us. To cite one example, an extremely widespread contemporary practice is for women and often men to wear wedding rings on the third finger of the left hand. This practice has its origins in classical Rome where it was believed that the blood vessel in that finger went to the heart. Roman grooms placed a iron ring on their bride's finger to ensure her emotional commitment to the marriage. Similarly, the standard contemporary wedding dress is white, it is common for the groom to have a "best man" as witness, and typically the bride's father "gives her away." And all of these wedding rituals have their origins in ancient Rome (Gies 1989). Just as the history of the term family shows the complexity of meaning embedded in the term, so an examination of family history can reveal the basic relationships involved in

contemporary family forms and practices. Indeed, an examination of comparative family organization sheds even clearer light on contemporary situations.

In every social system there is a relationship between the way people produce the goods and wealth of their society -- the food, shelter, clothing and other goods, including the tools to produce those goods -- and the way the human population is produced. This relationship is never simple or direct. However, the type of work people do to sustain life -- whether foraging, pastoralism, agricultural work or industrial capitalist production -- creates conditions for certain patterns of child bearing and rearing. In a similar way, certain practices of child bearing and rearing both require and make possible certain other types of work (Coontz and Henderson 1986).

For example, foraging economies tend to produce later ages of fertility for women, greater birth spacing and thus comparatively fewer numbers of live births per woman than peasant societies (Howell 1979). And because there is little wealth to inherit in foraging societies, there is neither social concern over the legitimacy of children nor control over women's sexuality (Leacock 1981). Instead, all children are welcomed as members of the society; biological parents are known, but the group as a whole tends to accept responsibility for the children (Turnbull 1962, Lee 1979). In such societies, because children are cared for collectively, women are not required to concentrate on child care instead of participating in other social activities, including the

work necessary to sustain community life (Lee 1979, Leacock 1981).

In contrast, peasant farmers tend to have more children, more closely together. As a result, women become more tied to child rearing and the work they do must be compatible with child care (Draper 1975, Scott and Tilly 1978, Harris 1981). In societies where kin groups own great wealth, inheritance becomes a major social concern and certain children are clearly designated as the legitimate heirs of specific individuals. In many agricultural societies where kin membership in the father's lineage both entitles the individual to rights in the land and its produce and legitimates the individual's claim to inheritance rights, child legitimacy is ensured by powerful social controls over women's sexuality (Lerner 1986).

In seventeenth-century Huronia, in contrast, the Huron and French Jesuit missionaries clashed vehemently over different ideas about children. The Huron were appalled by the French notion that they owned a child, claiming in contrast that children belonged to everyone (Leacock 1981). The Jesuits were horrified by the idea that Hurons did not pay attention to biological parentage (Anderson 1991). The Huron were also shocked by the notion that men could or should exercise power over women, a patriarchal assumption that the Jesuits absolutely took for granted and which, as missionaries, they felt compelled to impose on the Huron.

Similarly and relatedly, various political systems and practices of wealth transference encourage certain types of kinship and family forms, and vice versa (Yanagisako and Collier 1987).

Compare for example the different inheritance and land-use practices of the eighteenth century English and French who settled in what became Canada. English land owning families practiced primogeniture, where the eldest son inherited the whole estate (Seccombe 1991a). While this kept large estates intact, it produced patriarchal families in which the father had absolute control over his sons, his wife and his daughters (Greven 1973). It also produced a population of landless younger sons, many of whom formed the backbone of English migration to Canada. In contrast, French landholders divided their holdings among all their sons thus generating a relative equality among the young men but creating strip farming (Ouellet 1971).

The family forms and ideologies brought by the English and French colonizers to Canada had their roots in the agricultural societies of feudal Europe, themselves a result of the intermingling of the Roman Empire, the Germanic tribes of western Europe, and the indigenous peoples living in that region when the Romans colonized it. While there was enormous diversity across the region, and across the different classes of society, and while there was considerable historical change from the height of feudalism in the tenth to twelfth centuries to the beginnings of industrial capitalism in the mid nineteenth century, certain patterns remained fairly consistent (Seccombe 1991b).

First, wealth was owned by families or kinship groups and access to those resources was determined by membership in the group. Thus, for the most part, especially in agriculture -- which

was the dominant force in the economy -- an individual got access to land, learned how to work it, and got the right to make a living off the land by virtue of birth. Second, inheritance of social status as well as wealth was based on biological kinship and sex. A wealthy landowner passed his estates and his title (differentially) to his sons and daughters. A serf's child inherited certain rights to continue to live on the land and tithe to the parent's lord. Especially among the ruling class, where great wealth was at stake, the question of the legitimacy of heirs became extremely important. As a consequence, male control over both marriage and female sexuality to ensure that only legitimate heirs were conceived was a major factor maintaining the economy. The subordination of women served both to ensure that they would marry appropriate husbands and to guarantee that any children they bore were biologically, and therefore legitimately, those of their husbands.

Third, in the feudal and early modern periods, as in earlier Roman and Germanic societies, the household was the organizing centre for economic production. Indeed, the word "economy" comes from the Greek word for household. In fact, in medieval times, recruitment to the household, and household membership, were dictated by household labour requirements; and all workers and servants had the same position in the family as biological children and wives (Mitterauer and Sieder 1982). Thus the subsequent separation of place of residence and site of production for household use, on the one hand, from the site of the production of

goods and services for the market, on the other -- occurring as capitalism developed -- generated a major transformation in households and families. Among other things, the separation destroyed the ease with which parents had previously been able to coordinate child care and their other work (cf., Laslett and Brenner 1989). By the nineteenth century, for the most part, middle-class European households were centres for raising children and doing domestic labour (all those activities that maintain the physical space of the household and provide for the care of household members)(Hall and Davidoff 1987). They existed in contrast to the centres of paid employment - the factories, offices and shops -- where people worked in order to obtain the money necessary to maintain their families.

Family patterns in contemporary Canada were formed specifically by the practices of nineteenth-century European (especially French and English) middle-class families. European middle-class scholars, politicians and others in the nineteenth century were for the most part deeply convinced that the normative family forms of their own class represented the pinnacle of human development. Persuaded that these forms were superior, they embedded these family forms in law, religion, social and political practices and beliefs. In their efforts at colonization, they were struck by the very different gender relations and kinship and family forms of the indigenous peoples of North America, particularly by the relative equality between women and men, the social and collective responsibility for children, and the

assumption that all people had rights to use the land and its resources. The Europeans very deliberately imposed their family forms on the peoples they colonized (Anderson 1991). They also embedded their own ideas and practices in the legal and conventional practices of what became Canada.¹⁰

Thus contemporary family in Canada must be understood as derived from that inheritance. Our efforts to arrive at meaningful definitions, to determine appropriate functions and to develop a useful analysis must be informed by an appreciation of the diversity of family forms and practices and of the core significant relations inherent in "family." The property and economic considerations affecting gender relations and child rearing, for instance, must be recognized. In addition, immigrants from countries other than western Europe bring quite different families forms which must be recognized and taken into account in analyses of contemporary family forms and practices.

Towards Definition

We think that the most fruitful definitions of "family" to date come from anthropologists, who are most aware of the variety of family forms across human cultures. Gayle Rubin (1975) argues that all societies have "sex/gender systems" which regulate sexuality, sexual identity, conception and the organization of child rearing. For her, families are the social groups through which sex/gender systems are organized.

Carol Stack (1974), whose study of poor black families in an

American community showed white middle-class norms to be meaningless there, derived a definition of "family" that is very different from standard ones. She (1974:32) wrote, "Ultimately, I defined 'family' as the smallest, organized, durable network of kin and non-kin who interact daily, providing domestic needs of children and assuring their survival." According to that definition, networks of female kin and nonkin, which extended across households, constituted "family" in the impoverished community she studied. Such a family pattern seems primarily to be the product of the economic insecurity faced by black working-class men. In many Caribbean cultures, a similar pattern of family life holds (Rogers 1980:92). We can only speculate that in many immigrant communities in Canada the daily needs of children and even adults depend on similar networks of people committed to each other but not necessarily living together in the same household, married or even related by blood.

Stack's work was particularly insightful, making sense of a family pattern that previously had been dismissed as unstable, even pathological.¹¹ Some of her conclusions are particularly significant for conceptualizing "family:" 1) the economic cooperation necessary for child care, and the active provision of child care, are at the heart of "family;" 2) the marital relationship may not involve the economic cooperation essential for raising children, and so it may not constitute the central adult relationship in some people's families; and 3) household and family may not coincide.

Rayna Rapp's (1982) conceptual work is also helpful when trying to conceptualize "family." First, Rapp distinguished between household and family. Residential units, households are more importantly the units where people pool their resources and perform some key economic tasks -- such as reproducing labour power (i.e., maintaining workers' capacity to work). For Rapp, households are units of production, reproduction and consumption, in which people and resources connect. More broadly, they are the key units of social reproduction in this society: they maintain life on a daily and a generational basis (Laslett and Brenner 1989).¹² In turn, "family," for Rapp, is what organizes the household: it is the ideological, normative concept that recruits people to the household relations of production, reproduction and consumption.

This is a useful start in conceptualizing "family." At the outset, however, given Stack's observations, household (the residential unit) should be distinguished from the group of people who daily pool resources to care for children and sustain adults -- whom we might call "family." What is useful about Rapp's conceptualization is the emphasis on production and reproduction, and the relations involved in these critical processes. These, we think, form the heart of what we mean when we say "family."

i. Social Relations

Rapp refers to the social processes that recruit people to form these domestic units of social reproduction. If we begin with these, we not only uncover normative patterns in social behaviour

(and thus some of what we mean when we refer to family as an institution), but also locate some of the sources of change in families today. What are these processes and forces?

Romantic love is what propels many people into marriage or shared living -- or at least it is what many people feel to be moving them in that direction." In turn, romantic love, in our society, is also "feminized love," as Cancian (1985) has argued. Thus, since the development of industrial capitalism and "separate spheres" ideology -- which identified women with the privatized domestic sphere and men with everything in the public sphere -- love has been defined as expressive sentiment rather than instrumental caring, and seen as something for which women are best suited and also dependent on. The consequence, then, is that women not only take on responsibility for the success of a relationship (and for keeping their men happy) but also are defined as the dependent ones in a relationship. In turn, this illusion hides the ways men typically express love; it also hides the emotional dependency that is usually even more characteristic of men (who manage to project their dependency needs onto their female partners) (Cancian 1985, Hollway 1988).

Aside from gender ideology, what Adrienne Rich (1980) has called "compulsory heterosexuality" is also behind romantic love. By "compulsory heterosexuality," Rich means the practices and processes that produce females and males as (at least seemingly) different -- that is, gender socialization -- and that create an eroticization of the "other" (including the beliefs that penises

and vaginas are "made for each other", that "opposites attract", etc [Valverde 1985]). Finally, marriage is, of course, the formal process by which men and women are brought together, and their responsibilities formalized and regulated. While this legal contract only formalizes the interpersonal commitments already made, it also spells out legal rights and obligations that become operative in the event of separation and divorce -- and thus marriage itself becomes a force bringing people together, after all other sentimental attachments fail.

"Falling in love" not only connects a man and a woman. It connects men more firmly to the labour market. As Rapp (1982:174) has said, "To exchange love is also to underwrite both the necessity and the ability to keep on working." Marriage connects women to men's market earnings, which generally are the only ones sufficient for the support of a family. Simultaneously, it connects men to women, and thus ensures their own daily maintenance -- via women's domestic, sexual and emotional services (Luxton 1980). A consideration of economic matters makes clear that the organization of the labour market -- whereby men are paid higher wages than women, and indeed women typically are not remunerated sufficiently to support themselves, much less children -- is an important force behind the coming together of men and women in marriage. Many women simply are dependent on finding a man for economic security -- as recent data on women and poverty indicate (Gunderson and Muszynski 1990).

In connecting children to this pair, marriage (and thus the

state) aims to ensure their survival. More generally, though, the ideology of motherhood, which makes women responsible for young children's every need, ensures their survival -- and thus this ideology is a central social force constructing families (Chodorow 1978, Rossiter 1988, Margolis 1984).

Norms about respectability -- symbols of class status -- also recruit people to family, and keep them there. But, in the absence of such luxuries, and often because of economic stress due to poverty, kinship and even friendship among women serve to forge ties that substitute for the male breadwinner. In this case, common among poor blacks (Stack 1974, Martin and Martin 1978), women's ties are the forces behind groupings that function as families (Collins 1990).

In short, families are products of ideologies -- especially those of gender difference, "compulsory heterosexuality," romantic (and feminized) love, motherhood and "familism" itself -- legal practice -- especially marriage laws -- and even economic organization -- namely the gender inequality characteristic of the labour market. These forces recruit people to produce children, share their resources, raise their children, and care for each other; most importantly, they give children a claim on social resources, and ensure social reproduction.

For Rapp, these processes produce the social relationships that constitute "family." Clearly those forces that in the past recruited most people to form nuclear families have weakened in recent decades. Heterosexuality is no longer the only socially

viaable form of sexual expression. The ideologies of romantic love and even motherhood -- as women's primary career and one entailing full-time work that relegates all else to the background -- now compete against some other ideas, albeit only vaguely developed ones. And the majority of women do not need men economically in the same way they did in the early part of the century.

In terms of our objective, to conceptualize "family," we think it most useful to think of "family" as the relationships that bring people together daily to share resources for the sake of caring for children and each other. Certainly, the care of children is at the heart of what we mean by "family." More broadly, we think it most productive to think of "family" as the relationships that mobilize resources especially for the sake of generational and daily reproduction -- for social reproduction, in short.

There is something missing from this definition, however. Focusing on the relationships that gather and redistribute resources, and so provide for people's daily sustenance, refers to the material aspect of the relations that constitute families as productive and reproductive units. But the emotional connection that so ties people of different generations and households together "til death do us part" (more so than marriage, it seems) - especially that between parents and their children, whether young or old -- must be central to conceptualizations of "family." The power of familism, and kinship ideology in general, in this society attests to the tremendous intensity of the psychic connections

among close family. As others have argued, the privatization of family life in this society, and the exclusivity of the mother-child relationship, is no doubt behind this intensity (Mitterauer and Sieder 1982, Coontz 1988).¹⁴

Finally, to fully elaborate our definition of "family" as the unit of social reproduction, we need to examine the economics of families.

ii. Economics

The new type of social formation that emerged with the development of capitalist economic relations featured a sharp differentiation between domestic labour and paid labour. While the labour of both spheres -- household and marketplace -- was necessary to the operation of capitalism, paid employment came to dominate socially and economically (as part of capital accumulation), as domestic labour was increasingly privatized. Recent feminist scholarship has demonstrated that this apparent separation and privileging of the sphere of what has come to be known as "the economy" over "the family" has obscured certain realities. First, what goes on in the home is also work. Second, domestic labour is intimately linked to "the economy." Domestic labour includes all those activities that maintain the physical household and care for the people who live together in that household. Thus it includes:

Housework - meal preparation and clean up

-household tidying, cleaning and repairs

-laundry

-mending, sewing

Parentwork - all activities involved in raising children
from changing soiled diapers to listening to
a distraught teenager

Adult care giving -all activities involved in providing
care for adult members of the household,
as well as the care of members of other
households such as elderly or sick
parents

Making ends meet - taking the income available to the
household from all sources and allocating
it to the various needs and choices of
household members, from paying the
mortgage and buying the groceries to
purchasing luxury goods and services

In short, domestic labour includes much of the work that produces people, both at the level of day-to-day reproduction and at the level of generational reproduction. At the most basic level, families produce and reproduce members of the human species in a culturally specific form. Families are the main social relationships within which infants develop as social beings with a self identity that is gender, race, ethnic/national, and class specific. In addition, families are the major organizing units that produce people as citizens, workers, mothers, soldiers, bosses.

Understood from this perspective, the links between what

everyday language refers to as "the family" and "the economy" become visible. Even the centrality of heterosexuality to "the economy" becomes clear: it recruits people to form families, and thus enter this division of labour most basic to the economy.

On the one hand, for people to survive in this type of society, they must have access to an income. For the relatively small wealthy population, income is inherited; for the poorest, survival depends on welfare or charity. But most of the population depend on access to paid employment, either directly themselves or indirectly through a family member such as a spouse, a parent, or a child. Consequently, most of the population sells its capacity to work in exchange for pay, and only then can purchase the goods and services necessary for domestic labour. In turn, that labour by women is what transforms commodities into consumable items (e.g., meals, clean clothing), and thus makes possible the rejuvenation (or reproduction) of individuals' capacity to work (Luxton 1980) -- the capacity that attracts a wage or salary in the labour market.

On the other hand, the economy requires people to do the work and those people must have the means both to revitalize themselves after working and to replace themselves generationally, since the marketplace does not provide them. That is, the requirements of child care are such that commercial provision of good quality child care is very unlikely (Blumenfeld and Mann 1980); but also the comforts of a private home and nourishing home-cooked meals seem especially important in a society dominated by the "universal

marketplace" (Braverman 1974). Again, women do the vast majority of the tasks involved in daily and generational reproduction. In short, women and the domestic sphere seem essential to capitalist economies.

Nevertheless, in capitalist societies, the two necessary labours -- wage work and household labour -- are fundamentally incompatible. For the most part, the organization of work in sites of paid employment does not allow for children, and the unpredictable and demanding nature of child care does not suit the regularized hours of paid work. As a result, this tension between the demands of domestic labour and the demands of paid employment, between "family" and "work," has generated ongoing social problems.¹⁵

Before examining these problems, we briefly note the recent history behind current family patterns.

iii. An historical note

In the early stages of capitalist development, as wage labour came to be the dominant form of employment, women and children were among the first to be drawn into that kind of labour. By the mid-nineteenth century, most members of wage-earning households were likely to be in paid employment. Upon marrying, women assumed different work than that done by single women; they withdrew from factory jobs, for example, into the home. But the factory "outwork" or "home work" (typically in the garment industry), laundering, shop keeping and even street selling that married women did were as time consuming and energy draining as factory work

(Alexander 1976). For many working-class families, the demands of paid employment meant that there was time and energy for only the most minimal domestic labour. The consequences, in many cases, were wretched living conditions and high rates of infant mortality (Seccombe 1991b). In short, during this early period of developing capitalism, family was eroded for the working class, and thus neither adult workers nor the next generation were adequately reproduced: mortality rates were generally high for the working class.

Since the late nineteenth century, organized male workers have fought for a "family wage" -- that is, an income sufficient for a man to support his wife and their children (Land 1980, Barrett and McIntosh 1982, May 1982). While the model for this sexual division of labour was found in the majority of upper-class and middle-class families, it found widespread support among working-class families both because it conformed closely to widely held views of what was appropriate for each sex and because it appeared to offer a solution to the appalling living conditions confronting wage workers. Thus the sexual division of labour where men were breadwinners and women were primarily wives and mothers doing full-time domestic labour became the widespread ideal to which the majority of people aspired.

The gender roles explicit in the ideology of the family wage were, in fact, fairly new during this time. For all classes, women's loss of a central economic role as production left the household contributed to the novel notion of men supporting their

families (Clark 1968 [1919], Pinchbeck 1969 [1930])). As well, campaigns by various moral authorities to get wealthy and middle-class women to breastfeed their babies coincided with these women's growing desires to avoid frequent pregnancies, in the context of changing notions of the nature of childhood, to produce an ideology of motherhood (Branca 1975). Indeed, it can be argued that middle-class women themselves actively forged this new social identity and role, and that motherhood carved out for them an important position in both the home and the community (Ryan 1981, Coontz 1988, Laslett and Brenner 1989). In any event, it came to be assumed that young children needed special guidance and even full-time attention from their mothers, who no longer were preoccupied with work complementary to their husband's and vital to household subsistence. And more generally in the nineteenth century, an ideology known as "separate spheres" developed, which held women and men to be basically different in nature (Cott 1977).

Through the latter half of the nineteenth century, women and children were gradually removed from the formal paid labour force, in part because of the demands of domestic labour, and especially infant child care. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the paid work force was predominantly male, and men's wages were expected to support a dependent wife and children. Women's work was primarily understood to be domestic labour. It should be noted, however, that for many, and probably most, working-class families, the man's wage was not sufficient for family support, so older children and wives had to earn whatever cash they could (Fox

1980b).

The belief that men should be breadwinners with a family wage sufficient to support a wife and children was so deeply entrenched by the twentieth century that even when employers preferred to hire women, they often felt compelled to defend that practice (Parr 1990). Throughout most of the twentieth century, all employed women were subject to a certain degree of discrimination, which was justified in terms of nuclear family male breadwinner ideologies (Coontz 1988:292-321). While the actual number of men who succeeded in earning a family wage is unclear, especially among the working class (May 1982), the most successful sectors of the labour movement were those in large, well-organized industrial unions.

For most of this century, the dominant ideology maintained that women should marry and that marriage meant women should work full time in their homes providing unpaid labour for their husbands and children. The assumption that women would be homemakers permeated socialization practices and educational systems so that women were discouraged from obtaining the educational or training credentials that would enable them to qualify for many jobs (Gaskell and MacLaren 1987). This situation was reinforced by the hiring practices of many workplaces which prevented married women from holding paid work, by state regulations that either explicitly prevented married women from holding civil-service jobs or more generally made such employment difficult, and by a whole range of social conventions that took for granted that married women would work at home and punished those who had paid employment.¹⁶

The assumption that women should and would have husbands to support them was used to justify the fact that employed women were restricted to certain occupations ("women's work") which often resembled the type of work they were supposed to do in the home, and that women were paid about half of what men were paid. In turn, the fact that women's employment opportunities were so limited and their earnings so restricted encouraged women to marry.

Nevertheless, in response to a series of countervailing forces throughout the century, all women, and particularly married women, have increasingly moved into the paid labour force. For women from certain racial and immigrant groups, paid employment was required because of laws specifying the conditions under which immigrants were brought into Canada. For the many married women unable to live without earning their own wages, economic necessity impelled them to take up paid employment.

In the early part of the century, many women were still able to earn money doing work in their own homes -- taking in borders, doing laundry or sewing for neighbours, etc. -- and many households received income from the employment of older children who gave their wages to their parents (Synge n.d., Bradbury 1984). Such options have decreased as the century progressed. Eventually, the marketplace provided the goods and services married women had offered and compulsory schooling kept children out of paid labour. Consequently, the capacity of women and children to contribute to household earnings declined. In a sense, housewives were proletarianized this century -- as they lost the opportunities to

contribute materially to household subsistence by working at home. Increasingly, entry into the labour force was necessary for women to contribute significantly to family subsistence needs. Meanwhile, with changes in household costs, particularly with the dramatic increase in the amount of money required for taxes, housing and heating, the economic necessity for married women's employment has become more widespread.

Regardless of economic need, a variety of other factors moved married women into the paid labour force. There have been ongoing struggles by women stubbornly challenging gender ideologies that insisted that women marry and spend their lives working in the home; many women have demanded access to education, training, and jobs, and the right to keep their jobs after marriage. Many housewives have expressed their frustration and discontent with the way domestic labour is organized and in particular have noted the problems generated for them by economic dependency and social isolation. For many, paid employment is a potential source of pleasure from socializing with co-workers, on the one hand, and identity and prestige accorded paid workers -- which contrast with the isolation and low status of homemakers -- on the other.

Married women's involvement in paid labour also depends on the availability of suitable employment. Shifting patterns of capital deployment and particularly the growth in the 1950s and 60s of the civil service and, more generally, the service sector of the economy have created a general demand for a type of labour (well educated and English or French speaking) that married women were

well suited to provide (Marchak 1987). However, the demand for women's labour varies considerably from region to region. In particular, given the fact that the Canadian economy has been highly dependent on primary resource industries, in some areas of the country, the majority of jobs are in heavy industry. As a result, they have tended to employ only men and the men have won wages sufficient to support dependent wives. In those areas, many women find jobs hard to come by.

Patterns of married women's work have varied in part according to their class and race, as well. While there are very few Canadian studies investigating the ways in which class and race privilege and discrimination differentiate women's lives, certain general trends can be identified. Women of the owning classes command sufficient wealth that they can hire other people to do their domestic labour for them, including nannies or boarding schools for child care. While they too face sexist discrimination and may have a more difficult time than men of their class getting appointed to corporate boards or obtaining control of family wealth, they do not need to have employment for financial reasons and thus have the greatest range of options open to them. In contrast, poor women have taken any income generating work available regardless of prevailing notions of appropriate employment for women.

Race discrimination, a fundamental component of Canadian (both federal and provincial) aboriginal and immigration policies, and of labour force employment practices, has forced women of particular

racial and ethnic groups into specific types of work. Native women in rural areas have struggled to continue the work of foraging or horticulture in environments increasingly devastated by intrusions of industrial capitalist development (Campbell 1973). Black women who were slaves in Canada or escaping slaves from the US as well as black immigrants from the US and the West Indies were explicitly restricted to certain jobs.¹⁷ There was a general practice among married black women of all classes to assume that paid employment was a part of women's work experiences (Brand 1983, Hamilton 1982). Immigrant women from a variety of countries have been recruited to work in specific jobs under heavily restricted regulations (Arat-Koc 1990).

Generally, married women's entry into the labour force uncovered contradictions inherent in the capitalist economic organization of our society. On the one hand, there had occurred an erosion of the opportunities for women to earn cash by extending their regular domestic work, although the efforts of women during the Depression both to "stretch" their men's earnings (by sewing and re-sewing clothes, cooking creatively, etc.) and to earn extra cash (by taking in boarders, doing work for neighbours, etc.) made the difference between survival and starvation for many Canadian families (Hollingsworth and Tyyska 1988). On the other hand, the demands of child care, especially of babies and young children, have not changed -- indeed, have escalated, with rising standards and expectations about rearing children (Ehrenreich and English 1978). So, the family pattern involving women in full-time child

care and housekeeping was entrenched this century. The sexual division of labour, in short, has mediated the contradiction whereby the labour market requires a continual reproduction of labour power but makes no provision for this reproduction. That is, this mediation has worked until the recent influx of married women into the labour force.

As a backdrop to this situation, capitalist development -- involving urbanization -- eroded the community basis of many people's lives. Specifically, peasant villages (in Europe) and farming areas and native communities (in Canada) in earlier centuries involved ethics of cooperation and assistance for those in need, and near compulsory involvement -- with community patrol of individuals' behaviour (Flandrin 1979, Luxton 1980, Prentice et al. 1988). The rise of the welfare state meant a modern replacement of such community, providing the "safety net" for people whose lives were devastated by the normal workings of the marketplace. But current retrenchment of the welfare state spells a predicament for families. For decades, most families have been privatized, and coping with responsibilities for which the community provides no help (such as the care of young children). Others have relied on personal networks of friends and kin to carry them through. And still others have required, in addition, state support. The latter (two types) will have to rely increasingly on personal support networks. The former -- families who have been self sufficient, given full-time housewives -- are caught in a bind, barely able to cope with their daily schedules because there

is no longer a full-time housewife, and yet without increased state support (especially in the form of state assumption of some responsibility for child care). These people are left to rely on successful mobilization of friends, relatives and neighbours, yet they are precisely the people who are without the time to form and maintain personal "community."

Family Ideology and Reality

As we saw above, the actual family practices that people engage in are shaped by, and in turn shape, complex interacting social dynamics. These dynamics, and how people respond to them, are in turn shaped by, and shape, the understandings people have about the concepts of marriage and family. And just as actual marriage and family practices have a history, family ideology "is produced, challenged, reproduced, transformed" (Barrett 1980:97) in relation to changing socio-economic contexts. Thus, while there is currently a very clear and powerful ideology of the family, shaping not only the consciousness and practices of many people who take such ways of living for granted but also affecting a myriad of social, economic and legal practices, it is being challenged, and existing definitions renegotiated.

Fundamental to existing ideologies of family is the concept of "the family." This concept begins with the assumption that there is one dominant family form, assumed to be the married heterosexual couple with children which is based on a division of labour where the husband as breadwinner provides economic support and the wife

cares for the husband and children. Its dominance is asserted through notions of "the traditional family" in which it is argued that this family form is universal and probably "natural." It is widely assumed, in both popular and academic discourses, that "the family" -- meaning the nuclear family -- is the most efficient and best form for ensuring social stability (see for example, Morgan 1975, Gittins 1985, Anderson et al 1987). Central to these assumptions is the assertion that "normal family life" is vital to adequate socialization of children and that any other family forms are deviant, pathological and unworkable. Thus family ideology is collapsed into, and overlaps with, other complex ideologies of social relations including gender (masculinity, femininity, motherhood, fatherhood), sexuality (heterosexuality, homosexuality), work (divisions of labour), and human nature (ideals of child rearing and intimacy).

If we look back decades ago, before the mass entry of married women into the labour force and before the reform of family law, we can examine the closest approximation to the traditional nuclear family pattern -- involving man as provider and woman as full-time housewife and mother -- which so shapes our image of family life. The 1950s were probably the decade in which more Canadians lived in such families than before and after (boarders/lodgers being present in significant numbers of households in the nineteenth century and through the 1940s, housing shortages forcing some families to double up through the 1940s, and women working outside the home thereafter). As we now know, tensions and contradictions plagued

this normative family pattern.

Since the formulation of British common law and until the late 1970s, marriage involved the exchange of a man's financial support (his market earnings, at least those deemed necessary for the maintenance of his family) for a woman's sexual and domestic services. Accordingly, the first contradiction and tension in the nuclear-family pattern involved its material basis. The most obvious problem was the inadequacy of many men's wages, for a sizeable proportion of Canadian families in the early 20th century and into the 1950s (Fox 1980b). So, the exchange on which family was based failed to work, in many cases. Even when men's earnings were sizeable, the exchange failed in the case of separation and divorce: the vast majority of men legally owing alimony/support failed to pay.

In past decades, as we saw, compensation for the inadequacy of many men's earnings -- amounting to the absence of a "family wage" for these households -- was wage work by children, where households included old enough children, and various kinds of work done by women. In fact, the informal economy that many women were involved in sustained many families, as well as the illusion that women were "at home." In the nineteenth century, Canadian women kept barnyard animals and cultivated vegetable gardens, even in large cities (Bradbury 1984); took in boarders (Darroch and Ornstein 1985, Medjuck 1979); or did a variety of paid work for neighbours (e.g., sewing, laundering) or local factories (i.e., outwork, in the form of piecework) (Steedman 1986). As the twentieth century unfolded,

however, women lost many of these opportunities to make money by extending their work at home; at the same time, children were subject to longer mandatory school attendance. By the 1930s and 1940s, many old ways of supplementing the man's income had eroded while law and practice still prohibited women from working outside the home after marriage (Parr 1990) -- which explains women's ready acceptance of factory jobs during the War, and their resistance to dismissal afterwards (Pierson 1986).

Even when they could afford traditional gender roles, however, 1950s couples were involved in a second contradiction, in the form of high psychic costs. This second contradiction involved the costs to women and even men of these traditional gender roles -- the weight of the responsibility of "the provider" role and stunted emotional and relational life, in the case of men (who often scarcely knew their own children and had no friends besides their wives)(Ehrenreich 1984) and the isolation, economic dependence, lack of autonomy, etc., in the case of women (Luxton 1980). While the unrewarding nature of women's housework is well documented, less discussed is the absolute incompatibility of the demands of child care and the needs of young children, on the one hand, and the requirements of good housekeeping on the other: women's domestic work itself has involved a fundamental contradiction.

The third contradiction facing the single-breadwinner family was (and is) that privatized nuclear families are poor environments in which to raise children. A single, isolated caregiver inevitably loses inspiration, enthusiasm and even warmth over the

course of 24-hour-day, seven-day work weeks; home environments are not designed for toddlers -- and therefore are both more dangerous and less stimulating than they should be -- and family needs for order compete with infant and toddler needs to explore and manipulate their environment. In short, full-time mothering is not only bad for women, it is also bad for children. As Jessie Bernard (1974:9) stated: "The way we institutionalize motherhood ... assigning sole responsibility for child care to the mother, cutting her off from the easy help of others in an isolated household, requiring round-the-clock tender, loving care, and making such care her exclusive activity is not only new and unique, but not even a good way for either women or -- if we accept as a criterion the amount of maternal warmth shown -- for children."¹⁸

Even female socialization -- presumably so attuned to the needs of motherhood -- is useful for attracting a marriage partner but counterproductive for handling the heavy requirements of mothering (Breen 1975). But the key problem is, of course, not women's characteristics. As Rosenberg (1987) argues, full-time mothers of young children are in a high-demand, low-control situation of the sort reported to be most conducive to stress. The privatized nature of child care in our society is, though central to what is valued in familist ideology, the key problem. Accordingly, most research shows good-quality group day care to be better for young children than care by a full-time mother (Rutter 1981).

A final contradiction in the gender specialization that

characterized single-earner nuclear families is that loss of the husband/father means a dramatic drop in the family's standard of living, often a drop into poverty. Over a third (35.9%) of households headed by women lived below the poverty line in 1978, compared with eight percent (7.6%) of those headed by men (Ross 1981:11).

So, the 1960s and 1970s featured a revolt against traditional patterns: against strict heterosexuality and most restrictions on sexual expression; by men, against the emotional straitjacket of their role (Ehrenreich 1984); and (most importantly) by women against their restriction to a privatized domestic sphere, and economic dependence on men. In all cases, the attractions of a consumer society, especially the promises attached to individual wages (most importantly, in terms of personal autonomy), are important causally.

As a result of new patterns, which mostly involve the fact that over half of married women, even those with young children, work outside the home, contradictions implicit in family patterns in the 1950s have become explicit -- and necessary to deal with every day. The majority of women with families now must perform a "balancing act" every day -- as they continue to be responsible for household management and housework and child care (Luxton 1983, Hochschild 1988). Hochschild (1988) estimates that women now do a month of 24-hour days of work annually more than their partners. Other researchers find that women lose sleep, leisure, and time for friends in the process (Meissner et al 1975; see Hochschild 1988

for a literature review); the stress attached to juggling these several jobs is well documented (Michelson 1985, Rosenberg 1987). The source of the stress is clear for women involved in this situation. First, it is highly stressful to do several things at once. Women who are mothers not only have to do just that in their limited time, but also are never able to do anything in a single-minded way (even when away from their children) (Land in Gieve 1989).

Second, transitions between the home and the job, mediated by intricate dealings with children, are the most stressful times of the day (Michelson 1985). These times are most stressful for everyone, but it is women who most often must manage them. Third, the contrast in behavioural requirements -- literally in the modes of orientation to the world -- between job or career and home can be stunning, and disorienting to women. Finally, the sheer pressure on time -- the lack of time necessary to meet the demands -- is a constant strain.

Behind this virtual crisis in family life -- the privatization of child care and other domestic labour while both adults must work outside the home -- is an entire social organization predicated on traditional gender roles and family patterns. Jobs and careers are structured for men (that is, people without family responsibilities), shopping (now a major component of weekly household work) assumes women's free labour (e.g., grocery stores have continuously increased the amount of work the shopper does over this century), and the school system assumes mothers to be

free to provide support services (e.g., leaving and picking up children during normal working hours, volunteering at lunch time, or being home for the kids' lunch), etc. More importantly, child care -- til the age of five -- is privatized, and not a community responsibility. Privatized family life requires the management, if not work, of family members. And so, privatized families require women in some form of the traditional domestic role.

In short, we have a family system, and related social structure, that assumes traditional gender roles and, consequently, does not work. Meanwhile, challenges to familist ideology have come both from historical and cross-cultural studies which have demonstrated that there is nothing either universal or natural about the nuclear family form (see Collier et al. 1982 for a review). Instead, it is only one of many different forms and it takes the shape it does for very specific historical reasons (Secombe 1991b). More significant challenges come from the actual practices of people who live differently -- by not marrying; by having intimate, long-term sexual relationships with several partners; by raising children alone or with groups of parents; by demanding legal recognition and the extension of family privileges to other relationships.¹⁹ As these alternative family forms increase, family ideology simultaneously shifts to incorporate aspects of these changes and congeals to reaffirm the validity of its position. So, for example, in a 1982 study of married couples where one was a steelworker in Hamilton, there was a general acceptance of married women's employment, which marks a shift in

family ideology over the last twenty years, yet many steelworkers still hold on to the idea that men are primary breadwinners (Livingstone and Luxton 1989). Overwhelmingly, these people insisted that "the nuclear family -- a married couple and children -- is the most natural and best possible arrangement for raising children."

Measurement Issues

The confusions and ambiguities inherent in both common-sense assumptions and sociological analyses of families are reflected in existing social policy relating to family matters. To develop a coherent family policy, Canada first needs to achieve conceptual clarity about "family" and then measure the various patterns and problems in the population. When considering measurement, the primary questions are: What do we want to know and for what purposes?

While Canada has never had an explicit family policy (Armitage 1978), a range of social policies and programmes have direct consequences for families (Ryant 1988). The most obvious are those relating directly to family formation or dissolution: marriage and divorce, adoption, child welfare. There are a range of laws, policies and programmes relating to income that assume certain kinds of family-based economic relationships: minimum wage laws, tax policies, child allowances (which were initiated to encourage an increase in the birth rate [Ryant 1988:243]), pensions, income supplements such as welfare, mothers allowances and unemployment

insurance (most of which make assumptions about family breadwinner and spousal dependency patterns). There are many social policies and programmes that are predicated on assumptions about certain family forms and in turn reinforce such types of families. These include such things as community mental health, family services, family planning, abortion, day care (for children and elderly people), rape crisis centres, and assaulted women's shelters. Finally, implicit assumptions about families pervade the majority of social policies from education, urban planning and housing bylaws, to workplace employee benefits. It may not stretch the truth to say that every social policy makes assumptions about family and, in turn, has an impact on family life.

Our analysis implies that any research endeavours must begin from a critical stance, asking probing questions of the underlying research assumptions to ensure that a clear distinction is maintained between normative ideals and actual practices. A research project intending to measure the numbers of children living in "intact families" will fail if it assumes that such families consist only of a married co-resident couple with their children, for example. The concept "single parent family" fails to distinguish professional women who chose to raise a child alone, lesbian mothers, people who co-parent but are separated and live in different households, and women who were abandoned by their spouses and left to support their children, yet the material and emotional situation of these children is very different. Moreover, a study of "single-parent families" that assumes that the child only lives

with one parent may miss the large numbers of children who live with both parents though the parents live in different households. A census form that asks the respondent to list those who live in the house will produce a tabulation in which such children get counted twice.

One normative ideal that often clouds research is the idea that the family acts as a corporate group with collective interests. This idea is often found in policies advocating family responsibility for those unable to care for themselves. Beliefs that the elderly, the sick or disabled can best be cared for by their families too often mask the actuality that women do this work. Similarly this same ideal occurs in notions about income and access to resources. A family may have a high income if the total incomes of all family members are added together. However, a policy that says that if family income is above a certain level an individual member cannot obtain social support -- for example, a university student cannot get grants or loans, the unemployed man cannot get welfare -- ignores the reality that some family members may not be prepared to share their income with others. Parents may refuse to support a child through university, a separated spouse may refuse to give some of her salary to an unemployed man, and married men may not share their full incomes with their wives.

Too often, efforts to resolve the crises confronting families concern themselves with the form of "the family" rather than the extent to which people are actually able to get their needs met -- needs for physical sustenance and emotional support. For example,

there is a great deal of concern expressed about the increasing numbers of single-parent, female-headed households. The private anxieties motivating the public concern may be varied. But there is one concern that should be acted upon: because increasing numbers of children are now being raised and supported by women, rising proportions of children live in poverty. The solution is not a political one of insisting that all children be raised in two-parent, heterosexual households; it requires an economic solution of ensuring that all parents have sufficient incomes to support their children.

Thus research must measure what is actually going on, rather than beginning with a priori assumptions about what will or should exist and then explaining the cases that don't fit as exceptions. We suggest that measurement should start with individuals and investigate the social-support networks in which they are embedded. For example, who actually contributes what to the care of a particular child? While one child may be cared for exclusively by her biological parents, another may be located in a network of caring adults and older children, all of whom contribute on a regular basis both loving attention and financial and material support. Similarly, a person dying from AIDS may be cared for by a team of many people, some from his close personal kin and friends, some from the gay community who are committed to helping AIDS patients stay at home, and others from the alternative health care community.

Gathering information on the support network of each child

especially, but also every adult, will reveal what is important, and possibly problematic, about families. For every child, we should determine what adults contribute financial support for their subsistence needs, and the monetary resources of these adults. As well, we should find out who contributes daily or weekly physical and nonphysical care to each child. Following that measure, there should be an assessment -- by the child's primary caregiver -- of the child's needs and the extent to which they are or are not being met; information on special problems also should be solicited.

Information on the extent to which children's needs are being met, along with some indication of the numbers of people who could be called upon for assistance in special circumstances, will give an idea of the essence of what we mean by "family" -- more so than measures of the composition of households, which are often used as indicators of actual or potential child-care problems. For adults as well, measures of their support network -- people providing tangible and intangible resources and services and support -- should be most useful. In the end, measurement focusing on the individual and his or her support network will better inform policies not only on family but also the wide range of income/support policies and programmes. And it will give us a much better sense of the need for day-care facilities than data we now have.

One of the other absences in the existing literature on families in Canada is any measure of what people want of family life and what problems people have with family life. We need

investigations of what people want, what they think is possible and what they dream about. For example, while there are widespread demands for a national system of child-care centres that would provide quality care, we have little systematic information about what that means to people. At the same time, there are others who argue adamantly that the only quality care is that provided by mothers at home. Again, we have very limited information on what such child care actually entails and what are the specific problems of that type of care. The sociological literature implies that the first few months of life with a new baby involve a "crisis" but the specifics of that are not clear.

In Canada we have a wide diversity of family forms with roots in quite different traditions. We need studies that investigate the various forms of family life and assess the implications of various child-rearing practices, ways of organizing care giving and so on. Finally, we need extensive and systematic investigations of the ways in which ideologies of family are reflected in existing laws, social and economic policies and programmes, showing how unquestioned assumptions unintentionally shape the organization of personal life in Canada today.

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1. The term "family" is widely used easily and uncritically. As we argue below, the term "the family" is ideological, reflecting normative values that obscure meaning instead of providing a clear analytical or conceptual term. As a result, we do not use the term, preferring instead family or families. To illustrate the significance of this distinction, consider the term "work". We never talk about "the work" because we recognize a plurality of forms. We suggest that it is imperative that the phrase "the family" be reconceptualized in a similar way to convey the recognition that there are many types of families.

2. The following discussion is derived from the work both of us are currently doing on this topic. Further elaboration is available in our various publications. We have cited, where relevant, one or two key sources to illustrate the point. This is not intended to represent an extensive bibliography on the topic.

3. There is, of course, an extensive literature on various aspects of family life, including such topics as conjugal power and decision making, divisions of labour between spouses, socialization practices. For the most part these focus relatively uncritically on spousal or parent-child relations without examining the relation between family and the rest of society and without examining the reasons for particular family forms or practices.

4. Just twenty years ago, the Canadian Association of Sociology and Anthropology considered that family did not warrant designation as a specific topic of study (Wakil 1970).

5. Luxton (1980) on Canadian working-class family life, Stack (1974) on Afro-American family arrangements, and Hochschild (1989) on two-earner couples' "balancing acts" are obvious exceptions. So rare are such studies -- and on issues of such importance -- that these books quickly became bestsellers. Meanwhile, Stacey (1990) on American working-class families and Weston (1991) on lesbian and gay families look promising.

6. The emphasis in Eichler's criticism is that family membership, and treatment as a family member, handicaps individuals. Individuals' marital or family status -- and not their personal characteristics -- establishes their eligibility for state benefits: family relationships may disqualify people for benefits (e.g., a handicapped person loses disability if attached to a spouse with a reasonable income). Her solution is to treat people as individuals, in terms of claims on social resources. We agree, but are concerned about the implicit juxtaposition in her argument between individual and collective/community. The social forces that individualize and isolate us are so strong that advocating another such force is unsettling. The problem, as Eichler points out, is that the state is seeking to shift responsibility for people's welfare onto families, and simultaneously undermining them. Promotion of universal social services, as well as

guaranteed individual access to them and to a decent income, would alleviate the problem.

7. The term "blood" continues in both popular and scholarly usage to connote genetic ties.

8. In 17th-century, and earlier, Europe, the kinship aspect of "family" primarily meant obligation (Flandrin 1979:45). The same might be said today, although the nature of the obligations are different.

9. This section on the etymology of "family" is derived from Raymond Williams (1983).

10. The European practices brought to Canada were themselves diverse depending on country or even region of origin, class, religious affiliation and other similar factors. In addition, there were, as always, various types of resistance or violation of norms, such as unmarried sexual partnerships, illegitimacy, prostitution etc.

11. Daniel Patrick Moynihan's The Negro Family in America (1965), and its influential argument that the family structure typical of poor Afro-Americans was a major cause of their poverty (i.e., the "culture of poverty" argument), provided the intellectual backdrop for Stack's study.

12. Laslett and Brenner (1989:382-83) define "social reproduction" clearly and simply: "[F]eminists use social reproduction to refer to the activities and attitudes, behaviors and emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis, and intergenerationally. Among other things, social reproduction includes how food, clothing, and shelter are made available for immediate consumption, the ways in which the care and socialization of children are provided, the care of the infirm and elderly, and the social organization of sexuality. Social reproduction can thus be seen to include various kinds of work -- mental, manual, and emotional -- aimed at providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically, defined care necessary to maintain existing life and to reproduce the next generation."

13. Interesting about romantic love is that it may be directly implicated in violence against women. As MacLeod (1987) points out, the same things that denote romantic love -- obsession, a feeling of possession, exclusivity, etc. -- also can instigate men's attacks on women. Interesting also is that even in the absence of this turn, romantic love -- again as these characteristics make clear -- is intrinsically temporary, and thus a problematic basis for a long-term relationship.

14. In turn, we suspect that the emphasis placed upon biology in this society (which generates belief in socio-biological explanations of social phenomena without any evidence, for example) is emblematic of these same emotional bonds among parents and children, and the ideology that expresses them.

15. The tensions generated by the disjuncture between work and family have always been a source of conflict between employers and employees. The recent publication of the Ontario Women's Directorate Work and Family The Crucial Balance 1991 provides information on some of the most innovative and creative policies developed by unions and major corporations to balance the needs of both.

16. Social attitudes to women's paid employment differentiate white and "respectable" women from native, black and other racially identified groups, and from working-class and poor people.

17. In 1910 and 1911, a number of women from Guadeloupe were brought into Montreal as domestics. In 1955 a government sponsored Domestic scheme brought 2,690 workers from the West Indies. See Levitt and McIntyre (1967:172).

18. There is an extensive literature on mothering, and the negative effects on women and children of privatized child care (though this literature, which is largely psychological, does not discuss privatization as an issue). See Boulton 1983, Breen 1975, Leifer 1980, Oakley 1980, Eagin 1985, Rosenberg 1987.

19. Lesbian and gay couples are fighting to have their relationships legally and socially recognized as equivalent to heterosexual couples. Carolyn Andrews, fighting to have her employee family benefits paid to her same-sex lover and that woman's child, used the slogan "we are family too". Single people have fought (a bit more successfully) to gain recognition that they can parent children. Certain religious groups, such as the Mormons in the United States, have fought for many years to have multiple marriages recognized. Most people who have family practices that differ significantly from those legitimated by family ideology try to avoid public exposure and carry out their practices in clandestine ways.

(1)
THE CANADIAN FAMILY IN TRANSITION

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INTRODUCTION

"Looking back through history at the instrumental and indispensable role that the family institution has played in society has led some to voice deep concerns over the declining marriage rate, the rising divorce rate, the persistence of below-replacement fertility, the growing proportion of unwed mothers, increasing participation in the labour force by mothers of young children, the rise of individualism, the proliferation of one-person households, and many other emerging trends, all of which seem to point to the decline of the family" (Ram, 1990).

This concern with the "decline" in the family is echoed in numerous recent publications reflected even in their titles, e. g., The Family in Crisis: A Population Crisis? (Legare, et al., 1989); The Canadian Family in Crisis (Conway, 1990) and "What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic and Institutional Change" (Bumpass, 1990). Much of the analysis of the changing family is couched in negative terms and raises alarming questions about the trends, but many authors also argue that changing patterns may be beneficial, particularly for women and children (Caplow, et al., 1983; McDaniel, 1989). Thus, there is a major controversy in the literature concerning what the changes in the family over the past several years really mean.

Not usually a matter of debate is the importance of the family in the overall structure of any large social grouping. The family is perhaps the central institutional arrangement in society. While there have been experiments with other types of basic social arrangements, there appears to be no viable alternatives that provide for the on-going development and socialization of each succeeding generation. Almost all of us spend most of our lives in some type of formal

organization that we call the family, and usually within the context of the nuclear family arrangement. Thus, one generation leads to another, and the actual perpetuation of the human species has its foundation in the care that children receive from their parents.

While the family may be the bedrock of future generations, it is also true that the family has undergone many fundamental changes in this century, particularly in the recent past (one or two generations) in all of the Western world. The traditional family in which the husband went out to earn a living while the mother remained in the household raising the children is now a minority in terms of Canadian family structure. Lone-parent families, childless couples, and dual earning families make up the majority of the current structure in this country. The changes in the past 30 years relating to the relationship of women to the family in the Canadian scene have been remarkable. The proportion of married women in the labour force has increased from 22% in 1961 to nearly 60% as we enter the 1990s. The age at first marriage has risen from 21.2 for brides in 1965 to 23.7 in 1985. The proportion of women ever marrying has decreased from 95 to 85% in the past generation, and the proportion of marriage dissolution due to divorce has increased from 11% in 1965 to 42% in 1986. Total fertility rates in Canada have fallen from 3.6 in the early 1960s to 1.7 in the late 1980s. Adjustment to these different patterns produces behavioural changes for individual women, and there are macro-level implications for Canadian society as a whole in terms of gender roles, labour force activity, educational attainment, living patterns and kinship networks.

In Canada, basic to even a cursory understanding of these alterations in the family is an appreciation of what is one of the most fundamental and important revolutions in all of

human history, the changing role of women. While this revolution has complicated origins, patterns and developments, the essential components are found in the modernization process which is exemplified most clearly in the Western World by what demographers call the demographic transition. This demographic change from high birth and death rates to a world of stable low fertility and mortality has been accompanied, slowly, by a fundamental shift in the position of women in society in general, but particularly within the context of the family. The changing roles and behaviours of women in Canada are well underway and the repercussions are only beginning to be understood in terms of economic, social, sexual and family life.

From a feminist perspective, the 20th century has been somewhat of a watershed in the way in which familial and social life has been conducted. Prior to this time in Canada, women were often required to incorporate familial responsibilities (that most often included large numbers of children) with economic responsibilities (Davis, et al., 1986; Henshel, 1973). In a basically rural society, cottage industries and farm employment were a major part of the total social fabric. Only with the coming of urban, industrial society is there a drastic shift in living/working space for women. It was during this period of time when the process of modernization was in full bloom that women primarily acquired the role of homemaker while her spouse became the primary breadwinner. Paradoxically, this transition from rural to urban Canada also set the stage for women to have the opportunity to control reproduction and to step outside of a limited homemaker role (Keyfitz, 1986). Coincident with the modernization process, women have made important strides in achieving equality with men in a whole host of arenas including political, economic, educational and sexual behaviour.

One author has written that: "The steady erosion of the ideological baggage of patriarchy is good for both men and women. The increasing opportunity to choose rewarding occupations and rewarding intimate relationships is not something many of us would wish to reverse" (Bumpass, 1990). The patriarchy, basically defined as male domination and female subordination, as the prominent form of historical familial life certainly placed women in an inferior life chance position. In one of the earliest works concerning this subject, de Beauvoir called this position of women "the other." She says:

"Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being....She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the absolute--she is the Other.... (Women) have no past, no history, no religion of their own....The bond that unites her to her oppressor is not comparable to any other. The division of the sexes is a biological fact, not an event in human history....The couple is a fundamental unity with its two halves riveted together, and the cleavage of society along the line of sex is impossible. Here is to be found the basic trait of woman: she is the Other in a totality of which the two components are necessary to one another" (deBeauvoir, 1957, pp. XVI to XVIII).

Centuries of socialization had made women an adjunct to the life of men, such that women had been taught to look to males for total fulfilment and a reason for being. Women basically formed their identity through attachment to men, and by extension, through their children. Women accepted the

role of "other" and found a justification for being by having the central focus of their lives revolving around husband and family. Indeed, this "focus", or lack of it, is one of the central debates surrounding the changing family in Canada. To some extent this central tendency around the family is still important to many women, although now it may be more a matter of choice rather than obligation, of one behaviour out of many alternatives. While it may be "that profamilial normative pressures have eroded in all areas of the life course" (Bumpass, 1990), it is also the situation both currently and historically that familialism per se has never been highly valued in Canada in an economic sense (McDaniel, 1989). Women were expected to take care of family and household, with no formal compensation mechanisms. This idea of compensation for childrearing is one of the lively debates that also includes issues of day care and tax benefits.

In the past, the biological reality of women as childbearer/food supplier incorporated with the patriarchal sociological norm of women as primary child caregivers limited the alternative options for almost all women. Women's relative isolation within the family gave them less influence in the larger society and men were much more likely to be able to adjust to various situations outside of the familial organization (Meyorwitz, 1986). It was thought that a "natural" state of equality between women and men was not possible because of the reproductive difference between the sexes. "Locke's presumption that women were unable to provide for their offspring by themselves meant that women were therefore naturally dependent upon men" (Sydie, 1987). In lay terms, women remained at home to have and care for children (the average completed family size in Canada in the late 19th century was approximately seven children) (Gee, 1986) while men were freer to be involved in other pursuits. In this type of patriarchal process, women were, and to some extent still

are, the objects of political, psychological and economic prejudice and discrimination, much in the way that ethnic minorities have been such objects (Henshel, 1973, de Beauvoir, 1957). At best in these types of societies, women were helpmates of men, usually within the confines of home and family. Keyfitz (1986) hypothesizes that large families are possible only in those situations where women are in fact constrained and confined. Barefoot and pregnant was not an uncommon situation at the beginning of the 20th century for the average woman in Canada. Women had little or no control over their reproductive lives and little or no say in their options outside of the familial caregiver role. These were major factors in the limitations of alternative behaviours for women. In general, the patriarchy was about men having autonomy and women, dependency. In this arrangement, "The outside world is the man's world, and, in relation to it, the woman is crippled by ignorance and fear, bred not by biology, but by isolation" (Meyowitz, 1986, p. 203). Exclusion reinforced dependency, and dependency furthered isolated women and legitimated exclusion.

The purpose of this report is to document both the normative and demographic patterns that have accompanied the on-going revolution in the role of women in Canada over the past few decades. While there are certainly many inequalities remaining by gender, there is also less subordination and dependency among women. In this context, perhaps the major issue to be addressed relates to the family in transition. "What is at issue is not the persistence of the institution of the family but, rather, the nature of family patterns in the relevant future--the opportunities and costs of those patterns" (Bumpass, 1990). A key component of the changing family in all of its forms in Canada relates to the opportunity/availability of other life course alternatives for women, where childbearing and childrearing are transformed

from one's total existence to an episode in the overall life experience. In addition, one of the major changes in the family may relate to the shared responsibility of men and women in both familial household tasks and economic responsibilities that take place primarily outside of the home.

DEFINITIONS OF THE FAMILY

According to the Canadian Census, a family is defined as two or more people related by blood, marriage or adoption and residing together. Within this framework, the people are usually combined in an association designated as the nuclear family (which is a married couple who may or may not be parents and non married children, or lone parents). Another type of familial structure is the extended family which may include more than parents and unmarried children living in the same residence (married children, grandparents, other close relatives). Historically, the family unit tended toward extended situations, but with the coming of the industrial revolution and the movement from rural to urban areas, the nuclear family became the most prominent institution within Western society, and is the unit of analysis for this report. Most of the family literature indicates that the nuclear family is probably a basic, universal human grouping. It acts as the sole form of family, or it is the central arrangement from which more complex extended or communal family types evolve. It exists as a distinct group in every known society.

Most of us belong to two families as we move through the life cycle. The first of these is known as the family of orientation. This is the family into which we are born and through which we develop our cultural orientation to the world, through the process of socialization. Most experts in the area of socialization point to the family as the most

influential agent. The second of the family formations for most Canadians is the family of procreation. In this arrangement, we generally form our own residence after marriage (defined broadly as the commitment and ongoing exchange between two consenting adults, usually male and female, but not always), and the vast majority of us (over 85%) have children who fit into the nuclear family, the same as we did as children. This is the continuity across generations, each completing the life cycle and adding to the cultural history of the society. However, there are major changes going on in terms of the role of the family for both society and individuals, and these need to be examined within the framework of the modern arrangements between consenting adults and their children. At the same time as these fundamental changes are taking place, the family remains the basic unit of analysis where partners are involved in a sexual union and where they, along with any present immature children, constitute a group separate and distinct from the rest of the community.

THEORIES OF THE FAMILY

A theory can be defined in the social sciences as a scientific attempt to state an order, system and/or relationship among facts and variables in such way as to explain and predict outcomes, such as the origins and development of the family. Most of the modern literature on the family cites three general approaches: Structural Functionalism, Conflict, and Feminist theories (Lips, 1988; Scanzoni and Scanzoni, 1988; Veevers, 1991).

Structural-functionalism is a theory of human organization that predicts and explains behaviour based upon the hypothesis that society is a system of interrelated parts, and that an equilibrium is reached when roles and statuses are

assigned and filled according to need and ability. Each part or structure of the family is assumed to serve some function for another part and in the final analysis, for the whole. It has been argued that gender role specialization with men and women filling specific, unique patterns of behaviour is essential to the effective functioning of the nuclear family. Generally, the roles are seen as complementary and non-overlapping. "If the husband attends to his occupation and the wife attends to her role as the family's centre of nurturance, there is less chance for competitiveness between husband and wife--a rivalry that could lead to marital dissolution. Such a functionalist perspective suggests that serious conflict and system disruption could occur if a woman chooses to be as active and achievement-oriented as her husband in pursuing an occupation." (Scanzoni and Scanzoni, 1988, p. 27). Those who analyze the purpose of the family from a functionalist point of view usually point to four major reasons for the existence of the family across cultures and over time (Ram, 1990). These are: (1) a provision for regulating sexual behaviour between men and women in order to maintain cooperative relationships between individuals and groups; (2) economic requirements where the family is a unit of production with all members contributing to bring about the requirements necessary for food, shelter and clothing. This involves division of labour and gender specific roles; (3) control of reproduction where children are the outcome of a sexual liaison and are cared for in the context of family; and (4) socialization where the family is primarily responsible for the integration of the child into the culture of the society including norms, values, mores, gender roles, work orientation, emotional commitment, education, recreation and leisure time activity. In the ideal circumstance, the family is the source of love, affection and intimacy between spouses, parents and children, and much of the strength in the functionalist point of view of the family depends on the

emotional bonds the family is able to create between its members (Ram, 1990). It has been argued that as we approach the 20th century, only the socialization aspects truly remain, and even in that function, the family is more and more relegated to that of love and affection, and those bonds may be quite fragile (Ryder, 1979). Clearly, the functionalist perspective on the family is most under threat in terms of the changes taking place within the family, particularly as those changes are involving the role of women.

The conflict perspective basically views society as a struggle between have and have nots for scarce resources. This theory characterizes the family as resulting from an oppressive patriarchy where resources and power are in scarce supply, and the family is an organization where women and children are subordinated to the power of the male. Wife and child abuse, economic dependence, sexual manipulation and physiological differences in strength between male and female have made the sexes unequal with the result that women's roles in society have been restricted. Male self interest is advanced by keeping women subordinated, and the differential socialization of male and female children perpetuate that arrangement. "The persistence of segregation in the labour force and the privatized nuclear family remain two of the most pervasive structural barriers to gender equality." (Beaujot, 1988). In the conflict model, males dominate and the family as structured perpetuates that domination. While certain changes have in the legal and normative structure alleviates total male control, the basic argument is that men have consolidated power within the framework of the nuclear family.

The third perspective, feminist theory, is at odds with the functionalist perspective of assigning roles based on sex. This approach is basically a conflict model but argues that roles can be worked out independent of gender, even to the

point where traditional male/female roles are reversed. Who does what is negotiated and agreed to, even in the context of conflict between the partners. This theory argues that conflict may even be beneficial in a marriage by because people perform in terms of their individual abilities, rather than by societal expectations, even though individual activities are very much shaped by such expectations. There is a more egalitarian socialization of children, which, over time, feeds into societal norms about what is appropriate gender behaviour. "The influence of feminist research is significant and varied. A major aspect of this work concerns parenting and the different roles of mothers and fathers. The importance of fathers has been discussed in terms of infant bonding, sharing the traditional work of women, creating opportunities that have been denied to men, and as an activity which varies according to social class and culture" (Ferguson, 1988). Children may need the differing socializations provided by mothers and fathers, but mothers and fathers need not be automatically characterised as men and women. A feminist perspective might argue that gender role reversal is not only possible, but even desirable--a man as mother and a woman as father, at least in some behaviours, may produce a more well-rounded child.

With this short, theoretical development as background, what is happening in the family over the past generation in Canada? Is the family a dying institution, obsolete and no longer meeting the needs of individuals or the society? Or, is the family simply undergoing modification? Living arrangements may be more diverse, and individuals may rely less on family for economic and service support, but the form and structure may be more successful in the sense that women have more options within the system. Less structure in roles may bring about more freedom of choice and more emphasis on quality of family life, with less exclusion and dependency on

the part of women who choose to have family be a component of their life.

THE CANADIAN FAMILY IN TRANSITION

Veevers (1991) argues that there are eight major trends that characterize the family in transition in Canada, and these trends occur across the life cycle: Gender role change; increasing sexual freedom; more diverse mate selection; increasing numbers of single people, single parents, and diverse partner arrangements; more divorces and remarriages; female labour force participation; marked decreases in fertility and correspondingly, increases in the numbers of elderly. Some of these trends have been discussed earlier but more detail will be provided in this section.

GENDER ROLES: As we have seen, the role of women is undergoing dramatic change, and although less is written about the male transformation, there are also alterations taking place, although not as dramatic in form. A recent play opening in Vancouver had the following newspaper item: "Real men may not eat quiche but they do change diapers and brave the world of colic and chronic-sleep loss in Robert More's musical-comedy Dads in Bondage." On a more academic note, more men in a Manitoba town were involved in sharing household tasks with their partners (Luxton, 1988) and in a U.S. study, male household efforts increased 30% in situations where the female was working full time (Bumpass, 1990). However, most of the gender role change has involved women in families, both in terms of expanding opportunities outside of the home and in the decrease in childbearing.

It would appear that the decrease in the numbers and rates of children being born is very much related to the changing role of women. Keyfitz (1986) has written that low

fertility is a certain outcome of more gender equality. Societies that do not constrain women will contract--women want the alternatives and life choices that men have, and fewer numbers of children in their lives create the possibility that alternatives, if available, can be chosen. Perhaps the clearest statement concerning the changing role of women and the reproductive aspects of the family is provided by Norman Ryder (1979):

"...the principle reason for the recent decline in fertility is the possibility now gradually opening for women to derive legitimate rewards in the pursuit of activities other than motherhood. At considerable risk of oversimplification, I would assert that our past success at population replacement, throughout all of human history, has been conditional on the discriminatory treatment of women. If we are now prepared to consider this as fundamentally inequitable, and we are ready to respect the woman who chooses a nonmaternal way of life, we may be pulling out the prop that has all along made possible our survival as a species. Although I am apprehensive about the consequences, I believe we must accept them, because...it is right and proper for women as well as men to be self-determining persons....In summary of this account of the present family, I believe that there is less satisfaction from parenthood today, and there are alternative modes of living which appear preferable to a significant portion of young women." (p. 366).

While women's roles are certainly expanding, there is a long way to go in her emancipation from dependency and household. One important piece of evidence is this analysis is level of income. Women make about 60% of what men earn overall, and much of the differential relates to part-time work and job disruption (Goyder, 1981; Grindstaff, 1990). Even when human capital resources such as education, occupation and

full time employment status are controlled, women in families remain "junior partners" in the sense that they contribute less than half of family income (See Table 1).

(Table 1 About Here)

No matter how the available data are arranged or analyzed, there is a uniform indication that women generally, regardless of their particular status or background characteristics contribute less than 50% of total family income. In examining married women at age 30 (Grindstaff, 1990), about one-third do not work outside of the home and provide little or no income to the family. Women who work on a part-time basis account for about 20% of their total family income and make up 20% of all the women. By subtraction, nearly half of the women are employed in full time jobs, contributing 36% of the family income when working in non professional occupations and over 43% when in a professional situation. The data show that women are more financially involved in their families when there is a significant accumulation of human capital. Alternatively, there are no sub-groupings of women who contribute as much as half of the total family earnings. The changing gender roles concerning women and employment are such that it has become normatively acceptable for women to make a financial contribution to the family, and often that contribution is necessary for financial solvency.

However, the data show that it is the men who remain the principal providers. For example, when the total family income is \$20-30,000, professional women contribute 43% and other full time female workers 33%. When the total family income is higher, \$40-50,000, the same proportions are identified, 43 and 34% respectively (data not presented in the Table). This finding suggests that as women are better

educated, better placed in the occupational structure and earn more income, the men that they marry are also better situated in all of these areas, suggesting some selection effect in marriage. In these circumstances, no matter what the human capital achievements of some married women, the females do not "out distance" their partners, they remain at a junior level relatively. The women with more developed levels of human capital contribute a larger share of familial financial resources, but they remain within a traditional normative system by involvement with men who are doing even better. In a scenario where the women are economically dominant, a gender role reversal, theory might predict severe role strain and possible marriage difficulty. Thus, it would appear that roles are indeed changing around women, the family, and alternative behaviours outside of the household, but the women remain junior partners.

In a recent small sample size study in Toronto (N=36), it was found that women made children their primary responsibility in comparison to work outside of the home (Maclean, 1991). Motherhood brought with it responsibility that was qualitatively different from other functions the women were involved in, even the labour force. About half of the male partners in the study were actively participating in childcare, but for them, sharing domestic tasks was clearly secondary. While there have been changes in the roles of men and women in and around the home environment, the women remain the primary caregivers, with few examples of what might be thought of as equal parenting. When the male was involved, it was the woman who delegated responsibility and bore the bulk of the work load. Again, while changes are in progress, it remains a gender role truism that women are junior partners in the economic world, while men are the junior members in the domestic sphere. How much change occurs in household responsibilities is highly correlated to the financial

contributions of the partners.

SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR: The functionalist view of sexual behaviour argues that if all sexual norms were observed, most sexual problems, both individual and institutional, would disappear. The argument is that norms have evolved over thousands of years and reflect a cumulative human experience. For example, if the taboos against premarital and adulterous sexual intercourse were observed, there would be no births to single mothers, less venereal disease and less divorce. Sexuality is viewed as a powerful force that needs to be kept under control if society is to function in an integrated way. The conflict perspective holds that all sexual behaviour is natural and private, and institutional/legal regulation is fruitless. The efforts to both suppress or control sexual expression creates hypocrisy, subjects individuals to public disgrace, and often leads to sexual dysfunction in terms of guilt and neurosis. Women are especially disadvantaged in this view, as a double standard developed where men might legitimately experiment (sow wild oats) but women were held to strict rules. The double standard says that "nice girls don't and real men must" (Veevers, 1991).

In Canada, there has been a long-term trend away from a sexual double standard with more acceptance of premarital sexual behaviour on the part of men and women, and more sexual activity at earlier ages. In general, Canadian adolescent approval of premarital sexual intercourse between consenting adults "who love one another" runs about 80%, with slightly more males than females consenting (Bibby and Posterski, 1985; Herold, 1984). In terms of behaviour, the limited data show that by age 19, over 50% of Canadian women and 60% of Canadian males had had a sexual relationship, with about half of those having had more than one partner (Herold, 1984). An indirect measure of sexual activity is contraceptive use among

single women. The Canadian Fertility Survey of 1984 showed that more than 80% of never married women age 18-29 had used contraceptives at some point in their lives. In fact, over 70% of all single women had used the birth control pill for contraceptive purposes (Balakrishnan, et al., 1992). Even with rather universal birth control knowledge and usage, the proportion of children born to single women has steadily increased in the past generation, perhaps indicating that women are more willing to have children outside of the normal bonds of marriage, and not simply having an "accidental" pregnancy. In 1959, fewer than five percent of all children born occurred to unmarried females. By 1988, this figure exceeded 20%, with the vast majority of these single women keeping their babies. This is another indication of the removal of sexuality/childrearing from the traditional confines of marriage and two-parent families.

Clearly, marriage and family are not the only contexts in which sexual activity takes place. This is a major change from the past, relating to opportunity, contraceptive availability, less guilt and more societal acceptance. Many young people view sexual intercourse as the natural progression of a serious involvement with a partner, especially among the women who generally see the sexuality as an expression of love and relationship. More freedom in the area of sexuality for women has also seemed to create some difficulties. About 50% of university women report that they had received unwanted sexual aggression in the previous year, perhaps resulting from a misconception on the part of men concerning sexual availability (Herold, 1984). Sometimes, it is not clear when to draw the line once the line is in motion. However, it would appear that the sexual revolution is here to stay and the family is less likely to have rights of censure or exclusive access.

MARRIAGE PARTNERS: When people marry, they make a commitment not only to one another, but to a whole legion of other relatives and to sets of values and systems of belief. Historically, people married within confined geographic, religious, racial, national, economic and social groups. Rarely were partnerships formed outside of immediate social networks, and often marriages were arranged by families and villages. Today in Canada, few parents or organizations (religious, ethnic) would be involved in a direct way in the choice of mates for their children (Nett, 1988). The industrial revolution helped to create the situation in the Western world where a wider assortment of people came into regular contact with each other through increased levels of mobility. The following data show the change that has taken place in Canada in the 20th century relating to marriage partners by religious affiliation (adapted from Veevers, 1991).

<u>Religion</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1985</u>
Both Catholic	84%	87%	59%
Both Jewish	98%	96%	79%
Both Same Prot	60%	52%	40%

Clearly, intrafaith marriages have decreased over time, with most of the change occurring within the past two generations. More and more, people have a wider range of marriage partners available to them. Veevers (1991, p. 10) argues that "...children of ethnic intermarriages have a reduced sense of ethnic identity compared with children of homogamous couples. Because children who are different are potentially a force of

change, persons and groups with a conservative attitude toward family change generally resist mixed marriages." Thus, the cumulative effect of higher rates of interethnic marriages may end up changing the traditional family structure even more.

None-the-less, there are certain patterns that continue to dominate in heterosexual unions. Women tend to be younger, on average about three years, and when there are large age discrepancies (10 years or more), the older partner is almost always a male. Other things being equal, this age differential places the man in a more powerful economic and experiential situation. Men also die younger than women, about seven years earlier generally, and as a result older women have fewer males to select from in remarriage patterns. In relation to the family, the care of older people is usually the care of older women, who in the past had fewer resources to fall back on in old age.

NUPTUALITY: In the first two thirds of the 20th century, trends in Canadian marriage patterns showed a steady movement toward universal and younger marriage. For example, for birth cohorts in the 20th century, the average age at first marriage for Canadian women declined from about 25 to 21 for those marrying in the 1960s (Gee, 1986). In this decade, over 90% of women age 30 and over had been married at some point in their lives. In 1972, more than 200,000 marriages were performed in Canada, the most in history. Since that time, the number of marriages has declined slightly, with 190,000 marrying in 1989 (Statistics Canada, 1990). However, because there are more adult men and women of marital age in Canada in the 1980s (due to the baby boom of the 1950s), the rates of marriage have declined substantially. As early as the 1970s, both the age at marriage and the proportion of women remaining single began to increase dramatically.

Using the 1986 female age distribution as a standard, the first marriage rate per 1,000 never married women in 1971 was 105.8 but by 1986, that had been cut in half to 56.7. Among younger women, the change was even more substantial. The marriage rate in 1971 was 54.2 and 219.5 per 1,000 women 15-19 and 20-24 respectively, but by 1986 these figures were 14.9 and 106.7, declines of approximately 75 and 50% respectively (Ram, 1990). While remarriages now form a larger proportion of overall marriages than ever before (about 20%), the rates of remarriage parallel those of first marriages. Between 1971 and 1986, the remarriage rate of divorced women (per 1,000 divorced women) decreased steadily from 121 in 1971 to 88 in 1981 and to 77 in 1986. In the mid 1980s, the number of marriages numbered in the 180,000's and first marriage rates were at an all-time low. For young women in their 20's, the average marriage rate has declined by more than a third in past generation (Trovato, 1988). Corresponding to this decline has been an increase in the average age at first marriage for both brides and grooms, with an increase of approximately two years for both brides and grooms between the early 1970s and the late 1980s. The average age at first marriage for a bride in Canada in the early 1990s is about 25 years.

What do all of these changes signify? Among younger men and women, some of the change in marriage numbers relates to cohabitation (which will be discussed in more detail later). Also, because of the opportunity and need in modern society to develop human capital resources, education and work experience, marriage may be postponed. Perhaps those who continue to delay marriage develop a certain type of lifestyle compatible with being single and decide that the postponement has become permanent (Jones and Tepperman, 1988). It is also possible that those who delay marriage, especially men and

women under the age of 30, will eventually marry once the human capital resources have been developed. For example in 1961, for women age 25-34, about 35% had completed only an elementary education while less than six percent had some level of university training (two percent completing a degree). In 1981, these figures were nearly reversed with only eight percent of females having a maximum of elementary education and 22% having gone to university (12% graduating with at least an undergraduate degree). This growth in post secondary education among women may be explained in part by the notion that they are changing their tastes and preferences away from early commitment to household and family responsibilities in favour of developing human capital resources that allow for measures of independent lifestyles (Balakrishnan and Grindstaff, 1988). Delaying marriage (and childbearing) in order to achieve higher levels of education and work experience is perhaps viewed as the surest way to achieve these types of goals.

Such changing nuptiality patterns have important consequences for the family in terms of children. In that most childbearing in our society occurs to women 20-29, delays in marriage also compress the opportunities for having children. While there has been an increase in fertility to single women, the overall trend since the 1970s has been to reduce the number of children born to women in this age group to what is below replacement fertility levels. At the same time, it should be noted that almost all women do marry, and eventually have a child. For example, in the age group 30-34, 88%, 91%, 91% and 88% had ever been married in 1956, 1966, 1976 and 1986 respectively (Balakrishnan, 1989). For women age 35-39, fewer than 10% have been childless since the 1950s. While childlessness is on the increase among younger women, it should be noted that late childbearing to women over the age of 30 is also on the rise, and it is unlikely that more

than 15 percent of women completing their childbearing years in the near future will have no children (Ram, 1990).

Coincident with the changing nuptiality patterns are increasing rates of marital dissolution due to divorce. With the liberalization of divorce laws in Canada in 1969, the number of divorces tripled from 26,000 to more than 78,000 in 1986. The most current data show that in 1989, there were 190,000 marriages and 90,000 divorces. Throughout the 1980s, there has been about one divorce for every two and one-half marriages. While difficult to project over long periods of time, if such trends continue, approximately 40% of all marriages will end in divorce at some point (Burch and Madan, 1986). In the 1980s, the median duration of marriage for those couples obtaining a divorce was about 10 years, down from 13 years from the previous decade. More and more marriages are being dissolved by divorce and they are lasting shorter periods of time. Clearly divorce has become an important feature of our demographic landscape.

In terms of the family and the structure and function of the institution, how can divorce be evaluated? It has been argued that divorce may reflect the increasing individualism in society. Women may view marriages as less stable than in the past, and make plans for survival in case of marriage failure (Trovato, 1988). Individualism may reflect the increasing economic independence of women both within and outside of marriage. However, family dissolution may not portend familial destruction. Indeed, most men and women who are divorced remarry, although women do so less than men, primarily relating to availability of partners in later ages. The impact of divorce can reduce a woman's exposure to fertility in that most divorces take place during the reproductive years. While there may be disruption of families in terms of divorce, in fact it is possible that such change

may strengthen the family. In terms of children, divorce may run counter to the socialization interests of the child--she/he may need this type of mother/father structure--but it also may be that divorce has a long term positive impact on the family, especially for women and children who have been in physically or economically abusive situations. People no longer are legally or normatively required to remain married no matter what the circumstance. Also, norms opposing divorce have weakened to the point where marriage gets trivialized and "sticking out" tough times even in good marriages may be a thing of the past. The essential point is that divorce increases the choice of consenting adults regarding their on-going commitments, and need not automatically be destructive to family goals or even the survival of the nuclear family.

A relatively recent pattern of behaviour, particularly among young adults, is cohabitation. In effect, couples live together in a consensual union as if married, but without the marital legal status. While there have always been a small number of such unions in the past in Canada, the census gave official recognition to cohabitation status in 1981. In the 1960s, fewer than three percent of all couples were estimated to be in common law unions (Hobart, 1983). The 1981 census indicated that 352,000 couples were cohabiting, or about six percent of all married people. In 1986, the number of couples "living together" without formal marriage arrangements was over 485,000, or more than eight percent of all couples. The Family History Survey of 1984 (Burch, 1985) showed that over 17% of all adult women had been in a common law relationship at some point in their lives, but this varied dramatically by age (10% for women 40-49 and 27% for females 18-29). To this point in time the phenomenon has been primarily a pattern of young adults. It has been estimated that about half of cohabiting couples eventually enter into a formal marital contract (Burch, 1985). This type of outcome has led

researchers to argue that the behaviour is not so much a substitute for marriage, but rather a period of "trial marriage" (Burch, 1985; Shin, 1987). There has been concern that cohabiting relationships are replacing marriage and thus further setting the stage for family decline, but research such as the Family History Survey has shown that these unions can be more accurately viewed as an additional stage in the overall formation of marriage and the family.

While cohabitation is perhaps best seen as a trial marriage with more flexibility rather than an alternative to the traditional form of consenting adults living together, a recent article has argued that rather than being an alternative or precursor to marriage, cohabitation is really an alternative to remaining single (Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel, 1990). While it has many of the characteristics of marriage (shared residence, sexual intimacy), the people who cohabit "in almost all comparisons...are substantially more similar to the singles than to the married." These comparisons relate to childbearing plans, employment, educational attainment, financial plans and home ownership rates. In this context, cohabitation is seen as one more piece of evidence of the long-term trend toward individualism, relative to the long-term commitment of family. More tolerant norms concerning sexual freedom and the availability of effective contraception have allowed people to live together rather than spending young adult years as single or married. Clearly, we may have to rethink cohabitation as just another step in the process to a marital outcome. Certainly cohabitation is increasing, especially among young adults. The low fertility among these people is another indication that couples are devoting less time to reproduction, with the result that the time for fertility is compressed into a shorter period, usually at older ages.

A final demographic outcome of both higher fertility among single women (over 20% of births in the late 1980s occur to unmarried women, compared to five percent in the early 1960s) and the increasing divorce rates is the rise in single parent families. Approximately 80% of these families are headed by women and about 13% of all families are now headed by a lone parent, compared to just over eight percent in 1961 (Moore, 1987). Over half of these are the result of divorce/separation, with births to never married women (15%) and widowhood (28%) accounting for the remainder. It has been the legal pattern in Canada that when a divorce takes place, the mother receives custody of the children. Since many of these mothers are relatively young, it is difficult to have both an economically viable occupation and the time necessary to raise children. More than 50% of all single parent females are below the poverty line, making them one of the least affluent subgroups in Canadian society. In a recent study, Burch and McQuillan (1988) found that the earnings of lone-parent families, particularly those headed by women, "have been steadily declining as a percentage of the earnings of husband-wife families. In 1986, the total earnings of non-elderly female lone-parent families amounted to only \$12,563, barely one-third of the amount earned by members of husband-wife families." While marriage/remarriage provide a means of alleviating this type of situation, rates of female remarriage are lower than males, and substantially lower for single women with children. It may be that the next generation of all types of families will have to have a higher level of societal input in terms of economic and social assistance, rather than relying on the traditional form of family structure for goods and services.

The increase in single parent families has important consequences for the family as a self supporting institution. "Between 1961 and 1986, the number of children living in

lone-parent families climbed from 500,000 to 1.2 million, rising in significance from six to 14% of all children" (Ram, 1990). Single parent mothers showed the least income advancement compared to dual-income families or single parent families headed by men in the 1980s (Dewit, 1989). These women have less education compared to married females, but at the same time, single parent mothers are more likely to be employed outside of the home than mothers with men present in the household. Such a situation is especially problematic when dealing with child care. It is certainly difficult for one person to raise a child(ren), given the economic problems associated with single-parenting in Canada. One of the important political changes which may be necessary in order to improve the life situation of single parents is more societal involvement in single parent families in issues such as day care, housing and financial support.

WOMEN IN THE LABOUR FORCE: One of the major changes in the role of women in the last half of this century in Canada has been their participation in the paid labour force. Prior to this time, working outside the home environment was considered unusual for women, and only accepted within the context of dire personal need or in emergencies, such as WW II. In 1961, 22 percent of all adult women were employed in the labour force, and the majority of those females were single or married women without children. However, the 1960s was a period of dramatic change in terms of the position of women in society. Fertility rates began to decline, larger numbers of women were obtaining post secondary educations, and women were beginning to take part in the paid labour force. By 1972 about 40 percent of all women were working outside of the home and there has been a steady increase in that proportion until the late 1980s, when nearly 60% of all adult females were in the labour force. The number of women in full or part time work more than doubled in the past generation

(Dewit, 1989).

This increase occurred across all age groups and marital categories (Ram, 1990). Over 80% of women age 20-24 were in the labour force in 1986 compared to 50% in 1961. In 1971, about 25% of women with children under the age of six present in the home were participating in the work-for-pay world. By the late 1980s, this figure was approaching 60%. In fact, one of the fastest growing segments of the labour market is women with preschool-age children. Obviously, economic need is, in part, driving these dramatic changes, but it is also a change that reflects women's desire for more choice in the kinds of activities available to them during their adult lives. Children and family are no longer the sole sources of satisfaction for women. A job allows for more involvement with other adults throughout the life cycle. Overall, the labour force participation rate differences between single and married women have virtually disappeared in the previous generation, and even women with young children are working in the same proportion as single females two decades ago. Employment outside the home has become a normative pattern of behaviour for most women in Canadian society.

What is the impact of this pattern on the family? Most polls show that the vast majority of Canadians approve of mothers working outside of the home, but at the same time, about one third of young men and women feel it might be harmful to the children (Veevers, 1990). In a recent study of the impact of new adult lifestyles on Children in Canada, Marcil-Gratton (1988) shows that the traditional family of working husband and homemaking wife and mother is diminishing, and that the new patterns of family are having major repercussions on the lives of children. She argues that these children are not necessarily better or worse off, but surely different and the difference is happening at record speeds.

Overall, she concludes that whatever takes place in the adult world, the choices made must consider the place of children. Evidence from the U.S. does not seem to show that children with working mothers fare any differently than those families where the mothers are at home, depending in part of the type of arrangements made for child care. (Hayes, et al., 1990).

One study has shown that, again depending on the child care situation, children learn more and are better prepared for school than those raised by their mothers in the home (Clarke-Stewart, 1991).

It is clear, however, that such massive increases in female labour force participation could have a substantial impact on the structure and function of the family. The vast majority of Canadians believe that husbands should share in household tasks when wives are employed and bring money into the family, although the evidence is that the husband's contribution is often minimal (Nett, 1988). More husband involvement in household maintenance and childcare may be one of the major familial transitions of the next generation. Moore, et al. (1984) even argue that men have come to see the advantages of having working wives, even excluding the obvious economic ones. A resident "colleague", less psychological pressure to produce financially, more freedom to change jobs or to increase educational training, and less serious consequences of unemployment. The evidence indicates that both partners are happier and derive more satisfaction when household and family tasks are shared.

The initiation and continuation of marriage / reproduction may be importantly related to women in the labour force. Employment may encourage some women to delay marriage, or if married, to be more likely to consider divorce if a relationship is unsatisfactory. Employment provides women with a measure of economic independence. Also, there is a systematic relationship between labour force participation and

fertility (Balakrishnan and Grindstaff, 1988). While there are certainly interaction effects between labour force activity and childbearing, it is most probable that "the recent decline in the fertility rate in the West has been primarily in response to the increased employment and wages of women" (Ram, 1990).

Recent evidence shows that while women are still concentrated in lower paying jobs and less prestigious occupations, major changes are taking place. More and more women are entering fields that have previously been the bastions of males--medicine, law, and business (Marshall, 1987). For example in 1971, more than 90% of all lawyers were men, but by 1986, women accounted for over 20% of the legal profession, and about half of the entering law school students. Greater diversity in occupational choice will undoubtedly encourage women to study and learn the skills that will increase their marketability. All of these employment and occupational changes make the family less central to the lives of women, although the family remains an important component of a total life cycle.

THE AGING POPULATION: A population ages primarily as a result of lower fertility. The proportion of the population over the age of 65 in Canada has increased from about three percent in the first part of the 20th century to 11 percent as we enter the 1990s. Much of the increase in individuals living alone (in addition to increasing numbers of young adults who are remaining single) is attributable to the increasing number of older people, especially women, who live longer than their spouses. Between 1961 and 1986, the number of elderly men living alone increased by 142%, but the number of elderly women more than doubled that figure, 383% (Ram, 1990). Wister and Burch (1983) have shown a direct relationship between elderly women living alone and numbers

of children ever born. Generally, familial responsibilities for the elderly falls to the female children. Veevers (1990) argues that a "dearth of daughters" resulting from continuing low fertility will make family care of the elderly less probable. It would appear that the continuing trend in low fertility will make family less of a factor in elderly care. At the same time, the elderly become a larger and larger proportion of our population. Clearly, the demand for societal facilities in the housing and care of the elderly can only increase in the immediate future.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FERTILITY: At this point it should be obvious that patterns of reproduction are intrinsically bound to all of the changes observed in the family and in the role of women. To many observers, the numbers and timing of children are major predictors of other behaviours in Western society (Ryder, 1979, Grindstaff, et al, 1991). Traditionally, the family was an institution oriented toward reproduction, with average families having more than five children (Gee, 1986). In this context, the rights and duties of the spouses were well-defined and their continuing union did not necessarily depend on factors such as love and affection. Today, the stability of the family institution is no longer assured by tradition, but by expectations of love and commitment. This has come to mean that women are not prepared to enter marriage as easily in the past unless they are fairly certain of a strong "relationship", and they are ready to leave a union where that commitment is absent (Davis, et al., 1986). As has been shown, one result is a dramatic increase in cohabitation as well as in divorce and remarriage.

As recently as two generations ago, Canadians took substantial reproduction within marriage for granted, with large numbers of children more the norm than the exception. More than 40% of ever married women aged 50-54 in 1981 had

four or more children. In 1961, just after the peak of the baby boom years, the total fertility rate in Canada was 3.84 and the number of children born was 460,000. In the next ten years, the total fertility rate had been cut nearly in half (2.19) and the number of births had decreased by over 100,000 to less than 350,000. Since that time, the number of births have ranged between 350 and 375,000 and the total fertility rate declined to about 1.7 in the 1980s and has remained there. Only 15% of women aged 35-39 in 1981 had four or more children ever born. These are the lowest fertility rates in Canadian history and indicate that the value and demand for children has substantially changed. The decision to have a child or not is no longer determined by accident or ignorance, but more in subjective terms; whether or not it will make a woman and her relationship with her partner better. In some sense, the issue has become: How many children should one have to be happy and satisfied? What are the costs and rewards of having a child, or perhaps several children?

In his important work on the demographic transition, John Caldwell (1976) developed the theory of the flow of wealth, in which fertility behaviour was economically rational within only two models: "the first where the economically rational response is an indefinitely large number of children and second where it is to be childless." In the first case, Caldwell argues that the flow of wealth is from child to parent and there is an economic incentive to have as many children as possible. Also in these contexts geographically close kinship networks would help ease the burden of childrearing on parents by distributing the costs and care among relatives (Turke, 1989). The economic rationality of childbearing would result in large families. In the 19th and early part of this century, it was not unusual for families to contain six or more children. For example, the cohorts born between 1817-1831 gave birth to 6.6 children per woman

(Gee, 1986, p. 270). Even among surviving ever-married women 70 years of age or older in Canada in 1981, nearly as many had borne six or more children (130,570) as had a two-child family (139, 580). Among this group, over 18 percent had six or more children (Statistics Canada, 1983).

The second scenario that Caldwell develops relates to the situation of economically rational childlessness. Thus, in the Canada of the 1980s, where the flow of wealth from parent to child is in the neighbourhood of \$150,000 over the childrearing period, we would expect no children to be born. In fact, the number of children born as measured by calendar rates is below replacement: 1.7. However, the vast majority of women still have children. Obviously, economic factors are not the only impetus to childbearing, and fertility is determined by a host of other personal, social and physiological reasons. In our society, having a child is a very powerful norm, and the vast majority of women do want and indeed do have children, even into the 1990s. What has changed dramatically is the number of children that women have, the timing of the children born, and the impact that results from few families having large numbers of children, (i.e. four or more).

What has been found repeatedly in the literature is that low levels of economic achievement among women in Canada are associated with fertility, particularly the childbearing that begins at an early age (Grindstaff, 1988, 1990). When childbearing begins at a later age (30 and over), while employment and income are somewhat curtailed, the differences between these women and women without children are relatively small. Clearly, children are a competing variable for the time and energy of women (less so for men). It is instructive to compare a group of women who are childless with another who have children. Table 2 shows a comparison of childless and childbearing women on selected economic and demographic

variables for ever-married women, 30 years of age in Canada in 1981.

(Table 2 About Here)

Ever-married women without children are at a substantial economic advantage compared to women with children. About 16% of the women have no children, and on average, they have achieved 1.5 more years of education, are more likely to be in the work force, are nearly twice as likely to be in professional occupations, and earn twice as much money as their childbearing counterparts. In this comparison, having children is associated with a definite economic disadvantage for women (Grindstaff, 1989). Even among women with children, the higher the fertility level, the greater the economic disadvantage. If policies designed to increase childbearing are ever designed in Canada, they need to be constructed upon a platform that does not negatively affect the advancement of women in the economic sphere. "The current evidence is that there is a high economic cost associated with women who have children and, even more to the point, raise them. It would seem probable that women in the future would not be willing to exchange a measure of economic independence and affluence in order to have larger families" (Grindstaff, 1989). Again, if there were some types of institutional assistance available, women might be more inclined to childbearing.

(Table 3 About Here)

One pattern of childbearing that does seem to give women the opportunity to acquire human capital resources, while at the same time fulfil desires to have children, is to begin childbearing at a relatively later age, perhaps even in their thirties. This scenario is becoming rather commonplace in Canada in the 1980s. Table 3 presents information on the

proportion of first order births in Canada for various years for women 30-39. In 1961, over 30% of all births occurred to women in this age range, but only one baby in about 14 was a first-born child,(7.6 percent). These women accounted for nearly one-third of all children born in 1961, but rarely was the woman having her first child. Rather, the parity was often a third or even fourth birth. By 1976, in keeping with the dramatically falling birth rate across the age ranges, older women began to have fewer children. Less than 20% of the total reproduction was to women 30-39 (the number of children born compared to 1961 decreased by more than half). However, of those children who were born to the older women (age 30-39), now one in five was a first born child. By 1986, there was an increase in the overall proportion of children born to these women, nearly as high as that observed in 1961 (28%). What is remarkable about this data is that in 1986, over 25% of all of the children born to women 30-39 years of age were their first children. It would appear that more and more women are delaying the onset of childbearing until some human capital resources have been achieved (education, employment, and experience). These women are planning to have children, family and career by waiting until relatively late in their reproductive lives to begin childbearing. In 1981, about half of the women who were childless at age 30 had given birth to a baby by the time they were 35 (Grindstaff, et al., 1989). The following anecdote illustrates the situation many women discover as they move through the life cycle:

"When she was a little girl, Cheryl Kaszuba dreamed of being married at 20 and having a slew of kids. Somehow college, a career and a few gray hairs intervened. Now, at 40, Kaszuba is a first-time mom: 'My dreams are fulfilled. This isn't the way I thought it would be. I don't have the big brood I thought I'd have by now, but

I'm happy.'" "

The 55% decline in fertility in the past 30 years has had a profound impact on the role of women in society, and it is also a result of the changing position of women in the Canadian family. Yet, it can be argued that this dramatic change in reproductive behaviour takes place within the overall context of an highly pro-natal society, one in which children are in fact highly valued by men and women, and that value is reflected and supported in the various mass media and in the institutions of government and religion. In some sense we hold contradictory values. We want to have adult freedoms and choice with many alternatives available to both men and women in terms of education, employment and recreation. At the same time, we continue to want and to care deeply about children and their well-being, and about the future of the next generation (Bumpass, 1990).

Perhaps the best examples of the strong pro-natalism of North American society can be found in the popular media. Assuming the media reflects "real life" in some meaningful way, this normative system is fully portrayed in the play and film, Steel Magnolias. In this presentation, the young heroine is determined to have a child even though her health dictates that she should bear no children. She in fact has a baby, is enormously happy for a few years, and then dies pretty much as a direct result of the childbearing. Even the threat of death will not deter motherhood. Such is the pull to have a child in our society. Watch any group of adults around a baby and the strength of the pro natal norm in our culture is obvious. Canadians are no longer interested in have families with large numbers of children (less than five percent of women aged 35-39 in 1984 had five or more children), but creating a child is a very important behaviour for almost all of us. Over 95% of young adults indicate they

want to have a child at some point in their lives, and most of them prefer at least two children (Balakrishnan, 1989; Bibby and Posterski, 1985).

Some people have argued that the 60 to 70,000 abortions performed in Canada annually throughout the 1980s are an indication that Canadians are anti-child and anti-fertility. Such an argument is not supported by the evidence that shows 85 to 90% of the women who have a therapeutic abortion either already have children in the family, or go on to bear children in the future. Abortion is primarily a timing or limiting procedure, and not one that women employ in order to have no children at all.

At the same time, there are pressures in Canada to reduce childbearing. A recent Globe and Mail article (August 14, 1990) had the following headline: "Motherhood Too Costly, Report Warns. National Council of Welfare urges greater support for families." Clearly however, it is not childbearing that is costly to women and families, but rather childrearing. The National Council of Welfare report goes on to say: "Given the enormous cost of motherhood to most women, it is amazing that so many of them continue to have children." Obviously, in Canada, economics is not the sole criterion for childbearing/childrearing. Personal, social, normative and psychological factors all enter into the decision making, and most ever married women (85-90%) choose to have a child, but very few desire to have more than two or three. Overall, outside of the depressing economic factors, we are a dyed in the wool pro-fertility country. As observed, nothing brings a smile and tender look more quickly, even to the casual observer, than a mother with a small, cuddly, bright-eyed infant.

Yet, there are concerns expressed about the below-

replacement level of fertility in Canada. (Romaniuc, 1984). Some groups have even campaigned for higher levels of immigration to help compensate for the low numbers of children being born. Indeed, alternative choices to childbearing and childrearing for women are becoming more attractive, accessible, and accepted. By and large, women have achieved the ability to control fertility through contraception and abortion. We are an effective, basically two method contracepting society. For young women who are interested in timing their children, the birth control pill is nearly universal. About 83 percent of married women and over 70 percent of single females have used the oral contraceptive for birth control purposes at some point in their lives. Among young women 18-24 using a contraceptive, over 75% are taking the pill (Balakrishnan, et al., 1992). For women who have completed their childbearing, usually older women in terms of reproductive capabilities, the method of birth control choice is sterilization, either for the man or woman. Nearly 50% of all ever married couples in Canada age 18-49 have used sterilization to guarantee no contraceptive failures. In this situation, females are sterilized about twice as often as males (32% to 15%). As of 1984 in Canada, for women age 40-44 , nearly 85% were sterilized themselves or their partners had undergone the operation! (Balakrishnan, et al., 1992).

With this effective control of fertility, and in an economic situation which is both more open and more necessary for women to be employed, most women have opted for "real" work for "real" pay rather than to make a nearly total economic and personal sacrifice for higher levels of childbearing. Women have always be discriminated against in this regard, in that housework and childcare are not seen as real work for real pay, but rather as a female obligation, perhaps a natural inclination. It is certain that women can

never be forced back into a traditional familial setting by draconian means. The control that women have gained over their reproduction sets the stage for alternative opportunities and behaviours in the society. It is one of the major revolutions of our age.

At the same time, aggregate levels of fertility cannot fall too low if society is to survive. A substantial number of women must have children in order to assure a viable, on-going social system. In a very important way collectively, women cannot be totally free to reproduce or not, as they see fit. One author has written that: "...no society can allow the individual full freedom of choice regarding reproduction...."(Moen, 1979). Ryder (1979) contends that the historical past was a period where women were coerced into having children, and population replacement was "conditional on the discriminatory treatment of women." In this type of scenario, we need a solution to reconcile somewhat incompatible goals: to maximise individual freedoms and opportunities while also developing structures that recognise and reward childrearing. In this discussion, the really critical issue is not one of reproduction per se, but really that of raising the child, of care giving, whether accomplished by mothers, as in the past, or by other people or institutions (Turke, 1989). It would seem that, more and more, children are a societal rather than an individual family responsibility (education, health care, day care(?)) and if children are necessary for survival, then society must provide the appropriate economic and social props that help stem the flow of wealth from parent to child, and to make children less expensive, especially for the individuals involved (Eichler, 1988). In the past, childcare has been a very low paid enterprise, and this type of economic condition may well need substantial revision.

Over the last generation, the Canadian government and economic sector has tinkered around with economic issues such as maternity/paternity leaves, day care development, and employment return/equity. Quebec has even instituted a token bonus payment of \$3,000 for women who have a third child. This type of cosmetic application is really insufficient. What is probably necessary in the long run is for us to reward (economically) those people who do the day-to-day work of childrearing, be they mothers, fathers, or paid professionals. In the past, this was "women's work" who were never paid for their labour. The compensation for childrearing should not simply be a token gesture, but reflect real monies for the important work of raising our children. Such a programme would be expensive and require we substantially reorder our priorities, but it may be necessary for population replacement within a nuclear family structure. An economic compensation (say an average salary or income tax credits) coupled with the already positive motivations in Canada to have children, would undoubtedly result in a higher fertility rate, most likely one at or near the level of replacement. In a low mortality society, low fertility is the only compatible long-range possibility. Exactly how low is not a totally ascertainable category, but replacement levels of fertility could have rather universal appeal.

Most Canadians, both men and women, think that having children is an important part of the lives, and if the economics of the flow of wealth from parent to child can be made less onerous, especially for women, then it is likely that reproduction will increase somewhat. But, it is necessary to recognise the social as well as the individual importance of raising children, not just the biology of the matter. To that end, children in the 21st century will be more and more a societal responsibility that is concerned both with more economic equality for women and with societal

survival.

FAMILY VIOLENCE: While there are many demographic changes going on within the family, there are other patterns of activity within the structure, that are negative in outcome, and that seem to defy political or social attempts to bring about change. In the patriarchal family structure, power is based on hierarchy, and the general pattern is one of male dominance and female submission. In old English law, a man could legally beat his wife as long as the instrument used in the "discipline" was no bigger than his thumb--hence, the saying "the rule of thumb." While no longer set within a legalistic framework, violence in the family is a central feature of the institution: generally men assault women while both males and females (usually mothers and fathers) beat children. The extent or change of family violence in Canada is really not well established, but a recent report from the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women estimates that at least one woman in 10 is physically beaten by her partner every year, with about seven percent in relationships of repeated, severe violence. In the Native Indian sub-culture, it has been documented that four women in five have been physically abused by their partners (Ontario Native Women's Council, 1989). Death rates are higher for single compared to married women from almost every cause, but homicide is an exception, where single women have lower rates. "Thus, for women the shift from being single to being married increases the likelihood of being murdered, while for men the shift decreases their chances "(Gove, 1987). Being married can be physically dangerous for women. This is the battered women syndrome, and it is difficult to correct , or for women to leave the situation, given an economic and moral framework which emphasizes family stability.

The physical control of children is a behaviour well established in our society--spare the rod and spoil the child.

Again, it is difficult to establish the rates and extent of abuse among children, but there are increases in reported cases of child abuse. Mild forms of physical violence are common, a slap or a jerk of the arm. In one study, over 80 percent of children aged 2-10 had been physically hit in the survey year by a parent (Hutchings, 1988). Dangerous types of violence toward children, usually perpetrated by a male, occurs far less often. It is estimated in the U.S. that about five percent of children are abused in a violent manner (Gelles, 1987). Sexual abuse in families (again, predominately men with female children) is difficult to document and generally a taboo subject for research. It has been estimated that 97% of sexual attacks on children are by men and in more than 25% of the cases, the men are related to the children (Ferguson, 1988). While the data may be underreported, there has certainly been more publicity in the popular press and more research in the academic literature concerning the abuse of women by men in families. Such behaviours, in addition to issues such as economic difficulties, alcohol and other drug addictions, and extra-marital sexual affairs put the family under severe pressures. As more people report these problems in marriages and other relationships, people may be less constrained about taking action, with remedial behaviours ranging from counselling to divorce. It would appear that while there are many problems with bringing abuse within families to the attention of authorities, more and more women, and in some cases men, are willing to make the issue public in order to find a solution to physical and sexual abuse that takes place within the ideally "safe haven" of the family.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

All of this information indicates that the family continues to be an important, functioning institution in Canadian society, but many of the essential components of the family have undergone fundamental changes. The question is not really the demise or continuation of the family, but rather what kind of family will exist in the relevant future, and at what cost and consequence. As we enter the last decade of the 20th century, the characteristics of the family have undergone some important shifts, especially the role of women, since the period of the 1950s, which some have called the golden age of the family (Beaujot, 1986). The traditional, husband bread-winner, wife home-maker partnership has been supplanted by the dual wage earning family, and there are also more lone parent and childfree relationships. The proportion of married women in the labour force has increased from less than 20% in the 1950s to 60% in the 1990s, with women finding both more diverse and skilled occupations. While women continue to earn less than men, in constant 1981 dollars women went from \$3,803 in 1951 to \$10,183 in 1985, accounting for a change in the relationship of male to female income from 41% to 56% over that time period (Hunter, 1988). The average age at first marriage for women has increased by about three years since the 1950s, from under 21 to over 24. The proportion of women ever marrying has been declining and marriage dissolution due to divorce has risen from less than 10% in the 1950s to an estimated 40% into the 1990s. Perhaps the key component in all of these changes is the decline in fertility rates. At the peak of the baby boom in 1959, total fertility rates were nearly 4.0 and women who were 35-39 years of age had a mean number of children of 3.4, with nearly 40% having four or more children. The mid 1980s showed that the total fertility rates had fallen to under 2.0 (1.7), and women just completing their childbearing had about two children on

average, with 15% having four or more babies ever born (Grindstaff, 1992). All of these changes can be seen as providing women more alternatives in their life cycles. No longer is marriage and family the total way of life of women, but rather one among several.

A new basis for marriage and family continues to evolve and is profoundly affecting the life course paths of women, especially in terms of changing levels of educational attainment, labour force participation, as well as gender role obligations and expectations. It has been argued (Trovato, 1988; Beaujot, 1986) that increasing individualism in Canada has important implications for the decline in the "centrality of marriage" (and by extension the having of children) and women's increasing economic activity outside of the family. Often, those writing about individualism use the term interchangeably with "self interest," with the implication that such behaviour is selfish. But from another point of view, such behaviour is not narrowly selfish, but relates to the conditions for people pursuing activities that make them not only the best that they can be, but also entails a major contribution to the world in which they live. For a woman to be well educated and financially independent is not selfish, but is something in the modern world that she ought to be able to do in order to both fulfil herself and to provide her society with a range of talent hitherto untapped.

While all these changes are taking place and result in increasing time demands on parents, but especially women, we need to remember that while numbers of children per family have irrevocably decreased, the child remains one of the central features of most people's lives. A recent best seller (Turow, 1990, p. 514) puts the importance of children to all family life in the following way:

"He tried to envision their futures, and his with them,

but nothing came--murky shades, something bleak. Then he recalled. There would be a baby--a child. Children always drew a family together. Ever his, he supposed. He had some vision, like a vaguely surreal painting, the strange conjunctions of a dream, of all of them drawn close to this pink, unknown infant in a kind of halo radiance, each face alight with that wonderful instinctive glee. They would surround this child and be, each of them, someone new: parents, grandparent, uncle, aunts. New responsibilities. Fantasies. Dreams."

And so a new life begins the cycle anew. While the context of the family is different, and the roles of men and women within this context are changing almost daily, it is also clear that children are highly prized. From the micro economic stance, they are a valued commodity. Surveys of young people indicate that 95% want to have children at some point in their lives (Bibby and Posterski, 1985; Balakrishnan, et al., 1992). The dramatic change in reproductive behaviour has taken place within the context of an overall highly pro natal society, one in which children are an important and even essential part of human happiness. While parents may postpone and reduce the number of children, a child remains the central feature of most family life. For the minority who choose not to have children, we must help make them comfortable and satisfied with that decision. For men and women who select childbearing and childrearing as a part of their experience, we must also create circumstances where the costs are not disproportionately born by women. There needs to be substantially larger inputs from males and from the overall society in general. It may be that the next major change in familial life will revolve around a larger contribution on the part of males to the basic care and maintenance of household requirements and childcare. In Canada's overall orientation, we are a pro fertility society

within the bounds of a relatively few number of children per care unit. If, in Caldwell's terms, we provide a reasonable economic alternative to the negative wealth flow around children, the normative system is such that the family with a child is one of the most popular, desired outcomes in our society. But the whole picture must be seen in conjunction with the changing role of women in modern Canada. Children are important episodes in the life of women, but episodes (and not lifetimes) are what they are for most females. It is important to prepare for the growing independence of women and at the same time to provide for the economic assistance necessary for families to raise children in the last decade of the 20th century.

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Table 1: Wife's Contribution to Family Income, Ever Married Women 30 Years of Age, Canada, 1981.*

A. <u>Total Families (N=3,225)</u>			
	Mean Family Income	\$28,190	
	Mean Income of Wife	6,978	
	Wife's Contribution		24.8%
B. <u>Wife in Full-Time, Professional Occupation (N=490)</u>			
	Mean Family Income	\$36,818	
	Mean Income of Wife	15,942	
	Wife's Contribution		43.3%
C. <u>Wife in Full-Time, Non-Professional Occupation (N=985)</u>			
	Mean Family Income	\$27,744	
	Mean Income of Wife	9,660	
	Wife's Contribution		35.9%
D. <u>Wife in Part-Time Employment (N=622)</u>			
	Mean Family Income	\$26,466	
	Mean Income of Wife	5,399	
	Wife's Contribution		20.4%
E. <u>Wife Not in the Labour Force (N=998)</u>			
	Mean Family Income	\$23,143	
	Mean Income of Wife	486	
	Wife's Contribution		2.2%

*Adapted from (Grindstaff and Trovato, 1990)

Table 2: A Comparison of Childfree and Childbearing Women on Selected Demographic and Economic Variables, Ever Married Women, Age 30, Canada, 1981.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Childfree Women</u>	<u>Childbearing Women</u>	<u>Sign</u>	<u>Eta</u>
Years of Education	13.5 Yrs	12.0 Yrs	.000	.193
Professional Occupation	37.2%	19.2%	.000	.161
Employed	94.6%	64.0%	.000	.245
Family Income	\$34,133	\$27,017	.000	.182
Women's Income	\$8,990	\$4,015	.000	.346

*Adapted from (Grindstaff, 1989)

Table 3: Births, Total Fertility Rate (TFR), Percent of Children Born to Women Age 30-34 and 30-39, and Proportion of First Order Births to Women 30-34, 35-39 and 30-39, Canada, 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1986.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Births*</u>	<u>Percent Born</u>		<u>Percent First Born</u>		
		<u>30-34</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>30-34</u>	<u>35-39</u>	<u>30-39</u>
1961	465,535	19.4	30.5	9.4	5.7	.6
	TFR: 3.84					
1966	373,062	16.6	26.2	10.3	6.6	8.9
	TFR: 2.81					
1971	348,868	14.0	19.8	18.3	9.0	13.1
	TFR: 2.19					
1976	346,642	14.9	18.8	20.0	14.5	18.9
	TFR: 1.82					
1981	360,688	18.8	23.1	25.1	18.7	23.9
	TFR: 1.70					
1986	364,614	22.3	28.4	27.1	21.8	26.0
	TFR: 1.67					

SOURCE: Canadian Vital Statistics, 1961 and 1966, Catalogue 84-202; 1971 and 1976, "Births," Catalogue 84-204; 1981 and 1986, "Births and Deaths," Catalogue 84-204.

*Births with age of mother given.

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Overview Report on Direct and Indirect Provision of Childcare by
Families.

(August 1991)

APR 15 1992

Prepared for the Demographic Review, Health and Welfare Canada,
by Alena Heitlinger, Ph.D., Peterborough, Ontario.

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Provision of child care and extended maternity and parental leave benefits are highly complex areas of public policy. They touch upon questions of the public and private as well as the direct and indirect costs of raising the next generation; the invisibility and low value of women's work of caring; labour market requirements; the employment needs of mothers (parents); the developmental needs of children; the class, migrant and ethnic status of child care providers; pay and work conditions of childcare workers; child and family welfare; overlapping jurisdictions of 'care' and 'education'; state intervention in the family and in the informal sector of the economy; gender equality; and pronatalism.

This overview report will examine (1) the legacy of the ideology of 'mothercare' and its impact on post war childcare policies in Canada; (2) the emerging research on hidden, indirect costs of raising children at home, paid largely by women in the loss of employment and income; (3) the major demographic, economic, social and political trends which have shifted the location of childcare away from the parental home, thus forcing governments at all levels to address, although perhaps not fully meet, consumer pressure from working parents for more and better publicly supported childcare services; (4) the current childcare policy-making process, which has fragmented the issues of childcare, education and parental employment among a multiplicity of administrative and government authorities, and among a variety

of "mixes" of public, voluntary, commercial and employer-sponsored childcare services; (5) the advantages and disadvantages of demand and supply subsidies for childcare services; (6) the potential impact of affordable childcare on fertility; and (7) the costs of not providing public support for childcare.

1. The Legacy of the Ideology of Mothercare

The 'mothercare' ideology favours the view that young children should be cared for only by their mothers, and that women with pre-school children should stay at home rather than engage in paid employment. Reflecting a (pre-war) world in which most married women did not engage in paid employment, the 'mothercare' ideology was powerfully strengthened in the post war period by psychoanalytic theories of maternal deprivation. John Bowlby's writings on child development emphasized both the central importance of the mother-child relationship, especially in the first three years of the child's life, and the dangers of separating mothers and children.

The ideology of maternal deprivation was extremely influential in determining post war public policy on childcare provision. It not only legitimized the major thrust of post war childcare policies which had discouraged provision of day care places except for children with special needs, but it also ensured that public debates about childcare services focused only

on the needs of children. Little was heard of the employment needs of the mother or the parenting needs of the father during this period. The mother-child relationship was synonymous with 'family life'. Fathers wishing to look after their children received far less state support than mothers. Traditionally, single fathers have found it much more difficult than single mothers to receive social assistance to care for their children at home (Eichler, 1988). The eligibility for parental benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act was implemented only in 1990, after a successful legal challenge under the equality provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedom.

The continuing strength of the 'mothercare' ideology is evident even today. For example, a recent survey commissioned by Health and Welfare Canada revealed that "a whopping two-thirds of Canadians say the best place for pre-school children is at home with their parents." When asked to state their preference from a list including the home, neighbours and childcare centres, only 16 per cent of the respondents favoured putting children in licensed centres (Vienneau, 1991). However, long waiting lists at most licensed day care centres indicate that many parents now using informal care actually prefer group centre care (Ferguson, 1991).

Unfortunately, the published results of the recent Health and Welfare study reveal neither whether more men than women hold this view, nor whether this proportion is different from previous surveys. There are more complete data from the U.K. Martin and

Roberts (1984) found that 58 per cent of wives but 70 per cent of their husbands thought a married woman with pre-school children should stay at home, compared with 78 per cent of women surveyed 15 years earlier.

In Cohen's (1988b) view, the influence of theories of maternal deprivation has enabled successive British governments to largely ignore both the increase in women's employment and the implications of their own espousal of equality of opportunity, and to limit pre-school programs to part-time provision. The 1967 Plowden Report gave strong support to nursery education as a means of providing young children with an educational experience. However, this was to be achieved through part-time provision on the grounds that young children should not be separated from their mothers for too long a period each day. It is not clear whether the continuation of part-time provision is still a matter of fear of maternal deprivation or whether it is now used as a rationing and cost-saving device (Cohen, 1988a:18-19).

In Canada, many junior and senior kindergartens also offer only half-day programs. These cause enormous problems for working parents and children alike. The half-day program cuts right into the work hours of most working parents, who must either adapt their employment pattern or make a patchwork of frequently unstable informal childcare arrangements for the periods when the child does not attend school.

The Ontario government has encouraged boards of education to offer full-day senior kindergarten programs, but so far few local

school boards have been willing or financially able to allocate the required funding. In some areas of the province, full-day kindergarten programs have been introduced, but they often resulted in the closing down of local day care centres or nursery school programs. Because education is free while childcare charges fees, day care programs cannot compete with kindergartens, irrespective of whether or not kindergarten programs may be the most appropriate service for the community (Lero and Kyle, 1990:65).

The British Columbia Task Force on Child Care (1991:57-58) recommends that a proposed new childcare authority should "give a high priority to developing a strategy to expand school involvement in the delivery of on-site child care." As the Taskforce argues,

taxpayers have already spent millions of dollars for school sites and facilities in British Columbia. These existing facilities could be augmented and used to fuller advantage by implementing preschool programs, before-and-after school care and full-day child care programs. The confusion and stress for children (and for their parents) who travel from school to child care would be considerably lessened through the full-service school. The child would remain in a familiar setting and the liaison between the caregiver and the teachers would create the continuity that the child needs."

However, the Task Force admits that "the ideal, integrated model of a public school, a child care centre and a community centre is, for many schools and communities, a long way down the road."

2. The Indirect Costs of Rasing Children

Postwar policies which took for granted that mothers stop paid work when they have children took no account of the large indirect costs of raising children at home, paid mainly by women in the loss of employment and income. These indirect childcare costs to women have been the subject of much recent feminist research. The main findings of the research have been (1) that by far the largest amount of care of pre-school children is by mothers at home and by others in informal settings; (2) that whatever the setting, it is women, not men, who care for dependent children; (3) that many informal care providers in Canada are foreign domestic workers and/or women of colour who are frequently subject to exploitation; and (4) that women's care-giving work is neither adequately recognized nor remunerated (Pascall, 1986; Eichler, 1988; Arat-Koc, 1990; Ferguson, 1991)

The report of the Canadian Commission for the International Year of the Child suggested that childcare workers and other caregivers are chronically underpaid because they replace parents, especially mothers, who are paid nothing for their work as caregivers (quoted in Ferguson, 1991:77). Joshi (1987) has demonstrated the considerable impact of childbearing on women's lifetime earnings in the U.K. - an effect of between 25 and 50 per cent. As Cohen and Clarke (1986:3) put it, the negative employment effect of mothering "is both prospective and retrospective, i.e. it affects both the kind of training and

occupations open to women when they first enter the labour market, in anticipation of future childbearing, and the employment opportunities open to them when they return to the labour market after having a child."

A similar picture emerges in Canada and the U.S. In Canada, in 1988, 31.5 per cent of mothers with preschool age children worked part-time (defined as less than 30 hours per week). A significant proportion of these mothers had to arrange their schedule so that the bulk of their work hours occurred while their children were in nursery school or some other supplementary care. In addition, American data suggest that a significant number of parents of young children choose to "off-shift" their work hours so that one parent is always available as a caretaker.

While off-shifting saves money, and avoids difficulties that may occur if non-parental care is unsuitable or unreliable, it has negative effects on parental health, marital satisfaction, and other indicators of personal well-being. Moreover, many studies regard care provided by a father while mother is working a form of childcare arrangement. Yet, as Lero (1991:115) argues, "care by mother while father is working is simply considered normal parenting -- not child care. Is care by a father not parenting?"

This polarized view of parenting and childcare rests on the belief that women's caring for young children is "normal" and "natural". As New and David (1985:13) put it, "women are given caring work on the grounds that they are mothers, or may become

mothers, or should have been mothers." Since the childcare component of women's domestic work is the most difficult one to combine with wage work, the lack of affordable and reliable childcare, and/or the absence of adequate financial compensation for maternal childcare, continue to surface as significant factors preventing the achievement of women's equality in the labour force.

Feminists have traditionally regarded the sexual division of labour between breadwinning fathers and stay-at-home mothers as enforcing women's subordination and dependency. As Law (1984: 958-9) argues, traditional

assumptions about biological difference and destiny provided the prime justification for creating a separate, inferior legal status for women. The law denied women equal opportunity for wage work and participation in public life. It reinforced social and religious commitment to family-centered child rearing. Women were required, by law and custom, to care for men and children. Although women and children were and are entitled to look to men for financial support, that expectation was and is not theoretically enforceable during an ongoing marriage nor as a practical matter when marriage ends.

While "the social and religious commitment to family centered child rearing" is something traditional family organizations would like to see preserved rather than abolished, they too have identified the economic hardship suffered by women who stay at home with young children as a problem. Various forms of guaranteed income for mothers who care for children instead of working for pay have been therefore suggested by both feminist and more traditional groups. These include 'wages for housework' (put forward by elements in the Italian, British and Canadian

feminist movements), a 'maternal salary' (proposed in 1973 by The National Union of Family Associations in France), and independent right to social security payments (included in a European family proposal put forward by the European People's Party-Christian Democratic and in the Canadian Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women).

Burch (1986:8) has argued in a report written for the Demographic Review that guaranteed income plans need further investigation,

as a promising alternative to subsidized day care. If governments are willing, as increasingly they seem to be, to pay third parties to take care of a couple's children, then it would seem to make sense to pay one of the couple (or some other close relative -- e.g., a young adult son or daughter) an equivalent amount to stay home in a household-management as well as childcare role. Government policy might in effect create a new occupation, which could be described using the time-honoured term steward/stewardess, as in "household steward".

Historically, the only direct remuneration Canada has provided to recognize the direct costs of raising children are a nominal Family Allowance benefit and a Child Tax credit. Ferguson (1991:80) regards the latter also as an indirect measure, as an attempt to give some financial remuneration to low- and middle-income mothers caring for their children on a full time basis, and as "the first public acknowledgment of in-home child-care work. Unfortunately, the level of the benefit illustrates the low value placed on mother's caring, particularly in comparison to deductions allowed for "other than mother" child care."

In the meantime, a group called Kids First has mounted a

challenge to Section 63 of the Canadian Income Tax Act under the equality provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedom. Section 63 provides for annual deductible child-care expense of up to \$4,000 per child under age seven and \$2,000 for other eligible children. Child-care payments made between spouses are not allowed as an expense, and the spouse with the lower income must make the deduction. Kids First argues that these provisions discriminate against one-income couples. In the two test cases picked by the group, the husband - who has the higher income - has contracted the wife to provide child-care services and has claimed the child-care expenses as a tax deduction. The group, which says it has a membership of 5,000 across Canada, is in favour of a tax system that would replace the current benefits with a single refundable tax credit dependent on family income. The maximum credit would be \$2,500 per child per year for children up to the age of five, then \$1,000 per child per year for children aged six to twelve. The group is not against day care, because it is "tolerant of other people's choices " (The Globe and Mail, April 28, 1990).

The two main sets of problems with such schemes are the low level of financial reward relative to the costs of both childrearing and the loss of income from paid employment, and the reinforcement of the sexual division of labour. Non-employment of either parent is currently an important source of poverty for children (Joshi, 1989). Since guaranteed incomes for stay-at-home mothers would be very low, there is little hope that this

pattern would be reversed. As Gro Harlem Brundtland (1983:18), Chair of the 1982 European Population Conference and the current Norwegian Prime Minister, stated in her opening remarks, "it is financially almost impossible to imagine benefits that are high enough to compensate the family for the lack of one income." Paying women to stay at home to raise their children may also provide additional legitimacy to the idea that raising children is primarily women's work, and that fathers' interaction with children is not very important.

Single mothers would find it, of course, quite impossible to stay at home on only \$2,500 a year (should the Kids First scheme be accepted). The majority of single mothers live in poverty, due in part to the partial, and all-too-frequently total absence of the father and his economic resources; in part to the mother's limited earning capacity, reflecting the disadvantages women, and especially mothers with children, face in the labour market; and in part to low levels of social security payments. Reconciling paid work and other family obligations presents special difficulties for lone parents. Part-time employment may seem a sensible solution to combining the roles of a caring and a bread-winning parent, but in most developed countries, the income available from part-time employment would not finance independence for a single person, let alone for a single parent family, nor would it better the income available from social assistance (Joshi, 1989). The majority of lone parents are thus caught in the welfare-poverty trap.

Unlike other welfare recipients, lone parents are typically exempt from the requirement to look for work, reflecting the official belief that mothers of young children ought to stay at home. However, the means-tested and stigmatizing special benefits attached to lone parent status make single mothers vulnerable to attacks that the benefits actually promote lone parenthood, and to threats to withdraw these benefits. For example, in 1986 the then Queensland Minister for Welfare Services, Yvonne Chapman, suggested that sole parent benefits be stopped for unmarried mothers with more than one child. Many Queenslanders were sympathetic to that suggestion (Sawer, 1989:24).

Single mothers on welfare benefits are often subject to the unpleasant policing of their living arrangements. The special welfare benefits can be, and often are, withdrawn when the mother is found to be no longer single, even if she is just co-habiting with no sharing of financial resources taking place. When their children leave home, welfare mothers lose any special treatment which they enjoyed while their children were still living at home, making it that much harder for them to be able to find work after so many years spent in full-time mothering.

Thus the only way for parents with young children to end welfare dependency is to have access to affordable, state-supported childcare.

3. Childcare as a Welfare Service.

The view of childcare as a welfare service for children from disadvantaged families is clearly manifested in the legislation which has provided the main support for the development of state supported childcare in Canada, the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). Although funding a public childcare system was not CAP's major objective, most public day care services in Canada are, in fact, funded through it. The emphasis on state support for childcare as a way of ending welfare dependency characterizes not only the policy orientation of the current federal government, but also the dominant attitudes of the general public (Fine, 1990; Vienneau, 1991). The recent Decima survey commissioned by Health and Welfare Canada shows that support for the notion of targetting childcare assistance for only poor families has increased from 45 per cent in 1987 to 62 per cent four years later. The survey also showed that 57 per cent of Canadians who support the welfare view of childcare do not trust low-income families to spend the money on childcare. In their view, "the best way to guarantee value for money would be to give it directly to child care centres." (Vienneau, 1991)

Ironically, most low-income families who qualify for subsidized care do not get the childcare services they are entitled to because eligibility for government assistance varies among the provinces, and there are simply not enough licensed spaces available. In Metropolitan Toronto alone there were in

1989 5,000 eligible children waiting for subsidized spaces; the Ontario government said at that time that it would pay for only 1,000 new ones (Fillion, 1989:25). The National Council of Welfare (1988:11) reported that in 1987 only 10 per cent of the children eligible for either a full or partial subsidy in Ontario received it.

4. Childcare as a Public Service.

The allegiance to the theories of maternal deprivation was never complete. Demand for day care places, far from declining as expected after the Second World War, has steadily risen in all developed countries as more women with small children entered paid employment. The greatly increased proportion of mothers of small children who are employed outside the home; the diminishing pool of caregivers remaining at home and willing to care privately for children of others; the looming labour shortage (a result of the low fertility during the last two decades); and the growing political influence and institutionalization of feminism, eventually forced governments at all levels to take the needs of working mothers into account and acknowledge the need for an expanded, affordable, formal childcare system. In recent years, many OECD governments have "initiated, modified or even redefined their child care policies, sometimes linking them explicitly to questions concerning women's labour force participation and/or family status." (Ergas, 1987:1).

However, reliance on maternal labour force participation as the main indicator of childcare needs perpetuates a narrow employment-based definition of childcare. While parental involvement in employment and employment-related activities is a major factor in determining family needs for childcare, families need and use childcare for a variety of reasons (Lero, 1985, 1991). The recognition of families' needs for a variety of childcare supports has led to the concept of a comprehensive childcare system, and to the development of various family resource and support services.

The phenomenal growth of these programs in Ontario is attributed by Kyle (1991:72,76) to the Day Care Initiatives program, begun in 1981 to improve the quality of informal childcare arrangements and strengthen the capacities of parents to select and monitor such arrangements, and to an on-going provincial commitment to fund resource services. Because there is no specific federal policy regarding financial support for these services, and cost-sharing arrangements under CAP and the proposed childcare legislation are unclear, funding for these programs is quite sporadic, and varies from province to province.

Thus the Canadian state at the municipal, provincial and federal levels has declared its support for childcare in several ways: through changes in its rhetoric; through its willingness to sponsor a variety of commissions, task forces and research projects to study the issue; through increase in funding; and through co-optation of childcare activists (Prentice, 1988).

Like other measures of equal opportunities for women, the need for an extensive, publicly financed childcare system was first put on the Canadian political agenda in 1970 by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. While the federal government responded in 1972 by introducing the Child Care Expense Deduction, childcare as a significant social policy issue emerged only in the 1980s. For example, in the 1984 and 1988 federal elections, all three national parties found it necessary to make it a campaign issue and acknowledge the need for a reform.

However, the political rhetoric promising a more comprehensive childcare program has been much bolder than actual policies. As the number of working parents grows, demand for childcare has become much more generalized, but funding and service delivery mechanisms have retained their earlier selective welfare and market orientations.

5. Fiscal Support for Childcare: Demand and Supply Subsidy

State support for childcare can take two broad forms--supply subsidy and demand subsidy. The former involves direct public funding of services, while the latter involves public subsidy of parents, to help them increase resources with which they can buy childcare services in the open market.

While the majority of EEC member states have relied on supply subsidy, governmental policies in Canada have favoured the development of publicly regulated but privately provided

childcare services for children of working parents. Federal, provincial and territorial governments do not, as a rule, establish child care facilities themselves. Rather, under the terms of the Canada Assistance Plan, they provide full or partial means-tested subsidies to families using services provided by profit-making commercial enterprises, voluntary agencies or municipalities. As Ergas (1987:7) put it, "the private provision of care is thus encouraged through public franchising of its delivery."

The 1986 federal Report of the Task Force on Childcare concludes that the method by which services for children are financed in Canada places good quality licensed services beyond the means of most parents, unless their incomes are so low that they can qualify for a subsidy, or their incomes are so high that they can afford to pay the full cost. The private provision of childcare in Canada is also stimulated by fiscal arrangements which allow parents to deduct from their personal income tax documented childcare expenses, up to two-thirds of taxable income, a maximum ceiling of \$2,000 per school-aged child between 7 and 14, or \$4,000 for child aged six and under, whichever is less.

When first introduced in 1972, the Child Care Expense Deduction (CCDE) could be claimed by a working father only in the mother's absence. Today, the deduction is in theory gender-neutral, because it can be claimed by either working parent. However, in practice it remains gender-specific, because if the

parents are married, only the one with the lower income, usually the mother, is eligible to make the claim.

Critics of CCDE have pointed out that the maximum allowable deduction comes nowhere close to the real cost of childcare; that it does nothing to increase the supply of childcare; that it is of little use to parents who have to pay user fees up front, and since it is a deduction from taxable income, that it favours higher-income over low-income earners. It also fails to provide any subsidy to the majority of working parents who cannot produce receipts for expenses incurred. Most informal caregivers - up to 85 per cent by one estimate - do not declare their income and are therefore reluctant to issue tax receipts (Brown and Power, 1986:54).

One result of these problems is a very low take-up rate of CCDE. In 1984, the deduction was claimed by 420,000 women (and 82,000) men, with the average claim being \$1,487 (the maximum ceiling was then \$2,000 per child); yet there were 1,624,000 women in the labour force with children under 15 years of age. Thus relatively few Canadians are benefiting from the Child Care Expense Deduction, and those who do are likely to be at the higher end of the income scale. What good is a tax deduction if so few Canadians can take any advantage of it?

Aside from being regressive, tax deductions are also unlikely to perform the supply-side miracle the federal government is hoping for.

Providing childcare is simply not profitable for the private

sector, unless some direct ongoing direct operating funding is provided directly to the centres. Nearly three out of four day care centres in Alberta are profit making; according to Prentice (1988:60), this situation is "directly attributable to policy which made both commercial and non-profit programs eligible for a direct operating grant." Such direct grants involve significant state intervention in what is supposed to be a free market. As Moss (1988:257) has argued in the EEC context, "they undermine the supposed advantages of demand subsidy and introduce an element of supply subsidy without the full benefits of a properly organised system of childcare services based on supply subsidy."

The main advantage of demand subsidy is the choice that it is supposed to give to parents, at least in theory. As Ferguson (1991:95) notes, "studies of parental preferences in child-care arrangements indicate that parents' wishes vary for their children. Some prefer group care with more structure and professionalized input, others value the family home model's personal attention and flexibility, and still others choose to provide most of the care themselves." In practice, however, the parental choice is more illusory than real, because it is predicated upon unrealistic free market assumptions of commodified childcare. Yet, as we noted, basic principles of demand and supply do not apply to child services. It is very hard to operate a self-sustaining quality day care if parental fees are to be kept affordable, and as Fillion (1988) argues, private entrepreneurs are not lining up to open day care centres.

In 1986, there were nearly two million Canadian children aged 12 whose parents worked or studied a substantial part of the week, but only 150,000 spaces in licensed day care centres across Canada, one-third of them in Ontario. Forty-eight per cent of these centres were operated by voluntary, non-profit groups; 14 per cent were publicly run by municipalities; and 38 per cent were operated for profit by commercial enterprises. An additional 22,000 spaces were available in licensed family homes, two-thirds of which are located in Ontario and British Columbia. There are virtually no licensed care spaces to accommodate children of part-time or shift workers.

Over 80 per cent of Canadian children -- two-thirds of pre-schoolers aged three to five; 90 per cent of infants and toddlers under age three; and 97 per cent of school-aged children-- receive non-parental care in unlicensed arrangements, the quality and dependability of which are unknown. Licensed day care spaces serve only 9 per cent of children whose parents work or study 20 or more hours each week (The Task Force on Childcare, 1986). What is then the point of boosting demand through tax breaks and other forms of subsidies for parents if the supply is not there?

Another problem with the user fee demand subsidy is the objective conflict of interests between the users of care (parents and children) and the providers of care (owners, operators and day care workers). The user fee system of care leads to a Catch-22 situation, in which any rise in profits of day care operators or of wages of day care workers (virtually all

women) is contingent upon increase of parental fees. Staff salaries account for approximately 80 per cent of day care operating costs. In order to attract and hold skilled staff, many centres have had to increase salaries, which in 1990 still averaged only \$17,800 a year. High turnover of underpaid staff and program cutbacks tend to reduce the quality of care, which in turn may affect demand, especially if fees are increased at the same time.

The dramatic implications of this dilemma were vividly demonstrated in Toronto at the beginning of 1991, when at least four day care centres closed their doors because of financial problems, while dozens of others had to lay off staff, cut programs or dramatically increase fees just to survive. As fees skyrocketed by 20 per cent or more, to as much as \$250 a week, many middle class parents could no longer afford to keep their children in Toronto's 730 government licensed and regulated day care centres. The sudden and mass withdrawal of middle class children created 3,600 empty day care spaces. Centres that were unable to recruit enough new children to fill vacant spots had no choice but to lay off staff or pass on a higher percentage of their costs to the remaining parents, thus forcing more of them to withdraw their children. At the same time, there were more than 7,100 people on Metro Toronto's waiting list for day care subsidies but no government funding available to meet this increased demand (Pigg, 1991).

Commodified childcare purchased in the open market tends not

to be of high quality. A free market in childcare typically contains a large number of small-scale, under-resourced, fragmented, cottage-industry producers, whose 'product'-- childcare service -- is relatively invisible to working parents, its frontline consumers. Many parents have no idea what is happening to their children while they are at work. With demand multiplying every year, quantity not quality of service is the driving imperative, both for parents and for the state. Most parents take what they can find and hope for the best.

Fillion (1989) found many working parents relatively inexperienced as consumers, and quite confused about what childcare quality means and how much they should pay for it. Gifford (1989) reports the same difficulty from Australia. "Parents frequently have little idea of what to look for in a centre, and often rely on physical features and their own "gut reactions" which may stem more from the way staff interact with them and make them feel than from an accurate assessment of the child's needs."

The Canadian state has not served parents well in this respect. Over the years, there have been various charges that private commercial day care operators have been allowed to provide poor quality care in unsanitary and even unsafe conditions (Johnson and Dineen, 1981; Fillion, 1989). The Ontario 1989 provincial audit found that day care inspectors do not monitor the province's centres properly, often ignoring the rather minimal licensing standards developed by the Ministry of

Community and Social Services. The auditor found several commercial centres with chronic problems of understaffing, unsafe supervision, unsanitary facilities, poor meals and so on, yet the centres were allowed to operate for at least three years before they had to comply with the ministry licensing requirements. In most cases, parents were not informed of the infractions of provincial standards (Canadian Press, 1989).

A public health consultant with the Toronto health department told a meeting of the Canadian Institute of Public Health inspectors that "some dog kennels are often better run than some day-care centres in Ontario" (Brazao, 1989). However, a genuine state crackdown on health and safety violations would jeopardize forty per cent of day care spaces in the country, which is politically an unacceptably high proportion (Fillion, 1989). Private profit-making day care centres provide lower quality of care along every index imaginable: worker wages, parental satisfaction, staff training, turnover rates, quality of meals, sanitary and safety conditions. Historically, commercial day care operators have lobbied to downgrade government standards and regulations to increase their profitability. In turn, their inferior quality has enabled them to charge lower fees than municipal and other non-profit centres. Thus another outcome of the strong state reliance on user fees and demand subsidy is the growth in inequality of opportunity for children, with children from families disadvantaged economically and in other ways receiving poorer service.

Childcare advocates generally favour a strategy of supply subsidy, which could eventually guarantee public childcare services for all parents who want them. In their view, childcare services should be financed in the same way as most education and child health services, out of the general tax revenue. Parents would contribute to the cost of these services through taxes paid over their adult lives rather than at the time of use. As Moss (1988:258) has argued, charging childcare user fees puts working parents

at a financial disadvantage compared to workers without children, who have the added advantage of not carrying the other expenses associated with bringing up a child. Furthermore, childcare costs are most often paid for by women, from their earnings; they can become a disincentive for women to work, especially when they have more than one child needing to be paid for, and they can increase inequality in net income between men and women.

However, nobody expects full supply subsidy to be implemented in the current economic climate. Within the context of social services, childcare programs are in competition for supply side funding with basic "safety-net" programs such as social assistance, child welfare, and services for the elderly (a growing proportion of the population) and the handicapped. Within the larger economic context, these social services needs are competing against the demand for increased state funding in the housing, education, and health care systems (Lelo and Kyle, 1990:69).

Thus the best one could hope for is a combination of a demand and supply subsidy. If the user fee system is to continue, more attention should be paid the development of a

coherent system for charging, with clear and common principles about what proportion of net family income should go on childcare. As Moss (1988:259) argues, it should not "cost parents of very young children more than parents of older children, as often happens at present. Attention also needs to be paid to reducing the discriminatory effects of childcare charges on women, who normally pay for them out of their earnings." Since it is immoral to try to make money out of children, no supply subsidies, or at least no new supply subsidies, should go to commercial for-profit centres.

6. The Privacy of Childcare versus the Public Responsibility Assumed for Education.

The historical divisions between childcare and pre-school education are based on different perceptions of the child. Childcare provided through the family assumes that the child belongs to the parent, while education provided in the public domain assumes that the child is a citizen in her or his own right (Ferguson, 1991:87). The devaluing of women's private childcare work has had an important influence on the way we have organized our public childcare and education services.

Day care centres and licensed family day care are designed to perform the primarily custodial function of 'care' ; kindergartens are deemed to be exclusively responsible for 'education'. The childcare sector relies heavily on parental fees, is staffed by workers with a two year diploma in early childhood education from a community college, and the typical staff-child ratio is 1:8. The educational sector is free, relies on university-trained teachers better equipped to teach school-aged children than pre-schoolers, and its staff-child ratio is 1:20.

Canadian children aged four and five may participate in both types of institutions. Whereas regulated childcare services may also perform an educational function (after all, the required qualification for day care workers in Ontario is a diploma in early childhood education!), educational institutions only rarely take the custodial needs of children of working parents into account. Most junior and senior kindergartens offer only half-day programs, which, as we noted, cause enormous problems for working parents and children alike.

Comparison of the monetary values attached to caring for children reveals that the most highly valued form of care is that labelled as education. The substantially higher salaries of school teachers are a function of a universal education system, university credentials, and successful organizational fight for better wages and working conditions. As childcare workers seek to improve the status of their work through professionalization

and an emphasis on the educational component of care, "there is a real risk that the "care" component may be devalued, and the distinctions between education and care will increase rather than diminish."

Ferguson (1991:83-84) also notes that the historical divisions of childcare and the differing values attached to caring for children have reinforced competition between childcare settings and their supporters, thus undermining efforts to develop integrated rather than fragmented childcare provision. Instead of developing a united front, we have mutually hostile, resentful and feuding advocacy groups "appearing to support licensed care over unlicensed, non-profit care over profit, and mother-at-home care over day care. These divisions make it easier for the issue of the underfunding and undervaluing of all child-care labour to be avoided in the political arena."

The conflicts about childcare delivery and public subsidies for childcare among different groups of women are paralleled by an on-going jurisdictional conflict between social services and education. As Lero and Kyle (1990:65) argue, "by default, Ontario seems to be creating a patchwork system, with different mixes of child care and primary education services being developed in different communities...there are now two major service systems in place in Ontario - child care and education - that are continuing to develop and expand services for essentially the same target group of young children."

As an attempt to address this jurisdictional division, the

1990 Ontario Select Committee on Education's report on early education recommended that every elementary school in the province should offer day care facilities. As we noted, similar recommendation was made in the Complete Report of the British Columbia Task Force on Child Care (1991). Childcare activists have welcomed these recommendations, arguing that a mass service provision through the education system is the only way in which universal childcare will become a reality (Colley, 1990). The current childcare advocates' preference for the bureaucratic, professionalized and relatively inflexible traditional education system, at the expense of the more utopian and community- and caring- oriented concepts of childcare, is regarded by Prentice (1988) as an important indicator of the "mainstreaming" and institutionalization of the childcare movement.

However, the Ontario and B.C. recommendations are unlikely to be implemented either provincially or nationally. An expanded and properly funded national childcare program conflicts with the number one priority of the federal government: significant cutback in federal spending. While the federal government has spent most of the 1980s drafting plans for a new national childcare program, developments in the 1990s suggest that Ottawa is unlikely ever to play a leading role in the field. In recent years, the Canadian federal government has adopted an approach stressing a "shared partnership" with employers and the private sector. This shift in the philosophy of the delivery of social programs and services has alarmed most childcare advocates

(York, 1990).

The shift from a big-budget national childcare program to a small-scale package of tax incentives and subsidies to employers to encourage workplace day care raises troubling questions about private sector involvement in social policy, about the extent to which childcare policy should be attached to labour market requirements, about inequalities in the care of children of working and non-working parents, and about the disproportionate benefit of childcare subsidies accruing to high income executives and professionals. While childcare policy should not be labour market led (if for no other reason that it leaves little defence against reduction in provision when demand falls or labour expands), employers clearly do have an interest in childcare provision. One way to recognize this interest is through "partnerships" among employers, various levels of the state and the voluntary sector. Such developments in Canada are in early stages (Paris, 1989; Mayfield, 1990). However, both France and Australia have more experience with such "partnership" models.

7. Employer-sponsored Childcare in France and Australia.

French employers contribute to the funding of provision through Caissees d'Allocations Familiales (CAFs). These are organised regionally and financed by employer contributions. They pay a variety of financial benefits to families with children but since 1976 have been increasingly involved in the

direct funding of childcare services. Since 1983 this has been on the basis of what is known as the contrat-creche, a contract drawn by the regional CAF and local authority. This has involved local authorities undertaking to increase places in nurseries and organised childminder schemes by at least 50 per cent, in return for the CAF contributing to capital costs and 50 per cent of the operating costs of all new places. (Cohen, 1988b).

A much narrower, work- rather than community-based option is the Australian work-based childcare program. The program was initiated in 1988 as an incentive to private sector employers with a high proportion of low income earners requiring childcare. The funding arrangement required employers to provide capital facilities (i.e. the actual day care centre) including equipment. Operating costs were to be shared between users, the federal government and employers, with the Commonwealth contribution taking the form of fee relief for low income earners based on their means-tested ability to pay. The Commonwealth contribution automatically increases as the number of low income users increases.

Employer-provided childcare is highly attractive to the Australian federal government, because using employer-provided space can save the government the high cost of capital funding involved in setting up more and more community-based day care centres. Some employers have excess space capacity, and the capital cost of setting up a day care centre on their own premises is relatively small. However, in many cases available

space could not be adapted for childcare purposes because the work premises could not meet all of the current licencing day care requirements, which include a ground floor location, an outside playground, and an open green space. A roof top garden was apparently not acceptable.

The Women's Bureau of the Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET) sees some of these licensing requirements as unnecessarily rigid and restrictive. In their view, the federal licencing agency, the Children's Services Program, is too wedded to the traditional notion of a free-standing community childcare centre near people's home to be sufficiently flexible and enthusiastic about employer-provided childcare. The pilot scheme for industrial childcare initiatives was apparently set up only grudgingly (Interview with Ruth Doobov, Director, Women's Bureau, DEET, February 26, 1990). The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU, 1988:2) also regards the current guidelines of the Children's Services program as too narrowly geared towards the specific needs of community-based day care centres. In ACTU's view, the guidelines should be amended so that planning indices reflect "employment populations (e.g. industrial estates, transport routes, work patterns) and extended hours provision where the need is demonstrated."

In Cohen's (1988b:16) view, the partnership system currently promoted in the U.K. under the European Commission's program of childcare action projects

has advantages for employers, most of whom do not want to become directly involved in setting up or running nurseries

and other services but who would be able to directly discuss their requirements and future needs with service providers. At the same time the employers' contributions to the development of services in recognition of their own interest in the availability of provision would assist considerably with its financing and diminish the level of funding required from general taxation revenue.

8. Childcare and Pronatalism

As Krotki (1990:9) has argued, "we have no information as to whether daycare increases fertility because working mothers find it lowers the opportunity cost of having children, or whether it decreases fertility because more and more mothers are drawn into the labour force with eventually the traditional impact of high female labour force participation on fertility levels. From a policy standpoint the question is irrelevant because in Canada, at least, daycare is not considered in relation to natalist policy, but is promoted on the grounds of equity, so as to make the life of working mothers easier. Still, it would be interesting to know what the impact on fertility would be. The taxpayer would have to foot the bill for such an enquiry, though it need not be more expensive than many other demographic and socioeconomic enquiries."

Existing evidence on the impact of reliable and affordable day care on fertility is sporadic and speculative. To the extent that childcare availability increases women's entry into paid employment, it may be antinatalist, but to the extent that it reduces the burden of childrearing for those who are, and will remain in the work force, it may be pronatalist (Presser, 1986).

A British study of first-time mothers who intended to return to full time work revealed that some women begin the search for childcare "before they conceive; becoming pregnant may indeed be conditional on having arranged childcare." (Brannen and Moss, 1988:61). In Canada, several of the best day care centres in Toronto have "fat preconception files of applications from would-be parents." (Fillion, 1989:25).

A submission by the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1988:2) to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-144, the proposed Canada Child Care Act has made the link between day care provision and pronatalism quite explicit:

For women, child care is the sine qua non of their work lives. Knowing that arrangements for their children are complicated, inadequate, often random, sometimes unsafe, some women are choosing not to have children. Driven by economic fear, women are on strike against reproducing. That choice is often a sad one for individuals, and a disaster for the economy. By the 1990s, with births well below replacement rate, employers will be desperately, and unsuccessfully, seeking employees.

Thus in advanced industrial societies, characterized by a large number of mothers with young children already in the labour force, and with fertility desires often exceeding actual behaviour, subsidizing child care for working parents would seem to be pronatalist, as would a reduction of the childrearing burden after women (or parents) come home from work. Presser (1986) also suggests that both aspects of childcare become more problematic with the increase of the woman's age at first birth, because women are more likely to want to remain in the labour force with minimal interruption after their first child is born.

Furtermore, they will be making subsequent childbearing decisions while they are employed and experiencing these difficulties. Heitlinger (1986) notes that mothers in Czechoslovakia who are finding it difficult to place their first-born children in day care, tend to think twice before deciding to have another child.

However, very few Western governments have taken natalist considerations into account. One of these is the highly pronatalist provincial government of Quebec, which several years ago conducted a survey asking women what should be done to enable them to have more children. Seventy per cent of the respondents said that there is nothing the government could or should do. Of the remaining thirty per cent, half said that paying homemakers-mothers would make a difference, and a third of them suggested providing day care. The provincial government acted on both of these suggestions. Its May 1988 budget announced that the number of day care spaces had increased by a third in the past three years, and will double in the next seven years (Shifrin, 1988). The biggest change, though, was the highly publicized new fiscal bonus for third and subsequent child in a family.

9. The Costs of Not Providing Public Support for Childcare.

Good quality childcare is labour intensive and inevitably expensive if adequate pay and work conditions of childcare workers are to be met. However, parental care, when adequately financially compensated, is also not cheap. Yet the costs of not

providing childcare are rarely recognized by Western governments despite evidence showing that public spending on high quality children's services can be regarded as a valuable form of social investment. The major potential short- and long-term social benefits accruing from public expenditure on childcare are job creation, increased taxation revenue (from wages of childcare workers and parents being able to join the labour force), reduction in poverty and in the number of parents requiring welfare assistance, facilitation of home ownership (which increasingly requires two incomes), returns from investment in women's education and skill, early detection of child's developmental problems, reduced expenditure on remedial education, higher likelihood of completing high school and continuing to post-secondary education, greater gender equality, and higher fertility (Brennan and O'Donnell, 1986:147-8; British Columbia Task Force on Child Care, 1991:61-64).

A commissioned report by Ainstee, Gregory etal(1988) from the highly respected Centre for Economic Policy Research at the Australian National University suggested that the approximately \$200 million expended by the Commonwealth government on childcare might well generate for the federal government \$300 million in extra tax revenue and savings on social security payments. The paper also stressed the importance of childcare for skills maintenance and return on human capital investment. The report proved invaluable to women's organisations and sympathetic civil servants, because this time familiar feminist arguments were

being put by some senior male economists (Sawer, 1990:82-83).

10. Conclusion.

Childcare in the 1990s is at a strategic crossroad. On the one hand, there is the legacy of the post-war childcare policy which has discouraged provision of day care places except for children with special needs. This legacy has been translated into a residual welfare, "safety net" type of state intervention, whereby public childcare is provided as a special welfare service for children and families deemed to be in greatest socioeconomic need, or, as in the U.K., at high risk of abuse or neglect. Childcare for children from 'normal' (as opposed to 'dysfunctional') families has been left largely to market forces.

In Canada, childcare and educational policies have resulted in four quite different childcare systems: (1) a large unregulated informal sector where care is provided in a domestic setting by an untrained worker (providing by one estimate 88 per cent of all Canadian childcare; (2) a considerably smaller licensed sector which serves only 9 per cent of children whose parents work or study more than 20 hours a week; (3) a pre-school sector offering mostly part-time kindergarten programs for four- and five-year olds; and (4) a sector encompassing unpaid mothers caring full-time for their children in the privacy of their own homes. Locating, assessing, combining and maintaining these various arrangements is a recurring task facing most Canadian

working parents. Whatever the setting, the work of childcare is based on an ideology of women's caring.

The formal childcare system, which was developed as a collection of free-standing individual commercial and non-profit childcare centres, is highly de-centralized, fragmented and under-resourced, resembling a cottage industry mode of operation. Many childcare advocates would therefore like to move childcare out of the jurisdiction of means-tested social services and place it instead under the jurisdiction of education, on the grounds that the latter is a widely accepted universal program, which is supported primarily from tax revenue rather than from parental fees or means-tested government subsidies (Colley, 1990). The major danger of this approach is that the affective care component of child rearing may be devalued, and that the distinctions between care and education will increase rather than diminish (Ferguson, 1991).

Economic circumstances (e.g. continuing inflation, rising cost of housing and utilities, career structures based on uninterrupted 'male' work pattern) are now such that a majority of families are locked into the need for two incomes, whatever their preferences for childcare might be. Thus many people increasingly think of childcare in terms of what it can do for adults, as a place to put children while parents work. This 'child parking' concept is associated with minimum standards and low quality of care, and with cost efficiency based on the lowest cost per childcare hour. In contrast, a 'child development'

model envisages an integrated service to children and parents, which provides benefits through increasing parental access to economic resources, providing stimulation and education for young children as well as opportunities for constructive interaction with other children, thus offsetting the fragmentation, isolation and individuation of families in modern industrial societies (Moller, 1989).

Such an approach would not discriminate against children whose parents (mothers) are not in the labour force. Moreover, it would encourage the harmonization of childcare, employment and education policies. As Lero (1991:122) suggests, we need to ask questions about "the relative cost to individuals, communities, employers and Canadian society of a variety of alternatives, such as extended parental leave policies and benefits, a vast increase in the number of affordable, high quality child care programs and service agencies, and enhanced community support and resource programs."

However, benefits such as the quality of life of children and parents, better progress later in school and better social integration are notoriously difficult to measure in dollar terms or to connect directly with the quality of childcare provided. Hopefully, this econometric problem will not stand in the way of the current National Child Care Study (funded by Health and Welfare Canada) or the Child Care Quality Project (funded by the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services) to offer support for the 'child development' rather than the 'child

parking' model of childcare.

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LE RÉSEAU FAMILIAL ET
L'APPAREIL D'ÉTAT

par

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INTRODUCTION

La société moderne ne peut pas exister sans l'État. Personne n'en doute. Elle ne peut pas se perpétuer sans la famille. Cette seconde affirmation était moins évidente. Pendant les dernières décennies, plusieurs ont cru que l'État absorberait progressivement la majorité des fonctions de la famille. Basée sur le constat d'une certaine dépossession du rôle de la communauté par rapport à ses membres, cette analyse sera partagée par plusieurs auteurs classiques, même si leur interprétation diffère. Pour Durkheim, l'intervention de l'État permet de libérer l'individu des inégalités, des injustices et de l'oppression qui marquent les rapports dans la famille. Chez Tönnies, elle est le symbole du passage d'une organisation naturelle, la «communauté», à celle de la «société» dirigée par une autorité politique extérieure et artificielle. Engels identifiera plutôt l'économie capitaliste comme le facteur principal de destruction de l'ancienne économie domestique communiste. Dans cette même perspective, les recherches entreprises par l'École de Chicago concluront aussi à la désintégration des groupes domestiques, suite au déplacement de la main-d'œuvre de la campagne à la ville, qui entraîne une coupure entre les individus et leurs réseaux d'appartenance. L'État prend ainsi leur relais, en matière de sécurité sociale par exemple, mais il en viendra bientôt à intervenir dans des domaines très variés, en «remplacement» de la famille et de la communauté.

Mais les recherches de la dernière décennie confirment toutes avec une unanimité presque inquiétante que loin d'être moribonde, la famille (incluant la famille nucléaire et la parenté) joue encore un rôle essentiel. Ceux qui soutiennent que les communautés ont subsisté malgré tout se basent sur un ensemble de travaux empiriques à la fois historiques (Bott, Hareven, Young et Wilmott...) et contemporains (Rémy, Pitrou, Roberge, Fortin, Cuturello...). Par exemple, l'étude de Fortin (1987) confirme l'importance du réseau de parenté dans le choix d'implantation résidentielle dans le quartier, facteur favorisant l'entraide dans la famille. L'enquête effectuée par Roberge (1985) dans un village semi-rural du Québec a permis de conclure qu'entre dix et vingt pour cent du revenu annuel des répondantes découlait de rapports d'échanges

informels, en suivant quatre fois sur cinq le chemin de la parenté. Par ailleurs, les rapports familiaux se sont adaptés aux nouvelles exigences; les dons, les aides financières ponctuelles semblent avoir remplacé l'héritage (Cuturello, 1987). L'identification par Pitrou (1978) de divers types d'aide récurrents au sein des réseaux familiaux (l'aide à l'installation, l'aide régulière de subsistance ou en cas de période difficile et l'aide ponctuelle) confirme l'importance de la fonction d'entraide toujours présente dans la famille.

La réalisation de ces travaux a coïncidé avec la crise de l'État-providence : crise financière, mais aussi crise de confiance. Tout à coup il ne va plus de soi que l'État puisse remplacer avantageusement la famille. La mise en évidence des effets pervers et des problèmes liés à l'approche bureaucratique et professionnelle a ramené l'appareil étatique à plus de modestie, voire à d'angoissantes incertitudes sur ses capacités dans certains domaines et certains types d'intervention, ce qui l'a conduit à chercher la collaboration des réseaux sociaux dont la famille. Au début du siècle, Tönnies avait affirmé qu'un jour l'État ferait de nouveau appel à la communauté. Ce jour semble aujourd'hui arrivé.

De son côté, la famille reconnaît facilement la nécessité de l'aide de l'État dans de nombreuses circonstances. On en arrive donc à une troisième proposition : non seulement l'État et la famille sont indispensables mais leur collaboration est également nécessaire et va le devenir de plus en plus.

Cette évolution et cette affirmation sont vues de façon différente par les familialistes et les égalitaristes. Les premiers voudraient être certains que l'intervention de l'État se limite à la promotion du modèle familial traditionnel. Plutôt qu'une collaboration, ils favoriseraient davantage un retrait complet de l'État dans ce champ d'intervention. Les seconds préfèrent que ce dernier continue de s'adresser en priorité aux individus. Ils craignent qu'un retrait de l'État constitue un recul face à la reconnaissance de la pluralité des modèles familiaux (Guberman, 1987; Robert, 1989). Les travaux réalisés dans la foulée du débat sur une éventuelle politique familiale au Québec dans les années quatre-vingt sont un témoin privilégié de la confrontation entre ces thèses (Boily, 1987; Dandurand, 1987; Laporte-Dubuc; 1982, Sylvestre; 1986 et les

documents du gouvernement du Québec), ce que suggère aussi l'examen de deux textes analysant la situation suédoise. Malgré certaines réserves, Bradley (1990) met en évidence les avantages d'un support institutionnel très développé à la fois dans l'intérêt des enfants et dans la promotion de l'égalité entre les sexes. À l'inverse, en s'appuyant entre autres sur une comparaison entre les taux de divorce aux États-Unis et en Suède, Popenoe (1991) reprend la thèse de la disparition éventuelle de la famille à la suite de l'intervention trop massive de l'État.

Dans ce texte, nous partons de l'idée que nous n'avons pas le choix de trouver un mode de collaboration. Quelles formes une telle collaboration prend-elle déjà, et prendra-t-elle dans l'avenir ? Si cette collaboration est de toute façon inévitable, comment peut-elle se dérouler d'une façon favorable aux deux institutions ? Pour apporter des éléments de réponse à ces questions, il importe, au-delà des approches idéologiques, de voir comment les choses se passent dans la réalité concrète des rapports entre les membres des familles et les employés de l'État. Qu'est-ce qui se passe quand l'État et la famille se rencontrent ? Quand y a-t-il complémentarité, concurrence, nécessité, effets pervers ? De quoi cela dépend-il ? Telles sont les questions que nous abordons dans ce texte ¹. Nous le ferons de la manière suivante.

a) D'abord il importe de reconnaître les difficultés d'une telle collaboration en mettant en évidence les caractéristiques propres au modèle d'intervention étatique par comparaison au modèle familial. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons les concepts d'appareil et de réseau développés par Vincent Lemieux.

b) Dans un deuxième temps, nous ferons un bref rappel historique de ces rapports et de la position actuelle du problème ici et ailleurs. Nous verrons que l'intervention de l'État s'est d'abord appuyée sur une définition très étroite de la famille, avant de céder aux pressions sociales en faveur d'une reconnaissance de la pluralité des structures familiales. Plusieurs modèles se confrontent toujours au gré des diverses politiques et programmes des gouvernements.

¹ Nous poursuivons une réflexion abordée déjà dans Godbout, 1990, pour la famille et Godbout, 1991 pour les organismes.

c) Le coeur du texte sera consacré à une analyse des rapports actuels État-famille. Ayant constaté la faible quantité de recherches portant sur les rapports concrets État-famille, la réflexion utilisera également un inventaire des mesures que prend l'État à l'égard des familles, effectué par le gouvernement du Québec (1982). On a utilisé cet inventaire pour être le plus près possible de ce qui se passe, et à titre illustratif puisque cet inventaire a déjà dix ans et que le temps n'a pas permis de le mettre à jour, ce qui aurait permis de voir l'évolution récente ².

La rareté des études sur les rapports concrets entre l'État et la famille permettra surtout de suggérer des recherches, poser des questions, faire des hypothèses. Par exemple :

- quel type de solidarité familiale l'État favorise-t-il dans ses interventions ? Quel type de famille ? Quelle conséquence son intervention a-t-elle sur la solidarité familiale, le lien familial ? Inversement, quelle est l'influence de la famille sur l'État, ses intervenants, etc. ?;
- quel type de dépendance et quel type d'autonomie chaque institution permet-elle ou valorise-t-elle ? Il importe dans chaque cas de voir les deux côtés de la médaille. Par exemple, il ne suffit pas de dire que l'aide de l'État libère la femme de la dépendance financière du mari. Il faut comparer le type de dépendance et le type d'autonomie que favorise l'État pourvoyeur comparé au mari (conjoint) pourvoyeur;

de quelle façon le retrait de l'État s'exerce-t-il dans la réalité ? Est-ce toujours uniquement négatif ? Y a-t-il des secteurs où il est même préférable qu'il se retire ou encore qu'il finance quelqu'un d'autre pour le faire ? La préoccupation sera toujours au niveau des effets concrets (plutôt que de principe), dans la mesure où on peut les connaître ou à tout le moins faire des hypothèses qui donneraient lieu à des recherches.

² Eichler (1988) a déjà procédé à un exercice semblable afin de savoir si les programmes gouvernementaux au Canada tenaient compte du statut familial ou des caractéristiques personnelles dans leurs critères de sélection. Notre analyse des programmes sera plus élaborée, mais nous nous référerons aux conclusions de cet auteur.

APPAREILS ET RÉSEAUX ³

L'État est un appareil. «Les appareils sont des rassemblements d'acteurs sociaux organisés spécifiquement pour des fins de régulations externes des publics» (Lemieux, 1981, p. 1). La caractéristique première de l'appareil est donc d'avoir un public, c'est-à-dire un ensemble d'individus qui entretiennent un rapport d'extériorité par rapport à l'appareil sans lui être complètement étranger. Il y a donc à la base du fonctionnement de tout appareil une rupture entre un extérieur qu'on appelle un public et un intérieur qui constitue l'appareil proprement dit. Tout appareil consacre d'ailleurs une proportion importante de ses énergies à gérer ses rapports entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur qui sont dans un état de tension perpétuelle (la participation est un effort pour résoudre cette tension). On peut caractériser ce mode de fonctionnement en disant que les appareils sont hétérorégulés, ou hétéronomes dans leur principe même. Ils sont fondés sur le dualisme, sur une rupture entre eux et ceux pour qui ils existent théoriquement : leur public.

À l'inverse, les réseaux n'ont tout simplement pas de public. Les réseaux concernent le processus de régulation qui s'adresse à un ensemble de *membres*. Il n'y a pas cette rupture au sein même du mode de fonctionnement d'un réseau. C'est pourquoi on peut dire que le mode de fonctionnement d'un réseau c'est l'autorégulation. Il ne régule pas un public, mais des membres, c'est-à-dire des individus qui font *partie* d'un même ensemble.

De là découle tout un ensemble de caractéristiques propres aux appareils et aux réseaux. Pour les appareils cela entraîne la méta-régulation, une hiérarchie linéaire, une frontière rigide, une faible redondance entre les éléments. Inversement, les réseaux ont plutôt tendance à s'autoréguler, à se caractériser par une hiérarchie non linéaire que Hofstadter désigne par l'expression «hiérarchie enchevêtrée»; la frontière des réseaux est floue, et la redondance tend à être élevée.

³ On part ici des considérations déjà faites dans le texte mentionné plus haut

Si la notion d'appareil s'applique à l'État, celle de réseau convient à la famille. Il est toutefois nécessaire de distinguer deux types de réseaux dans les sociétés modernes. Car le marché est aussi un réseau. La différence entre le réseau marchand et le réseau social, dont fait partie la famille, réside dans le caractère obligatoire des rapports entre les membres. Le marché est un réseau composé d'individus qui n'ont pas d'obligations autres que celles du contrat marchand. Le réseau familial demeure au contraire l'institution sociale où les obligations sont les plus grandes. La famille est un tout qui est différent de la somme de ses parties, de ses membres. Il sera important de se demander si l'intervention de l'État tend à reconnaître la spécificité du réseau familial ou si elle le traite comme un appareil ou encore comme un réseau marchand composé d'individus indépendants les uns des autres.

RAPPEL HISTORIQUE

C'est par le biais de plusieurs champs d'action que l'État a construit progressivement son intervention dans le champ familial. Cette dernière a connu plusieurs changements d'orientation au cours des décennies sans que les orientations précédentes soient nécessairement abandonnées, ce qui a conduit à une sédimentation des tendances plutôt qu'à un remplacement successif de celles-ci. À long terme, il en résulte une intervention marquée par de nombreuses incohérences, phénomène qui, tout en étant normal, n'est pas étranger à la remise en question de la légitimité et à l'efficacité de l'action de l'État dans ce domaine.

Comme le rappelle Commaille (1982), le premier objectif de l'État n'était pas d'aider les familles, mais de favoriser la reproduction sociale de ses citoyens. À la fin du 19^e siècle, immédiatement après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et, plus récemment, depuis que certains ont sonné l'alarme d'un vieillissement accentué de la population, l'État a développé un ensemble de mesures référant à une perspective plus strictement *nataliste*. Puisque la situation démographique est actuellement perçue comme préoccupante, il est peu probable que l'État cesse d'intervenir à court terme dans ce domaine.

La politique démographique a trouvé un certain prolongement dans une seconde logique institutionnelle : celle de l'approche normative décrite en particulier par Foucault et les auteurs qui se sont inspirés des travaux de ce dernier, Meyer (1977) entre autres. La thèse du «*contrôle social*» est basée sur le constat de la dépossession progressive des fonctions de la famille — jugée incompétente — en faveur de l'État et renvoie à la notion de déviance développée par Durkheim. Ainsi, l'État qui veut encourager le développement d'un contexte favorable à l'éducation des enfants — les futurs citoyens — élaborera une série de mesures dans le champ de la régulation des rapports parents/enfants, en particulier par le biais d'une politique de protection de la jeunesse et en favorisant la scolarisation des enfants.

Depuis les années soixante, l'État semble référer moins systématiquement à cette argumentation pour légitimer son intervention. Certaines législations, comme celles concernant le divorce ou la planification des naissances, démontrent une certaine volonté de l'État de cesser d'intervenir dans les choix familiaux de ses citoyens. Mais, en matière de protection de la jeunesse en particulier, ou même en ce qui concerne la régulation des rapports entre les conjoints, cette logique est encore présente; elle s'appuie toujours sur une valorisation de la connaissance des «experts» et sur une approche dite rationnelle et objective. La dénonciation des «effets pervers» de l'intervention de l'État remet fortement cette approche en question actuellement (Mercier, 1989; Manseau, 1990). Elle sert de leitmotiv à la réorganisation des rapports entre l'État et la famille, particulièrement par ceux qui font la promotion d'un retrait étatique au profit du développement de solidarités communautaires.

Avec le développement de l'État-providence, une nouvelle approche sera privilégiée; la «*logique sociale*» sera d'abord plus universellement distributive avant de devenir plutôt redistributive en faveur de certains segments de la population dont les besoins sont jugés plus importants. Dans cette perspective, l'État mettra en branle une série de mesures en faveur d'une meilleure sécurité du revenu (retraite, allocations) et favorisera l'accès à l'école, à un logement décent (H.L.M.) ou aux services sanitaires pour les plus démunis. Dans ce dernier cas, la logique sociale peut parfois être confondue avec la logique

normative. La question de la distribution et de la redistribution se trouve au cœur du débat actuel sur le rôle de l'État. C'est ici que s'affrontent les thèses égalitaristes et familialistes.

Finalement, à partir du moment où le marché lui-même paraît réclamer une aide extérieure pour faire face à certaines «crises» cycliques, la logique sociale se confondra elle-même avec une logique économique. Les politiques élaborées en matière de sécurité du revenu (assurance-chômage, aide sociale), les programmes d'insertion à l'emploi, ceux visant à relancer la construction résidentielle, ont tous été conçus dans cette perspective. Ces politiques ne sont guère remises en question par les temps qui courent, mais elles mettent quand même en évidence les limites fiscales de l'État qui doit absorber les effets des crises économiques successives en débloquent des budgets substantiels en matière de sécurité du revenu. Dans ce domaine, la volonté de retrait de l'État se mesure surtout aux différentes modalités imposées aux clientèles afin de réduire l'accès aux programmes disponibles et, conséquemment, l'enveloppe budgétaire qui leur est allouée.

Toutes ces interventions se préoccupent à des degrés divers de la situation familiale des citoyens. C'est à l'ensemble de ces champs d'action que l'État réfère quand il présente ses mesures en faveur de la famille. Quel intérêt a-t-il d'aider la famille en particulier ? Comment celle-ci est-elle alors définie ? Cette dernière question est au centre de la plupart des travaux qui traitent du lien entre l'État et la famille. Ces travaux réfèrent généralement à deux axes d'analyse : le premier nous renvoie à la problématique de la normalité et de la

déviance, le second aux réflexions sur l'effet de catégorisation et de recomposition du social provoquée par l'intervention de l'État ⁴.

Rappelons que l'approche normative est basée sur un constat négatif de la capacité de «certaines» familles — entre autres les classes démunies et les mères célibataires (Hatzfeld, 1971) — de mener à bien la tâche d'éduquer les enfants. L'État chercherait alors, de façon autoritaire, à imposer un modèle familial plus propice; ce sera le cas du modèle de la «famille bourgeoise», à la fin du 19^e siècle (Segalen, 1981). *Ce modèle familial est à l'image de l'État lui-même, fonctionnant à la manière d'un appareil hiérarchisé*, contrastant ainsi avec l'organisation communautaire pré-existante, plus conforme à un modèle de réseau. Les résultats de cette tendance se font sentir à long terme. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'adéquation entre le modèle familial et le modèle étatique trouve son apogée (Messu, 1991). Parsons (1954) fera une description précise du modèle familial «idéal», basé sur une spécialisation des rôles intra-familiaux sous l'autorité du mari/père. Mais si les rôles sont bien définis, l'État intervient peu encore au sein même de l'entité familiale, sinon pour appuyer le rôle du chef de famille. Depuis ce moment, les divers intervenants réfèrent à ce modèle pour justifier une action normative de l'État dans les affaires de la famille, ou pour la dénoncer.

Les réflexions sur l'effet de catégorisation et de recomposition du social provoqué par l'intervention étatique prennent, quant à elles, appui sur l'observation d'une définition de plus en plus étroite des clientèles ayant accès aux programmes de l'État. Notamment, ils constatent que, de plus en plus, l'État s'adresse de façon privilégiée aux individus. Ce faisant, il nie la présence de groupes sociaux pré-existants dont il ne reconnaît d'ailleurs généralement pas la compétence. Il favorise plutôt la création de groupes qui n'ont de commun qu'une similarité des pratiques en fonction de certains programmes étatiques

⁴ Ces réflexions s'appuient sur l'idée que l'élaboration et la mise en place de diverses politiques sociales contribuent substantiellement à la définition de catégories («jeunes», «chômeurs», «familles monoparentales») qui nient l'existence de groupes sociaux déjà formés (à partir des liens familiaux, par exemple) et s'imposent avec le temps comme groupes réels.

(«chômeurs», «assistés sociaux»...). La logique de la catégorisation, qui est celle des «experts», conduit aussi à «fixer» l'identité de façon rigide et à y accoler une évaluation normative. Dans le champ familial, elle conduira à une définition de plusieurs «types» de famille ainsi qu'à celle des pratiques familiales jugées plus ou moins conformes à un certain modèle, selon les «experts» qui la définiront (Lenoir, 1987). Selon de Gauléjac (1988), cette normalisation accentue l'exclusion sociale de ceux dont les situations ne sont pas conformes.

Cette logique a, par ailleurs, comme effet pervers de provoquer une dépendance accrue des individus par rapport à l'État plutôt que de simplement les «libérer» de leurs liens communautaires jugés trop contraignants. Le face-à-face de plus en plus direct entre l'État et les citoyens peut-il être interprété comme une volonté de l'État d'amener chacun des citoyens dans son propre appareil ? La remise en question actuelle s'inscrirait plutôt dans un mouvement de reconnaissance des réseaux familiaux toujours actifs.

ANALYSE DES RAPPORTS ACTUELS ÉTAT-FAMILLE

INTRODUCTION : LES TROIS STADES ET LES QUATRE TYPES D'EFFET

Cette évolution des rapports historiques entre l'État et la famille et les différentes conceptions que l'État moderne s'est fait de la famille permettent de dégager trois phases dans lesquelles, sans abandonner ses rôles antérieurs, l'État ajoute de nouvelles fonctions, ce que nous avons appelé la sédimentation des rôles historiques de l'État. Il est commode de reprendre ces catégories dans l'analyse des rapports actuels concrets.

Nous allons donc distinguer les trois rôles suivants :

1- État régalien

Poursuivant sa fonction traditionnelle régaliennne, l'État, encore aujourd'hui, règle les rapports entre les membres de la famille, entre les familles, et entre la

famille et la société : les lois sur le divorce, la loi récente sur le patrimoine familiale, la loi sur l'héritage, etc. Par ces lois, l'État peut soit libérer les individus des liens familiaux soit au contraire les renforcer. La loi sur le divorce et la loi sur le patrimoine familial sont deux illustrations de ces tendances.

Il faudra accorder ici une attention spéciale à un type particulier d'intervention autoritaire : celui où l'État se substitue aux familles défaillantes. Autrement dit celui où un acte d'autorité l'entraîne à remplacer la famille plutôt qu'à la réguler.

2- État-providence première génération

L'État distribue de l'argent aux familles sous plusieurs formes. Cette approche est fondée principalement sur l'idée de l'égalité des individus et de l'universalité des droits. On verra qu'il s'est établi là un rapport unique entre l'État et la famille, découlant des caractéristiques spécifiques du réseau familial.

3- État-providence deuxième génération

Enfin, l'État dispense lui-même des services. C'est cette fonction qui s'est le plus accrue avec l'État-providence. Le postulat de l'effritement et de l'incompétence de la famille s'ajoute à l'idéologie de l'égalité et du droit universel de la période précédente. Ce rôle est à distinguer de celui qui découle de sa fonction autoritaire puisqu'il s'agit ici d'une offre de services aux familles, lesquelles décident ou non d'en bénéficier : maintien à domicile, aide aux couples, etc., contrairement à l'intervention autoritaire, qui devient cependant de plus en plus une combinaison de 1 et 3.

Nous allons passer en revue les caractéristiques actuelles de ces différents types d'intervention du point de vue des réseaux et des appareils, en nous demandant quels sont les effets de l'intervention de l'État. Nous distinguerons quatre types d'effets ou quatre tendances concernant les conséquences de l'action de l'État.

1. Individualiste libérale

L'État pourra avoir tendance, par ses mesures, à orienter la famille vers le modèle du réseau marchand. Il insistera alors sur l'autonomie, la capacité de décider de l'individu qui est, en conséquence, «libéré» de l'obligation de certains liens. Le divorce est évidemment l'exemple le plus évident et le plus important de ce type d'intervention. Il constitue sans doute la plus grande révolution du 20^e siècle dans les liens sociaux.

2. Individualiste égalitaire

L'État peut aussi appliquer au fonctionnement de la famille l'idéologie égalitaire qui caractérise l'État-providence. Comme dans le premier cas, les membres de la famille seront alors perçus comme des individus autonomes mais dont la liberté est ici limitée par l'impératif de l'égalité entre les membres. La famille est un public composé d'individus égaux en droit. La loi québécoise récente sur le patrimoine familial en est une illustration.

3. Appareil

L'État peut aussi considérer la famille à son image, comme un appareil, comme on a vu qu'il l'a fait historiquement avec le modèle patriarcal : institution autoritaire, hiérarchie linéaire.

4. Réseau social

Enfin l'État peut considérer la famille comme un réseau social, réseau solidaire d'obligations. C'est ce qu'il fait par exemple lorsqu'il autorise une déduction d'impôt pour personnes à charge. Pour chacune des mesures, nous nous demanderons si l'État fournit plutôt le réseau familial (4-a), le réseau de parents (4-b) ou le réseau communautaire plus large (4-c).

Nous tenterons de déceler les tendances de l'intervention de l'État pour chacun de ses rôles : régalien, État-providence première génération, État-providence deuxième génération. Pour ce faire, nous analyserons d'abord les mesures

gouvernementales; dans un second temps, les recherches existantes sur le thème seront considérées.

L'ÉTAT RÉGALIEN. LES TENDANCES RÉCENTES

Nous distinguons entre les lois à portée générale et celles s'adressant aux familles défaillantes.

Tableau 1-Mesures d'intervention de l'État régalien auprès de la famille et tendances générales du modèle familial sous-jacent

Mesures	Tendances
Loi sur le divorce	individualiste libéral
Loi sur le patrimoine familial	individualiste égalitaire
Réforme du droit de la famille (volet sur l'autorité parentale)	individualiste égalitaire
Perception de la pension alimentaire	individualiste égalitaire
Écoles	individualiste égalitaire
Comité d'école, comités de parents et conseil d'orientation	réseau communautaire
Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse	individualiste égalitaire

a) Lois générales

Les mesures sont ici peu nombreuses; elles ont cependant en général une portée très large à la fois en ce qui concerne leur objet et en termes de «clientèle» potentielle. Quel type de famille, quelle solidarité familiale, quelle caractéristique des réseaux familiaux l'intervention réglementaire de l'État favorise-t-elle ? Quelles sont les conséquences de ces interventions sur les rapports familiaux ? Le plus souvent, les lois générales ont le souci de protéger l'individu ou, du moins, de s'assurer que tous les individus profitent des mêmes droits. C'est ainsi que la tendance la plus répandue est celle de l'individualisme égalitaire. Mais, dans leurs modalités, les lois peuvent tenir compte des autres tendances. Par exemple, la loi sur le patrimoine familial accorde priorité à l'individualisme égalitaire sur l'individualisme libéral. Mais elle accorde une valeur encore plus grande aux réseaux de parenté

(tendance 4) puisque l'égalité ne touche pas aux biens transmis par héritage. Cette loi privilégie donc les rapports d'obligation intergénérationnels (verticaux, tendance 4) et les rapports égalitaires intragénérationnels (horizontaux, tendance 2). Elle est neutre par rapport à la tendance 3 et négative par rapport à la tendance 1; elle diminue la liberté contractuelle des individus.

C'est dire que la famille n'est plus considérée comme un appareil par l'État. C'est dans les changements apportés à l'autorité parentale sur les enfants que ce changement est le plus évident. L'autorité traditionnelle du père cède la place à une responsabilité conjointe et égale des deux parents. En outre, plutôt que d'être conçue comme un droit des parents sur les enfants, cette autorité est vue plutôt comme un ensemble de responsabilités à l'égard de leurs enfants (Joyal, B., 155-156).

Toutefois, même si l'État ne conçoit plus la famille comme un appareil, mais comme un réseau, ce réseau familial est vu comme un ensemble d'individus unis de façon contractuelle. La solidarité est mise «sous surveillance» de l'État, ce dernier s'assurant que chaque membre respecte le contrat familial. S'il ne fait pas la promotion de la «famille/appareil» — ce serait plutôt l'inverse —, l'État régalien met cependant en évidence son propre rôle autoritaire. Par celui-ci, il entre cependant dans une dynamique d'intervention dont les frontières demeurent floues. Jusqu'où doit-il intervenir dans la régulation des rapports internes dans la famille ? La question de la perception des pensions alimentaires en est l'exemple le plus couramment cité. Malgré cela, le rôle de l'État régalien n'est pas véritablement remis en cause dans le débat entourant le retrait de l'État-providence, même si la révision de la législation ou la mise en place de nouvelles dispositions, comme celle de la Loi sur le patrimoine familial, est généralement l'objet d'un débat passionné qui renvoie toujours à d'éventuels effets pervers. L'intervention de l'État régalien est particulièrement valorisée par le mouvement féministe car il a généralement servi d'encadrement à une meilleure protection du droit des femmes.

b) Autorité sur familles défaillantes :

Il importe de traiter ici de façon spécifique les lois qui permettent à l'État de remplacer les familles dans des fonctions qui leur sont normalement attribuées mais pour lesquelles les familles sont considérées défaillantes. Historiquement, le développement de l'encadrement scolaire paraît certainement la première mesure d'importance en ce domaine; l'État s'en est octroyé le monopole au détriment des autres formes d'apprentissage, souvent familiaux. C'est l'ensemble des familles qui ont été considérées incapables d'assumer l'instruction des enfants. S'il est maintenant ⁵ entièrement responsable de la définition du cheminement scolaire des enfants jusqu'à seize ans, l'État compte cependant de plus en plus sur la collaboration de la famille, de façon individuelle à travers le soutien quotidien de chacun des parents, mais de façon plus communautaire à travers les divers comités de parents. Si la famille n'est pas jugée compétente pour mener seule à bien la tâche d'éduquer ses enfants, l'État lui offre toutefois la possibilité d'exprimer son opinion sur ses propres actions. Ce n'est certainement pas le cas en ce qui concerne la protection de la jeunesse, domaine où il est plus souvent qu'autrement accusé d'autoritarisme et d'incapacité. La Suède est très sensible à ce problème. Comme le souligne Bradley (1990), l'analyse de la politique sociale suédoise peut laisser l'impression que l'État, en particulier par sa volonté de protéger l'enfant en priorité, agit de façon très autoritaire à l'égard des familles. En fait, la politique suédoise poursuit l'objectif de réduire le besoin d'intervention directe de la part de l'État et celui de favoriser une plus large participation des parents eux-mêmes dans le développement social et dans l'éducation des enfants.

Il y a, en fait, peu de recherches sur la protection de la jeunesse. Il faut toutefois mentionner l'étude de Manseau (1990) sur l'intervention des professionnels de l'État dans le domaine de l'abus sexuel auprès des enfants. Elle y montre que la conjonction de l'approche techno-professionnelle et de l'appareil étatique conduit à des effets pervers importants. Les valeurs des professionnels de

⁵ Les commissions scolaires conservent une fonction administrative et un pouvoir sur les valeurs en milieu scolaire (religion, éducation sexuelle, etc.).

classe moyenne et leurs intérêts professionnels finissent par se combiner pour conduire à ce qu'on peut appeler avec Manseau la construction sociale du problème de l'inceste. Dans ce cas, l'appareil étatique est insensible au réseau familial. Il ne perçoit qu'une victime et son agresseur et traite le cas comme s'il s'agissait d'une agression dans la rue entre deux étrangers. *«Le problème de l'abus sexuel est en quelque sorte un construit parce qu'il est le fruit d'un processus définitionnel largement extérieur aux situations-problèmes vécues par les personnes désignées comme victimes»* (p. 135). On a là une illustration des conséquences de l'intervention de l'État-appareil définissant son public comme un ensemble d'individus sans liens les uns avec les autres, ayant tout au plus un contrat à respecter. À l'égard des relations familiales, l'intervention de l'État régalien est plutôt créatrice d'une méfiance entre les membres.

L'ÉTAT-PROVIDENCE PREMIÈRE GÉNÉRATION

L'égalité des individus demeure un principe important pour guider l'intervention de l'État-providence «première génération», mais elle se traduit de façon différente.

Tableau 2-Mesures d'intervention de l'État-providence «1e génération» auprès de la famille et tendances générales du modèle familial sous-jacent

Mesures	Tendances
Allocations familiales	réseau familial
Prime à la naissance	réseau familial
Allocation de maternité	réseau familial
Aide pour les familles qui font garder leur enfant dans un centre de garderie autonome	réseau familial/ individualiste égalitaire (femme)
Aide pour service de garde en milieu familial	réseau communautaire
Subventions aux garderies	réseau communautaire
Retrait préventif	individualiste égalitaire
Congé parental	individualiste égalitaire (père) + réseau familial
Déductions et transferts généraux (c)*	gén : individualiste égalitaire; réseau familial (c)

Exemption pour enfant à charge	réseau familial
Déductibilité de la pension alimentaire	individualiste égalitaire
Déductibilité de frais de garde	individualiste égalitaire
Allègement des impôts sur les successions	réseau de parenté
Exemption pour personne à charge	réseau de parenté
Rentes et pensions (c)	gén : ind libéral; appareil (c)
Retranchement de mois de la période de cotisation (rentes)	individualiste égalitaire
Aide sociale (c)	gén : ind libéral; appareil (c)
Supplément au revenu (c)	gén : ind libéral; réseau familial (c)
Indemnités en cas d'accident (travail, crime, route) (c)	gén : ind libéral; réseau familial (c)
Prêts et bourses : dépendance/charges (c)	gén : ind égalitaire; dépendance : appareil; charges : réseau familial
Programme de retour aux études (fam mono)	individualiste égalitaire
Aide aux étudiants handicapés	individualiste égalitaire
Allocation aux enfants handicapés	individualiste égalitaire
Prêts garantis à l'accession à la propriété (ou bonis) (c)	réseau familial
Supplément de loyer (c)	gén : ind libéral; réseau familial (c)
Remboursement d'impôt foncier (c)	réseau familial
Programme de chirurgie buccale et services dentaires	neutre
Subventions aux associations	réseau communautaire

(c) Seulement une clause de la mesure réfère à la situation familiale.

Il s'agit de loin de la forme la plus importante de l'intervention de l'État auprès des familles. Le grand nombre et la diversité des mesures rappellent l'ancienneté de cette formule. C'est d'ailleurs ici que la sédimentation des tendances est la plus visible et qu'apparaît plus distinctement, à plusieurs reprises, une définition relativement étroite de la famille c'est-à-dire réduite à son noyau de base. Lorsque la famille est définie comme un réseau, il est en effet plus souvent limité à ce noyau. Certaines mesures plus récentes sont toutefois marquées par une plus grande influence de la tendance égalitariste;

celle-ci demeure la plus répandue dans l'ensemble, comme dans le cas de l'État régalien. Les mesures paraissent aussi plus neutres par rapport aux types de famille.

La prise en compte de la famille nucléaire ou conjugale comme unité de base découle ici d'une logique catégorielle. En premier lieu, elle conduit à identifier l'entité restreinte qui pourra avoir accès à un certain financement ou profiter d'une déduction. La définition des catégories pourra d'ailleurs produire une distinction entre les types de famille selon le statut légal ou non du lien conjugal. Dans certains cas, comme le notera Eichler (1988), il sera plus avantageux d'être marié (déductions pour conjoint à charge, par exemple) alors que ça pourra être l'inverse pour d'autres mesures (supplément de revenu). D'autres critères (âge, revenu) pourront d'ailleurs s'ajouter pour définir la classe des ayants droit. En un sens, l'intervention de l'État peut ici être considérée comme substitutrice à la communauté qui n'a plus la responsabilité de voir au bien-être des familles, responsables d'élever les enfants, par exemple. Les diverses allocations liées à la naissance des enfants peuvent être interprétées de cette façon. Elles s'inscrivent, en quelque sorte, dans une perspective redistributrice en faveur des familles. Par ailleurs, la redistribution financière paraît plus respectueuse des valeurs des usagers : elle est moins sensible à une transmission des valeurs de classe moyenne qui caractérise l'État en général.

Caractère exceptionnel du financement étatique des réseaux familiaux

À l'intérieur du noyau familial, l'État ne cherche pas à s'assurer que l'aide financière atteigne effectivement ses objectifs. Ce phénomène est exceptionnel comme nous pouvons le voir en le comparant au financement des groupes communautaires. Dans la mesure où le partenariat véritable est souvent difficile à cause des caractéristiques respectives des réseaux sociaux et de l'État comme appareil, une des formes les plus courantes de collaboration entre l'État et les réseaux sociaux est effectivement le financement. Ce financement par l'État de différentes institutions communautaires a pour but soit de contribuer à

des objectifs de politique étatique soit, inversement, constitue une façon pour l'État de contribuer à des objectifs des organismes qu'il considère souhaitables. Ce mode de relation entre les réseaux sociaux et l'État est souvent positif. Mais il pose un énorme problème qui est au coeur des conflits actuels entre les organismes communautaires et l'État. C'est le problème de l'évaluation. L'État ne peut pas ne pas évaluer ce qui est fait à partir de fonds publics. Or, les modes d'évaluation des appareils ont tendance à être bureaucratiques et à ne pas respecter les façons d'opérer des réseaux sociaux. Ils sont extérieurs et ont tendance à se limiter à des évaluations quantitatives (nombre de personnes rencontrées, etc.) souvent inadéquates pour une institution fonctionnant comme un réseau. Cela conduit des organismes communautaires à refuser toute forme d'évaluation consécutive à un financement, position injustifiable par ailleurs. D'autant plus que le fait même de financer un organisme entraîne souvent toutes sortes de conséquences, dont un rapport différent avec la clientèle, rapport salarial se rapprochant des rapports entre l'appareil et ses publics, ou du rapport marchand. Un tel type de rapport nécessite une évaluation. Mais une modalité d'évaluation qui tiendrait compte à la fois des exigences de l'appareil étatique et de celles des réseaux n'a pas encore été trouvée.

À cet égard, la famille bénéficie d'un statut privilégié. À la différence des autres réseaux sociaux dont nous venons de décrire les difficultés d'évaluation lorsque l'État verse des fonds, la famille est le seul à posséder une légitimité telle que l'État ne ressente pas le besoin d'évaluer les résultats, de vérifier que l'argent distribué a atteint son but. Pourquoi ? Parce que, comme nous le mentionnions plus haut, l'État considère ici la famille comme un réseau au sens le plus fort du terme, celui dont la solidarité transcende les individus; ce ne sont donc pas seulement des individus qui composent ce réseau. Le lien d'obligation familiale est perçu comme le moins individualiste, celui en qui on peut faire confiance sans nécessité de vérification bureaucratique sauf celle de s'assurer que l'État lui-même n'est pas trompé, mais non que l'argent soit détourné à l'intérieur même du réseau à qui on le donne. Ce type de légitimité fait que l'État fait confiance sans exiger d'évaluation sauf à titre d'exception et à posteriori. C'est le mode courant de fonctionnement entre l'État et la famille.

Mais il faut bien se rendre compte qu'il s'agit là d'un mode exceptionnel parmi l'ensemble des institutions. Jamais l'État n'ira vérifier ce que le réseau familial fait de ces sommes; jamais il demandera à une mère de famille un rapport annuel, comme il tend à le faire auprès des autres réseaux sociaux. Cela illustre la pertinence de la distinction entre réseau-appareil. Plus les réseaux sociaux deviennent des appareils, plus ils sont justifiables d'évaluation bureaucratique, avec tous les problèmes que cela implique. Le fait de pouvoir se dispenser de ces évaluations constitue un grand avantage et pour la famille et pour l'État. On limite la bureaucratie, la possibilité de rapport conflictuel entre l'État et le réseau social. Or, cet avantage est dû précisément au fait qu'en ce qui concerne ces mesures, la famille n'est pas considérée comme un appareil car elle n'est pas fondée sur le même type de légitimité et de solidarité que l'État; elle est un réseau autorégulé auquel l'État peut globalement faire confiance. C'est ici la différence elle-même entre l'État et la famille qui *facilite* les rapports. La confiance que manifeste l'État envers la famille permet à de nombreuses mesures d'être libres de contrainte bureaucratique. Elle permet à l'argent de jouer son rôle, mis en évidence par Simmel. Ce n'est pas parce que l'État ne se soucie pas de l'usage qui en est fait. Au contraire. Rappelons à cet égard, le grand débat qui a eu lieu au Québec sur les allocations familiales au moment où le gouvernement fédéral mettait en application ce programme. La petite histoire raconte que ce débat aurait entraîné un triple changement d'adressage des enveloppes chez les fonctionnaires fédéraux ! Finalement, le mouvement des femmes de l'époque l'a emporté, et les chèques ont été adressés à la mère et non au père. Retenons-en la raison : l'argument qui l'a emporté est qu'il y avait plus de probabilité que l'argent serve véritablement aux enfants si on adressait le chèque à la mère plutôt qu'au père. C'est donc le sentiment maternel, c'est-à-dire ce qui, au sein même de la famille, est le plus éloigné de la logique individualiste, qui a motivé cette décision. Dans la mesure où l'État (et la société) a de plus en plus tendance à considérer les membres de la famille comme des individus, il risque de perdre cet avantage.

La famille est le réseau dans lequel l'injection d'argent étatique est le plus ancien et le plus important parmi l'ensemble des institutions sociales. Or, très

souvent, dans d'autres institutions, l'argent a entraîné des effets pervers sur le rapport entre les membres en créant une rupture caractéristique des appareils et bien souvent en les transformant en appareil ou en les faisant disparaître à terme. Tel n'est pas le cas pour la famille, même si on peut soupçonner certaines conséquences non connues, puisque aucune étude n'a été faite sur l'impact des allocations familiales et autres mesures similaires sur la famille.

Malgré cela, plusieurs mesures de l'État-providence renvoient aussi à la tendance individualiste. Il est d'ailleurs nécessaire d'introduire plusieurs distinctions à cet égard. Certaines mesures réfèrent à plus d'une tendance; c'est surtout le cas lorsqu'il s'agit d'une politique générale dont seulement une clause tient compte du statut familial. Eichler (1988) aura aussi noté la présence concomitante des logiques individualiste et familiale. C'est ce que nous observerons pour les rentes et les pensions ou pour le supplément au revenu, par exemple. Dans les deux cas, l'objectif général renvoie à une logique individualiste libérale marquée par une volonté redistributrice en faveur de groupes plus démunis dans la société; les cas sont analysés sur une base individuelle en référence avec la situation financière personnelle. Mais la clause familiale réintroduit la présence de la famille, du moins de la famille nucléaire. Dans le premier cas, le modèle de référence est plus visiblement celui de la famille traditionnelle : l'épouse est directement dépendante de son conjoint si elle n'a pas travaillé et doit attendre son décès pour retirer une pension personnelle. Dans le second cas, la prise en compte de la présence de la famille, qui est aussi définie comme un réseau d'obligations et renvoie encore à son noyau de base, est plus favorable : plus les personnes à charge sont nombreuses, plus le financement est important.

La référence à l'individualisme égalitaire dans plusieurs mesures n'a pas non plus toujours la même signification. Elle peut renvoyer à des caractéristiques individuelles et être neutre par rapport aux tendances familiales : l'égalité réfère alors à celle des citoyens entre eux, sans autres considérations que celle d'une redistribution, la plupart du temps. Ce sera le cas par exemple pour l'allocation aux enfants handicapés. On pourrait dire qu'elle assure alors l'égalité entre les familles. Elle peut, par ailleurs, assurer une égalité entre les

types de famille (programme de retour aux études pour les familles monoparentales), entre les familles et les individus (déductibilité des frais de garde ou de la pension alimentaire) ou entre les membres de la famille (retranchement de mois de la période de cotisation pour le régime des rentes pour les femmes qui s'absentent du marché du travail après une naissance).

Dans ce dernier cas, il faut souligner le fait qu'une mesure comme le congé parental tient compte de la possibilité pour le père d'exercer un rôle plus actif dans l'éducation des enfants qu'auparavant; le recours au principe d'égalité peut jouer en faveur de tous les membres de la famille. En même temps, certaines mesures peuvent théoriquement sembler neutres mais, confrontées à la réalité, elles constituent en fait un renforcement des modèles existants en particulier du modèle de la famille traditionnelle. C'est ce que certains auteurs mettront en évidence à propos des transferts de déduction fiscale entre conjoints ou des pensions de retraite (Gauthier, 1985; Sylvestre; 1986, Eichler; 1988).

La référence aux réseaux fait aussi intervenir une multiplicité de niveaux; les mesures peuvent effectivement s'adresser à la famille nucléaire — c'est souvent le cas ici —, à la parenté (exemption pour personne à charge) ou à la communauté (groupes de familles nucléaires qui profitent de subventions pour organiser certains services).

Les mesures développées dans le cadre de l'État-providence «première génération» sont certes celles qui tiennent compte à la fois de la définition la plus étroite et la plus large de la famille. Certaines ne s'adressent qu'à un seul type de famille, d'autres sont tout à fait neutres par rapport au statut familial. Dans certains cas, elles paraissent très libératrices pour les individus et, à d'autres, conçoivent encore la famille comme un appareil. Mais, dans l'ensemble, elles ne s'accompagnent pas d'une confrontation directe entre l'État et la famille au niveau de la promotion de valeurs. Elles tendent vers la neutralité. C'est une des principales raisons pour laquelle les classes populaires préféreraient l'aide financière à un service direct de l'État, selon Pitrou (1978). La frontière de l'intervention étatique est ici bien définie et favorise en général un plus grand respect de l'autonomie familiale.

Le désengagement de l'État ?

C'est au niveau de la définition des types de famille admissibles que certaines de ses mesures se retrouvent au milieu du débat sur le retrait de l'État-providence. Certaines féministes mettront en évidence le fait que certaines actions de l'État tendent à nouveau à se limiter aux familles traditionnelles. Dans d'autres cas, c'est moins l'aspect familial que redistributif de la mesure qui sera pris à partie par ceux qui sont favorables au retrait. L'aide sociale en est l'exemple le plus connu. Dans les faits, le désengagement de l'État ne s'exprime pas avec éclat; c'est dans la subtilité et la complexité de la définition des catégories admissibles qu'il s'exerce d'abord. L'analyse de la réforme fiscale par Rose (1987) lui permettra, par exemple, de noter la suppression du droit pour les familles monoparentales de déduire l'équivalent de l'exemption de personne mariée pour le premier enfant. Elle l'interprète, au même titre que l'imposition de quotas pour les familles monoparentales dans les H.L.M., comme l'indice d'un retour à la famille nucléaire traditionnelle.

En ce qui concerne la réforme de l'aide sociale, la nouvelle politique réfère directement à l'importance de tenir compte de l'existence des liens de solidarité et de responsabilité familiaux. Par exemple, la nouvelle définition de la conjugalité pour les conjoints de faits (vie commune d'un an) et l'introduction du principe de responsabilité parentale confirmeront la prise en compte de la solidarité familiale. Selon Gauthier et Coulombe (1990), il faut analyser cette réforme à la lumière de la volonté de désengagement de l'État. Ainsi, la parité obtenue par les jeunes de moins de trente ans sera rendue possible grâce aux restrictions liées à la nouvelle définition des catégories admissibles et à la prise en compte de la contribution parentale, comme c'est le cas pour les prêts étudiants. C'est donc un changement qui affecte directement la famille. Le retrait peut prendre forme à la suite d'un gel ou d'une réduction du budget de certaines politiques; aucune étude n'en fait encore une analyse précise.

DISPENSE DES SERVICES. LA DEUXIÈME GÉNÉRATION DE L'ÉTAT-PROVIDENCE

Ce n'est pas d'aujourd'hui que l'État dispense directement des services aux citoyens. La première, et encore aujourd'hui une des plus importantes missions de service que l'État s'est donné c'est l'instruction, service qu'il a d'ailleurs rendu obligatoire. Mais c'est vraiment depuis ce que Fourastié a appelé les «trente glorieuses» que l'État s'est défini comme providence. Il offrira alors toute une panoplie de services personnels et collectifs aux familles et poursuivra son rôle de soutien au système de production commencé avec l'école en favorisant le travail de tous les membres adultes de la famille, dévalorisant ainsi le fait qu'une personne non spécialisée, non incluse dans le système de production, remplisse cette sorte de travail au noir qui consiste à élever ses propres enfants. Cela fait partie de la tendance générale du modèle de la croissance qui consiste à transformer le plus d'activités possibles en travail, soutenu par l'État, par le monde économique et, curieusement, par le mouvement féministe qui a beaucoup contribué à l'extension de ce modèle durant les dernières décennies.

Concernant la famille nous examinerons successivement les mesures étatiques et les recherches sur ces mesures qui sont ici plus importantes que dans les deux sections précédentes.

A) LES MESURES

Tableau 3-Mesures d'intervention de l'État-providence «2e génération» et tendances générales du modèle familial sous-jacent

Mesures	Tendances
H.L.M.(c)	réseau familial
Médiation	individualiste égalitaire
Programme de planification des naissances (avortement)	individualiste libéral
Adoption	réseau familial

Déjeuners à l'école	individualiste égalitaire
Centres d'accueil	individualiste libéral
Maintien à domicile	individualiste libéral
À l'aidant (maintien à domicile)	réseau de parenté
Direction de la protection de la jeunesse et placement en famille d'accueil	individualiste libéral + appareil (État)
Garde à l'école	réseau communautaire
Groupe de familles avec enfant en difficulté	réseau communautaire
Échange et entraide (familles monoparentales)	réseau communautaire
Suivi de la naissance	neutre
Prévention en milieu scolaire	neutre
Réadaptation (mésadaptés sociaux)	neutre
Consultation matrimoniale (conjointes)	neutre
Consultation budgétaire	neutre

Les mesures sont moins nombreuses que dans le cas de l'État providence «1ère génération». Les tendances font montre d'une plus grande diversité que dans les cas précédents; il faut souligner en particulier l'importance d'une nouvelle tendance qui semble plus neutre en termes de modèle familial. L'importance des mesures est de plus très variable; certains services ne touchent qu'un nombre limité de personnes et nécessitent un budget de fonctionnement minime (service de consultation budgétaire par exemple) alors que d'autres sont à la fois très populaires et très coûteux (centres d'accueil par exemple). Le débat sur le retrait de l'État concernera évidemment principalement ces derniers. Il faut rappeler que nous poursuivons l'objectif d'analyser les services qui s'adressent à la famille ou qui y réfèrent directement. L'État s'est impliqué dans de nombreux autres types de services (l'aide juridique, la recherche d'emploi) qui ne seront pas pris en compte. Ces derniers, tout comme ceux que nous analysons, peuvent aussi être l'objet d'un questionnement actuellement.

Rappelons qu'au meilleur moment de l'État-providence, ce dernier avait tendance à assumer toutes les responsabilités de la société et à considérer les institutions sociales comme des résidus qui devenaient complémentaires de

personnes âgées (centres d'accueil) ou pour les mésadaptés sociaux, comme ce sera le cas par rapport au financement de certains autres services, comme les garderies. Sous-jacent à ces actions, on retrouvait le modèle de l'homme-producteur. Il s'agissait de tout transformer en marchandises. Et c'est le modèle marchand qu'on avait tendance à appliquer considérant l'usager comme un consommateur de services, sans le pouvoir du consommateur la plupart du temps puisque l'État-producteur était généralement en situation de monopole.

Une telle conception des services publics pouvait à la limite convenir pour des services impersonnels comme la poste, etc. Mais pour un ensemble de services personnels qui allaient prendre de plus en plus d'importance, il est impossible de les considérer comme un produit ⁶ (Gadrey, 1991). Dans le cas qui nous occupe, cela signifie qu'on ne peut pas considérer l'État et la famille comme deux entités étrangères l'une à l'autre ayant un contact minimal au moment de la dispensation du service sur le modèle du marché. Seule la distribution d'argent permet de fonctionner de cette façon avec succès, comme on vient de le voir. La dispensation d'un service est nécessairement une activité conjointe État-famille, appareil-réseau, une *co-production* comme on a tendance à le dire aujourd'hui, même si nous n'aimons pas cette expression qui suppose qu'il s'agit d'un produit (Godbout, 1991). Le service personnel est, la plupart du temps, d'abord et avant tout la production d'un lien.

C'est ce que mettront en évidence certaines des études réalisées dans ce domaine, comme nous le verrons. La volonté de désengagement de l'État a, par ailleurs, déjà contribué à renverser la vapeur dans certains domaines : la désinstitutionnalisation et le développement du maintien à domicile pour les personnes âgées en témoignent. D'une certaine façon, nous pourrions conclure à une sédimentation des pratiques étatiques comme nous l'avons fait à propos du financement. Il y a cependant une différence importante entre les deux types de mesures et les effets de la présence concomitante de diverses logiques qui sous-tendent les politiques. Dans le cas précédent, la

⁶ Dans ce contexte il faudrait tenir compte de tout le courant (inspiré notamment par l'ethno-méthodologie) qui étudie les rapports de service et autour duquel un important colloque a eu lieu récemment à Paris. Nous ne pouvons que le mentionner dans le cadre de ce bref travail.

sédimentation donnait généralement lieu à l'élaboration de mesures dans des domaines différents, selon les préoccupations de l'heure. Ici, la coexistence de différents modèles met en évidence une certaine contradiction entre les politiques : on favorise le maintien à domicile des personnes âgées, on veut même soutenir les aidants familiaux, mais pas au détriment des budgets accordés pour les centres d'accueil...

Comme nous le verrons, la politique à l'égard des soins aux personnes âgées est aussi la plus commentée dans les différentes études sur les services. L'analyse du tableau précédent met toutefois en évidence d'autres types de mesures où l'aide de l'État s'effectue selon des principes différents. Comme c'était le cas précédemment, il y a des services qui réfèrent en priorité au principe d'égalité, que ce soit entre les citoyens (déjeuners à l'école pour les plus démunis) ou au sein de la famille (service de médiation au moment du divorce).

Il y a aussi une série de services basés principalement sur le respect de l'autonomie de ceux qui y font appel; ce sera le cas lorsque l'État se contente de soutenir matériellement (locaux, etc.) les initiatives de groupes de familles, pour organiser la garde à l'école, un réseau d'échange et d'entraide pour les familles monoparentales ou des rencontres pour les familles qui ont des enfants handicapés. Le soutien de l'État est ici comparable à un soutien financier. À l'inverse, une autre série de services présente un caractère ambigu (consultations matrimoniales et budgétaires, suivi de la naissance, prévention en milieu scolaire...). De prime abord, ces derniers semblent neutres car aucun modèle familial n'est mis en évidence ou encouragé. D'autre part, ils impliquent une relation directe avec des agents de l'État et supposent ainsi la possibilité d'une confrontation des valeurs car il s'agit de services qui visent à favoriser le développement de certains comportements jugés plus acceptables. L'État ne vient pas remplacer la famille, mais il vient se substituer directement aux modèles de comportement qui peuvent effectivement être transmis au sein de la famille et de la communauté. En quelque sorte, il vient même se substituer à la capacité de décider de l'individu. Bien sûr, il s'agit toujours de services et chacun peut choisir de ne pas y avoir recours...

Ainsi, dans l'ensemble, il est plutôt rare que les services réfèrent à un type de famille très précis — même s'il paraît évident que les services de consultation matrimoniale impliquent nécessairement la présence de deux conjoints —, certains tiennent même compte du cercle de la parenté ou des groupes de famille. Il faut cependant rappeler les commentaires de Gauthier (1985) à propos des quotas de familles monoparentales imposés aux H.L.M. et souligner que, lors de l'utilisation des divers services de consultations, bien des valeurs peuvent être véhiculées comme le montrent les études effectuées sur ces services.

B) LES RECHERCHES

Les recherches permettent d'entrevoir un renversement de tendance au sens d'une reconnaissance de la part de l'État et de ses employés de la nécessité d'établir un rapport différent avec le milieu pour la dispensation des services. Souvent on ne peut plus dire clairement et de façon précise quelles sont les responsabilités respectives de l'État et des autres institutions sociales, organismes et réseaux sociaux. Elles sont partagées et cela s'applique au lien entre la famille et l'État. Le fait que ce partage ne soit pas clair ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'il s'agisse d'une phase transitoire, ni que se soit négatif. Au contraire, lorsque l'État tente de clarifier la responsabilité, il introduit souvent ses normes et son mode de fonctionnement dans des réseaux qui ne fonctionnent pas selon les mêmes principes. Il s'agit là d'une conséquence intéressante de la crise de l'État-providence (Godbout, 1991).

Les études sur l'analyse concrète des rapports État-famille, portent surtout sur les services. Il n'est pas facile de les distinguer des études plus générales sur les clients et les usagers car les études portent rarement sur les réseaux eux-mêmes, à l'image d'ailleurs des interventions qu'elles analysent, qui sont des services qui s'adressent la plupart du temps à des individus.

Les études de la famille comme usagers

La plupart des études se focalisent sur l'expérience concrète de certaines clientèles pour qui peut coexister une prise en charge mixte de la famille, de la communauté et de l'État : personnes âgées (Lesemann et Chaume, 1989; Jobert, 1988; Roy, 1990) ou enfants en difficulté (Bernier, 1990, Mercier, 1990). D'autres études abordent la question par le biais d'événements ponctuels comme les naissances (Cournoyer, 1990), la rupture conjugale (Charbonneau, 1991), le chômage (Gauthier, 1988) ou analysent l'utilisation de certains services dans le domaine du loisir (Pitrou, 1978), de la santé (Godbout et Guay, 1989; Cournoyer, 1990) ou de l'éducation (Cournoyer, 1990), services auxquels nous n'avons pas référé jusqu'à présent.

Ces études convergent sur un certain nombre de constatations qui vont dans le même sens que les études des organismes communautaires et les études générales sur les usagers (Godbout, 1987). Certes, l'aide institutionnelle est souhaitée par les familles. Mais quel rôle doit-elle y jouer ?

- L'aide attendue est celle d'un soutien, d'un coup de main (Lesemann et Chaume, 1989), d'un soulagement, mais non un appel au changement (Bernier, 1990). Comme le mentionne Cournoyer, en analysant les services offerts aux parents après la naissance d'enfants, c'est un appui et une compréhension qui sont demandés, «bien au delà d'une transmission de connaissances et de normes de comportement» (1990, p. 194-195). Dans le domaine du maintien à domicile des personnes âgées, l'aide peut permettre d'éviter la surcharge de l'entourage (Jobert, 1988).
- L'aide souhaitée doit ainsi être discrète, complémentaire, plus ponctuelle que permanente, facile d'accès et exempte de valeurs et de normes.

Est-ce celle qui est offerte ? Les différentes analyses identifient un certain nombre d'obstacles que rencontrent les usagers lorsqu'ils demandent ou utilisent les services de l'État. En premier lieu, l'aide n'est pas toujours facile d'accès. L'utilisateur doit parfois effectuer de nombreuses démarches, faire valoir ses droits (justifier ses «carences»), se soumettre à des horaires et des

règlements et, surtout, à un certain contrôle par rapport aux conditions d'accès, à l'accès au service et même à l'utilisation (Pitrou, 1978; Godbout, Leduc et Collin, 1987; Lesemann et Chaume, 1989). Il doit, de plus, prévoir à l'avance ses besoins et savoir quoi demander. Une fois engagé dans le processus, il lui sera aussi difficile de s'y soustraire (Pitrou, 1978). D'autres obstacles réduiront la capacité des services de s'adapter aux besoins des usagers, comme les rivalités interprofessionnelles, les normes de gestion et les conventions collectives (Cournoyer, 1990). Certains critères d'accès seront incohérents et les usagers ne connaîtront pas toujours les services disponibles (Gauthier, 1988; Charbonneau, 1991).

Tout cela illustre l'absence de contrôle du réseau familial et la tentative constante de l'appareil étatique d'intégrer l'utilisateur-famille dans sa logique plutôt que de s'adapter à la sienne.

Il n'est pas étonnant que les usagers soient rébarbatifs à demander une aide institutionnelle devant cette série d'obstacles et de «problèmes» éventuels. S'y ajoutera en plus le problème du conflit de valeurs, déjà souligné, qui se traduit en fait par la volonté de l'institution de transmettre des connaissances et des normes, situation qui a été observée notamment dans les cours prénataux (Cournoyer, 1990) et au niveau des services de protection de la jeunesse (Godbout, Leduc et Collin, 1987; Mercier, 1990). L'aide de l'État n'est alors plus complémentaire mais concurrentielle et substitutive (Mercier, 1990). Dans le cas de la protection de la jeunesse, elle s'établit même sur la déqualification légale de certains des usagers, en l'occurrence celle des parents.

Il y a donc un décalage entre ce qui est attendu de l'aide institutionnelle et ce qui est offert par l'institution; décalage qui peut prendre effet dans une lecture erronée de la demande d'aide institutionnelle mais aussi dans l'importance réelle que les usagers accordent à cette aide par rapport à celle qui leur vient de leur environnement immédiat. Comment ceci peut-il s'expliquer? Essentiellement par le fait que l'appareil est inconscient du fait que son intervention s'insère dans un réseau, qu'elle est nécessairement ponctuelle, complémentaire, secondaire, alors que la famille la perçoit comme globale. Ces

constatations déjà faites ailleurs sont encore plus évidentes dans l'étude des réseaux familiaux, plus englobants que tous les autres pour l'individu.

D'abord, il faut comprendre que l'aide institutionnelle et l'aide familiale ne revêtent pas les mêmes caractéristiques. Dans le tableau suivant, nous présentons certains éléments de comparaison, puisés dans les différents textes, entre l'aide familiale et l'aide institutionnelle afin de mieux saisir les caractéristiques qui les distinguent.

Tableau 4-Comparaison de certaines caractéristiques de l'aide familiale et de l'aide institutionnelle

	Aide familiale	Aide Institutionnelle
Caractéristique générale	floue, globale	précise et spécialisée
Conditions d'accès	«à la morale», «au bon-vouloir»	critères stricts, soumis à l'évaluation et au contrôle
Effort exigé de l'utilisateur	aide peut être offerte et demandée compréhension «à demi-mots»	aide doit être demandée défense du dossier possible
Logique d'attribution	affective	catégorielle et normative logiques diverses (dont rivalités professionnelles, conventions collectives, rationalité économique) qualité technique et compétence
Références idéologiques	variées selon la famille	classe moyenne et supérieure
Coût	gratuite	tarification possible
Souplesse d'utilisation	forte : rapidité d'intervention, interruptions possibles	faible : lenteur d'intervention (délais) difficulté de se retirer
Capacité d'adaptation	prise en compte de l'imprévu, diversifiée	presque inexistante (dépend principalement de la capacité d'initiative de l'agent)
Rôle de l'utilisateur	membre	client
Durée	courte surtout, éphémère	variée
Rapport personnel	proximité géographique, culturelle et psychologique	rapport avec l'étranger anonymat
Référence aux valeurs	morale partagée à priori respect de la dignité, réciprocité	normes universelles «scientificité, rationalité et objectivité»

Résultats	variés : efficacité + ou - grande autonomie p/r à l'institution	variés : efficacité + ou - grande affranchissement p/r à la famille pas de dette morale, financière
Impacts et effets pervers	limitation des retombées éventuelles (reste dans la famille) dépendance familiale conflit de pouvoir obligations de gratitude fardeau pour l'aidant	dépendance institutionnelle impacts indirects sur la relation familiale ⁷

La comparaison n'est certes pas toujours défavorable à l'État. Certains usagers valoriseront l'indépendance ressentie par rapport à la famille lorsqu'ils demanderont une aide de l'État. À l'opposé, les reproches que d'autres usagers formuleront à l'égard de l'aide institutionnelle et des agents de l'État renvoient souvent aux caractéristiques de l'aide familiale qu'ils voudraient retrouver. En fait, au delà des obstacles déjà mentionnés pour accéder à l'aide institutionnelle, qui réfèrent aux traits distinctifs d'un appareil tel que celui de l'État, au delà de la simple alternative des préférences entre deux types d'aide ⁸ et des effets pervers qu'ils produisent, il existe aussi un certain nombre de points de rupture entre les deux types d'aide qui font dire à certains auteurs que nous sommes en face de deux logiques différentes, de deux «économies des rapports sociaux» (Lesemann et Chaume, 1989).

Ceci est particulièrement visible lorsqu'on examine, entre autres, les conditions d'accès, la logique d'attribution ou la référence aux valeurs. Il apparaît nettement que l'État présente des limites certaines par rapport à la famille. Il ne pourra jamais la remplacer parce qu'il ne peut pas reproduire le caractère d'affectivité qui règle le rapport intrafamilial. Comme le précisent Lesemann et

⁷ Citons en exemple les effets du règlement de la S.H.Q. concernant la déclaration des revenus des résidents en H.L.M. Le règlement que la S.H.Q. cherche à implanter obligerait tous les membres d'un ménage familial de moins de 25 ans à déclarer leurs revenus. Lors d'une première tentative d'implantation, le règlement a eu pour effet de provoquer le déménagement de certains jeunes adultes (Brais, 1991); l'intervention de l'État a ainsi pour effets de séparer les membres de la famille.

⁸ On peut préférer la compétence institutionnelle au soutien informel (par exemple en ce qui concerne l'aide psychologique), on peut préférer une dépendance institutionnelle à une dépendance familiale ou vice-versa (Charbonneau)...

Chaume, les critères qui justifient l'aide familiale réfèrent à «*l'amour, la haine, le sentiment de dignité, d'une certaine solidarité familiale qui constituent autant de facteurs de motivation et d'endurance*» (1989, p. 28). De plus, l'aide familiale s'inscrit dans une temporalité longue, que traduisent les principes d'échange et de réciprocité. De l'autre côté, l'économie institutionnelle puise aux principes d'égalité et de liberté, à la libération de l'individu des liens communautaires, principes critiqués parfois pour leurs effets pervers sur les relations dans la famille et la communauté mais qui n'en demeurent pas moins un acquis que les individus veulent pouvoir conserver. Dans le cas de l'étude sur la mobilisation des ressources familiales et institutionnelles à la suite d'une rupture conjugale (Charbonneau, 1991), les jeunes femmes ⁹ participant à l'enquête ont très souvent justifié leur préférence à recourir à l'aide de l'État plutôt qu'à celle de la famille, en mentionnant cette volonté de conserver une autonomie par rapport à leur famille, en fait à leurs parents. Malgré le fait que cette réaction peut être due en partie à un effet d'âge, il n'est pas superflu de rappeler cet aspect du rôle de l'État. Les autres études consultées ne présentent pas l'État comme un garant de l'autonomie : les effets pervers d'un transfert de la dépendance de la famille vers l'État sont souvent mentionnés. La

⁹ Âgées en fait de 26 à 35 ans au moment de l'enquête.

question des différences entre les générations mérite d'être creusée davantage ¹⁰ : les jeunes d'aujourd'hui seront les personnes âgées de demain et leurs comportements, modelés par un contexte de support institutionnel très différent de celui qu'ont connu leurs aînés il y a quelques décennies et par un contexte familial plutôt changeant, pourront donner lieu à d'autres types d'articulation des ressources. La question reste ouverte.

Car c'est l'usager qui doit articuler les différentes ressources, c'est lui qui, en bout de ligne, effectue le choix final. L'articulation donne lieu à divers types de rapports entre l'État et la famille où transparaît le caractère plus ou moins autoritaire des mesures institutionnelles. La réponse peut se traduire par des stratégies de repli ou d'évitement (Pitrou, 1978) de la part de la famille mais aussi par des stratégies de complémentarité très volontaires (Charbonneau, 1991).

Effets sur la famille comme telle

Les études que nous avons citées jusqu'à maintenant ne font pas de distinction entre le rapport qui lie l'usager et l'État et celui qui relie la famille et l'État; on pourrait presque dire que la plupart des chercheurs adoptent le comportement institutionnel de prendre en compte l'individu, client ou usager, plutôt que l'unité familiale dont l'individu fait partie. Ainsi, dans le secteur de la santé mentale, Guay (1990), dans une recherche en cours sur l'intervention-réseau, observe que tous les chercheurs adoptent une approche individuelle. Ce faisant, à l'instar des politiques elles-mêmes, ils négligent le fait que la famille est un réseau différent des réseaux d'individus. Cela est le plus manifeste dans ce qui est le cœur de la famille : les enfants. C'est ici que la contradiction est la plus grande entre la logique individualiste de l'appareil et des professionnels et les caractéristiques des réseaux familiaux. Le réseau familial pose le problème de l'intervention étatique prévu pour les citoyens en tant qu'individus ayant des

¹⁰ Elle explique sans doute en partie les différences observées par Lesemann et Chaume entre le discours et la pratique des aidantes qui affirment que ce n'est pas aux femmes de prendre soin des personnes dépendantes alors qu'elles le font en pratique. Lesemann et Chaume affirment qu'elles cèdent sans doute au discours normatif ambiant. Celui-ci est peut-être plus conforme aux pratiques de générations plus jeunes.

droits alors que les enfants ne peuvent pas défendre leurs droits. Le lien parents-jeunes enfant(s) met en évidence un phénomène qui a été peu commenté : celui d'une *dépendance obligée* des enfants par rapport aux parents. La dépendance obligée entre en contradiction avec la logique de l'autonomie individuelle et plonge au cœur du réseau social. L'intervention de l'État dans des situations où persiste une dépendance obligée ne peut que provoquer un transfert de dépendance malgré tous les discours qui tendent de faire croire, par exemple, que l'enfant est devenu «sujet de droit plutôt qu'objet de droit» (Commaille, 1982). Cela affecte particulièrement les mesures où l'État intervient à titre de substitut aux familles défaillantes.

Dans les faits, que ce soit par rapport aux enfants, aux personnes âgées non autonomes ou aux personnes souffrant de handicaps variés, les initiatives étatiques dans les décennies précédentes ont permis aux membres des familles et aux membres des communautés de se dégager, ou du moins de réduire l'importance, du lien de dépendance obligée par un transfert de responsabilité vers l'État lui-même. C'est précisément dans ce domaine que se pose maintenant la question d'une nouvelle collaboration entre l'État, la famille et la communauté.

Dans le cas de l'analyse des services de maintien à domicile, en particulier celle de Lesemann et Chaume, la relation paraît plus évidente puisque c'est la famille et non seulement la personne âgée qui mobilise les ressources. Lesemann et Chaume ont procédé à une enquête auprès des aidants et non des personnes aidées. Comme nous l'avons mentionné, dans ce cas ce qui est demandé de la part de l'État, c'est un soutien aux initiatives, une certaine complémentarité avec les ressources familiales déjà existantes.

L'approche est très différente dans le cas de la protection de l'enfant. Ici aussi l'unité familiale est interpellée dans son ensemble et non seulement l'individu-enfant. Mais l'État agit de façon beaucoup plus autoritaire que dans le cas du maintien à domicile des personnes âgées; son intervention se traduit généralement par une déqualification de la compétence parentale et provoque un transfert de responsabilité où l'État se substitue à la famille.

Les relations entre l'État et la famille se réalisent donc sur un continuum qui part d'une intervention très autoritaire de l'État — la substitution — à des mesures de soutien des initiatives du milieu. Entre les deux pôles, se situe un éventail de rapports d'autorité, de concurrence, de récupération, d'indifférence, de complémentarité et même de partenariat. Seules des études sur des cas concrets permettent de faire un portrait plus qu'approximatif du rapport qui s'établit entre la famille et l'État. Dans le cas des études que nous avons retenues, certains éléments peuvent être mentionnés.

Comme nous venons de le dire, c'est sans doute dans le cas du maintien à domicile des personnes âgées que les relations sont les plus «harmonieuses». Ce résultat confirme plusieurs résultats antérieurs. L'absence de professionnel dans ce secteur est à noter. Jobert mentionnera que les services de l'État peuvent, jusqu'à un certain point, assurer effectivement la relève de l'aide familiale dans un certain respect de l'initiative de la famille. L'action de l'État est alors plus complémentaire que concurrentielle. C'est aussi ce que l'étude de Lesemann et Chaume permet de comprendre. Ces auteurs soulignent, de plus, l'importance du rôle de suppléance de l'État lorsque les ressources du réseau familial sont absentes, phénomène observé aussi auprès des familles monoparentales (Charbonneau, 1991). L'étude de Mercier qui rappelle la tradition d'autoritarisme de l'État dans le domaine de la protection de la jeunesse, nous fait part, par ailleurs, de *nouvelles tendances* plus respectueuses des compétences des usagers — ici des parents —, une approche qui considère maintenant ces derniers comme de potentiels collaborateurs, des partenaires, «des experts en quête de compétence...» (1990, p. 207), avec qui il faut «négocier» l'intervention. Cournoyer (1990) observera aussi cette volonté de changement de perspective en prenant en exemple le cas des services qui encadrent la naissance et qui connaissent un allègement des contraintes bureaucratiques malheureusement freiné par les problèmes de rivalités professionnelles, de convention collective et de rationalité économique. Les «nouvelles tendances» semblent encore très éparses. Le peu d'études dans ce domaine ne permet pas d'en faire un bilan plus exhaustif.

Ces nouvelles tendances où les organismes et leurs valeurs sont reconnues et où un nouveau modèle de collaboration émerge, ont été observées également ailleurs que dans le rapport avec la famille.

REMARQUES GÉNÉRALES

- Quel type de famille l'État encourage-t-il ? Notons d'abord qu'il s'adresse très peu aux réseaux de parenté. Trois mesures seulement peuvent être ainsi considérées : une mesure financière de déduction fiscale pour personne à charge qui inclut les petits enfants, neveux et nièces (elle s'étend aux oncles, beaux-frères, etc. s'ils sont atteints d'infirmité), et une mesure d'allègement des impôts sur les successions. Elles constituent donc une mesure de soutien financier aux réseaux de parenté, d'encouragement à la prise en charge par ces réseaux et de reconnaissance. La troisième mesure qui peut être ainsi considérée est le maintien à domicile et l'aide fournie aux aidants naturels qui peuvent être d'autres personnes que la famille nucléaire. Il est donc à peine exagéré de dire que, pour l'État, le réseau de parenté n'existe pas alors que nombre d'études ont montré récemment son importance, notamment les rapports avec les grands-parents, mais pas seulement. L'importance de ce qui circule dans l'ensemble des réseaux de parenté et les règles qui régissent cette circulation font l'objet d'un projet de recherche et pourra aider à préciser le soutien que l'État pourrait éventuellement apporter, et inversement.
- L'État s'adresse à tous les types de famille. Il a peu à peu neutralisé son action par rapport au statut conjugal, aux types de famille (mono., etc.), au modèle familial traditionnel, même si celui-ci est encore présent dans certaines mesures à caractère financier, en particulier parce que, dans la réalité, ce modèle est toujours présent. Quelques mesures sont même spécifiques aux nouvelles catégories de famille.
- Par contre, il tend à s'adresser aux individus et encourage donc le réseau individuel plutôt que le réseau social. L'appareil ayant tendance à ne connaître que des individus interchangeables et «égaux devant la loi»

plutôt que des personnes uniques, il tend indirectement à favoriser le réseau marchand d'individus sans obligation les uns vis-à-vis les autres, autres que contractuelles. Plusieurs mesures légales vont dans ce sens, mais pas toutes et aussi les mesures financières, même si leurs effets ne sont pas connus. C'est dans le domaine des services que l'approche qui ne tient pas compte des réseaux comporte le plus de conséquences négatives.

- La très grande majorité des mesures sont d'ordre financier, de la distribution d'argent soit à toutes les familles, soit à certaines familles. Le temps n'a pas permis d'évaluer globalement le montant de transfert financier que représente l'ensemble des mesures gouvernementales (voir Mathews). Certes, il ne faut pas minimiser l'importance des lois générales sans impact financier et exagérer l'importance de ce critère quantitatif. C'est tout de même significatif et mérite d'être souligné par comparaison aux autres aides de l'État aux réseaux sociaux. Cela fait ressortir la spécificité de la famille, comme on l'a vu.

Il est normal que les mesures de loin les plus importantes soient centrées sur le support financier plus que sur les services directs car c'est dans le domaine des services directs que les problèmes les plus importants se posent concernant l'action conjointe de l'État et de la famille. La logique de l'appareil et la logique de réseaux se confrontent souvent de façon négative rendant même souvent impossible la collaboration directe. Nous l'avons vérifié dans des domaines autres que la famille. Ainsi, dans plusieurs organismes communautaires, le fait que les personnes soient référées par un organisme étatique (CLSC) transforme le rapport entre l'organisme et la personne en un rapport client-public et enlève de ce fait une grande partie de la qualité du rapport qui existe au sein de l'organisme communautaire. Les recherches concrètes sur les rapports entre l'État et la famille étant quasiment inexistantes, nous n'avons pas pu vérifier dans le cadre de cette brève étude la pertinence de ces constatations pour la famille. Mais nous pouvons faire l'hypothèse qu'elle s'y applique.

- L'intervention la plus difficile demeure sans contredit le rôle d'arbitre de l'État entre les membres d'une famille, ou de juge de la capacité d'une

famille de s'occuper de ses membres et en particulier ses enfants. Cette intervention est ressentie par tous comme non naturelle, mais nécessaire. Le recours aux familles d'accueil indique bien l'état d'impuissance de l'État. De nouvelles approches se développent dans ce secteur comme l'indique la recherche de Mercier dans lequel un modèle de collaboration est développé.

- Les champs d'action communs à l'État et la famille sont très nombreux. Les deux institutions sont en fait engagées dans un rapport étroit de complémentarité dans lequel la responsabilité alterne et où il est même souvent difficile de distinguer qui a le rôle principal; parfois l'État est complémentaire ou substitut à la famille, parfois la famille vient aider l'État à remplir son rôle, notamment dans le secteur de la production, dont c'est une responsabilité conjointe État-marché dans une société libérale. Mais la famille est toujours «là derrière» comme l'ont remarqué déjà plusieurs auteurs qui affirment que la société moderne ne fonctionne que parce que la famille est là derrière (Sgritta, 1983, et surtout le livre de Berger et Berger, 1984). Cela n'empêche pas de constater que le type de rôles que remplissent l'État et la famille tendent à être toujours les mêmes, et très différents l'un de l'autre.

Tableau 5-Types et complémentarité des rôles de la famille et de l'État

	Famille	État
Soutien	1	2
Substitut	3	4

Légende :
 1- Famille soutient État, ou complément
 2- État soutient Famille, ou complément
 3- Famille substituée à État
 4- État substituée à Famille

Donnons quelques illustrations pour montrer à la fois l'importance et la variété de cette collaboration. Exemples :

a) *L'éducation des enfants*. C'est le secteur où la collaboration est la plus intense, sans pour autant qu'il y ait aucun contact direct ou presque. De la maternelle à l'université, les rôles respectifs de la famille et l'État évoluent. La co-production (devoirs, comités d'école, etc. du côté des parents; garderies, petits déjeuners, etc. du côté de l'État) devient le modèle dominant; les deux institutions se contentant de plus en plus d'une contribution purement financière à mesure que l'individu devient autonome. Les parents contribuent à la mission de l'État en aidant les enfants à faire leurs devoirs, etc. Ils sont coproducteurs avec l'État de l'instruction. Dans ce cas, la famille contribue à une mission étatique.

Mais inversement, dans le cas d'une politique telle que celle qui est discutée actuellement de fournir des déjeuners dans les écoles (voir les articles de presse), c'est l'État qui contribue à une responsabilité parentale. Les caractéristiques de ces contributions sont cependant bien différentes. Tout cela montre qu'on évolue vers un partage assez souple, mais avec des rôles bien définis. Que tout cela demeure relativement informel et implicite, c'est souvent ce que l'on peut souhaiter de mieux. Cela montre que l'État réussit à restreindre sa tendance à transformer toutes les actions de ses «partenaires» en une action d'appareil.

b) *Les familles d'accueil.* La famille est ici quasiment employée de l'État pour une fonction fondamentale, la prise en charge d'un enfant.

Dans ces cas, la famille contribue à l'État. Inversement, dans le maintien à domicile, par exemple, c'est l'État qui soutient la famille, dans une collaboration de service comme dans la majorité des services développés dans la deuxième génération. Ceux-ci atteignent souvent mal leur but; on y constate de nombreux problèmes, mais un modèle de collaboration y est aussi en émergence.

- Le retrait de l'État s'exprime principalement par un renforcement subtil des critères pour l'accès à certaines mesures, principalement financières (l'aide sociale par exemple), mais aussi de certains services (les H.L.M.). En même temps, la volonté de désengagement se traduit par le développement de nouveaux services plus légers, pouvant prendre la relève de l'alternative proposée jusqu'à présent. C'est clairement le cas pour les services aux personnes âgées. Mais la subtilité nécessaire pour faire passer les premières restrictions et le dédoublement des services rappellent une fois de plus que l'État peut difficilement décider de façon arbitraire de renverser la vapeur.

- Le rapport aux valeurs est différent selon les trois types : régalien, il intervient sur les valeurs mais de l'extérieur. La loi est certes l'affirmation directe d'une valeur (divorce) mais le parlement détient la légitimité nécessaire pour intervenir sur les valeurs. Et une fois la loi votée, son application n'entraîne normalement pas de conflits de valeurs (sauf le cas spécial, difficile, où l'État intervient en remplaçant les familles défaillantes). L'argent est neutre, mais les mesures financières actuelles renforcent la vision de la famille réduite à son noyau de base. C'est dans les services que le rapport aux valeurs est le plus difficile, surtout les services rendus par des professionnels valorisant le changement, ce qui s'oppose en tout point aux attentes des familles. C'est un des résultats les plus clairs des recherches.

On touche là à une source importante d'incompréhension, de malentendus et d'inefficacité de l'intervention de l'État dans ses services professionnels, lequel, en tant qu'appareil, ne détient ni la légitimité, ni la capacité d'être un moteur de changement auprès de ses clients, ce qui inclut évidemment les familles. Et

pourtant cette valorisation du rôle d'agent de changement chez les intervenants est partout et presque inhérente à l'idéologie professionnelle. On retrouve ici dans les études sur la famille une confirmation de nos recherches antérieures sur les usagers. Entre un appareil et un réseau familial, la distance est beaucoup trop grande pour que l'intervention soit porteuse de changements de valeur, pour que l'on puisse agir sur les valeurs autrement que de façon contraignante ¹¹.

Le type d'intervention d'un appareil dans un réseau devrait donc être «value-free»; or, l'appareil tend toujours non seulement à véhiculer des valeurs, mais aussi à les imposer au réseau. Ce qui est le plus «value-free», c'est le rapport marchand qui se définit comme étant au service des valeurs (les préférences) du consommateur. Mais ce modèle ne peut pas s'appliquer tel quel, car l'État dispense des services et le service n'est pas un produit (Gadrey, 1991). Le service suppose la présence des valeurs. Donc plus l'intervention se rapproche des valeurs, plus il faut que le réseau et l'appareil partagent les mêmes valeurs ou en tout cas que les deux puissent influencer le processus en fonction de leurs valeurs. Il ne suffit pas que le réseau devienne co-producteur avec l'État; il faut que les deux deviennent un peu l'autre. C'est ce que nous avons constaté dans les rapports entre organismes communautaires et CLSC, et que nous voulons vérifier dans le cas des rapports État-famille dans une recherche en cours.

RECHERCHES À FAIRE

C'est certainement par la réalisation d'un plus grand nombre d'études de cas qu'il sera possible de connaître l'état des rapports entre la famille et l'État. Dans quelles situations les phénomènes de concurrence ou de collaboration sont-ils les plus fréquents ? Quels facteurs peuvent expliquer les différences ? La personnalité des agents de l'État et les initiatives de ces derniers expliquent-

¹¹ Une des manifestations de ce malaise qui existait entre l'État et la société au moment de l'État-providence réside dans le fait que, d'après Cigler (1990), plus la professionnalisation de l'appareil d'État augmentait, plus l'insatisfaction de la clientèle augmentait également.

elles l'introduction de nouvelles tendances, ou doit-on attendre des directives pour tenter de nouvelles expériences ? Y a-t-il d'autres nouvelles expériences de collaboration qui mériteraient d'être connues ? Est-ce que l'histoire particulière de la mise en place de certains services ou le type de services offert prédisposeraient ces derniers à des rapports plus harmonieux ou, au contraire, plus conflictuels entre la famille et l'État ? Quelle est la place des valeurs dans le processus et, surtout, du respect des valeurs des membres des familles ?

Le maintien à domicile et les services de protection de l'enfant ¹² ne sont certainement pas les seuls lieux où peut être observée l'évolution du rapport entre la famille et l'État et les tentatives éparses de reconnaissance des compétences de la famille. Les services de réadaptation, les diverses modalités et facilités en matière de garde d'enfants, les services psychosociaux qui s'adressent aux conjoints pourraient tout autant être étudiés. Évidemment, c'est au niveau des services concrets où peut être observé un rapport direct entre l'usager et les agents de l'État qu'une analyse pourra être la plus riche d'enseignements, mais il ne faudrait pas négliger pour autant l'étude d'autres mesures qui ne font actuellement l'objet que d'une analyse des principes sous-jacents généralement en termes idéologiques sans qu'il soit possible d'en identifier les impacts réels. Qu'en est-il des impacts de la réforme de l'aide sociale ou de la nouvelle Loi sur le patrimoine familial ? Quel est l'impact réel de mesures aussi anciennes que les allocations familiales ? Quel usage en est-il fait ?

Par ailleurs, pour comprendre l'articulation des ressources à laquelle se prête les usagers, il faut favoriser la tenue d'études qui ne se restreignent pas nécessairement à un seul service ou une seule mesure. Comme Lesemann et Chaume l'ont rappelé, pour les usagers, l'aide institutionnelle est perçue globalement. Elle ne revêt pas le caractère spécialisé défini par l'État. En abordant certains thèmes généraux, à travers l'expérience concrète des usagers, nous aurons un meilleur portrait des stratégies d'articulation qui pourront mettre en évidence certains besoins de coordination entre les

¹² Dans ce dernier cas, une étude plus exhaustive serait nécessaire.

services. Dans la même perspective, favoriser la réalisation d'études qui permettent de révéler le caractère temporel de l'articulation des différents types d'aide. Cela permettra de mieux comprendre les caractéristiques de l'alourdissement progressif de certains cas et la nécessité de développer des mesures ponctuelles de soutien plutôt que de prise en charge complète.

Cela nous amène à aborder la question sous un angle différent. S'il apparaît si important de mieux comprendre le processus d'articulation des ressources étatiques et familiales, il faut rappeler qu'il n'existe pas non plus beaucoup d'études sur le fonctionnement même des rapports d'entraide dans la famille, en particulier sur les changements entraînés par le travail des femmes en dehors du foyer et par la diversification des types d'organisation familiale. Comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, il est possible que les générations plus jeunes ne conçoivent pas la complémentarité entre les diverses sources d'aide de la même façon que leurs aînées.

VERS UNE TROISIÈME GÉNÉRATION ?

En conclusion, nous pouvons croire que l'État favorise aujourd'hui le passage de la famille comme appareil, à la famille comme réseau, passage qui s'effectue depuis quelques décennies. Mais, par plusieurs de ces mesures, l'État tend à favoriser l'émergence d'un réseau d'individus analogue au réseau marchand et aussi à se limiter au réseau familial oubliant la parenté. Les liens qui se tissent entre les générations, notamment, sont oubliés aussitôt que les enfants deviennent des adultes. De ce fait, l'État peut contribuer à la disparition de plusieurs des caractéristiques du réseau familial qui facilitent l'action même de l'État dans ses rapports avec la famille, comme nous l'avons vu à propos des mesures de support financier. L'État a donc tout intérêt à favoriser le réseau familial comme réseau d'obligations non seulement comme un réseau d'individus libres au sens fédéral du terme. Certes, c'est ce qu'il affirme faire; mais c'est souvent le contraire que ses mesures favorisent. L'État a contribué et contribue encore à libérer la famille du modèle autoritaire traditionnel. Le défi est peut-être de ne pas pour autant la transformer en un réseau marchand.

Historiquement, cela correspond à un virage important. On a vu en effet que dans le passé l'État avait tendance à favoriser un modèle familial à l'image de ce qu'il était. Aujourd'hui, il doit au contraire reconnaître la différence et miser sur elle. Reconnaître avec modestie cette différence signifie reconnaître une certaine supériorité de la famille qui consiste essentiellement dans le fait que c'est un lieu où l'individu est reconnu comme une personne, autrement que comme producteur, où l'individu est une fin en lui-même, ce qui implique un réseau d'obligations uniques que l'État doit respecter et ne pas transformer en moyen pour ses propres fins ou tenter d'imposer ses valeurs, même les plus nobles comme l'égalitarisme. Le rapport de confiance qui existe entre l'État et la famille est à la fois une grande ressource et un modèle éventuel pour une sortie intelligente et humaine du modèle antérieur de l'État-providence deuxième génération. Cette sortie est différente de celle qui prône le retour au libéralisme et à l'individualisme pur et dur. Un tel rapport de confiance fait appel au contraire à un véritable partenariat. Il se développe actuellement dans plusieurs secteurs. C'est un avenir possible que l'on voit se dessiner en jetant un premier regard sur l'évolution des rapports entre ces deux institutions fondamentales à la société moderne que sont l'État et la famille. Compte tenu du peu d'études empiriques analysant concrètement les rapports qui se tissent et les effets des mesures étatiques, ce n'est pas vraiment une constatation. C'est plutôt une hypothèse de travail qui se dégage de ce tour d'horizon, et que nous souhaitons vérifier par des travaux ultérieurs portant sur les grandes missions communes aux deux institutions : assurer la suite du monde, relier le présent au passé et à l'avenir, ce que fait la famille naturellement, et ce que fait l'État de plus en plus en tant que responsable ultime du bon fonctionnement du système de production. Cette division des tâches semble la plus naturelle et peut-être la plus féconde aussi. Cette dernière affirmation demeure évidemment à vérifier.

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
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**LIVING ARRANGEMENT PREFERENCES WHEN
OLD: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1989 AND 1990
ALBERTA SURVEYS**

by

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ABSTRACT

As Canada's population continues to age, questions about alternative approaches to providing care for the elderly become ever more important. The 1989 and 1990 Alberta Surveys reveal little support for a general reduction in benefits to the elderly, although one in two Albertans agree with the idea of restricting benefits to seniors with low incomes. Nevertheless, a small majority agree that taxes should be raised, if necessary, to support a growing elderly population. These public opinion surveys show only a minority of Albertans agreeing with higher immigration quotas and pro-natalist policies as possible solutions. In addition, only 36% agree that elderly Canadians should be encouraged to live with their children.

When asked about their own personal preferences for future living arrangements, if they were old and frail and in need of assistance, Albertans react more positively to professional home-care and to institutional care than they do to informal family-care. This pattern of results probably reflects a desire to remain independent and the recognition that family members cannot be expected to provide more assistance than they already provide. The most important implication for policy-makers is that the state must continue to remain actively involved in care-provision for the elderly. Attempts to shift more of this responsibility to families would probably not be very successful, and would certainly not be viewed favourably by the public.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1988, individuals 65 and older made up 11.1% of the total Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 1989). While this figure identifies Canada as a "young" nation, compared to many other industrialized countries (CECD, 1988), the proportion of senior citizens will continue to steadily increase. In short, Canada's population is slowly aging, and this fact has clearly caught the attention of government policy-makers, those in charge of providing services to seniors, and also the media.

Some observers of this trend describe it as an "aging crisis", voicing concerns about the potentially huge costs of providing pensions, health care, and institutional living arrangements for the elderly (Davis and vandenOever, 1981; Longman, 1987). Others argue that such cost projections are based on faulty assumptions: the elderly of the future may be better able to support themselves (with more savings) in old age (McDaniel, 1986); they may live longer in a (relatively) healthy state (Chappell et al., 1986); and they may prefer (less costly) living arrangements than did previous cohorts of Canadian seniors.

Such debates have influenced national immigration policies (Logan, 1991; Seward, 1986) and have also led some politicians to promote pro-natalist policies. Concerns about the financial costs of supporting a growing elderly population have prompted recommendations to reduce benefits to the elderly (Burke, 1991) or to eliminate the universal provision of old age security benefits. The same concerns have also generated considerable discussion about alternative forms of care-provision and living arrangements for seniors, especially those who are very old, disabled, and in need of at least some regular assistance.

In the past few decades, a common approach has been to provide institutional care for those who are old and frail, and unable to look after themselves (Chappell et al., 1986).

However, community-based professional home-care has come to be seen as a possibly cost-effective alternative, one which allows the elderly to maintain more independence (Evans, 1984; Chappell, 1985). It has also been argued by some that regular care and assistance provided by immediate family members would be even less costly, and would also provide additional social support for dependent seniors. But such arguments assume that informal family-care has traditionally been absent, which is not really the case. Furthermore, some critics of this line of argument note that the emphasis on promoting "traditional family values" may merely represent an effort by governments to shift the costs of providing care for the elderly back to their families (Walker, 1991).

It is obvious, then, that a consensus does not exist on the best solutions to the problems of an aging society, and that further discussion of these alternatives would be beneficial (Termote, 1990:40). This paper contributes to these debates in several ways. Using recent random-sample survey data from the province of Alberta, we begin by asking whether the general public even shares the same concerns. Assuming that they do, how do they respond to proposals to raise taxes to provide services to the elderly, or to reduce the benefits which senior citizens receive? In addition, what does the general public think about immigration and pro-natalist policies as solutions?

Analysis of responses to these questions sets the context for a more detailed examination of the future living-arrangement preferences of Alberta residents. When asked to speculate about what kind of care they would like to receive, if they were old and unable to look after themselves, how do Albertans evaluate family-care, professional home-care and institutional care? Are there significant differences in response by age, gender, marital status and residential location? The following review of related socio-demographic trends in Alberta, and of previous research on similar topics, suggests that such differences might be expected.

2. AGE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE ELDERLY


Within Canada, Alberta is the "youngest" province in terms of age distribution (only the Yukon and the NWT are "younger"). As of June 1, 1990, 220,500 of the approximately 2,471,600 provincial residents (8.9%) were 65 years of age and older (Table 1). Because women tend to live longer than men, 57% of Alberta's seniors are women, reflecting the age-sex structure of the country as a whole. For the same reason, the ratio of males to females declines rapidly in the upper age categories (Figure 1). Thus, we find that 70% of the very old (90 and over) are women.

Table 1
Elderly population by age groups and sex, Alberta,
June 1, 1990

Age	Total	Male	Female
all ages	2,471,500	1,239,500	1,232,000
65-69	74,500	34,800	39,700
70-74	57,000	25,400	31,600
75-79	42,700	18,000	24,700
80-84	26,400	10,400	16,000
85-89	13,900	5,100	8,800
90+	6,000	1,800	4,200
total 65+	220,500	95,500	125,000

Source: Alberta Statistical Review, 1991. Edmonton, Alberta Bureau of Statistics.


Figure 1
Sex ratio by selected age groups, Alberta 1986



While Alberta is still a relatively young province, the number of senior citizens has been growing steadily, as in the rest of the country. Population projections indicate that between 1986 and 2016, the growth rate for senior citizens (age 65 and older) will be almost three times as high as the rate for those under 65 (Seniors Advisory Council, 1991). The largest percentage increase is projected for the 85 and older subgroup.

The 1986 Census showed that, in the 65 and older group, most Alberta men (74%) were married, compared to only 41% of women in this age category (Figure 2). Alternatively, many more older women were widowed (50% compared to 13% of men). These very different proportions (which closely reflect the national pattern) are a result of the greater longevity of women; since their husbands tend to die first, many more older women are widowed. This also means that older males are much more likely than older women to have a spouse available for care-giving tasks.

Figure 2
Marital status of the older population
by age and sex, Alberta 1986



Source: Statistics Canada, The 1986
Census of Canada, Table 5. Cat. #93-101

These age and marital status patterns explain why, according to the 1986 Census, most Alberta males over 65 lived in a private household with a spouse (70%), compared to only 39% of women in the same age category. Over one-third (36%) of older women lived alone. The corresponding figure for older men was only 15%. One in ten older women lived in institutions for the elderly and chronically ill, as did 7% of men age 65 and older.

Very few older people live with their children, for a number of inter-related reasons. The high degree of geographic mobility in Canada in the last few decades has meant that, for many families, different generations are separated by considerable distance. Furthermore, the strong desire for continued independence on the part of many of the elderly may translate into a reluctance to live with their adult children. Thus, the current living arrangements of Canada's elderly appear to reflect a clear preference on the part of both seniors and their adult children for "intimacy at a distance"; in other words, separate households are preferred when possible (McPherson, 1990).

3. AGING AND HEALTH

In the past several generations, major gains in life expectancy have been achieved for both women and men in Canada (Nagnur, 1986). In 1920-22, fewer than six out of ten Canadians could expect to survive to their 65th birthday; by 1985-87, this had risen to eight out of ten (Adams, 1990:361). On average, women have a considerably longer life expectancy than men. In Alberta, recent (1987) estimates show women at age 65 can expect to live another 19.6 years, compared to 15.6 years for 65 year-old men (Statistics Canada, 1991).

A concern expressed by some observers about these noticeable gains in life expectancy is that the additional years of life may not necessarily be years of good health. For example, data from the 1985 General Social Survey (GSS) indicate that the probability of encountering chronic health problems increases significantly with age.¹ The prevalence of one or more chronic health problems doubles in the middle-age (44 to 64) range, and triples in the senior citizen age group. Thus, according to the 1985 GSS, approximately 79% of Alberta respondents age 65 and older reported at least one chronic health problem (Parakulam and Odynak, 1988).

Similar patterns are observed in the 1986 Canadian Health and Activity Limitation Survey which also indicated that the probability of disability increases dramatically with age.² In Alberta, the estimated disability rate for ages 65 to 74 was 37%, compared to 58% for ages 75 to 84, and 78% for those 85 years of age and older. Because, on average, women live longer than men, women 65 and older with a disability outnumbered male seniors with a disability (49,655 compared to 40,580), and constituted 55% of all disabled Alberta seniors. If we employ life table methodology on these Health and Activity Limitation Survey estimates, we observe that, at age 65, Alberta women can expect to live 8.8 of their remaining 19.6 years with some kind of disability

compared to 5.0 of 15.6 years for men (Canadian Centre for Health Information, 1991).

It is important to note that the majority of the elderly with disabilities do not require institutional care, since many of the fears generated by the "aging crisis" focus directly on the potentially high costs of providing assistance and benefits to less-than-healthy seniors. Among disabled Alberta seniors, for example, only 14% of men and 22% of women receive institutional care (Alberta Health, 1990). Similarly, the majority of seniors with other chronic health problems do not require constant or regular medical care.

Nevertheless, seniors in Alberta account for a disproportionate amount of hospital-days, relative to their share of the total population. Data for 1989/90 show that 39% of general hospital-days were for care to seniors. The average length of stay in a hospital for those under 65 was 6.4 days, compared to 15.4 days for Albertans age 65 and older (Alberta Seniors Advisory Council, 1991). And because the probability of health problems and disabilities increases quickly with age, the very old require considerably more medical care and assistance with daily living. Thus, in 1986/87, 54% of disabled Albertans age 85 and older lived in some kind of institution, with the majority of these individuals being women (Alberta Health, 1990).

Estimates of the rapidly increasing costs of providing health care for an aging population are based on current rates of disability and chronic health care problems among the elderly. One could obviously argue that future generations of senior citizens may be more healthy, due to changes in life-style (declining tobacco use, for example) and medical advances. Hence, concerns about escalating costs may be somewhat overblown. Nevertheless, it is very clear that the elderly population is increasing, that health problems increase with age, that a significant proportion of the very old may require some kind of assistance with daily living, and that women will outnumber men in this group. Hence, the future living arrangement preferences of different genera-

tions, and of women and men, should be of considerable interest to policy-makers and those who provide services to the elderly.

4. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ELDER-CARE

Given the evidence of higher rates of disability and chronic health problems among the very old, it is not surprising that the medical profession has long been influential in determining how the old and frail received care and assistance. The traditional approach involved the construction of many long-term care facilities and the “warehousing” of the elderly in them. But recently, several alternatives to institutionalization have come to be considered much more seriously (McPherson, 1990).

The “social model” of health care for the elderly, in contrast to the “medical model”, looks for ways to keep people out of institutions. Formally-provided community care is seen as one potentially useful alternative, involving a wide range of services such as visiting nurses, adult day care programs, geriatric day hospitals and professional home-care (Novak, 1988). Home-care, in particular, is generally seen as a central component of a comprehensive system of elder-care, one which would involve fewer of the elderly being institutionalized (Connidis, 1989).

Another alternative to institutionalization of the elderly with disabilities and chronic health problems would be informal care provided by family and friends. Some have suggested that families should be encouraged through financial incentives to provide more care for their elderly relatives (Linsk et al., 1988). However, closer examination of current care-giving patterns reveals that families are already providing a great deal of assistance to the elderly, that informal care is, in fact, the predominant form of care for the elderly (Stone et al., 1987).

By and large, the elderly are not left alone and forgotten in long-term care facilities, nor are they largely left to be cared for at home by professional care-givers. Research shows that when the elderly become frail, the informal network of family and friends begins to provide assistance. More accurately, female family members and friends typically provide the bulk of this informal care (Cantor, 1983; Shanas, 1979; Brody, 1990; Stone et al., 1987).

Since future cohorts of informal care-givers will be relatively smaller, compared to the growing elderly segment of the population, and because many of these (female) care-givers will also be full-time labour force participants, the need for more professional care-givers can be expected to escalate (Connidis, 1985). At the same time, increased pressure on women to leave the labour force to provide assistance to elderly relatives can be expected, even though higher divorce rates may make full-time employment even more of a necessity for many women (Hess, 1991).

Debates about the best approach to providing care for a growing number of elderly frequently centre around costs (Burke, 1991). While it is typically assumed that institutionalization is more expensive than community-based formal care systems that allow the elderly to continue to live at home, Gross and Schwenger (1981) point out that this need not always be the case. Kane and Kane (1990) note that there are often difficulties in controlling the cost of community care, while Opit (1977) suggests that it is difficult to estimate the full costs of community-based elder-care systems. Nevertheless, it remains clear that costs are not the only consideration. The well-established fact that most of the elderly would prefer to remain living at home if they could, and evidence that doing so typically enhances their quality of life, must also be taken into account (Connidis, 1985).

Discussions of the growing need for elder-care also raise the question of where the responsibility for providing such care should lie. It has been argued by some that the implementation of community-based programs will replace informally provided elder-care, and will lead to a "shirking of family responsibility" (Chappell, 1990). For example, Antonucci (1985) says that the frail elderly receive either formal or informal assistance, but not both. However, Gibson (1984) cites several studies which conclude that the majority of families do not reduce their level of support, but are assisted by community-based services in caring for elderly family members (see Brody, 1981; Brody and Schoonover, 1986; Chapell, 1985; Chapell et al., 1986).

Recently, a number of writers have reversed the responsibility argument by suggesting that, under the guise of promoting "traditional family values", policy-makers may be avoiding obligations to provide public funds to assist the growing elderly population (Walker, 1991; Myles, 1991; Binney and Estes, 1988). It is noteworthy that discussions about the declining supply of informal care-providers typically continue to assume that elder-care is largely a female responsibility. Rather than focusing only on the supply of women available for the task and adding to the workload of employed women, policy-makers need to be thinking about broadening the elder-care responsibility to include both male and female family members. Encouraging employers to provide paid leave for elder-care, and funding community-based services that would assist family care-givers, are two obvious examples (Hess, 1991; Kaye and Applegate, 1990).

The preferences of the public, particularly older people who might soon find themselves in need of some assistance, should obviously be considered in these debates about alternative forms of elder care. As already noted, most seniors would prefer to continue living at home, if they could, to maintain their independence. Some early studies of the care-provision preferences of the elderly (see discussions in Litwak, 1985 and Cicerelli, 1981) suggested that they preferred care from immediate kin. However,

more recently, Marshall et al. (1987) describe how preferences for formal care increase with age, suggesting an unwillingness to "burden one's children".

It is apparent that more research on the personal preferences of the public for future care would be useful. Much of the recent literature on long-term care for the elderly (e.g. Brody et al., 1986; Stone et al., 1987; Noelker and Bass, 1989; George and Gwynter, 1986; Snyder and Keefe, 1985) focuses mainly on the characteristics and problems of care-providers, an obviously important subject. However, studies which address the experiences and preferences of the elderly themselves (e.g. Aronson, 1990a; 1990b) remind us to consider them as "subjects" rather than only as "objects". This study attempts to take this approach, while also commenting on the opinions of those in younger age groups about future care preferences.

At the same time, this study also reports the opinions of the general public about other approaches to solving future problems of an aging society. A recent U.S. overview of opinion poll results reveals widespread support for programs to support the elderly and the use of public funds to finance such programs (Gilliland and Havir, 1990). The same issue is addressed in this study, along with opinions about higher immigration policies (to increase the labour supply) and attempts to encourage higher fertility among Canadians. Recent random-sample survey data from the province of Alberta form the data base for this study. In the analyses, age and gender are key explanatory variables, along with marital status, since the discussion above suggests that opinions and preferences might vary significantly across population sub-groups defined by these variables. In addition, area of residence within the province (Edmonton/Calgary; other cities; smaller towns and rural areas) is considered in the analysis.

Urban-rural differences may be important predictors of preferences for future elder-care. Elderly rural residents may be less likely to have children living in the community, given the tendency for younger people to migrate to cities. In addition, many of the friends and neighbours of rural seniors may also be elderly, making it less likely that they would be able to provide assistance. Rural communities tend to provide fewer social services for the elderly (McPherson, 1990), so professionally provided home-care may not be seen as an option by many rural residents. But while rural communities typically lack a range of home-support services for the elderly, they are generally well served in terms of institutional facilities. Most provinces, including Alberta, have the largest proportion of their institutional facilities located in communities with populations between one and five thousand residents (Martin-Matthews, 1988). Thus, greater familiarity with long-term care institutions may make them more attractive to rural and small town residents.

5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions are highlighted by the preceding review of demographic and health trends and of research on the provision of care to the elderly:

1. Researchers and policy makers clearly agree that the aging of the Canadian population will create some problems and call for some creative solutions. Does the general public have the same concerns?
2. Assuming the general public shares these concerns, would they be willing to accept higher taxes or a reduction in benefits for seniors as possible solutions?

3. Assuming these concerns are shared, what do Albertans think about government policies intended to affect labour supply (through higher immigration, or through encouraging higher birth rates)?
4. What do they think about encouraging the elderly to live with their children as a possible solution?
5. When asked to speculate about their own future, what kind of living arrangements (institutional care, professional home-care, or care provided by family members) would people prefer if they could no longer care for themselves?
6. How do these future living arrangement preferences vary by age, gender, marital status, and residential location?

6. SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION

The Population Research Laboratory's annual Alberta Survey collects data on a variety of topics of current interest in the province. A number of questions about aging and the elderly were asked of Albertans in 1989 and 1990 (see Appendix). The 1989 Alberta Survey (The Changing Family in Alberta) included questions about policy options to support Canada's aging population. The 1990 survey (Health and the Environment) contained questions about alternative ways of providing support and care for the elderly.

Approximately 1,200 non-institutionalized Alberta adults (18 years of age and older) were interviewed in both 1989 (n=1,190) and 1990 (1,245). In Edmonton, random samples of households were selected from the most current civic enumeration list

(1989), and face-to-face interviews were conducted. For Calgary and the rest of Alberta (excluding Edmonton), respondents were interviewed by telephone with the numbers selected by random-digit dialing. Quota sampling in the household for both modes of interviewing resulted in roughly equal proportions of males and females in both the 1989 and 1990 surveys.

Table 2 is a summary of data collection parameters for the 1989 and 1990 Alberta surveys. High response rates were generated for each sub-area in the province and for the province as a whole. The median interviewing time difference between Edmonton and the other two samples in the province reflects the longer questionnaire format administered in face-to-face interviews. The difference between the percentage of first-contact interviews and the high overall response rate shows that interviewers repeatedly called back (four-times for a face-to-face interview and up to 10 times in the telephone samples) to obtain a completed interview.

Table 2						
Data collection parameters						
	Edmonton		Calgary		Other Alberta	
	1989	1990	1989	1990	1989	1990

Unweighted Sample Size	443	448	370	401	377	396
Percent First Contact Interviews	29	26	25	20	34	26
Response Rate (%)	76	75	75	75	80	80
Median Interviewing Time (min.)	60	57	28	30	29	32

The city of Edmonton was deliberately oversampled in both the 1989 and 1990 surveys to maintain continuity with previous Edmonton Area Studies. Subsequently, the provincial sub-areas were weighted in the overall provincial samples for 1989 and

1990.⁴ Estimates for province-wide data presented in this report are weighted. For questions asked only in the Edmonton sample, the estimates are not weighted.

Table 3 shows some of the socio-demographic characteristics of the 1989 and 1990 Alberta Survey respondents. Comparisons to postcensal estimates (1988,1989) for the province show that these samples are representative of the populations from which they were drawn (Kinzel, 1989; Kinzel and Odynak, 1990).

Table 3
Demographic Profile of Respondents
1989 and 1990 Alberta Surveys (weighted data)

	1989 Percentage	1990
Location		
Edmonton	25.5	25.5
Calgary	28.0	28.0
Other Alberta	46.5	46.5
Age Group		
18-24	13.4	11.5
25-34	31.9	29.8
35-44	22.1	24.2
45-54	13.2	13.5
55-64	8.9	10.4
65+	10.5	10.5
Sex		
Male	49.4	50.5
Female	50.6	49.5
Education (years of schooling)		
Less than 12 years	25.1	23.1
12 years	21.2	21.3
More than 12 years	53.7	55.7
Marital Status		
Single	19.3	17.6
Married	56.8	60.6
Common-Law	7.7	6.0
Separated	6.3	3.7
Divorced	4.6	7.1
Widowed	5.3	5.0
Employment Status		
Full-time	53.8	55.6
Part-Time	11.9	10.7
Unemployed	4.9	4.5
Retired	10.4	11.2
Keeping House	12.2	12.2
Other	6.8	5.8
Household Income		
Under \$20,000	20.5	16.1
\$20,000-39,999	31.4	30.1
\$40,000-59,999	27.1	24.2
\$60,000+	21.0	29.6

7. SURVEY RESULTS

A. Public Awareness of the Problems of an Aging Society

The previous discussion of aggregate data clearly reveals that researchers and policy-makers have become very conscious of some of the implications of an aging society. While debate continues between those who warn that an "aging crisis" is looming and others who are less alarmed, there is agreement about the need for creative government policies and programs to address the needs of an aging population. Is this opinion also shared by the general public?


Only one of the questions included in the public opinion surveys conducted by the PRL over the past several years directly addresses this issue. In 1989, respondents in the Edmonton Area Study ($n = 435$) were told that "some people believe that there will be an 'aging crisis' in the future" and then asked "how much do you agree or disagree that Canada will have problems in supporting its elderly citizens?" Three out of four of these randomly-selected Edmonton adults agreed that Canada will face such problems in the future (27% agreed strongly). Only 12% disagreed, and a similar proportion chose a neutral response from the seven-point response scale.

These results are from an urban sample. Rural residents might be somewhat less informed about demographic trends and, hence, somewhat less concerned about the potential problems of an aging society. However, even accepting this assumption, it is still evident that a substantial majority of the population share these concerns. In the several years since these 1989 data were collected, media discussions of the implications of an aging population have become much more common. Hence, legislators and individuals implementing new programs designed to serve an aging population can confidently assume that the public is aware of the future problems they are trying to address.

B. Higher Taxes and Reduced Benefits as a Solution?

As noted above, there is widespread recognition that Canada might encounter problems in supporting its aging population in the future. Respondents in the 1989 Alberta Survey (including the Edmonton Area Study) were asked to evaluate several different policies intended to address such problems. Over half (57%) of the province-wide sample agreed that “if the costs of supporting the elderly rise, personal taxes should be raised to meet these costs” (Figure 3), while one-quarter disagreed.

Figure 3
Higher taxes and fewer benefits to help
support an aging population




1989 Alberta Survey

Exactly half of the sample (50%) agreed that “only the elderly with low incomes should receive the old age security cheque”, but there was much less support for a universal reduction in benefits to the elderly (Figure 3). Only 14% agreed that “if the costs of supporting the elderly rise, the elderly should receive reduced benefits (e.g. reduced old age security benefits)”. Almost four out of five adult Albertans (78%) disagreed with the idea of an across-the-board reduction in financial support for Canada’s seniors (51% disagreed strongly).

C. Increased Immigration and Policies to Encourage Child-Bearing as a Solution?

Attempts to increase the labour supply would be another approach to helping Canada support its growing elderly population. Respondents in the 1989 Alberta Survey were also asked how much they agreed or disagreed that "we should allow more immigrants to come to Canada" and that "Canadians should be encouraged to have more children." Neither of these suggestions were evaluated favourably by Albertans, with only 22% of the sample agreeing with higher immigration quotas and 24% agreeing with attempts to encourage child-bearing (Figure 4). Six out of ten were opposed to the immigration solution, while just under one-half (49%) disagreed with attempts to encourage fertility.

Figure 4
Higher immigration and encouraging
child-bearing to help support an
aging population



1989 Alberta Survey


Follow-up questions to probe for reasons for this pattern of response were not included in the 1989 survey. However, the lack of support for attempts to encourage fertility probably has more to do with the belief that such efforts would be relatively unsuccessful than with opposition to child-bearing per se. Alternatively, the opposition

to higher levels of immigration is a common finding. Even if immigration is posed as a solution to a demographic problem, as it was in this survey, a very sizeable majority of Albertans remain opposed.

D. Encouraging the Elderly to Live with their Children as a Solution?

Along with the questions discussed above, 1989 Alberta Survey respondents were also asked how much they agreed or disagreed that (as a policy to help Canada support its elderly population) "Canadians should be encouraged to have their dependent elderly parents come and live with them." While the level of agreement with this idea was somewhat higher than for proposals to increase immigration or to encourage higher fertility (Figure 4), still only one-third of the sample (36%) agreed (Figure 5). A similar proportion (39%) disagreed, while one-quarter chose a neutral response in answer to this question.

Figure 5
Encouraging the dependent elderly
to live with their children to help
support an aging population



It is interesting to note that older Albertans were less likely to agree with this statement (results not shown). A total of 61% of respondents 65 years of age and older disagreed, compared to 42% of those 45 to 64, and 35% of sample members under 45 years of age. In addition, women were more likely than men to reject the formation of multiple-generation households as a means of supporting a growing elderly population (42% compared to 36%). In fact, elderly (65 and older) women reported the highest level of disagreement (70%) with this possible solution. In short, the group most likely to be directly affected by attempts to encourage the dependent elderly to live with their children (i.e., older women) is also the group most opposed to such an idea.

E. Personal Preferences for Future Care, if Old and Frail

Respondents in the 1989 Alberta Survey were asked to evaluate alternative policies and programs which might help Canada deal with problems of an aging society. Answers to such questions (e.g. encouraging Canadians to have their elderly parents live with them) obviously reflect personal preferences, as well as opinions about the best societal approach to dealing with such problems. However, the 1990 Alberta Survey included a number of more direct questions about personal preferences for future care.

The introduction to these questions asked respondents to "suppose you have become old and frail. You live alone and can no longer care for yourself.... how much do you agree or disagree with the following alternatives for your care?"⁵ Four out of ten (42%) respondents agreed with the first alternative, "my family would care for me", but 58% responded positively to "professional care givers would come to my home", and 60% agreed with the statement "I would move into a long-term care facility (e.g. nursing home)." In short, when asked to state their preferences if they could no longer care for themselves in the future, Albertans are considerably more receptive to profes-

sional home-care or institutional care, compared to care provided by family members.

Table 4 shows that women were somewhat more likely to agree that they would move into a long-term care facility (63% compared to 57% of men) and that professional care-givers would come into their home (61% versus 54%). However, women were considerably less likely than men to agree with the family-care option (35% versus 47%). As noted earlier, women are more often the providers of care for elderly relatives. The fact that women are also less likely to agree with the family-care option (when asked to speculate about their personal future) may be a result of their own greater experience with the difficulties of providing elder-care.

Table 4
Preferences for future care alternatives (if old and frail, and unable to care
for oneself) by age and gender, Alberta, 1990.

		Percent agree *		
		Long-term care facility	Professional home-care	Family care
Total	(1224) (n)	60	58	42
Female				
	All ages (601)	63	61	35
	18 - 24 (64)	50	53	52
	25 - 34 (172)	58	62	46
	35 - 44 (144)	61	64	32
	45 - 54 (84)	69	62	26
	55 - 64 (68)	76	54	22
	65 + (69)	72	72	25
Male				
	All ages (623)	57	54	47
	18 - 24 (77)	37	52	71
	25 - 34 (194)	50	54	54
	35 - 44 (155)	59	60	43
	45 - 54 (83)	70	50	36
	55 - 64 (57)	62	53	44
	65 + (56)	78	52	21

*Respondents replied to each statement on a seven-point scale (strongly disagree - strongly agree); answers of 5, 6 and 7 are combined into 'percent agree'.

Further examination of the data in Table 4 reveals distinct age differences in response to two of the statements, with older respondents (both women and men) clearly favouring care in a long-term facility and disagreeing with the family-care option (also see Figures 6, 7, and 8). But while older women were somewhat more likely than younger women to agree with the professional home-care option, age had little effect on male responses to this statement.

Figure 6

Move to long-term care facility:
percentage agreement by age and gender




Figure 7

Professional caregivers come to home:
percentage agreement by age and gender





Figure 8

Family will look after me:
percentage agreement by age and gender



If we focus only on the senior citizens in the sample (who would be most at risk of becoming frail and dependent), we observe a clear preference for traditional institutional care (72% of women and 78% of men) or for professional home-care (72% of women and 52% of men). However, only one in four seniors (both women and men) agree with the family-care option (Table 4). Thus, while family-care may be seen by some policy-makers as a cost-effective approach to providing care for a growing elderly population, it is the elderly who are least likely to see this as a preferable approach.

Table 4 reveals that the limited preference for family-care is already apparent among women in the middle age categories, while a somewhat larger proportion of the men in these age groups continue to evaluate this future-care option positively. Women's greater experience of *providing* care for elderly relatives may account for this difference. As for men, it may be that preferences for family-care begin to dissipate only when they personally (as seniors) begin to encounter problems *receiving* care from family members.

These age and gender differences in response to future-care alternatives are paralleled by differences across marital status categories (results not shown). Seven out of ten widowed respondents agreed with the professional home-care option, compared to less than 60% of single (never married), married (including common-law), and divorced or separated sample members. Similarly, a larger proportion of widowed respondents evaluated the institutional care option positively.


However, only 24% of widowed sample members agreed with the family-care alternative, compared to 50% of single respondents and 42% of those who were married or living common-law. Obviously, individuals who have lost a marital partner would be less likely to prefer or expect assistance from family members if they were to become dependent in their old age. The same explanation would account for the low

level of agreement with the family-care option among divorced or separated sample members (30%).

F. Urban-Rural Differences in Preferences for Future Care

The preference for family-care, if old and frail, does not vary across residential location categories. Almost identical proportions of those living in Edmonton or Calgary, other smaller Alberta cities, and in small towns and rural parts of the province, agreed with the family-care statement (Figure 8). However, Edmonton and Calgary respondents were somewhat more likely to agree with the professional home-care option (60%), than were residents of other smaller cities (56%) and of small towns and rural areas (54.5%). Alternatively, small town and rural residents were most likely to express preference for institutional care (69%), compared to 62% of those living in other cities, and only 54% of Edmonton and Calgary residents.

Figure 8
Preferences for future care alternatives
by urban-rural residence



1990 Alberta Survey

The pattern of results in Figure 8 suggests that variations in evaluations of family-care are largely a function of gender and age. However, in addition to the effects of age and gender, location of residence also appears to influence preferences

for institutional care versus professional home-care. The more positive evaluation of institutional care among small town and rural residents may reflect the greater knowledge of such institutions which small town and rural residents might have. Residents in smaller communities would be more likely to know someone resident in a nursing home, to perhaps have visited such an institution, or to know someone employed there. Consequently, the possibility of living in such an institution, if old and frail and in need of assistance, might be seen more favourably.

8. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Canada's population is slowly aging. While the majority of the elderly remain healthy and independent for a considerable time into their retirement years, it is clear that health problems and the need for assistance in daily living increase with age, particularly among the very old. Thus, as the elderly come to make up a larger proportion of the population, questions about how best to provide assistance to the very old and frail will become much more central to the public policy agenda.

Recent research on the characteristics of care-givers and on the problems of providing assistance to the elderly has contributed significantly to these debates. However, we still have only limited information on public opinion regarding alternative responses to the problems of an aging society. We also know relatively little about the future living arrangement preferences of Canadians, especially older Canadians who may soon be dependent and in need of some form of regular assistance. Such data would clearly be of value to those charged with designing and implementing policies and programs intended to assist the elderly (Gilliland and Havir, 1990). This paper attempts to fill some of these information gaps by discussing survey data from the 1989 and 1990 Alberta Surveys.

Analysis of these survey data revealed that, in 1989, three out of four Edmonton respondents agreed that Canada will have problems supporting its elderly citizens in the future. Almost six out of ten (57%) sample members in the 1989 Alberta Survey agreed that personal taxes should be raised if the costs of supporting the elderly were to rise, while only one in four disagreed. Thus, while a large majority appear concerned about future problems of an aging society, somewhat fewer will concede that personal taxes should be raised to deal with such problems.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that the elderly continue to be seen as deserving recipients of government assistance, since only 14% of Albertans agreed with the proposal that the elderly should receive reduced benefits if the costs of providing such benefits were to rise. However, exactly half agreed that only the low-income elderly should receive old age security benefits. In short, a policy of reduced benefits for (all) elderly Canadians is generally unacceptable to Albertans. However, one in two adults agree with the idea of restricting benefits to only those seniors with low incomes. At the same time, slightly more than half agreed that taxes should be raised, if necessary to support a growing elderly population. The implications for policy-makers are fairly obvious. Reductions in benefits to seniors can be expected to generate considerable opposition. Higher taxes or the implementation of some form of means-testing to determine eligibility for old age security benefits might be met with somewhat less opposition, but would still not be particularly easy to "sell" to the general public.

Less than one-quarter (22%) of Albertans agreed with higher immigration quotas as a solution to future problems of supporting an aging population. Only slightly more (24%) agreed that Canadians should be encouraged to have more children. The low level of support for the latter suggestion probably reflects a wide-spread belief that attempts to encourage fertility would be unsuccessful. However, limited support for increased immigration is a common finding in Canadian public opinion polls (Canada

Employment and Immigration Advisory Council, 1988:76). For example, in eight national Gallup polls between 1975 and 1991, the proportion of Canadians favouring higher immigration never exceeded 17% (Gallup Report, 18 July, 1991). Even when higher immigration is posed as a solution to a widely-recognized demographic problem, as it was in the 1989 Alberta Survey, only 22% agree. Consequently, as immigration comes to play a larger part in the federal government's response to an aging population (Logan, 1991), the Canadian public's generally negative response to this solution will have to be continually addressed.

Albertans were only slightly more receptive to the proposal that "Canadians should be encouraged to have their dependent elderly parents come and live with them". Only 36% agreed, while slightly more (39%) disagreed. The elderly in the sample, especially women, were least likely to agree with this proposed solution to some of the problems of an aging society. Thus, the group most likely to be directly affected by programs encouraging the dependent elderly to live with their children is the group most opposed to the idea.

When asked about future living arrangement preferences if they were old and frail and no longer able to care for themselves, respondents in the 1990 Alberta Survey again demonstrated their limited support for family-care arrangements. While 60% of the sample viewed long-term care facilities (e.g. nursing homes) positively, and a similar proportion (58%) responded positively to the option of professional care-givers coming into the home, a significantly smaller proportion (42%) agreed that "my family would care for me". Once again, women and older respondents were less likely to view family-care positively. The oldest sample members quite clearly favoured institutional care or professional home-care over assistance provided by family members.

The lower level of agreement with the family-care option, compared to professional home-care or institutional care, does not mean that the elderly are eager to move into institutions or that they receive little assistance from family members. Instead, previous research has revealed that most of the elderly would prefer to remain living independently, as long as possible. Furthermore, friends and family members actually provide a large amount of informal care to the elderly. More specifically, female family members are most likely to be the care-givers for the dependent elderly.

Such research findings help us interpret these 1990 Alberta Survey results. The less-than-positive response to family-care, if one were old and frail, probably reflects respondents' inter-related desires to remain independent and to not become a bother to family members. Older sample members would more often have been in a position where they had to provide assistance to an elderly family member. Hence, they would also be more conscious of the potential problems. And since women have more often been the primary care-providers, they would be even more aware of the dilemmas created for both the elderly and their family members in such a relationship.

Again, the implications for policy makers are fairly clear. As the Canadian population slowly ages, and as the costs of providing elder-care increase, the family cannot be expected to take on an ever-larger share of care-provision. Family members are already active care-givers, and the elderly generally appear reluctant to become more dependent on them. Furthermore, the increased labour force participation of women means that relatively fewer will be available to provide regular and extensive care for elderly family members. Thus, as Myles (1991) notes, the "crisis" in elder-care provision is more one of supply than of demand. Even if more employers allow their employees to take time for elder-care responsibilities, as the majority of Albertans believe they should (McKinnon and Odynak, 1991), it is evident that the state must continue to play an active role in provision of care for the dependent elderly.

In the past, the provision of long-term institutional care has been the typical response. Today, professional home-care is coming to be seen as a preferred alternative, both because it appears to be less costly and because it allows the elderly to remain independent for a longer time. These Alberta Survey results reveal that professional home-care and institutional care are seen as acceptable options by similar proportions (about 60%) of the Alberta population. However, urban-rural comparisons highlight a more positive response to institutional care among rural and small town residents, perhaps because of the greater access to and familiarity with such institutions within rural Alberta. Policy-makers should attempt to take these and other differences in preference into account when designing and implementing programs of assistance for the elderly. Hence, further research on differing preferences for future care arrangements among population sub-groups would clearly be of value, as would studies exploring the reasons underlying these patterns of preference and research on the cost-effectiveness of alternative elder-care programs in different settings.

Notes

¹ Chronic health problems surveyed in the 1985 General Social Survey include: arthritis/rheumatism, hypertension, respiratory problems, heart trouble and diabetes

² The Health and Activity Limitation Survey used a modified version of the World Health Organization's "Activities of Daily Living" questions to measure disability.

³ If the number of years in disability measure was further refined by taking into account the severity of disability, male-female differences would probably decline for more severe forms of disability.

⁴ The weights are calculated by establishing the share of the total population accounted for by Edmonton, Calgary and areas outside of these two major cities according to the 1986 Canadian Census. In the case of Edmonton, the sample is then downsized, while for Calgary and the rest of Alberta the sample sizes are increased.

⁵ Given the wording of these questions, it is possible that some respondents answered with respect to what they expected (e.g. my family would care for me), rather than what they would prefer. However, the fact that many respondents agreed (to a varying extent) with more than one of these alternatives suggests that many were identifying their preferences. But even if one were to treat these questions as measuring only expectations, the conclusion would remain that care from family-members ranks lowest.

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APPENDIX

1989 Alberta Survey:

1. a. Some people believe that there will be an "aging crisis" in the future. How much do you agree or disagree that Canada will have problems in supporting its elderly citizens. (Edmonton Only).

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree DK		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

b. If the costs of supporting the elderly rise, personal taxes should be raised to meet these costs.

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree DK		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

c. Only the elderly with low incomes should receive the old age security cheque.

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree DK		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

d. If the costs of supporting the elderly rise, the elderly should receive reduced benefits (e.g. reduced old age pension benefits).

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree DK		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

2. The following are different policies that could help Canada support its elderly population. How strongly do you agree or disagree that

a. Canadians should be encouraged to have more children.

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree DK		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

b. We should allow more immigrants to come to Canada.

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree DK		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

c. Canadians should be encouraged to have their dependent elderly parents come and live with them.

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree DK		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

1990 Alberta Survey:

1. Now suppose you have become old and frail. You live alone and can no longer care for yourself. Still using the 7 point scale, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following alternatives for your care.

a. My family would care for me.

Strongly					Strongly		
Disagree					Agree		DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

b. Professional care givers would come to my home.

Strongly					Strongly		
Disagree					Agree		DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

c. I would move into a long-term care facility (e.g. nursing home).

Strongly					Strongly		
Disagree					Agree		DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

(22)
Older Canadians in Families:
Findings from the 1990 General Social Survey
on Family and Friends

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Family and aging are newsworthy topics in the 1990's in Canada. Changes and challenges to Canadian society in both family and aging are recounted regularly in newspapers and magazines, as well as in academic journals. Little of the remarkable amount of attention given to family and to aging links the two. Instead, families are often discussed as if most families are nuclear families with children. And aging is most often discussed in terms of pension and health care challenges rather than in family context.

This paper presents an overview of state-of-the-art data on older families in Canada. Data analysed here are from the 1990 General Social Survey, Cycle 5 (GSS-5) on Family and Friends. Data were collected from 13,495 respondents by interviews conducted in January through March 1990 (Statistics Canada, 1991:2-3). The 1990 GSS-5 is the first national survey of family and friends representative of the Canadian population, and thus provides a rich glimpse into the family lives and relationships of Canadians.

In looking at older Canadians in families in this paper, two orientations are taken. The first is to look closely at the structure and dynamics of families for those 65 years and older, providing a glimpse of older families in 1990, from the vantage point of seniors. The second orientation is to look at family life involving older relatives, from the vantage point of the middle-aged, those

45-65. This affords a glimpse of the family lives of older Canadians from the perspective of their younger relatives.

Following a brief discussion of context and a discussion of data and methods, the bulk of the report will be findings from the 1990 GSS, divided into four sections:

- Structure of older families;
- Dynamics of older families;
- Health and happiness of older families;
- Ethnicity and older families.

The presentation will focus on visual presentation of the data in graphs and tables, with summaries in the text.

Context in Brief

The circumstances and the context in which families live have altered discernibly in the past decades in Canada. We know about increased rates of divorce and separation, the growth in single parenthood, the increase in two-earner families, the decline in family size, among many other changes occurring in contemporary families. Less well known are the changes in the wider social context which have swept families along with them. Among those wider changes are demographic aging and related changes in life course events (Gee, 1990; Kyriazis & Stelcner, 1986; McDaniel 1987).

Family change occurs in social context, even though it might seem at times that families are under individuals' control. For example, demographic aging in Canada is largely the unintended consequence of carefully planned parenthood. [Exactly why this is

the case and how it works are discussed in McDaniel, 1986.] So, when families have fewer children, the society, whether it wishes to or not, collectively ages. Population aging itself provides a context for family change. For example, there tend to be more older people, including relatives, and fewer younger, including dependent children. The shape of families becomes more vertical, involving more generations, and less horizontal, with more children of similar ages. Other changes occur as well, such as the timing of life events. Women with smaller families spend a smaller proportion of their lives raising children and have more time for other pursuits. This is particularly true when life expectancies are extended at the same time (Gee, 1990). Women are also more likely to be caught in the demands of both younger and older generations, sometimes at the same time (Kaden & McDaniel, 1990; Kobrin, 1981; McDaniel, 1991a; 1991b; McDaniel & Gee, 1991; Myles, 1991).

There is also the gender context of population aging, which has very important family implications. Women, for reasons not fully understood, tend in most advanced countries in the world, to outlive men by a considerable margin. Given that women also tend to marry men older than they, this means that many more women than men will likely be widows and spend the last days of their lives outside of an intact marriage (Dulude, 1987; Harrison, 1981; Wolf, Burch & Matthews, 1990). This, of course, has profound implications not only for aging families, but for social policy and services (Connidis, 1989; Foot, 1988; Gee & McDaniel, 1991; Hooyman, 1990; Jutras, 1990; McDaniel, 1990; Neysmith, 1989; Walker, 1991).

Aging societies, in part as a result of the affluence that

accompanies and causes control over both births and deaths, tend to be more ethnically diverse societies. This is because immigrants are attracted to affluent countries, and also because aging societies are more likely to import labour (Statistics Canada, 1990). Thus, ethnic variations are an important component of aging and families (Statistics Canada, 1990).

Considerably more is known about the structure of older families, although its causes and consequences may not be fully understood, than about the dynamics of older families (Connidis, 1989; Rosenthal, 1987; Statistics Canada, 1991; Stone, 1988). By dynamics, I mean how they live: who lives with whom, who helps in case of need, how much interaction they have, where they live in relation to other family members and the like.

Canada-wide 1990 data afford a look at some of these aspects of older Canadians living in families.

Data and Methods

The General Social Survey, begun by Statistics Canada in 1985, seeks to collect data on social trends in Canada over time, and to provide information on policy issues. Conducted yearly since 1985, each survey includes core questions which monitor long-term social trends in well-being and living conditions, as well as basic socio-demographic data. As well, each survey has a specific focus not repeated each year: Cycle 1 (1985) was on health and social supports; Cycle 2 (1986) on time use, language, and social mobility; Cycle 3 (1988) on crime and accidents; Cycle 4 (1989) on education and work; and Cycle 5 (1990) on family and

friends. The 1991 GSS will be largely a repeat of the 1985 survey on health.

The sample for the 1990 General Social Survey (GSS-5) comes from two sources: The majority of the sample, which includes those 15 years and older in the ten provinces, was selected by random digit dialing. In addition, GSS 1990 includes an oversample of those 65 years and older drawn from the Labour Force Survey population. Each household contacted was enumerated, with one member randomly selected for interview. A total of 13,495 persons were interviewed. The response rate for the oversample is 80%, with the response rate for the random digit dialling not measurable.

The GSS 1990 sample includes 3,196 non-institutionalized persons 65 years and older, with 56.9% of these women. Table 1 shows the distribution of the 65+ sample by age, sex and marital status. Questions were asked on relationships with family and friends, size and composition of families, household help, supports and division of labour, satisfaction with family and friends and background socio-economic data. See Statistics Canada 1991 for further information.

Data are weighted by Statistics Canada so as to be representative of the Canadian population. Only weighted data are presented here. The N's provided on each table and graph, therefore, will not correspond to the sample size reported here.

Findings

Structure of Older Families

(Note that tables and figures are discussed in the order in which they appear at the end of the text.)

Household Size by Sex

Household size for older Canadians is generally small, with 1 or 2 persons only. There is an impressive gender difference in household size, with women living alone substantially more than men, who more often live in 2 person households. This reflects, to a large degree men's shorter life expectancy, and their greater likelihood to die in intact marriages.

Family Type by Sex

Although living alone is common for both women and men over the age of 65, it is significantly more typical for women. Men live most often in couples. Women predominate as single parents with children, while men predominate in couples with children. This likely represents the contemporary tendency for children to live in the family home for longer periods of time, known as the cluttered nest. Few elders live in 3-generation families.

Among those 80+, the gender difference in family type becomes more extreme, with over two-third's of women living alone, while over two-thirds of men live in couples.

Legal Marital Status by Sex

While the overwhelming majority of men over 65 (85.5%) are married, only half the women of the same age are married. Widows make up 43.5% of women over 65, compared to 10.7% of men. There is a greater proportion of single women than single men in the 65+ group.

Siblings by Sex

Not surprisingly, older Canadians have large numbers of sib-

lings. Most have 5 or more siblings, with those over 80 reporting larger proportions with 5+ siblings. Only 4% of males and 5.1% of females have no siblings, and only 7.7% of males and 10.1% of females have only one sibling. Family sizes have declined markedly since these older Canadians were children.

Brothers & Sisters Still Living by Sex

More respondents report sisters still living than brothers, not surprising in light of differential life expectancies of men and women. Even among those 80+, over 1/4 of both men and women report having at least one living sister, and approximately 1/3 have 2-4 living sisters. Whether the sisters are within "reach", if help is needed, is not clear from this tabulation. Around 1/2 of those 80+ report having no living brothers.

Among those 65+, 1/3 of both men and women have no living brothers, and 1/4 have no living sisters. The majority have multiple sisters and brothers still living.

Children by Sex

Most older Canadians report having children, with a substantial minority having 5+. Interestingly, those who report having no children is also a notable minority. Sex differences are not apparent.

Grandchildren by Sex

Older Canadians report having numerous grandchildren, with most having between 2 and 9 grandchildren. Around 1/4 of both men and women report having no grandchildren.

Distance from Reference Child

Respondents were asked a number of questions about the child on whom they might rely, referred to here as the "reference child". Almost 1/2 of women aged 65+ and slightly fewer men report living within 10 kilometers of the reference child, with another 1/4 of men and of women living within 50 kilometers of the reference child. Approximately 10% of women and 14% of men report living 1000 kilometers or more from the reference child.

Contact with Reference Child by Sex and Marital Status

Contact between older Canadians and at least one reference child is frequent indeed, with around 44% of both men and women (married and widowed) reporting contact at least once a week. Another 21% of married men and women report contact at least once a month. Widowed women and married men report contact less than once a month, but the numbers reporting no contact at all are too small to report.

Satisfaction with Amount of Contact with Reference Child

Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of both men and women 65+ report that the amount they see the reference child is just right. Men are slightly happier than women with the amount of contact. About 1/4 of married men and 1/3 of married women report wishing that they had more contact. More widowed men than widowed women are unsatisfied with the amount of contact they have. Although some respondents DID indeed report too much contact with reference child, the numbers are too small to report here.

Among respondents 80 years and older, more men than women

report unhappiness with contact with reference child. A greater proportion of women aged 80+ than women 65+ think that the contact they have with the reference child is about right, while a lesser proportion of men aged 80+ than men 65+ feel this way.

Frequency of Contact with Siblings

Female respondents and married respondents report the most contact with siblings. About 1/2 of married women aged 65+ see their siblings less than once a month, but more than not at all. Thirty seven percent of married men see siblings less than once a month. Only 15% of married women report never seeing siblings, compared to almost 1/4 of married men. Twenty percent of widowed men and women report never seeing siblings.

Distance Mother Lives from Respondents Aged 45-64

This table and the following ones look at family contacts with older relatives from the vantage point of the middle-aged children. The tabulation is limited to those who have living mothers.

As distance increases, it is clear that frequency of contact lessens. Nonetheless, the majority of middle-aged respondents report seeing their mothers at least "less than once a month", but more than never, except for those whose mothers live outside Canada. Once weekly visiting is the common pattern for those who live within 10 to 50 kilometers of mother.

Distance Mother Lives From Respondents 45-64 by Sex

A distinct gender difference is apparent in contact with mothers by middle-aged children. Women tend toward more daily visits and weekly visits, if they live in close proximity to their mothers. Men, although frequent weekly visitors of mothers, tend more toward monthly visits than women. With increased distance

from mother, women still tend to have more contact than men, with the exception being when mothers live more than 1000 kilometers away, but not outside Canada.

Distance Father Lives from Respondents Aged 45-64

For fathers, the picture is very different. Only fathers who live very close to middle-aged respondents see their middle-aged children once a week or once a month. Even fathers who live outside Canada are seen by a slightly smaller proportion of respondents than are mothers. Nonetheless, even for fathers, the proportions reporting no contact at all are too small to report.

Frequency of Contact with Mother by Distance Lived

This is a summary of contacts with mother by distance lived. The pattern clearly emerges of reduced contact with mother as distance increases. But the striking subpattern in these data is that contacts are maintained, even over great distances.

Health and Happiness

Self-Reported Happiness

More women than men report being "very happy" up until middle-age. From age 45, more men report being "very happy."

Self-Rated Health

The overwhelming majority of seniors in Canada in 1990 report that their health is excellent (about 1/4) or good (almost 1/2). Only a small percentage report experiencing poor health (5%).

Self-Rated Health by Sex and Age

More men report excellent health at the younger old ages than women, with few differences in other self-reported health cate-

gories by sex at these ages. But, more women at the oldest old ages report excellent health than men. Surprisingly, reports of good to excellent health remain high for both men and women into the very oldest ages. Excellent health reports for men drop as they move into their 70's; for women, reports of excellent health do not drop until they move into their 80's. Throughout all the ages over 65, more women than men (but only slightly) report having fair health.

Self-Rated Health by Sex and Marital Status

Those who report having the poorest health are both older men and women who are divorced or separated, with more women reporting poor health, and more men reporting fair health. Few differences emerge between widowed men and widowed women, or between married men and women. The gender similarities for both of these marital statuses are somewhat surprising. The biggest surprise, however, occurs among the single (never-married) where it is found that single men report having better health than single women. And single women report being in fair to poor health more often than single men. This is contrary to previous research findings for single men and women of all ages, where it has been found that single women are generally healthier than single men. It might be that the gender differential found for younger unmarrieds reverses as a result of higher mortality among those who are less well.

Health-Related Activity Limitations

About 1/3 of men and slightly more than 1/3 of women over age 65 report activity limitations as a result of health problems. For women, the proportion with activity limitations remains fairly

constant at 1/3 for each age group from 65. For men, the peak is reached during the 65-69 period and then drops consistently.

Contacts with Children by Health and Gender

There is no clear relationship between self-rated health and frequency of contact with reference child (adult). Those in excellent health, both men and women, tend to have more weekly contact. Males in poor health report as much less than monthly contact as weekly contact, and it is men in poor health who are most common in the no contact category.

Parent/Child Contacts: Satisfaction by Self-Rated Health

Most respondents, regardless of health status, report that they are satisfied with the amount of contact they have with their reference child, although those in excellent health, both men and women, seem a touch more satisfied than those in poor health. Men in poor health are least satisfied with contacts, with women in poor health a little less satisfied than those in excellent health.

Who Helps First when Respondent is Depressed

GSS 1990 is the first national survey to ask questions about emotional supports. The striking finding from analyses of the data on emotional supports is the degree of emotional support older men receive from spouses. Women rely on greater numbers of relatives for emotional support, particularly daughters, but also friends.

Who Helps First when Upset with Partner by Sex

When the spouse is ruled out as a source of emotional support, up to 1/4 of men in the various age groups report that they would have no one to turn to for support. While the "no

one" response also increases for women, it does not reach the levels it is for men until the women are 80+. Rather, women report that they would turn more to daughters. Men also would increase their reliance on daughters, but also more on sons than would women.

Percentages of Respondents Receiving Outside Help by Sex and Health

More older Canadians get help with home maintenance than with housework. And, more men receive help with housework than women. The pattern for home maintenance is less clear, with more women than men in excellent health receiving help, and more men than women in poor health receiving help. It might well be that women in poor health more often move to accommodations where maintenance is not required than do men. Men more often spend their last years at home in an intact marriage, as shown earlier.

Help Received, Home Maintenance, by Activity Limitation

Activity limitations are a clear factor in receipt of help with home maintenance. For all ages over 65, those who have health-related activity limitations report receiving more help with maintenance, with the differences largest in the youngest age groups.

Percentages of Respondents Receiving Outside Help for Maintenance by age, sex and activity limitation

Activity limitations are more of a factor in help with home maintenance for men than for women up to age 70. Between 70 and 74, activity limitations become an important factor for women, but less so for men. This likely is the age at which women change accommodation to one requiring less maintenance. After age 74, activity limitations become less important for both men and women.

Ethnicity and Older Families

Household Type by Ethnicity

Few ethnic differences are apparent by ethnicity in household type. The big differences in household type for older Canadians are by gender, with significantly more women living alone, and more men living in couples.

Number of Children by Ethnicity

French ethnic elders report having more children than British or Europeans. Numbers for Non-Europeans and North Americans are too small to report. While French have more than twice as many as British in the 5+ category, they also have more with 0 children than either British or Europeans.

Numbers of Siblings by Ethnicity

Here ethnic differences are very apparent. French report the largest proportions of 5+ siblings with North American, Non-European and European also having more than 1/2 of respondents with 5+ siblings. Only British respondents report having come from smaller families, with their modal category 2-4 siblings. These differences reveal the different family world that elder Canadians were raised in, compared to the families they headed, and those of their children. Family size has shrunk visibly for all ethnic groups, but most apparently among those with the largest families in the past, the French.

Distance Mother Lives by Contact and Ethnicity

This is a glimpse of family dynamics from the vantage point of middle-aged children. Ethnicity makes a difference in contact

with mothers. Those of British, French and European ethnicity live in closer proximity to mothers than do Non-Europeans. The proportions of British, French and Europeans who maintain weekly contact with their aging mothers is large indeed. Among North Americans who live close to mothers, over 1/2 see their mothers once a week. Among British whose mothers live 1000 kilometers away, 1/3 see them not at all. And among Europeans and Non-Europeans whose mothers live outside Canada, the majority do not see them at all.

A similar tabulation was done for fathers who are still living, but is not reproduced here since the numbers are too small to report. Two factors are likely operative in the more limited contacts reported with aging fathers. The first is that fathers are less likely to be alive, thereby reducing the actual numbers in the analysis. The second factor is the well-established gender difference in parent/child contacts --contact with mothers are more common than contact with fathers.

Unpaid Help of All Types by Ethnicity

Ethnic differences in receipt of unpaid help of all types by older Canadians are not large. Gender differences are more pronounced with more women than men receiving unpaid help. There is a slight tendency for European women to receive more help than women of other ethnicities. Interestingly, European men report receiving the least unpaid help.

Unpaid Help by Sex and Ethnicity by Type of Help

When help received is considered by type, it becomes clear that the bulk of help women receive is with transportation, with European women receiving the most help in this area. It may be

that older women of European ethnicities are the least likely to drive or own cars. Women of all three ethnic groups shown here (the others had numbers too small to report), receive slightly more help with home maintenance than men, and for British and Europeans more help with housework than men in the same ethnic groups. Among the French, however, men report receiving more help with housework than women.

Unpaid Help Provided by Respondents to Others

A significant minority of older Canadians provide unpaid help to others. Both gender and ethnic differences are apparent in type of help provided. With the exception of child care, men of all ethnic groups tend to provide more help than do women. British and European men provide more help, on average, than do French men. The same pattern occurs for women, although at a lower level of help provided, with the exception of child care. For all three ethnic groups, the area where most help is provided is transportation by men, followed by financial help by men. Interestingly, women of all three ethnic groups provide virtually as much financial help to others as men. The largest gender gap in type of help provided occurs for the British on maintenance. Men of all three ethnic groups do considerable child care, although not as much as the women.

Paid Help to Respondents by Sex and Ethnicity

This last series of three graphs reveals that older Canadians, regardless of sex or ethnicity, receive little paid help. About 1/5, more British than others, receive paid help with outside maintenance. British men receive more paid help with maintenance than British women; French women receive more of this type of help

than French men; and European men and women receive similar amounts of paid help with maintenance. More women of all ethnicities pay for help with cleaning than do men, but the differences are small. Considering the ethnic and gender differences that occur with unpaid help with transportation, it is surprising that only 10% (for French and European women) and 13% (for British women) pay for help with transportation.


1: Sample of Respondents 65+
by age, sex and marital status, WEIGHTED

	Sex of respondent			
	Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%
WEIGHT				
total	1,193	100	1,597	100
65-69	466	39	557	35
70-74	338	28	468	29
75-79	213	18	320	20
80+	178	15	252	16
total	1,193	100	1,597	100
married/common-law	947	79	704	44
single	44	4	109	7
widowed	131	11	683	43
sep/div	51	4	80	5
not stated	20	2	22	1


Source: General Social Survey, 1990

STRUCTURE OF OLDER FAMILIES


Household Size · Males 65 +




Household Size · Females 65 +




Family Type by Sex, Age 65+




Family Type by Sex, Age 80+




Legal Marital Status : Males 65+



Legal Marital Status Females 65+



Number of Siblings by Sex, 65+, 80+
(Both Brothers and Sisters)



Brothers and Sisters Still Living
by Sex
65+, 80+


<u>Brothers</u>	65+		80+	
	M	F	M	F
0	33.8 (319,546)	35.0 (438,133)	46.2 (67,506)	54.2 (113,176)
1	29.6 (279,666)	27.0 (337,803)	34.6 (50,596)	24.9 (52,012)
2-4	30.9 (290,946)	32.6 (407,289)	--	13.4 (27,974)
5+	5.7 (54,264)	5.4 (67,087)	--	--

Sisters


0	21.1 (211,570)	24.0 (318,432)	37.4 (58,759)	34.1 (76,175)
1	27.4 (275,438)	26.4 (351,157)	27.2 (42,766)	25.8 (57,584)
2-4	41.1 (413,619)	36.7 (486,789)	32.7 (51,324)	31.4 (70,319)
5+	6.4 (64,672)	7.9 (105,409)	--	--

-- means numbers are too small to report, not that there are zeros in these cells.

Number of Children by Sex, 65+, 80+




Number of Grandchildren by Sex,
65+, 80+




DYNAMICS OF OLDER FAMILIES

Distance Reference Child Lives From
Male Respondent Age 65+



Distance Reference Child Lives From
Female Respondent Age 65+



FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH REFERENCE CHILD
BY SEX AND MARITAL STATUS
65+

	Married	Widowed	Single
MALE			
Daily	12.1 (88,129)	---	---
Once a Week	44.6 (324,555)	43.6 (39,368)	---
Once a Month	21.7 (158,274)	---	---
Less than once a Month	18.6 (135,515)	---	---
Not at All	---	---	---
FEMALE			
Daily	12.0 (69,132)	13.3 (65,238)	---
Once a Week	44.3 (255,369)	45.9 (225,193)	---
Once a Month	24.0 (109,354)	21.9 (107,411)	---
Less than once a Month	---	17.7 (86,686)	---
Not at All	---	---	---

SATISFACTION WITH AMOUNT SEEN OF REFERENCE CHILD
BY SEX AND MARITAL STATUS
65+


<u>Satisfaction</u>			
	Less often than would Like	More often than would Like	Amount Right
<u>Male</u>	25.0 (205,984)	---	73.6 (606,722)
Married	24.0 (175,250)	---	74.7 (546,008)
Widowed	33.2 (30,744)	---	65.1 (60,258)
Single	---	---	---
<u>Female</u>	29.5 (315,691)	---	68.2 (741,782)
Married	31.6 (181,917)	---	67.1 (386,376)
Widowed	27.2 (133,774)	---	71.6 (351,931)
Single	---	---	---

SATISFACTION WITH AMOUNT SEEN OF REFERENCE CHILD
BY SEX AND MARITAL STATUS
80+

<u>Satisfaction</u>			
	Less often than would Like	More often than would Like	Amount Right
Male	34.2 (42,753)	---	64.4 (80,489)
Female	23.5 (38,541)	---	74.4 (122,010)


Frequency of Contact with Siblings

For Female Respondents Age 65 +



Frequency of Contact with Siblings

For MARRIED Respondents by Sex 65+



DISTANCE MOTHER LIVES FROM RESPONDENT
BY FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
FOR RESPONDENTS AGED 45-64
WITH LIVING MOTHERS

MALES

Frequency

Distance	Daily	Once Week	Once Month	Less Than Once a Month	Not at All
10km	---	61.9 146,308	24.4 57,663	---	---
50km	---	43.1 68,973	43.2 69,047	---	---
100-400km	---	---	37.0 55,750	55.2 83,133	---
1,000km	---	---	---	71.6 28,610	---
1,000+km	---	---	---	68.1 63,643	---
Outside Canada	---	---	---	37.3 62,275	61.3 102,192

FEMALES

Frequency


Distance	Daily	Once Week	Once Month	Less Than Once a Month	Not at All
10km	16.7 47,926	68.6 196,220	9.8 28,254	---	---
50km	---	56.9 99,844	34.1 59,893	---	---
100-400km	---	15.5 30,099	34.3 66,460	47.3 81,664	---
1,000km	---	---	---	78.4 58,767	---
1,000+km	---	---	---	59.5 46,122	35.3 27,359
Outside Canada	---	---	---	50.4 55,975	45.8 50,900

DISTANCE FATHER LIVES FROM RESPONDENT
BY FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
FOR RESPONDENTS AGED 45-64
WITH LIVING FATHERS

Frequency


Distance	Daily	Once Week	Once Month	Less Than Once a Month	Not at All
10km	---	64.9 53,290	---	---	---
50km	---	---	49.3 33,588	---	---
100-400km	---	---	56.1 26,399	---	---
1,000km	---	---	---	92.7 33,404	---
1,000+km	---	---	---	82.1 35,384	---
Outside Canada	---	---	---	---	58.1 26,723

Frequency of Contact with Mother by
Distance Mother Lives from Respondent




HEALTH + HAPPINESS: OLDER FAMILIES

Self-Reported "Very Happy" by Age and Sex



Self-Rated Health of Respondents 65+ Years



**Table 25 Self rated health status by sex and age
for respondents age 65+. GSS, 1990
WEIGHTED**

	Sex of respondent			
	Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%
	WEIGHT			
Total	1,193	100	1,597	100
Respondents state of health compared to others				
Excellent	313	26	396	25
Good	556	47	721	45
Fair	234	20	359	23
Poor	70	6	99	6
Not stated	20	2	22	1
65-69				
self-rated health				
total	466	100	557	100
excellent	141	30	149	27
good	209	45	255	46
fair	83	18	116	21
poor	31	7	31	6
not stated	1	0	6	1
70-74				
self-rated health				
total	338	100	468	100
excellent	81	24	124	27
good	157	47	214	46
fair	67	20	97	21
poor	22	7	29	6
not stated	11	3	5	1
75-79				
self-rated health				
total	213	100	320	100
excellent	49	23	72	23
good	103	48	134	42
fair	47	22	92	29
poor	11	5	17	5
not stated	2	1	4	1
80+				
self-rated health				
total	178	100	252	100
excellent	42	24	51	20
good	87	49	118	47
fair	37	21	54	22
poor	5	3	23	9
not stated	6	3	7	3

Source: General Social Survey, 1990

Self rated health status by sex and marital status for respondents age 65+. GSS, 1990
WEIGHTED

	Sex of respondent			
	Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%
	WEIGHT			
married/common-law				
self-rated health				
total	947	100	704	100
excellent	244	26	193	27
good	460	49	320	46
fair	184	19	156	22
poor	54	6	31	4
not stated	4	0	4	1
single				
self-rated health				
total	44	100	109	100
excellent	13	29	24	22
good	22	51	49	45
fair	7	17	22	20
poor	1	3	13	12
not stated	-	-	1	1
widowed				
self-rated health				
total	131	100	683	100
excellent	34	26	155	23
good	57	44	316	46
fair	29	22	166	24
poor	8	6	41	6
not stated	2	1	4	1
sep/div				
self-rated health				
total	51	100	80	100
excellent	20	38	23	29
good	14	27	28	35
fair	13	24	13	17
poor	5	10	14	17
not stated	-	-	2	2
not stated				
self-rated health				
total	20	100	22	100
excellent	2	9	1	6
good	3	14	7	32
fair	1	4	3	12
poor	-	-	-	-
not stated	14	72	11	50


Source: General Social Survey, 1990

Health related activity limitations by 5
year age group and gender for respondents age 65+.
GSS, 1990
WEIGHTED

	Sex of respondent			
	Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%
	WEIGHT			
total				
activity				
limitation				
total	1,193	100	1,597	100
yes	368	31	606	38
no	815	68	988	62
not stated	11	1	3	0
65-69				
activity				
limitation				
total	466	39	557	35
yes	132	11	162	10
no	333	28	395	25
not stated	-	-	-	-
70-74				
activity				
limitation				
total	338	28	468	29
yes	89	7	153	10
no	241	20	313	20
not stated	8	1	2	0
75-79				
activity				
limitation				
total	213	18	320	20
yes	80	7	153	10
no	131	11	167	10
not stated	2	0	-	-
80+				
activity				
limitation				
total	178	15	252	16
yes	67	6	137	9
no	109	9	114	7
not stated	2	0	1	0


Source: General Social Survey, 1990

Frequency of Contacts with Oldest Child by Self-Rated Health & Gender, 65+ Years




Source: 1990 General Social Survey


Parent/Child Contacts: Satisfaction by Self-Rated Health & Gender, 65+



Who Helps First When Respondent Feels Depressed by Age and Sex, 65 years+



When Respondent is Upset with Partner Who Helps First By Age and Sex, 65 years+




**% Percentages of Respondents Age 65+Years
Receiving Outside Help for Housework & Home Maintenance
by Self-Rated Health (Excellent vs Poor) and Sex***

1990 General Social Survey

	Excellent		Self-Rated Health Poor		All 65+
	M %	F %	M %	F %	Both Sexes %
Received Outside Help with Housework	12	7	14.5	27	15
Received Outside Help with Home Maintenance	21	25	32	18	27

*Weighted data, excludes not applicable

Help Received for Home Maintenance by Activity Limitations, 65+ Years



Source: 1990 General Social Survey

**3. Percentages of Respondents 65+Years
Receiving Outside Help for Home Maintenance
by Age Group, Sex, & Activity Limitation***


1990 General Social Survey

<u>Age Group</u>	No Activity Limitation			Activity Limitation		
	M %	F %	Both %	M %	F %	Both %
All 65+	18	20	19	22	23	22.5
65-69	17	20	18.5	28	24	26
70-74	17	21	19	19	30	24.5
75-79	20	17	18.5	20	18	19
80+	17	20	18.5	22	21	21.5


*Weighted data, excludes not applicable.

ETHNICITY AND OLDER FAMILIES

Household Type for Respondents Age 65+ by Ethnicity



Number of Children by Ethnicity, 65+




DISTANCE MOTHER LIVES FROM RESPONDENT
BY FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
FOR RESPONDENTS AGED 45-64
WITH LIVING MOTHERS
BY ETHNICITY


Frequency

Distance	Daily	Once Week	Once Month	Less Than Once a Month	Not at All
<u>10km</u>					
British	18.4 39,102	59.0 125,631	18.8 39,986	---	---
French	---	67.5 136,808	16.2 32,906	---	---
European	---	70.0 92,461	---	---	---
Non Europe	---	---	---	---	---
North American	---	51.3 42,236	---	---	---
<u>1,000+km</u>					
British	---	---	---	58.7 53,938	31.7 29,117
French	---	---	---	---	---
European	---	---	---	67.4 44,087	---
Non Europe	---	---	---	---	---
North American	---	---	---	---	---
<u>Outside Canada</u>					
British	---	---	---	52.3 31,111	---
French	---	---	---	---	---
European	---	---	---	38.7 53,311	61.3 84,395
Non European	---	---	---	---	72.1 54,271
North American	---	---	---	---	---


Unpaid Help of All Types to
Respondents 65+




Unpaid Help Given to FEMALE Respondent
65+ by Type of Help & Ethnicity




Unpaid Help Given to MALE Respondent
65+ by Type of Help & Ethnicity




Unpaid Help by Respondents 65+ to Others by Sex & Ethnicity



Paid Help to BRITISH Respondents 65+



Paid Help to FRENCH Respondents 65+



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Social and Economic Effects of Changing Family Patterns
The Case of Child Care

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Elisabeth Beaujot

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Population Studies Centre
University of Western Ontario

September 1991

Report prepared for the Review of Demography and its Implications for Economic
and Social Policy, Health and Welfare Canada

Social and Economic Effects of Changing Family Patterns The Case of Child Care

As part of the analysis of "what the family does and how it deploys its resources to meet its needs", the case of child care deserves special consideration. The present report will consider the various forms of child care that families use for children under 13 years of age. We adopt a broad definition of the family as going beyond the immediate household in order to assess the involvement of absent parents, grandparents and other relatives in child care.

It is important to determine the extent to which this broader family acts as a support unit. Some family members beyond the household clearly provide support as in the case of grandparents providing babysitting possibly when both parents are working, parents helping children with mortgages, absent fathers making child support payments, etc. But an important point here is that there is often no obligation for persons to do this and in other cases there is simply no possibility: the father may be deliberately delinquent, the grandparents may live far away, older parents may have no excess resources, etc.

The present report includes (1) an inclusive literature review concerning issues of child care within this perspective and (2) an analysis of relevant data from the National Child Care Survey (1988) and from Cycle 5 of the General Social Survey (1990). That is, we attempt to determine the extent to which families depend on their own resources to care for their children under 12, and the extent to which they depend on other sources including formal social agencies. Of particular interest is the extent to which the broader family beyond the household is involved in child care. We also consider information about the preference of parents on child care: parental care, care by the broader family, other informal sources of care, and formal care. Both the existing situation of families and their preferences can inform social policy in the area of child care. Broadly speaking, this policy can support formal child care systems, care by the parents themselves and/or informal care including that of relatives.

In some ways demographics are changing in ways that permit the family to take more responsibility for child care. In particular, low mortality means that very few young children have deceased parents. In addition, considering only one side of the family, 69 percent of children 12 and under have a surviving grandfather, 86 percent have a surviving grandmother, and 93 percent have at least one surviving grandparent. Other changes reduce the potential of families to look after their own children, in particular 13 percent of children aged 12

and under are living in a lone-parent family. Also, for 60 percent of children the parent mostly responsible for child care is employed. Various studies have concluded that while "today's families tend to have fewer children than their parents, at the same time they have lost many of their traditional sources of support" (Lero and Kyle, 1991; Friendly, Cleveland and Willis, 1989). Thus it is important to assess the extent of need for child care, the ways in which families fulfil this need, along with their preferences and constraints in this important area of family life.

Research in the area of child care options and parental preference provides some indication of the complexity of family decisions around the issue of care for their children. The following section of the report will review information on the growth of child care options and availability; the choices parents make between licensed and unlicensed care; centre-based and family day care; and care by family members or non-family members. The complexity of parental decisions concerning child care arrangements is also addressed. Finally, existing and proposed policy in the area of child care as a family support are discussed.

The child care terminology employed in this report is adapted from the Health and Welfare Canada publication Status of Day Care in Canada 1990. **Licensed care** refers to child care provided in a provincially approved and monitored centre or private family day care home. **Unlicensed care** is an arrangement between a parent and a child care provider which is not under the supervision of a licensing authority or child care agency. **Centre-based care** refers to care given to groups of children in a licensed day care centre. **Licensed family day care** is a program involving the selection and supervision by a government or authorized private agency of private families who give care to children. **School-age child care** refers to the supervision of children 6 to 12 years before school begins, during the noon hour, after class, and on days when school is not in session.

Growth of child care

The past twenty years have seen a dramatic growth of child care in Canada. Health and Welfare Canada (1991) reports an eighteen-fold increase in full-time child care spaces over this period. In 1971 there were 17,391 full-time spaces by 1990 the number had grown to 320,624. Over this period, child care has also grown in scope, from an earlier emphasis on care for 3-5 year old children to expansion in the area of care for infants and toddlers (0-18 months) and school age children (6-12 years). Types and variations of licensed child care has also expanded, from the traditional model of centre-based care provided full day from

8:00-6:00 to child care models providing flexible hours, seasonal care, care for mildly sick children and licensed family day care.

Determining child care needs

Various methods of determining the need for child care have been employed: local surveys asking families directly to describe their needs and preferences, estimates based on labour force participation of mothers, and estimates based on the philosophy of universal access to child care which assumes every child has a right to care within the child care system.

For the most part, these methods of determining child care need assume that families need and want licensed care within a regulated system. Studies based on such estimates usually conclude that only a small percentage of children are being cared for within the organized child care system. A national estimate for 1984 suggests that only about 9 percent of all children in Canada whose parents worked or studied at least 20 hours each week were cared for in licensed programs (Eichler, 1988). It has been suggested that this orientation towards determining need represents a bias against the informal sector as a legitimate form of child care, and that this may be an inaccurate reflection of child care needs and preferences of many families (Emlen, 1975; Moore, 1982).

What of the estimated 91 percent of children in the care of parents and family members or in unlicensed care while parents work or study? Can we assume, as American advocates of a comprehensive child care system have done (Zigler and Ennis, 1989), that parents resort to informal, unlicensed child care options simply because of a shortage of licensed care?

There is no doubt that a serious shortage of licensed child care spaces exists in Canada (Health and Welfare Canada, 1991). Although accurate figures are difficult to determine, one Ontario estimate indicates that the current child care system in that province is meeting more than 10 per cent but less than 18 per cent of the need (Park, 1991). There is also evidence that a number of parents seeking child care would prefer licensed care if it were available. The Status of Day Care 1990 (Health and Welfare Canada, 1991) cautions that evidence of parental preference is sketchy, but suggests that 50 percent of parents using non-licensed care would prefer licensed care if it was available. The 1986 Report of the Task Force on Child Care found that approximately half of urban parents using child care would prefer a day care centre for their preschoolers (age 2-5). Indeed, the majority of day care centre spaces are being used by children between the ages of 3 and 5 years. Health and Welfare Canada (1991)

reports that the spaces available for this age group account for 56.9 per cent of total day care spaces. In contrast, only 11 percent of centre spaces are filled by children under the age of 3 years. School age child care spaces constitute 29.9 per cent of all Canadian day care spaces, a large proportion (just under one third) of those are in the province of Quebec. It is notable that children under the age of three years account for 41.7 per cent of licensed family day care spaces, which may be an indication of parental preference for home-based care as opposed to centre-based care for younger children.

Family choice: licensed or unlicensed child care

A family's decision to use unlicensed child care may be due to a number of factors. These include the shortage of accessible licensed child care facilities, the lack of flexible care options (part-time, seasonal, extended hours, emergency, sick child care), cost, and family values and preferences.

The **shortage** of licensed child care facilities in Canada has been well documented (Health and Welfare Canada, 1991; National Council on Welfare, 1988; Status of Women, 1986). The lack of flexible, licensed child care options has also been acknowledged. Flexible care is for the most part offered through demonstration projects and institutions with large numbers of female shift workers (Friendly, Cleveland and Willis, 1989; Gorlick and Lubell, 1989). One factor in a family decision for informal, unlicensed care may be that the more flexible nature of such care allows for part-time and variable work schedules, the possibility of providing care to children of various ages, and the possibility of bridging care for school age children (before and after school, lunch hour, and half time care and transportation to kindergarten).

The importance of the cost factor in choosing between licensed and unlicensed care is difficult to determine; the evidence found in the literature is contradictory. In their sample of 126 families in Victoria, British Columbia, Pence and Goelman (1987) found cost was not a major factor in making the decision between licensed and unlicensed care. However, an American study undertaken by Robins and Weiner (1978) which analyzed nine child care arrangements, concluded that cost was a chief determinant in choice of child care. The actual magnitude of cost in a particular situation may well be an important aspect of a family's decision. Park (1991) cites a 1987 report by the Ontario Municipal Services Association which suggests that care in the informal system costs 40 percent less than licensed centre-based care in that province. In an analysis of data from the 1981 Child Care Survey conducted by Statistics Canada, it was found that low income and high income households used licensed

child care more than middle income households (Henriques and Vaillancourt, 1988). It was speculated that this pattern reflects the availability of subsidies to low-income families (determined primarily at the provincial and municipal levels) and desire for "certified" quality care or tax considerations on the part of high-income families. Child care choice between the licensed and the unlicensed sectors then becomes limited for middle income families who may have difficulty bearing the entire direct cost of child care, and for low income families whose child care costs are subsidized only if they use the licensed system.

The family values and preferences around child rearing also appear to influence the choice of family day care (licensed and unlicensed) over centre based care. Some families, for example, may choose care in a household which most closely resembles their own. Li and Johnson (1978) in their study of private child care arrangements in Toronto, found a tendency for parents to match up with caregivers of similar socio-economic status, ethnicity and housing type. Lero (1981), in a study of parents who chose informal care for their children found the most important factor influencing parents' decisions about the choice of caregiver was the caregiver's personality and attitudes to child rearing. Considering the three settings of licensed centre-based care, licensed family day care and unlicensed family day care, Pence and Goelman (1987) found that parents who chose the family day care settings and those who chose the centre-based settings had different value orientations. The centre users were influenced by the programming offered, while family day care users stressed caregiver characteristics.

Many parents prefer family home day care (licensed and unlicensed) for children under 3 to centre-based care (Health and Welfare Canada, 1991). A more intimate home-like setting for young children has been cited by parents for their preference of family home day care, but some studies indicate that adult intimacy may be a factor as well. Pence and Goelman (1987) report that of the child care user groups they surveyed, parents using licensed and unlicensed family care reported closer relationships with caregivers than did centre users. It was found that relationships between caregivers and parents in unlicensed family day care, in particular, were most likely to be described by parents as "good friends". Unlicensed caregivers were also more likely to be located live within a five-minute drive of the child's home, generally closer than licensed family care and centre-based care in this sample, indicating that they are more likely to be neighbourhood based.

Family day care has been characterized as "an adaptation of family life for the working mother". It has been described as a way of acquiring an extended

"family within the neighbourhood" (Emlen, 1972, p.31). Within a larger social context, the need to share child care with individuals and families outside the nuclear family has been seen as de-privatization of the family centring around a family's children (Eichler, 1988). Eichler sees this process as a two way street, children are exposed to another family's values and ways of functioning, but so is the caregiver affected through caring for unrelated children and interacting with their families.

Child care within the family

The focus, thus far, has been on child care provided by non-family members. However a traditional form of child care, that provided by family members, continues as an important child care option. While this form of care may no longer be the most common model, evidence suggests that child care provided by members of the nuclear and extended family continues to meet at least some of the child care needs of many Canadian families.

While 42.9 percent of the parents principally responsible for child care of children 12 and under work full-time and an additional 17.1 percent work part-time, it must be remembered that a substantial 40.0 percent remain home with their children using only occasional informal care or part-time nursery school as child care (see Table 4 later). The 1981 national survey on child care arrangements conducted by Statistics Canada indicates that 47.8 percent of all pre-school children (age 0-5 years) were cared for exclusively by their parents (Eichler, 1985).

In fact, working parents appear to make substantial use of members of their nuclear or extended families. Morgan (1985) outlines various ways in which families manage such care: staggering parents' work hours so that one parent is always at home; leaving children in the care of relatives either in the child's home or in the relative's home; using older siblings to provide care.

According to a 1987 report from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 62 percent of the mothers of preschool children who work part-time depend on family-based child care (by parents, grandparents, older children or other relatives), while 39.4 percent of those who work full-time use such care (Lubeck and Garrett, 1988). In a 1985 study of 336 families across Canada, Lero and her colleagues found that the father was the main caregiver for children under 6 in 15 percent of cases in which mothers worked full-time and in 23 percent of cases in which mothers worked part-time (Lero et al., 1985). This survey found that other relatives were main caregivers less frequently than anticipated, 14.6 percent

in the case of infants and 9.2 percent in the case of preschoolers.

There is evidence to indicate that some families arrange work schedules to allow them to provide child care within the nuclear family. Gorlick and Lubell (1987) found this to be the case in their survey of rural families around London, Ontario. An American study (Morgan, 1981), indicated that some families chose shiftwork as a way of arranging child care within the family. It is difficult to know whether such arrangements are made by choice or for lack of alternatives. Parents in Gorlick and Lubell's sample reported a lack of child care services in their area. A British study (Charles and Brown, 1982) found that although families chose shiftwork as a way of arranging for child care, there were indications that some parents would not work shifts if adequate day time child care were available.

Another source of child care within a family is children themselves. Based on the 1981 Statistics Canada survey of child care, Biemiller, Regan and Lero (1987) found that as children become older they are increasingly likely to be left on their own or in the charge of a sibling. Parents reported leaving about 5 percent of children 6 to 9 on their own, about 13 percent of children aged 10 to 11, and 26 percent of children aged 12 to 13.

Although child care options tend to be studied and discussed in relative isolation from each other, families, in fact, often use a patchwork of child care arrangements. Wattenberg (1980) has commented on the pattern of multiple child care arrangements and the informal, reciprocal neighbourhood system on which some families depend. In their study of alternative child care arrangements among Canadian families, Lero and her colleagues (1985) found that combinations of two or more non-parental care arrangements were common. The growing trend towards half day public schooling for four year old children (Health and Welfare Canada, 1991) adds an additional patch to the quilt of child care which families must arrange.

Along with a recognition of the complexity of the child care needs of families, has come an approach to studying the question known as the "ecology" of child care. Lero et al. (1985) describe the ecological approach as follows:

The complex interplay among child, family, employment and community variables (including federal and provincial policies that ultimately affect the availability, affordability and quality of alternative care arrangements) is referred to as the ecology of child care...the child care use patterns that we observe at any time reflect the particular solutions parents in specific communities have found best meet their current needs

and fit their circumstances and values (p. 107).

Child care as a family support

The wide range of ages of children needing care and the recognition that child care is an essential family support (Lero et al., 1985) has led to the growing recognition of the diversity of child care needs. As Morrison (1989) points out in a discussion of child care policy into the next century, policies for preschool children (three to five year olds in group care) are distinct from those for younger children (infants in family day care homes) and older children (6 to 12 year olds in school care). It has also been suggested that child care policies need to address the broader needs of families with young children generally (Lero and Kyle, 1991; Special Parliamentary Committee on Child Care, 1987). This view has been echoed by the report of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Child Care (1987):

...it is only by offering support for a wide range of programs that promote the well-being of families and children that the federal government can acknowledge the diversity of families and respond in a way that allows Canadians to make informed choices about their children (p. 33).

Sharing the Responsibility (1987), the Report of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Child Care, went on to recommend "a range of family support services to complement formal and informal child care...to include family resource programs, information and referral services, a registry of licensed caregivers, parent education, and services for families with special needs (p.41).

Such programs, known variously as child care support services, family resource centres and "family places", exist presently in a limited way in many of the provinces of Canada. Ontario, thanks to a 1981 provincial policy to "improve the quality of informal care arrangements and strengthen the capacities of parents to select and monitor such arrangements (p. 62), and the subsequent provision of funding for such resource centres, has the largest number of such facilities in Canada.

The concept of providing comprehensive child care and family support services has been offered in various forms over the past decade. In most cases such services base themselves on a neighbourhood model, close to the families they seek to serve and loosely modeled on the system of support networks thought to have traditionally existed in small communities and neighbourhoods. Many proponents of such centres propose locating them in schools, institutions already well established in many neighbourhoods (Lapierre, 1979; Ontario Ministry of

Community and Social Services, 1991; Zigler and Ennis, 1989). Others propose variations on a "hub" model with a licensed child care facility at the centre of the hub and various related support services, including parent/caregiver resource centres, radiating from it (Ontario Coalition for Better Day Care, 1990; Gallagher-Ross, 1978).

Such proposed models and the comprehensive child care, and family support systems they represent, require the cooperation of many levels of government (federal, provincial, municipal) and various ministries within those levels of government. Children First, a recent report from the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, suggests that as many as five ministries in that province would need to cooperate in order to offer integrated services to families and children at a neighbourhood level: Community and Social Services, Education, Correctional Services, Health, and Tourism and Recreation.

Ontario has perhaps taken some of the first steps toward a comprehensive model of child care through its funding since 1981 of child care support services meant to strengthen the informal sector of child care (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1981), and through a recent initiative sponsored jointly by the Ontario Ministries of Community and Social Services and Education to build child care centres in every new school built in Ontario after 1988 (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services & Ontario Ministry of Education, 1988).

In the final analysis, however, it must be remembered that it is families who use child care, and it is with them that ultimate child care decisions rest. As Moore (1982) commented:

Parents are in a better position than professionals to assess their own individual situation in terms of child care needs...they are concerned for the well-being of their children and their family unit as a whole...Advocates who claim to view child care as a family support service must come to recognize that parents' control over services used is critical to retaining a sense of personal integrity and self-determination over their families' lives. By delegating decision-making to parents...government involvement in child care (may seem) more politically palatable (p.133).

In the context of these earlier research findings on the broad range of factors affecting parental choices in child care, we will now take a close look at two recently available Canadian surveys.

The 1990 General Social Survey

Cycle 5 of Statistics Canada's General Social Survey (1990) on "Family and Friends" provides useful information on the extent to which people depend on relatives for child care. For the purpose of the analysis that follows, we chose a sample of respondents who had children under 13 either in their household or out of their own household. This sub-sample consists of 3665 respondents, of which 97.6 percent are between ages 20 and 50. The respondents are evenly divided by gender and have a total of 8062 children of all ages, for an average of 2.2 per respondent. Some 88.1 percent of these children are living in the respondent's household and the remaining 11.4 percent are living out of the household. In all figures cited from this survey, the data have been weighted according to the weight provided in the data set, but the population has been reduced to that of the size of the sample itself.

For the children living out of the household, it is possible to consider further those under 15 years of age, for which additional questions were asked concerning one specific "reference child". Among these 282 "reference children" under 15 years, living outside of the households of respondents, 90.5 percent were living with the child's mother or father (73.3 percent with mothers and 17.2 percent with fathers) and 6.1 percent with another relative. Some 57.1 percent were living within 100 km of the respondent and the respondent saw the child at least once a month in 61.9 percent of cases. Clearly, the broader family of the child, in particular the separated parents, are heavily involved in the care of their young children who are not living with them. Nonetheless, 38.1 percent of respondents saw these children either less than once a month or not at all.

In the total sub-sample of persons who had children under 13 living either in their household or out of their household, some 82.8 percent worked at a job (95.6 percent for men and 70.2 percent for women). Considering both persons working and not working, 66.6 percent (85.4 for men and 48.0 for women) worked 40 or more weeks in the year, and 69.1 percent worked for 35 or more hours per week (92.9 percent of men and 45.7 percent of women). Those working for 35 or more hours for 40 or more weeks involved 58.6 percent of the sample (83.4 for men and 34.2 for women). Among the cases where both spouses are present, in 36.1 percent of cases these were both working full-time for the full year. Conversely, in 63.9 percent of husband-wife families with children under 13, at least one of the spouses is not working full-time for the full year. Among couples with children under five years of age, 65.3 percent involved at least one spouse not working full-time for the full year. This indicates that couples

can depend considerably on their own time for the care of their children while they are not working.

This survey also permits us to consider the extent to which the fathers and mothers of respondents (that is grandparents of the children) are physically available for child care. First, in 13.9 percent of cases the mother, and in 31.1 percent the father, was deceased. Another 2.0 percent of cases involved the mother living in an institution and 1.0 percent for fathers. In addition, 36.6 percent of respondents had mothers, and 29.5 percent had fathers, living 100 or more km away. Finally, 0.8 percent had mothers, and 0.7 percent had fathers, working for more than half the year. Considering that parents are theoretically available for child care if they are not deceased, not living in an institution, not working 26 or more weeks and living within 100 km of the respondent, mothers are available for 47.5 percent of respondents and fathers for 36.9 percent. One or the other parent is available in 52.0 percent of cases. These results involve only one side of the family. It is not possible to determine the extent to which grandparents are available on one of the other side.

Several questions in the General Social Survey focus specifically on child care, including the reason for care, the location and the person providing care. Among all persons in the sub-sample, that is with children 12 and under, 33.5 percent received child care on a regular basis. This figure rises to 45.2 for respondents with children under five and to 69.6 in the case of husband-wife families with children under five and where both are working full-time for the full-year. It is noteworthy that some 30 percent of the latter involve no regular child care provisions. Clearly, some of these children must be in kindergartens or nursery schools for which no information was collected, others are in the care of older brothers or sisters, and still other cases must involve parents caring for children while working or juggling their work so that they do not use child care. Some of these questions will be explored further through the National Child Care Survey.

Focusing first on the reason for child care among persons who received child care on a regular basis, Table 1 includes all reasons given even if several reasons were listed for a given respondent. Clearly, "working at a job" is the predominant reason, accounting for 88.7 percent of cases for all respondents with children 12 and under, and almost all respondents with children four and under. However, some 20 to 25 percent of respondents cite studying or "doing something else" as a reason for child care. Some 61.6 percent of responses are multiples involving more than one reason.

Table 2 shows the place of child care for respondents who received care outside of their household. Note first that 75.8 percent of persons receiving child care on a regular basis received at least part of this care outside of their home (83.4 percent in the case of children four and under where both parents worked full-time for the full year). Day care centres are used in 53.4 percent of cases and sitters or neighbour's house in 59.2 percent. In addition, 24.7 percent involve grandparent's home, 18.8 involve some other relative's home and 11.6 percent involve some other arrangement. Once again, there are many cases involving more than one arrangement since there are 168 categories of arrangements cited for 100 respondents.

There is also overlap between the use of care inside and outside of the child's home. Among the 1139 respondents who received child care on a regular basis, 863 (75.8 percent) cited care received outside the household and another 430 (37.8 percent) cited care received in the respondent's home. The persons providing child care in the respondent's home were sitters or nannies in 67.7 percent of cases, the child's grandparents in 27.2 percent, another relative in 26.0 percent and someone else for 9.1 percent. That is, for 100 cases of care received in the home, 130 categories of providers were cited.

Parents clearly make use of a variety of arrangements for the care of their young children while not in school. First, much of the care is provided by the parents themselves, partly because the majority of cases involved at least one parent who is not working full-time for the full year. Even among husband-wife families where both spouses work full-time full-year, a substantial number do not receive any child care on a regular basis. Since we are focusing on the family looking after its own needs with its own resources, these are noteworthy observations. The broader family of grandparents and other relatives is also important. Among persons receiving care on a regular basis, 26.4 percent receive care from grandparents either in the grandparent's or the child's home for at least part of the child care arrangements. In addition, relatives' homes or relatives in the child's home is involved in 22.2 percent of cases. Clearly, many parents depend on a complex arrangement of child care that centres on the parents themselves.

National Child Care Survey (1988): Employment status of respondents and their spouses

The 1988 National Child Care Survey used a population of households where there were children under 13 years of age (Statistics Canada, 1991). The survey

sample included 24,155 households and 42,131 children. In the tables presented below, the sample has been weighted to the corresponding population sizes. In each household, a "designated adult" was chosen as respondent. This designated adult was the person who was most responsible for child care. In cases where two people were equally responsible, the mother was chosen. As a result, 95.5 percent of respondents were women (Table 4). Very few of the sub-categories by employment status make exception to this female dominance. In the case of respondents employed full-time and spouses employed part-time, 61.5 percent of respondents are men. Also, in the case of respondent working full-time and the spouse not-employed, 22.7 percent are men. These categories, representing only 2.8 percent of the sample, involve the unusual case of fathers being both employed full-time and principally responsible for child care, while the wife is either working part-time or not at all. In all likelihood, these include cases of mothers who were not well or not available as respondents for the survey. Otherwise, partly through the somewhat biased designation of the respondent, the survey clearly points to women being chiefly responsible for child care. This is also visible in the case of single parents. Of all the single parents with children 12 and under, only 8.2 percent are men (compared to 3.9 percent male designated adults in the case of husband-wife families). These male single parents comprise more than a third of all males designated by the survey as principally responsible for child care.

Among the 12 categories of respondent and spouse employment listed in Table 5, the largest category is that of both spouses working full-time. This category represents 39.2 percent of all husband-wife families with children under 13. However, this figure goes down with the number of children, representing only 25.9 percent of husband-wife families with three or more children under 13. Conversely, the second largest category of "respondent not employed and spouse working full-time" increases with the number of children, reaching 45.9 percent in the case of three or more children. In addition, 20.6 percent of these larger families have a respondent working part-time and spouse full-time. In the case of one-parent families, the employment status is full-time for 45.5 percent of cases, part-time for 9.0 and not employed for the remaining 45.5 percent. While a total of 60.0 percent of respondents are employed, only 42.9 are employed full-time, and the rate declines as the family size increases.

Tables have been established separately by census metropolitan areas (64.5 percent of the sample), other urban areas (15.7) and rural areas (19.9 percent of the sample). The employment status does not vary extensively over these residence categories. For instance, the proportion of designated adults who are employed ranges from 60.6 percent in metropolitan areas to 58.7 percent in rural

areas. As another example, among families with three or more children under 13, the proportion of respondents employed full-time is 27.9 in metropolitan areas, 23.9 in other urban areas and 32.2 in rural areas. Adding the observation that some persons employed full-time may not be for the full-year and that some 7.8 percent of these designated adults working full-time have spouses who are either working part-time or not employed, it is clear that, especially in these larger families the major part of child care is the responsibility of the parents themselves.

What one child-related benefit would you like your employer to provide

The question on child-related benefits desired from employers did not solicit extensive responses. For the total sample, the answer was "blank" in 49.5 percent of cases, partly because many respondents did not have an employer. Restricting the analysis to employed respondents, the cases that are either "blank", "none" or "not stated" still represents 43.6 percent of the total responses (Table 6). It is interesting that a quarter of employed respondents specifically said that they did not desire any further child-related benefit from their employer. The most frequent response involved "workplace daycare" which was suggested by some 20 percent of respondents. This figure rises to 21.1 percent in the case of respondents with two children under 12 living in metropolitan areas with both parents working full-time, and 23.6 percent in the case of single-parents in metropolitan areas working full-time with one child under 13 years. The second most common response involves "flexible work hours" which was suggested by 14.9 percent of employed respondents, a figure which rises to 17 or 18 percent in the specific cases used above. Some 7.6 percent would want the "option of working part-time" a figure which rises to 9.4 percent in the case of respondents working full-time with two or more children under 13. Paid parental leave was suggested by some 6.0 percent of respondents. It must be noted that the question asked for only one response, thus minimizing the total number of suggestions. However, with the cases that are either "none" or "blank" typically staying above 35 percent for given categories of employed respondents, it would not appear that the single response requirement has eliminated much information. If one considers the categories of "paid parental leave", "flexible work hours" and "option of working part-time" as ways in which the employer would allow for parents to have more possibility of looking after their own children, it is noteworthy that 28.5 percent of employed persons (32.0 percent for the category of both parents working full-time) would opt for one of these.

Child related benefits desired for spouse's employer

The survey also asked "What one child related benefit would you like your spouse's employer to provide?". Table 7 is restricted to women respondents, who comprise 96.1 percent of respondents with spouses. The data are shown for the three main categories of employment status of respondent and spouse, representing 92.7 percent of women respondents with spouses.

Over half of respondents either said "none" or did not answer the question. In the case of respondents not employed with spouses working full-time, 36.4 percent specifically said "none" and an additional 18.0 percent did not answer the question. The most common response was "flexible work hours", followed by "workplace day care", except in the instances of census metropolitan areas involving respondents working part-time or not employed, where workplace day care comes first. The three categories of paid parental leave, flexible work hours and option of working part-time, which would permit fathers more time for child care, are placed among the more important desired benefits by some 22 to 28 percent of respondents. These answers are not much affected by the number of children under 13. For instance, in the case of both parents working full-time, 28.7 percent give one of the three above answers in the case of one child, compared to 27.0 in the case of two or more children.

Work preference

Respondents who worked and who had someone other than themselves or their spouse look after any of their children while working were asked "When considering your own needs and those of your family, would you most prefer to work full-time, to work part-time, or not work at a job or business?". Those eligible to answer this question involved 55.4 percent of the sample or 92.3 percent of employed respondents.

For all persons who answered this question, excluding those for whom the answer is "blank" or "not stated", 33.6 percent answered "work full-time", 53.6 percent said "work part-time" and 12.8 percent said "not work" (Table 8). Clearly, those desiring to work part-time outnumber those working part-time. In the whole sample, 42.9 percent were working full-time, 17.1 percent part-time and 40.0 percent were not employed (Table 4). It is also significant that 12.8 percent of employed respondents said they would prefer not to work.

In many surveys of preferences people say that they prefer to do what they are doing. However, there is considerable departure from this generalization in these work preference responses. Among designated adults working full-time, 28.0 percent would prefer to work full-time, 30.5 prefer part-time, and an

additional 8.8 percent say that they would prefer not to work. The remainder of answers are blank or not stated. The responses for male designated adults are rather different, showing five times as much preference for full-time as compared to part-time work. Single parents are also more likely to prefer to work full-time.

This difference between current activity and preferences is not at all as common for those working part-time. For every person in this category who would prefer to work full-time, there are almost eight who prefer part-time. Those preferring not to work are slightly more numerous than those preferring to work full-time, among these people working part-time. Once again, the category most likely to desire to work full-time are the single parents.

The desire to work part-time is even stronger for those with two or more children under 13 years. For instance, in the case of both spouses working full-time, almost twice as many express a preference to work part-time as those preferring full-time work. In the second largest category, designated adults working part-time and spouse employed full-time, 3.8 percent would prefer to work full-time, 45.9 percent part-time and 6.3 percent not to work, with the remainder having no response. Employed single parents with two or more children continue to prefer full-time work.

Preference for changing work hours

After the question on preference to change the amount of work they do, employed respondents who depended on someone other than the spouse to look after children while working were asked if they would prefer to change the schedule of hours they are currently working. If they answered "yes", five specific plus one open ended change was suggested (Table 9). While 59.1 percent of employed respondents gave specific answers to the question on amount of work they do, 33.3 percent indicated specific responses to the question on changing work hours. For instance, among cases of both spouses working full-time, the desire to change work hours occurs in 39.0 percent of cases while the desire to either work part-time or to not work occurs in 41.7 percent of cases. It should be noted that some respondents may have wanted more than one change in the work hours, making for double counts in these totals.

Except the "other" category for which we did not obtain specific breakdowns, the most common response is to "work only during school hours". Next in prevalence comes "not work evenings" and "not work on week-ends", then "have consistent hours: no changing shifts" and finally "no more than eight hours per

shift". The response patterns do not vary extensively by the employment status of respondent and spouse. However, respondents employed part-time are least likely to want some change in the schedule of work hours (24.8 percent), while single parents are most likely (49.9 percent want some change). These responses confirm the observations of the section on preference to work full and part-time or not to work. That is, among persons employed, especially among those working full-time, there is a considerable preference to either work part-time or to change the work schedule to accommodate for children. Obviously, some of the responses on working evenings, week-ends, changing shifts and longer shifts may well be to accommodate the interests of the respondents themselves.

Distribution of children by work status of parents

As indicated, the 1988 National Child Care Survey involved households with children under 13 years. The survey permits the analysis to focus on respondents and their spouses/partners, as we have done in the earlier sections, or on the children themselves, to which we will now turn.

Some 46.3 percent of respondents (called designated adults) had one child, 39.8 percent had two and 13.9 percent had three or more children 12 and under. The average was 1.71 children under 13 years per respondent. Some 12.6 percent of the children had a lone parent.

Table 10 shows how these children are distributed by work status of the respondents and their spouses/partners. For all ages under 13, 57.5 percent of the children had employed designated adults. Some of these designated adults are working part-time or have spouses/partners working part-time. For all ages 13 and under combined, 36.9 percent had either both their parents working full-time or their single parent working full-time. The remaining almost two-thirds have access to parental time during normal working hours. At the two youngest age groups, 0-17 months and 18-35 months, 32.2 and 31.8 percent respectively have either both parents working full-time or a lone-parent working full-time. In contrast, at ages 10-12 years, 43.1 percent of children fall in these categories. At ages under 6, the largest category of parents are "designated adult not employed and spouse working full-time". At ages 6 and over the category of both spouses working full-time becomes the largest. The categories of designated adults working part-time involves 14.6 percent of children at ages 0-17 months and 18.4 at ages 10-12 years.

Considering the hours worked and studied during the reference week, and focusing on children under 3 years in two parent families (table not shown), 22.4

percent involve both spouses working 30 or more hours, 7.1 percent have parents each working 20 or more hours (but at least one not working 30 or more hours), and the remaining 70.5 percent fall in other categories (at least one parent working less than 20 hours). For lone parents, 26.0 percent have a parent working 30 or more hours, 8.1 percent 20-29 hours and 65.9 percent less than 20 hours in the reference week.

Main form of child care for each child

For each child, the survey has determined the main form of child care for each child, other than the designated adult when not working. This is also called the primary supplemental care arrangement, that is supplemental to the designated adult's care. For all ages, "child in school" is the largest single category, and consequently a subsequent table will be presented excluding school as an arrangement for children 6 and over.

We have combined three sub-totals involving group care, care by non-relatives and care by relatives (child's other parent, sibling, other relatives, child in own care and care by designated adult while working). This is to identify the proportion of care that basically involves the child's extended family. At ages 0-17 months this category involves 35.4 percent of main care, followed by 22.0 percent care by non-relatives and 3.4 percent in group care, and the remaining 39.2 percent having no care arrangement beyond the designated adult (Table 11). At 18-35 months the categories are in the same order but group care is increased to 11.0 percent and no arrangement is reduced to 29.4 percent. Excluding cases that have "no arrangement", the combined categories of group care and licensed care by non relatives amounts to 7.2 percent of total main care at ages 0-17 months and 17.6 percent at ages 18-35 months.

At ages 3-5 years, group care (including before and after school) becomes the dominant category (44.2 percent of cases where there is an arrangement), followed by care by relatives. At ages 6 and over, "child in school" is by far the largest category, followed by care by relatives. Thus, excluding the care by the designated adult only (called "no arrangement") and school, the category of care by relatives (including the respondent's spouse) is the largest component, except at ages 3-5 years where it is second after group care. In this care by relatives, the largest sub-category is relatives beyond the nuclear family.

Looking specifically at care arrangements for children of employed respondents, Table 12 shows that care by relatives is the largest category, even

at ages 3-5 years. This care amounts to 46.4 percent of the total at ages 0-17 months, 46.1 percent age 18-35 months and 37.2 percent at 3-5 years. The group care accounts for 4.1 percent of total care at 0-17 months, 12.8 percent at 18-35 months and 29.8 percent at 3-5 years. At ages under 3 years, care by non-relatives is more predominant than group care, with group care becoming the second category at ages 3-5 years.

Table 13 shows main care arrangements for children 6-12 years, excluding school as an arrangement, for employed respondents. The largest single category is the spouse while not working, followed by "no arrangement" at ages 6-9, and by "own care" at ages 10-12. The combined categories of "no arrangement", "relative out of child's home", "relative in child's home", "designated adult while working", "spouse", "sibling" or "own care" amount to 75.9 percent at ages 6-9 years and 92.1 percent at ages 10-12 years of care other than school, for these children of employed respondents. In effect, the vast majority of care outside of school at ages 6 and over is provided by the immediate and broader family.

In Table 14 the main care arrangements are listed for cases of both spouses, or lone parents, working or studying 30 hours or more in the reference week. Other than school, the predominant categories for two parent families are care by non-relatives at ages under 6 and relatives at ages 6 and over. For lone parents the largest categories are relatives for children aged 0-17 months, non-relatives at 18-35 months, group care at 3-5 years, and relatives again at 6-12 years. Relatives (including spouses and other children) account for 38.4 of main care for two-parent families at ages 0-17 months, and 29 percent in the next two age categories. The highest predominance of group care occurs for lone parents at child ages 3-5 years, where it amounts to 44.5 percent of total main care, followed by non-relatives at 25.3 percent. For two parent families, even at ages 3-5 years, group care comes third after care by non-relatives and relatives, in these cases of parents each working or studying 30 or more hours in the reference week.

It should be noted that these tables have considered only the main care arrangement. For employed respondents, there are two or more arrangements in 34.5 percent of cases at ages 0-17 months, 45.9 percent at ages 18-35 months, 65.7 percent at 3-5 years, 36.2 at 6-9 years and 32.9 percent at 10-12 years (excluding school as an arrangement). At ages 3-5 years, 28.4 percent have three or more, and 7.1 percent have four or more arrangements (excluding school).

Preferred child care

The National Child Care Survey asked employed respondents "Given your current work schedule and your present income, which type of arrangement would you most prefer to use for (each child) while you are working?". The response categories are listed in Table 15, along with the frequency of each response by age of child. Note that respondents may have preferred an arrangement involving more than one type of care, making for multiple entries. The table includes multiples but the sub-totals add a given sub-type only once.

For children under 18 months, the category of relatives is the most frequent response (33.3 percent), followed by non-relatives (28.0) and group-care (14.4). Since 29.5 percent did not reply, there are some 5.2 percent who are in more than one of the above categories. The main types of care by relatives are "other relative" followed by "spouse/partner".

At ages 18-35 months, the non-relative becomes slightly larger than the relative categories, with 23.4 percent preferring some form of group care. At ages 3-5 years, the option of care by relatives (spouse, other relatives or respondent while working) becomes the largest category again, with group care in third place at 27.1 percent.

Patterns are similar at older ages except that care by relatives becomes an even stronger proportion of the total and group care mostly means before and after school. In effect, at ages 10-12, only 29.2 percent indicate a preference for group care or non-relative care or relatives outside of the immediate family, in these cases of working respondents.

Responses are similar in cases where both respondents are working full-time (table not shown). However, care by non-relatives is a slightly larger preference than care by relatives for both age groups of children under three years, with group care being preferred by 14.5 percent for ages 0-17 months and 24.0 percent at 18-35 months. At 3-5 years the three categories of care by relatives, group care and care by non relatives are in almost equal proportions. Considering only cases of both spouses working 30 or more hours per week, the preference for group care increases further to 22.1 percent at ages 0-17 months, 27.6 at 18-35 months and 32.7 at 3-5 years. However, except at ages 3-5 years, the categories of care by relatives and by non-relatives each receive more preference than group care. When the respondent is employed part-time and spouse full-time, the preference for care by relatives increases. For instance, at ages 3-5 years, only 17.6 percent prefer group care, which is the highest preference for this type of care over the age groups of children.

The categories of employed respondents with "no spouse" typically have higher preference for group care. For those employed full-time, the group care preference is 10.1 percent at ages 0-17 months, 41.0 at 18-35 months, 47.0 at 3-5 year, 31.7 at 6-9 years and 13.8 percent at 10-12 years. Mostly, the later two age groups involve before and after school programs. Nonetheless, the preference for care by relatives is the highest category for children under 18 months. When the lone parent is employed part-time, the preference for group care is typically reduced slightly with a counter-balancing increase in preference for care by non-relatives.

After having stated the preferred care for each child, the survey asked whether the respondents were using this care and what factors were preventing use of these types of care. Table 16 shows simply the percentage who were not using a given preferred care. Overall, 20.1 percent are not using their preferred care, including over 23 percent at ages under 6 years. The most frequent reason given was that a given method was not available, followed by questions of cost or other circumstance.

When the preference is for group care, around half are not using this care, again mostly because it is not available. When the preference is for care by non-relatives, around a third are not using this care. For specific types of care by non-relatives, there is more difficulty with obtaining the preferred care in the child's home or licensed care, but less difficulty if the preference is for care in a non-licensed home. Only some 12 percent who prefer the latter are not using it for a given child. When the preference involves care by relatives, only 9.0 percent are not using this care, with the specific sub-category of "other relative" having the highest proportion not using their preferred care, among these categories of care by relatives of the child. In almost every specific instance by age and type of care, the factor of lack of availability is strongest followed by the cost factor. It should be noted that some of the specific percentages in Table 16 are based on rather small numbers, as seen in Table 15.

Summary

Both the literature reviewed and the specific surveys considered show that parents depend on a variety of forms of child care, which becomes the most complex when children are aged three to five years. However, it is also clear that the majority of care is by the immediate family itself, typically followed by the extended family of grandparents and other relatives. Not only in terms

of actual care, but also in terms of preferences, the broad category of care by relatives of the child, including the spouse of the parent principally responsible for child care, comprises the largest category. Care by non-relatives in the child's home or in another home is generally the second type, followed by group care. Group care becomes a somewhat higher proportion of total care in lone parent families, in families where both spouses work or study 30 or more hours per week, and especially for children aged three to five years.

Considering children under six years of age, the 1988 National Child Care Survey shows that 50.1 percent are living with at least one parent who is not employed (Table 10). Besides, 17.1 percent have at least one parent who is employed part-time. Thus only 32.7 percent have either both parents working full-time or are with a lone parent working full-time. From Table 14 we see that only 25.1 percent of children under six are in families where either both parents, or the lone parent, are working or studying 30 or more hours in the reference week. Clearly, these work patterns leave much room for the majority of parents to look after child care without outside assistance.

Concentrating on employed respondents (60 percent of the sample of respondents), the main form of child care is either "no arrangement", child in school, the spouse, or the respondent while working for 31.7 percent of children under six (Table 12). Care by other relatives of the child make up an additional 19.3 percent of the primary child care for these employed respondents. Care by non-relatives either in the child's home or in another home (but not licensed) makes up 27.7 percent, with 9.0 in nursery school, kindergarten or before and after school programs, and 12.2 in day care centres or licensed home day care. Considering the base of children who have some form of care beyond the parents and school as their primary form of care, 17.9 percent of these children under six are in day care centres or licensed home day care. This considers only the primary source of care for employed respondents, while 53.3 percent of these children have two or more arrangements (excluding school).

The distribution of primary care is not that different from that of preferred care: "given your current work schedule and your present income, which type of arrangement would you most prefer to use for (each child) while you are working?". Excluding the 18.8 percent of employed respondents who did not state a preference, 23.1 percent of expressed preferences for given children under six involved care by respondent and spouse, 15.7 percent by other relatives of the child, 30.9 by non-relatives not licensed, 4.8 in nursery school, kindergarten, or before and after school programs, and 25.5 percent in day care centres or licensed home day care (Table 15). This broad comparison would imply that

parents appear to want somewhat more of their children's care in formal settings and to assume less of it by themselves. This is confirmed by another observation that slightly more than half of persons who prefer day care centres are not using such care, mostly for lack of availability and cost (Table 16). Nonetheless, these preferences still imply that 43.6 percent of preferred arrangements are limited to the parents themselves, other relatives, nursery school or kindergarten and before and after school programs, for children under six of employed respondents.

At ages 6-12, the combined categories of no arrangement, spouse, respondent while working, sibling or own care amounts to 72.9 percent of primary care other than school, for children of employed respondents (Table 13). Also, only 40.2 percent indicate preference for some type of care that goes beyond the above categories (Table 15).

Responses to questions on child-related benefits also show preference for those benefits that would give more time for parents to be with their children. Asked to state their most preferred benefit, close to a third of the respondents with children under 13 years suggest either paid parental leave, flexible work hours, or the option of working part-time. There are also considerably more parents who would want to work part-time than the numbers actually working part-time. In fact, among respondents employed full-time, more would prefer to work part-time than those who prefer full-time work. In the case of respondents working part-time and spouse working full-time, there are 12 who respond that they prefer part-time work for every one that prefers full-time work.

Other results from the 1990 General Social Survey imply that a reasonable proportion of care by relatives outside of the immediate family involves the grandparents of the child. Among persons receiving care on a regular basis, 26.4 percent received at least part of this care from grandparents. Considering only one side of the family, in over half of cases, at least one grandparent is "available" in the sense of not being employed full-time and living within 100 km of the child. If the probabilities are equal on both sides of the family, this would mean that 75 percent of children would have at least one available grandparent within a reasonable distance of their home. This survey also shows that when parents are separated, fathers do not appear to be extensively involved in child care. Of children under 15 not living with a given parent, 73.3 percent are living with the mother, 17.2 percent with the father and 6.1 percent with other relatives. Only 57.1 percent of these children are living within 100 km of the absent parent, and 38.1 percent of saw their children either less than once a month or not at all.

The care of children under 13 years clearly involves a diversity of arrangements that partly follow on parental choices and preferences, and partly on available services and resources. Preferences are clearly divided, with some preferring to work less and be more available for their children, and others desiring a greater availability of formal care arrangements. The push for more formal care will continue, but it is equally important to note the extent of care by the immediate and broader family, which in the majority of cases is both the preferred and actual choice. In addition, care by non-relatives either in the child's home or in another home is typically more important than care in day care centres or licensed home day care, both in terms of preferences and in terms of actual use of care.

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Table 1. Reason for childcare among persons who received childcare

	Total	Children under 5	
		Total	Both parents working FT
Work at a job	1011 (88.7)	435 (91.0)	191 (99.0)
Study	234 (20.5)	100 (20.9)	31 (16.1)
Volunteer work	171 (15.0)	70 (14.6)	30 (15.5)
Care of another person	140 (12.3)	61 (12.8)	28 (14.5)
Do something else	284 (24.9)	110 (23.0)	39 (20.2)
Total receiving care on regular basis	1139(100.0)	478(100.0)	193(100.0)

Notes:

Includes cases where a given reason was only a partial reason for childcare.

Figures in parenthesis are a percent of the total receiving care.

FT: full-time.

Source: Public Use Sample from the 1990 General Social Survey (Cycle 5), Statistics Canada.

Table 2. Place of childcare among persons receiving childcare outside of the home

		<u>Children under 5</u>	
	Total	Total	Both parents working FT
Workplace daycare	106 (12.3)	53 (14.0)	21 (13.0)
Other daycare	354 (41.0)	172 (45.5)	82 (50.9)
Sitter's house	511 (59.2)	195 (51.6)	82 (50.9)
Grandparent's house	213 (24.7)	103 (27.2)	42 (26.1)
Other rel. house	163 (18.8)	74 (19.6)	28 (17.4)
Other arrangement	100 (11.6)	45 (11.9)	16 (9.9)
Total care received outside household	863(100.0)	378(100.0)	161(100.0)

Notes:

Includes cases where there is more than one source of care.

Figures in parenthesis are a percent of the total receiving care outside of their household.

FT: full-time.

rel.: relative

Source: Public Use Sample from the 1990 General Social Survey (Cycle 5), Statistics Canada.

Table 3. Persons providing childcare in child's home

	Total	Children under 5	
		Total	Both parents working FT
Child's grandparents	117 (27.2)	50 (32.7)	12 (23.5)
Another relative	112 (26.0)	36 (23.5)	8 (15.7)
Sitter or nanny	291 (67.7)	92 (60.1)	33 (64.7)
Someone else	39 (9.1)	12 (7.8)	6 (11.8)
Total of child receiving care in respondent's home	430(100.0)	153(100.0)	51(100.0)

Notes:

Includes cases where there is more than one source of care.

Figures in parenthesis are a percent of the total receiving care inside their household.

FT: full-time.

Source: Public Use Sample from the 1990 General Social Survey (Cycle 5), Statistics Canada.

Table 4. Employment status of respondent (and spouse/partner) by gender or respondent

Employment status	Total	Males	Females
	I N T H O U S A N D S		
Total	2724.3	123.6	2600.7
Both full-time	910.7	50.2	860.5
Respondent FT, spouse PT	16.1	9.9	6.2
Respondent FT, spouse NE	59.5	13.5	46.0
Respondent FT, no spouse	181.8	25.4	156.5
Respondent PT, spouse FT	410.2	1.4	408.8
Both part-time	4.4	0.3	4.1
Respondent PT, spouse NE	15.3	0.4	14.9
Respondent PT, no spouse	36.1	0.9	35.2
Respondent NE, spouse FT	811.5	11.0	800.5
Respondent NE, spouse PT	9.7	0.5	9.2
Neither employed	87.4	3.7	83.7
Respondent NE, no spouse	181.6	6.3	175.3
Sub-totals:			
Respondent employed	1634.1	102.0	1532.1
No spouse	399.5	32.6	366.9
Has spouse	2324.8	91.0	2233.8

Note: FT: full-time

PT: part-time

NE: not employed

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 5. Employment status of respondent (and spouse/partner) by number of children under 13

Employment status	Number of children			
	Total	One	Two	Three+
	I N	T H O U S A N D S		
Total	2724.3	1261.0	1085.5	377.8
Both Full-time	910.7	454.0	367.0	89.7
Respondent FT, spouse PT	16.1	7.6	6.1	2.4
Respondent FT, spouse NE	59.5	32.1	21.4	6.0
Respondent FT, no spouse	181.8	126.2	46.6	9.0
Respondent PT, spouse FT	410.2	153.7	186.1	70.4
Both Part-time	4.4	2.7	0.9	0.8
Respondent PT, spouse NE	15.3	7.7	5.9	1.7
Respondent PT, no spouse	36.1	23.6	9.7	2.7
Respondent NE, spouse FT	811.5	304.3	348.6	158.6
Respondent NE, spouse PT	9.7	5.2	3.2	1.4
Neither employed	87.4	40.3	32.1	15.0
Respondent NE, no spouse	181.6	103.5	57.8	20.3
Sub-totals:				
Respondent employed	1634.1	807.7	643.8	182.6
No spouse	399.5	253.4	114.1	32.0
Has spouse	2324.8	1007.7	971.3	345.8

Note: FT: full-time

PT: part-time

NE: not employed

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 6. What one child-related benefit would you like your employer to provide

		<u>Respondent employed</u>		
	Total	Total	Both FT	No Spouse
	I N T H O U S A N D S			
Total	2724.3	1634.1	910.7	217.9
Workplace daycare	303.8	302.7	172.6	45.1
Paid parental leave	99.2	98.7	60.8	9.3
Flexible work hours	244.1	243.2	141.5	40.2
Option of working PT	124.2	123.7	89.4	11.2
Other	153.7	153.5	82.3	30.8
None	404.9	402.9	204.9	55.5
Blank	1349.4	265.0	138.7	20.7
Not stated	45.0	44.4	20.4	5.1

Note: FT: full-time

PT: part-time

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 7. What one child related benefit would you like your spouse's employer to provide, for female designated adults, by categories of employment status, for total and census metropolitan area populations

Benefit	Both work	DA PT	DA NE
	FT I N	spouse FT T H O U S A N D S	Spouse FT
<u>Total population</u>			
Total	860.5	408.8	800.5
Blank	162.5	98.7	120.2
Workplace daycare	110.1	46.8	98.3
Paid parental leave	83.6	34.9	86.8
Flexible work hours	138.8	48.9	102.6
Option of working PT	17.2	5.3	15.2
Other	75.3	35.3	61.9
None	253.2	130.0	291.5
Not stated	19.7	7.0	24.0
<u>Census metropolitan areas</u>			
Total	559.8	250.2	499.5
Blank	85.9	51.2	74.1
Workplace daycare	78.2	32.5	68.5
Paid parental leave	53.3	21.6	53.2
Flexible work hours	100.1	31.1	67.3
Option of working PT	10.0	3.5	7.5
Other	55.7	22.4	38.9
None	162.0	83.2	174.5
Not stated	14.6	4.7	15.4

Note: DA: designated adult
 FT: full-time
 PT: part-time
 NE: not employed

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
 Statistics Canada

Table 8. When considering your needs and those of your family, would you most prefer to work full-time, to work part-time or not work at a job or business, by employment status of respondent and spouse/partner, for employed respondents

	Total	Blank	FT	PT	Not work	Not stated
I N T H O U S A N D S						
Total	1508.6	301.0	324.8	518.1	123.3	241.4
DA FT, spouse FT	826.2	130.0	210.2	269.2	75.0	141.7
DA FT, spouse PT	15.7	4.0	4.9	2.7	1.5	2.6
DA FT, spouse NE	55.2	24.0	10.2	10.6	3.3	7.0
DA FT, no spouse	170.8	8.3	74.1	43.5	14.0	30.9
DA PT, spouse FT	387.6	119.3	15.4	174.3	26.4	52.2
DA PT, spouse PT	4.2	1.7	0.3	1.2	0.2	0.7
DA PT, spouse NE	14.5	6.6	1.9	4.3	0.8	0.9
DA PT, no spouse	34.5	7.2	7.8	12.1	2.0	5.3
Sub-totals:						
No spouse	205.3	15.5	81.9	55.6	16.0	36.2
Has spouse	1303.3	285.5	242.9	462.5	107.2	205.2

Note: DA: designated adult

FT: full-time

PT: part-time

NE: not employed

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 9. Preference for changing work hours for employed respondents, showing given categories of employment status

	Total	DA FT spouse FT	DA PT spouse FT	No spouse
	I N	T H O U S A N D S		
Total	1508.6	826.2	387.6	205.3
Work only in school hrs	145.2	90.2	23.4	27.1
Not work evenings	77.7	40.9	16.3	16.9
Not work weed ends	75.7	39.3	16.0	16.5
No changing shifts	65.6	31.8	13.9	16.1
No more than 8 hrs per shift	48.4	29.4	8.0	8.7
Other	132.7	90.5	18.5	17.1

Note: FT: full-time
PT: part-time
DA: designated adult

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 10. Work status of respondent (and spouse/partner) by age of children

	All ages	0-17 mo.	18-35 mo.	3-5 yrs.	6-9 yrs.	10-12 yrs.
		I N T H O U S A N D S				
Total	4658.5	559.0	531.9	1073.9	1436.8	1056.9
Both FT	1472.0	172.1	150.8	310.3	463.1	375.8
DA FT spouse PT	27.2	4.3	2.4	7.6	6.2	6.6
DA FT spouse NE	94.7	10.7	14.4	20.9	24.7	23.9
DA FT no spouse	247.4	7.9	18.3	49.4	92.3	79.4
DA PT spouse FT	755.4	73.6	82.0	178.8	245.7	175.2
Both PT	6.9	1.3	0.9	1.2	2.1	1.3
DA PT spouse NE	24.7	3.5	3.2	6.0	7.2	4.8
DA PT no spouse	52.0	3.1	4.4	10.8	20.1	13.6
DA NE spouse FT	1520.0	217.1	202.3	373.8	444.0	282.7
DA NE spouse PT	16.2	3.5	1.3	4.7	3.9	2.9
Neither employed	154.6	23.3	19.3	36.5	41.9	33.6
DA NE no spouse	287.4	38.6	32.6	73.7	85.6	57.0
Sub-totals:						
DA employed	2680.2	276.6	276.5	585.1	861.4	680.7
No spouse	586.9	49.6	55.3	133.9	198.1	150.0
Has spouse	4071.6	509.5	476.6	939.9	1238.7	906.9

Note: FT: full-time
PT: part-time
NE: not employed
DA: designated adult

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 11. Main care by age of children

	All ages	0-17 mo.	18-35 mo.	3-5 yrs.	6-9 yrs.	10-12 yrs.
		I N T H O U S A N D S				
Total	4658.5	559.0	531.9	1073.9	1436.8	1056.9
Group Care	497.6	19.2	58.3	410.1	10.0	0.0
Daycare	154.8	15.0	42.7	95.1	2.0	0.0
Nursery/K	336.2	4.2	15.6	310.1	6.3	0.0
B-A School	6.6	0.0	0.0	4.9	1.7	0.0
Non-relative	467.5	123.1	138.5	182.6	17.4	5.9
Child's home	158.6	41.9	46.5	58.3	9.8	2.1
Not licensed	286.5	76.0	84.3	115.2	7.5	3.5
Licensed	22.4	5.2	7.7	9.1	0.1	0.3
Relative	747.7	197.8	178.4	268.1	57.7	45.5
Spouse	203.7	43.9	41.8	79.1	22.5	16.4
Sibling	8.4	0.3	0.8	1.5	1.7	4.0
Other rel	419.1	134.4	109.0	139.0	23.9	12.8
Own care	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	3.1
DA while working	112.9	19.2	26.9	48.4	9.1	9.2
Child in school	2394.1	0.0	0.0	66.8	1333.5	993.8
No arrangement	551.7	218.9	156.6	146.2	18.3	11.6

Note: K: kindergarten
 B-A: before and after school program
 DA: designated adult
 rel: relative

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
 Statistics Canada

Table 12. Main care for employed respondents by age of children, for children under 6 years

	0-17 mo.	18-35 mo.	3-5 yrs.
	I N T H O U S A N D S		
Total	276.6	276.5	585.1
Group care	11.4	35.4	174.6
Daycare	10.6	32.0	76.9
Nursery/K	0.9	3.4	93.5
B-A school	0.0	0.0	4.2
Non-relative	88.5	101.7	145.3
Child's home	23.4	29.2	39.2
Not licensed	60.4	65.6	98.0
Licensed	4.7	6.9	8.1
Relative	128.4	127.4	217.6
Spouse	41.6	40.3	76.8
Sibling	0.3	0.8	1.4
Other rel	67.3	59.4	90.8
Own care	0.0	0.0	0.1
DA while working	19.2	26.9	48.4
Child in school	0.0	0.0	37.1
No arrangement	48.2	12.0	10.5

Note: K: kindergarten
 B-A: before and after school program
 DA: designated adult
 rel: relative

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
 Statistics Canada

Table 13. Main care for employed respondents while respondent working or studying, by age of children, for children 6 to 12 years

	6-9 yrs.	10-12 yrs.
	I N T H O U S A N D S	
Total	861.4	680.7
No arrangement	166.7	125.7
Nursery/K	0.5	0.0
B-A School	37.9	6.8
Daycare	12.5	0.0
Non-relative in child's house	47.5	15.6
Relative out of child's home	53.8	28.6
Relative in child's home	47.7	25.8
Non-relative licensed	6.3	1.3
Non-relative not licensed	103.2	29.9
DA while working	69.4	48.7
Spouse while working	11.3	8.9
Spouse in home	203.5	173.4
Sibling	56.4	80.8
Own care	44.7	135.2

Note: K: kindergarten
 B-A: before and after school program
 DA: designated adult
 rel: relative

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
 Statistics Canada

Table 14. Main care by age of children, for respondents and spouses working or studying 30 or more hours in reference week

	0-17 mo.	18-35 mo.	3-5 yrs.	6-9 yrs.	10-12 yrs.
I N T H O U S A N D S					
Both parents 30 or more hrs.:	101.0	120.3	246.0	375.8	321.8
Group care	7.0	19.8	60.2	1.8	0.0
Non-relative	48.8	54.4	78.3	7.0	1.8
Relative	38.8	35.9	72.0	20.8	18.0
Child in school	0.0	0.0	14.6	340.8	296.6
No arrangement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Lone parent 30 or more hrs.:	8.3	19.0	49.0	89.5	77.7
Group care	1.5	5.7	21.8	1.0	0.0
Non-relative	3.2	7.9	12.4	3.7	1.0
Relative	3.4	4.8	10.2	4.0	4.6
Child in school	0.0	0.0	3.2	79.9	71.2
No arrangement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 15. Preferred care by age of children, for employed respondents

	All ages	0-17 mo.	18-35 mo.	3-5 yrs.	6-9 yrs.	10-12 yrs.
I N T H O U S A N D S						
Total	2680.2	276.6	276.5	585.1	861.4	680.7
Group care	480.8	39.7	64.7	158.6	150.2	67.5
Daycare	287.6	38.9	59.3	121.7	45.2	22.6
Nursery sch.	31.4	0.9	6.6	23.4	0.5	0.0
B-A school	181.8	0.3	0.2	18.2	113.3	49.9
Non-relative(1)	607.4	77.5	93.4	172.9	184.6	79.0
Child's home	302.5	41.7	48.0	84.4	88.2	40.2
Not licensed	269.6	30.0	38.8	77.1	86.4	37.3
Licensed	71.1	10.6	12.4	20.6	20.0	7.5
Relative	1028.2	92.0	90.0	201.3	311.3	333.6
Spouse/partner	373.1	33.8	32.7	80.7	126.4	99.5
Sibling	137.7	0.7	0.9	7.1	50.4	78.6
Other relative	293.2	43.9	36.7	73.4	87.1	52.1
Own care	110.1	0.8	0.4	1.7	16.1	91.1
DA while work	183.7	18.1	23.8	50.0	53.7	38.1
Not stated	693.2	81.6	42.4	90.1	251.1	228.0

(1) This sub-total was determined by adding licensed care to a sub-total of non-relative in child's home plus non-relative in another home but not licensed. As a consequence, there can be some overlap between the sub-categories which is not excluded in the total of care by non-relatives. In all the instances of group care and care by relatives, all overlap between the sub-categories is counted only once.

Note: DA: designated adulte

B-A: before and after school program

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

Table 16. Percentage non using preferred care for given children, by age of children, for employed respondents

	All ages	0-17 mo.	18-35 mo.	3-5 yrs.	6-9 yrs.	10-12 yrs.
Total	20.1	23.1	27.8	24.9	18.8	13.1
Group care	57.6	68.0	59.5	48.1	60.5	65.8
Daycare	51.5	68.1	58.9	45.8	48.7	31.9
Nursery sch.	50.6	88.8	68.2	44.9	40.0	0.0
B-A school	68.2	0.0	50.0	58.2	65.1	78.8
Non-relative(1)	32.8	33.3	34.4	31.9	30.9	37.1
Child's home	51.5	52.5	54.3	51.3	49.2	52.7
Not licensed	13.0	12.7	11.6	11.3	12.2	20.4
Licensed	38.7	26.4	37.1	38.3	41.5	52.0
Relative	9.0	15.6	11.9	11.7	7.4	6.3
Spouse/partner	6.6	13.3	9.5	8.8	5.4	4.2
Sibling	2.5	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.6	3.1
Other relative	17.2	18.5	16.3	17.7	15.0	19.6
Own care	3.9	12.5	0.0	23.5	4.3	3.0
DA while working	6.6	12.7	6.7	7.6	4.8	5.0

(1) This sub-total was determined by adding licensed care to a sub-total of non-relative in child's home plus non-relative in another home but not licensed. As a consequence, there can be some overlap between the sub-categories which is not excluded in the total of care by non-relatives. In all the instances of group care and care by relatives, all overlap between the sub-categories is counted only once.

Note: DA: designated adulte

B-A: before and after school program

Source: Special tabulations from 1988 National Child Care Survey,
Statistics Canada

RAPPORT DE RECHERCHE SOUMIS AU
SECRÉTARIAT DE L'ÉTUDE DE L'ÉVOLUTION DÉMOGRAPHIQUE
ET SON INCIDENCE SUR LA POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE

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Titre du projet

Quitter ses parents, hier et aujourd'hui:
quand, pour qui, pour quoi?

par

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Introduction

Parmi les événements qui régissent le cycle de la vie individuelle et familiale, le départ de la famille d'origine est sans contredit le moins bien connu. Cette étude a pour objectif de mettre en lumière les connaissances acquises sur ce sujet et d'exploiter de façon exploratoire l'Enquête sociale générale sur la famille et les amis pour faire un portrait synthétique de l'évolution de ce phénomène au Canada.

I. PREMIERE PARTIE

Revue de la littérature en sociologie et en démographie

Dans les sociétés occidentales contemporaines, les familles s'attendent à ce que les enfants qu'elles ont élevés quittent le foyer pour vivre de façon autonome lorsqu'ils atteignent l'âge adulte. Ce processus a été étudié à plusieurs reprises, mais il reste en partie mal connu puisqu'aucune grande synthèse n'a encore pu être réalisée: les efforts de conceptualisation de la signification du départ de la famille d'origine n'ont pas été poussés assez loin et, en conséquence, les résultats de recherche empiriques sont souvent fragmentaires et difficiles à interpréter.

Dans le cadre de cette étude, les travaux effectués dans la perspective sociologique et démographique ont été inventoriés. Les études en psychologie n'ont pas été retenues, car elles portent essentiellement sur les départs associés à des formes de délinquance, plus particulièrement les fugues et les comportements "marginiaux" (English, 1973; Haley, 1980). Quelques-unes toutefois présentent le départ des jeunes comme un moment normal de l'évolution d'un individu ou du cycle de vie familiale (Sullivan et Sullivan, 1980; Goleman, 1980); on considère alors le départ physique et le départ psychologique,

qui ne coïncident pas nécessairement; il s'agit fondamentalement du développement d'une relation différente avec les parents.

Quelle est donc en sociologie et en démographie la signification du départ des enfants de leur foyer d'origine et comment faut-il l'interpréter? Les auteurs qui se sont intéressés à la question ne sont pas toujours très explicites à cet égard. On peut toutefois affirmer que la majorité d'entre eux considèrent cet événement comme une transition entre l'adolescence et la vie adulte (Kiernan, 1989; Young, 1987), ces deux concepts n'étant pas définis avec une grande précision. Le départ de la famille d'origine peut être associé, mais pas nécessairement, aux éléments suivants: l'indépendance économique (Kiernan, 1989; Young, 1987), la fin des études (Young, 1987), le mariage (Young, 1987), le fait d'avoir un enfant (Young, 1987) ou tout simplement le désir d'autonomie en soi. En définitive, c'est le départ des enfants, c'est-à-dire le fait de ne plus habiter chez leurs parents qui est étudié; on ne peut affirmer que ce fait consacre vraiment le moment où les jeunes sont complètement indépendants de leur famille du point de vue physique, psychologique, matériel et financier. D'ailleurs, les retours nombreux qui sont observés montrent à l'évidence que la coupure n'est pas complète pour plusieurs et que le moment où le jeune devient un adulte tout à fait autonome est difficile à identifier. Il s'agit sans doute d'un processus dont les étapes varient suivant les circonstances individuelles et familiales, le fait de ne plus habiter avec les parents étant l'un des indicateurs observables les plus significatifs.

Que sait-on sur le départ des enfants? Quatre grands thèmes permettent de regrouper les études sociologiques et démographiques sur le sujet:

a) l'évolution et les variations de l'âge au départ;

- b) les motifs du départ;
- c) les facteurs qui influencent le départ des jeunes;
- d) les départs et les retours.

En examinant chacun de ces points, nous mentionnerons au passage les problèmes liés aux données disponibles et à la mesure du phénomène.

a) L'évolution et les variations de l'âge au départ du foyer d'origine

Etablir l'âge auquel les jeunes quittent leur famille d'origine semble une opération fort simple. Or les résultats de la recherche montrent que tel n'est pas le cas. En effet, les données disponibles et les méthodes utilisées font qu'il est difficile d'obtenir des valeurs comparables d'une époque ou d'un pays à l'autre. On distingue d'une part les études longitudinales (Goldscheider et Da Vanzo, 1985) et les études rétrospectives (Mayer, 1984; Young, 1987) à partir desquelles on établit l'âge moyen ou médian pour des générations; par ailleurs, les recensements (Glick et Lin, 1986; Heer, Hodge et Felson, 1985; Schwarz, 1984; Brass, 1984; Péron, Lapierre-Adamcyk et Morissette, 1986) ou les enquêtes ponctuelles (De Vos, 1989; Kiernan, 1989) permettent le calcul de l'âge moyen ou médian à partir de la proportion d'enfants habitant chez leurs parents au moment de la collecte. Rarement les données permettent de tenir compte des mouvements d'aller-retour qui marquent souvent ce phénomène.

Voyons maintenant les principaux résultats:

Mayer (1984) observe à partir de son étude sur les jeunes adultes de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne un déclin dans l'âge médian du départ. Pour les cohortes nées dans les années 1930, 1940 et 1950 et qui ont quitté la maison dans les années 1950, 1960 et 1970 respectivement, le déclin de l'âge au

départ est de 25,5 à 25,2 et à 24,1 ans pour les hommes et de 23,6 à 22,5 et à 21,0 ans pour les filles. Young (1987) pour l'Australie constate une baisse de 0,5 ans dans l'âge du départ entre les cohortes nées en 1948-52 et celles nées en 1958-62.

Brass (1984) en Angleterre, grâce à l'utilisation des populations stables et de données de recensements, constate une augmentation de l'âge du départ entre 1971-76 et 1976-81. Il signale que cette augmentation est inférieure à l'augmentation de l'âge médian au mariage pour les deux sexes au cours de la même période.

Les résultats de Schwarz (1984) pour l'Allemagne à partir de l'étude de cohortes nées en 1947-51, 1952-56 et 1957-61 (cohortes plus jeunes que celles étudiées par Mayer 1984), basée sur des données de recensements, démontrent une augmentation de la proportion d'individus d'un âge donné dans leur foyer d'origine, donc une augmentation de l'âge au départ.

Les mêmes résultats sont observés pour les Etats-Unis où une augmentation de la proportion de jeunes habitant chez leurs parents est observée en 1983-1984 comparativement aux années 1970 (Heer, Hodge et Felson, 1985; Glick et Lin, 1986). Ce fait est attribué par Glick et Lin (1986) à l'augmentation de la proportion de jeunes qui font des études universitaires et habitent dans leur famille, à la liberté sexuelle avant le mariage (qui réduit le besoin de se marier), à l'augmentation des taux de divorce (qui provoque souvent le retour des enfants à leur famille d'origine), à l'augmentation du taux de chômage (qui fait que les jeunes ne peuvent pas toujours affronter les coûts d'avoir leur propre logement) et finalement, à l'augmentation de la proportion de mères

célibataires avec des enfants (qui reviennent souvent chez leurs parents).

Par contre, Péron, Lapierre-Adamcyk et Morissette (1986) constatent que pour le Canada il n'y a pas eu de changement de l'âge au départ entre 1971 et 1981; les femmes quittent en moyenne à 20,5 ans et les hommes à 22,5 ans.

D'après Young (1987), les variations de l'âge au départ, soit dans le temps, soit entre les pays, sont moins importantes chez les femmes que chez les hommes.

D'autre part, une conclusion se retrouve dans la majorité des études: les femmes quittent leur famille d'origine plus jeunes que les hommes. Cette différence est attribuable à des facteurs sociaux et économiques liés à l'évolution et au développement des pays étudiés. Etant donné que les femmes généralement se marient plus jeunes que les hommes (Young, 1987; Goldscheider et Da Vanzo, 1985) et que, comme on le verra plus tard, le mariage reste la raison fondamentale du départ (Goldscheider et Da Vanzo, 1985; De Vos, 1989), il est normal alors que les hommes quittent à un âge plus avancé que les femmes. En Amérique latine, par contre, l'explication du départ plus tardif des hommes est attribué par De Vos (1989), non seulement au mariage plus précoce des femmes, mais aussi à des facteurs économiques. Parce qu'ils travaillent, les hommes représentent une valeur économique supérieure pour leur ménage, surtout dans le milieu rural, et cela fait qu'ils sont retenus plus longtemps par leurs familles d'origine que les femmes.

En bref, se dégagent les tendances et les différences suivantes:

- depuis les années 1940, l'âge au départ a eu tendance à s'abaisser jusqu'aux années 1970 chez les hommes et les femmes;
- depuis 1970, on observe une légère remontée;
- de façon systématique, les femmes quittent leur foyer d'origine plus jeunes que les hommes et cela est vrai pour les diverses époques et les divers pays étudiés;
- de plus, les âges moyens et médians se situent toujours entre 20 et 25 ans pour la période couverte par la littérature, soit des années 1940 à 1990.

b) Les motifs du départ

Dé tous les travaux qui étudient les motifs du départ, ceux de Christabel Young (1987) sont sans doute les plus complets et les plus importants. Ces analyses distinguent le premier départ et le départ définitif et identifient le mariage comme étant la raison principale pour justifier le départ de la maison. En Australie, 31% des hommes et 45% des femmes quittent leurs parents pour se marier quand on fait référence seulement au premier départ; ces pourcentages augmentent à 44% et 57% respectivement lorsque tous les départs sont pris en compte. Les femmes ont donc ici une propension plus forte à quitter pour se marier que les hommes; le contraire est observé en Allemagne (Mayer et Schwarz, 1989).

L'importance du mariage comme motif du départ a été identifiée dans toutes les études qui s'intéressent à cette question (Young, 1987; De Vos, 1989; Goldscheider et Da Vanzo, 1985; Barker, 1972 et d'autres). Par ailleurs Goldscheider et Le Bourdais (1986) signalent que le processus de départ est

devenu plus complexe dans les dernières décennies: les jeunes quittent de plus en plus souvent leur famille sans avoir comme objectif immédiat la constitution d'une famille; ces auteurs poussent plus loin le raisonnement en affirmant que pour les cohortes récentes le moment du départ ne peut s'expliquer par le fait de travailler, d'étudier ou de se marier, signes habituellement associés à l'entrée dans la vie adulte, car une proportion grandissante quittent sans avoir atteint ces étapes. Par contre, Barker (1972) montre que le mariage continue d'être le geste le plus significatif, car les jeunes de South Wales dont elle a étudié le comportement considèrent le départ pour le travail ou les études comme temporaire.

D'après Young (1987), d'autres raisons ont une importance considérable pour expliquer le départ des jeunes: l'indépendance, les conflits familiaux, les études, le travail et les voyages. Ces raisons varient en importance selon le sexe. Pour les femmes, les raisons du départ les plus importantes après le mariage sont: l'indépendance (10%), les études (9%), le travail (9%), et les conflits familiaux (9%); tandis que pour les hommes, on trouve l'indépendance (18%), le travail (18%), les voyages (7%) et les études (6%). Le service militaire constitue aussi fréquemment une raison de départ dans certains pays (Goldscheider et Le Bourdais, 1986; Young, 1987).

Les jeunes qui quittent leur famille à la recherche d'indépendance ou à cause de conflits le font à des âges moins élevés que ceux qui partent pour se marier et, très souvent, retournent chez leurs parents pour repartir plus tard. La distance qu'ils mettent entre eux et leur famille est beaucoup plus grande que celle enregistrée pour ceux qui quittent pour se marier (Young, 1987).

Les études peuvent influencer le départ dans des sens contraires. D'une part, le fait d'étudier peut provoquer le départ des enfants quand les études se déroulent à l'extérieur du milieu géographique d'origine (Young, 1987); d'autre part, on observe souvent que les études provoquent une remise du départ (Grigsby et McGowan, 1986). D'après Grigsby et McGowan (1986), aux Etats-Unis, les études constituent une raison légitime pour que les adultes restent chez leurs parents: pour tous les groupes d'âge, la moitié des jeunes adultes qui habitent chez leurs parents étudient.

En France, jusqu'à 18 ans, les actifs quittent plus fréquemment leur famille que ceux qui sont encore aux études. Par contre, ce rapport s'inverse au moment du passage à l'enseignement supérieur (INSEE, 1981). Les données sur l'Allemagne indiquent que les départs pour des raisons professionnelles constituent 20% du total des départs (Mayer et Schwarz., 1989).

Le mariage semble, en définitive, même s'il a subi un recul, le motif le plus fréquemment invoqué pour expliquer le départ des jeunes. D'autres motifs sont importants, dont le travail et le désir d'autonomie. Pour ce qui est des études, leur effet varie: elles peuvent dans certaines circonstances justifier le départ; dans d'autres cas, elles motivent les jeunes à rester dans leur foyer d'origine. Malgré quelques nuances, les divers pays étudiés présentent un éventail assez semblable de raisons associées au départ des jeunes.

c) Les facteurs qui influencent le départ des jeunes

Les motifs du départ que nous venons d'examiner correspondent aux raisons qui sont invoquées par les jeunes lorsqu'on les interroge à ce sujet dans des enquêtes. D'autres facteurs sont associés au départ des jeunes et en particulier

à l'âge où il se produit. Plusieurs études se sont attachées à identifier ces facteurs. Voici les principaux résultats.

Young (1974) signale que le bagage socio-économique des familles et des enfants a un effet opposé sur l'âge au départ selon le sexe. Une éducation supérieure des parents ou de l'enfant s'associe à une augmentation de l'âge au départ des filles et à une réduction de l'âge au départ des garçons. Le pays d'origine de la mère semble aussi provoquer les mêmes différences selon le sexe des enfants. Le revenu par contre a un effet similaire sur l'âge au départ pour les deux sexes. Les enfants de familles à revenu moyen (surtout les garçons) ont tendance à quitter plus jeunes que les enfants de familles plus ou moins aisées.

Péron, Lapierre-Adamcyk et Morissette (1986) ont conclu qu'au Canada, les familles rompues se contractent, c'est-à-dire qu'elles voient partir leurs enfants plus tôt que les familles non rompues, et que parmi ces dernières la contraction était plus précoce en 1981 qu'elle ne l'était en 1971 chez les familles moyennes ou nombreuses et plus tardive chez les petites familles de un ou deux enfants.

Dans le même sens, Burch (1985) et Mitchell, Wister et Burch (1989) affirment que la probabilité qu'un enfant demeure avec ses parents est fortement liée à sa situation dans la famille (enfant propre, adopté ou d'un autre lit). Les enfants d'un autre lit semblent quitter le foyer du beau-père ou de la belle-mère à un âge beaucoup plus jeune que ne le font les enfants adoptés ou les propres enfants. A partir des données de l'enquête sur la famille réalisée par Statistique Canada en 1984 où les adultes interrogés devaient indiquer à quel âge leurs enfants les avaient quittés, Burch (1985) soutient que le nombre accru d'enfants d'un autre lit qui quittent le foyer des parents répondants à un âge donné s'explique par le fait

que la plupart d'entre eux peuvent aller demeurer avec leur autre parent naturel.

D'autres facteurs sont parfois liés à la décision de quitter le foyer: l'espacement entre les enfants, le fait que la mère travaille ou pas, l'âge de la mère au mariage et le prix des logements.

Quand le nombre d'enfants d'une famille est considéré, les filles appartenant à des familles nombreuses ont un âge moyen au départ inférieur, tandis que pour les garçons, on ne constate pas de différences (Young, 1974). Selon Burch (1985), l'âge moyen auquel les enfants d'un couple ou d'une personne ont quitté le foyer dépend, entre autres, du nombre d'enfants à l'origine; de plus, il affirme que plus le nombre d'enfants est élevé, plus la période de "solitude" dans le cycle de vie d'un couple est courte.

Certains auteurs ont essayé d'analyser s'il existait un lien entre le travail de la mère à l'extérieur du ménage et le départ des enfants. Burch (1985) affirme pour le Canada que le fait pour la mère de travailler à l'extérieur ne semble pas avoir une influence sur l'âge auquel les jeunes adultes quittent le foyer. L'âge au départ est à peu près le même, peu importe que la mère de ce jeune adulte ait eu un travail à l'extérieur de la maison ou qu'elle ait interrompu ce travail pour donner naissance ou élever son enfant.

Young (1974; 1987) par contre conclut que dans le cas de l'Australie, le fait que la mère ait travaillé à l'extérieur du ménage pendant que l'enfant grandissait affecte l'âge au départ en le réduisant, surtout chez les filles.

L'âge de la mère au moment de son mariage est une variable qui conditionne fortement le départ des filles:

d'après Young (1974), les filles sont influencées considérablement par le modèle parental.

Un autre aspect qui a été considéré dans l'étude du départ est le prix des logements. D'après Kiernan (1989), la possibilité de trouver des logements bon marché est un facteur très important qui conditionne le départ des jeunes. Harrison (1981) signale qu'il existe une relation directe entre le revenu et le degré d'intimité et d'autonomie que les individus peuvent se donner en choisissant de vivre en dehors de leur foyer d'origine.

d) Les départs et les retours

Peu d'auteurs font référence aux jeunes qui retournent chez leurs parents après un premier départ. L'étude de Young (1987) analyse en profondeur le cycle de départ en accordant une importance primordiale à la proportion de jeunes qui rentrent chez leurs parents après un départ et à la durée moyenne de temps passé entre le départ et le retour. Elle affirme que le retour est un fait qui prend beaucoup d'importance surtout parmi les jeunes qui quittent pour des raisons autres que le mariage. Young observe que les hommes ont plus tendance à revenir que les femmes, et signale aussi que le phénomène du retour atteint un sommet pendant la deuxième année qui suit le départ; d'autre part, si un retour doit avoir lieu, il aura lieu certainement durant les cinq premières années suivant le départ.

Goldscheider et Da Vanzo (1985), ainsi que Farnsworth et Riche (1988), étudient le retour en fonction des événements qui marquent la transition entre diverses étapes de la vie. Ils concluent que le divorce ainsi que le fait d'échouer à l'université constituent deux événements qui entraînent souvent le retour vers la famille d'origine. Dans le même

sens, Grigsby et McGowan (1986) ainsi que Glick et Lin (1986) démontrent que la proportion de jeunes divorcés habitant chez leurs parents est élevée. Par exemple, en 1980, 10% des fils et 17% des filles âgés entre 23 et 29 ans et qui résidaient avec leurs parents étaient séparés, divorcés ou veufs, tandis que cette proportion était de 30% et de 35% respectivement chez ceux qui avaient 30 ans et plus (Grigsby et McGowan, 1986).

Certains auteurs signalent quelques caractéristiques des jeunes qui provoquent parfois leur retour. Young (1987) conclut que le retour est plus fréquent chez ceux qui quittent leur maison et l'école en étant encore très jeunes, et parmi ceux qui quittent à cause de conflits familiaux. D'autre part, elle signale que les jeunes chômeurs et ceux qui sont dépendants financièrement de leurs parents ont un taux de retour élevé. Par contre, elle constate qu'une forte proportion de jeunes ayant une attitude fortement positive face au fait d'habiter chez leurs parents retournent chez eux après un premier départ.

D'autres facteurs influencent aussi le retour. Par exemple, le fait de devenir mère célibataire provoque deux effets différents d'après Goldscheider et Da Vanzo (1985). Les femmes qui deviennent mères célibataires pendant qu'elles habitent chez leurs parents ont tendance à partir, tandis que celles qui étaient déjà parties ont tendance à revenir dans leur famille d'origine.

La conclusion fondamentale de Young (1987) est que le retour d'un jeune dans sa famille d'origine est l'indicateur d'un manque de préparation pour vivre de manière indépendante, principalement si le premier départ implique seulement une période temporaire à l'extérieur de la maison.

Conclusion

Cette brève revue des principaux travaux effectués en démographie et en sociologie sur la question du départ des enfants de leur famille d'origine montre qu'il s'agit d'une étape du cycle de vie qui, malgré son importance, n'a pas encore fait l'objet d'enquêtes très détaillées, à l'exception de celles effectuées par Young en Australie.

Longtemps associé au moment du mariage, le fait de quitter sa famille a cependant été provoqué aussi par d'autres raisons qui semblent être devenues de plus en plus complexes au cours des dernières décennies. Cette complexité se manifeste, entre autres, par la fréquence accrue des retours qui ne sont pas exclusivement reliés à des départs conçus à l'origine comme étant temporaires.

Parmi les faits les mieux établis, on trouve que l'âge moyen ou médian au départ se situe entre 20 et 25 ans dans toutes les sociétés occidentales contemporaines qui ont été étudiées. On observe aussi de façon systématique que les femmes quittent leur famille plus jeunes que les hommes. On a aussi démontré que si l'âge au départ s'était réduit depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale, il a été l'objet d'une légère remontée depuis le milieu des années 1970.

Par ailleurs, certains facteurs associés à des départs plus ou moins précoces ont été mis en évidence. Dans ce cas, les résultats sont plus limités et varient suivant les époques et les pays. Mentionnons aussi que ces aspects n'ont pas été étudiés de façon systématique, en partie parce que les données ne sont pas disponibles. Etant donné que la formation des ménages ne repose plus sur le seul mariage comme événement dominant, il semble opportun de s'interroger sur les

circonstances qui entourent le départ des enfants tant en ce qui concerne les jeunes eux-mêmes et le mode de vie qu'ils adopteront en quittant leur famille, qu'en ce qui caractérise les familles d'où ils partent.

II. DEUXIEME PARTIE

Evolution du calendrier et de l'intensité du départ des jeunes adultes de leur famille d'origine au Canada

La recherche en sociologie et en démographie, on l'a vu dans la première partie, s'est intéressée occasionnellement au rythme auquel les jeunes adultes quittent leur famille d'origine, aux motivations qui les inspirent ainsi qu'à certains facteurs qui s'y associent. Au Canada, pour la période contemporaine, peu de travaux existent (Burch, 1985; Harrison, 1981; Péron et al., 1986; Mitchell et al., 1989); les résultats restent donc fragmentaires.

Une nouvelle source d'information, soit l'Enquête sociale générale, cycle 5, effectuée par Statistique Canada en 1990 permet de retracer l'évolution de l'intensité et du calendrier du dernier départ des jeunes adultes dans les générations canadiennes nées de 1911 à 1970. Dans cette seconde partie, nous allons tenter de façon exploratoire de dégager un portrait général du départ des jeunes au Canada. L'analyse est préliminaire et ne portera que sur les aspects suivants:

- l'intensité des départs dans les générations;
- le calendrier ou le rythme des départs dans les générations en comparant les hommes et les femmes et en tentant d'interpréter les variations par le contexte social;
- les motivations invoquées par les répondants;
- les retours: les limites de l'Enquête sociale générale.

Dans le cadre restreint de cette étude, nous avons pu dégager une image globale du phénomène et de son évolution dans le temps. Malgré son caractère un peu superficiel, cette analyse représente une contribution originale, car elle ajoute à nos connaissances sur un sujet important. Elle est aussi intéressante parce qu'elle nous convainc de la nécessité de la poursuivre d'abord en exploitant à fond les données de l'enquête de 1990, pour ensuite susciter de nouvelles collectes qui permettront de répondre plus adéquatement à nos interrogations.

a) Les données de l'enquête sociale générale, cycle 5, sur la famille et les amis: les questions sur le dernier départ

L'enquête sociale générale sur la famille et les amis a été réalisée en 1990 par Statistique Canada auprès d'un échantillon de 13 495 personnes, dont 6 600 hommes et 6 895 femmes. Grâce à la question suivante, "Quel âge aviez vous la dernière fois que vous avez habité avec l'un ou l'autre de vos parents?", on peut étudier de façon rétrospective le moment où les répondants ont quitté leur famille d'origine pour la dernière fois.

Les données qui en résultent présentent des limitations:

- elles sont collectées de façon rétrospective et, de ce fait, portent sur les survivants qui n'ont pas émigré, auxquels se sont ajoutés des immigrants. Pour les générations les plus âgées en 1990, les biais créés par cette sélection pourraient ne pas être négligeables si l'âge au départ n'est pas indépendant de la mortalité ou de la propension à émigrer; il est cependant impossible de les mesurer;

- des biais liés à la qualité des déclarations, en particulier les problèmes de mémoire, peuvent aussi affecter les données; encore une fois, plus les personnes interrogées sont âgées, plus la mémoire risque d'avoir fait défaut.

Ces limites relèvent du type de collecte. D'autres problèmes sont posés par la nature même des questions. Ces dernières portent sur le dernier départ avant l'enquête. Il s'agit d'une question claire à laquelle les répondants peuvent répondre sans risque de confusion. Du point de vue de l'analyse cependant, cela représente une difficulté dans la mesure où l'objectif est d'étudier le départ définitif. Dans certains cas, des personnes ont déjà quitté leur famille; certaines circonstances pourraient les amener à y revenir: fin des études, manque de ressources, rupture d'union, etc... Le départ ne serait donc pas définitif. Dans d'autres cas, les personnes ont quitté une première fois, sont revenues et vivent dans leur famille au moment de l'enquête; le dernier départ n'était donc pas définitif.

Pour parer à ces difficultés, l'analyse se fera en deux temps:

- nous fixerons de façon arbitraire à 30 ans l'âge avant lequel les départs devront avoir lieu pour être pris en considération; cette règle s'appliquera pour les générations nées avant 1960;

- chez les générations nées après 1960 et qui avaient moins de 30 ans en 1990, deux situations existent: pour les personnes qui n'habitent pas avec leurs parents au moment de l'enquête, l'âge au dernier départ déclaré est retenu; pour les personnes qui sont revenues vivre chez leurs parents après un premier départ, le départ est ignoré et cette personne est considérée comme si elle n'avait pas quitté.

D'autre part, pour éviter que la mesure de l'âge au départ ne soit affectée par le décès prématuré des parents, nous avons éliminé de l'analyse les répondants pour lesquels le décès d'un des parents s'est produit avant ou coïncide avec le départ du foyer.

Un dernier point mérite d'être soulevé: la réalité qui est prise en considération est limitée au seul aspect du lieu de résidence. La nature des liens qui a continué d'exister entre les parents et les enfants à la suite du départ n'est pas explorée: seul le fait que le jeune vive à l'intérieur de la maison familiale est retenu. On ne sait pas si le jeune est autonome ou non.

C'est donc en pleine connaissance de ces limites que nous abordons la mesure de l'évolution de l'âge au départ du foyer d'origine.

b) Intensité des départs observés à l'âge de 30 ans

On prend facilement pour acquis le fait qu'à un moment donné les jeunes adultes quittent leur famille d'origine pour vivre de façon autonome. Pour observer ce phénomène de façon significative, il semble opportun de fixer, même s'il s'agit d'une limite arbitraire, à 30 ans l'âge à partir duquel les départs ne marquent plus le début de la vie adulte, mais reflètent des circonstances particulières liées soit à la famille elle-même qui compte sur ses grands enfants pour subsister ou au jeune adulte qui n'a pu ou n'a pas voulu quitter ses parents.

Au Canada, pour les générations nées de 1911 à 1960 (âgées de 30 à 79 ans en 1990), l'intensité des départs mesurée par la proportion des individus qui ont quitté leur famille la dernière fois avant leur trentième anniversaire

varie de 88 à 93% pour les hommes et de 89 à 96% chez les femmes (tableau 1). Cette quasi-universalité confirme donc l'impression spontanée que nous avons: dans notre société, les jeunes adultes organisent leur vie en dehors de leur famille d'origine et, cela est vrai, pour les hommes et les femmes à quelques variations près. Il y a quelques fluctuations dans le temps, mais elles sont trop légères pour mériter une explication.

Il est intéressant d'observer les variations assez prononcées du calendrier du phénomène avant l'âge de 30 ans; aux graphiques 1 a) et b), on retrouve le comportement de trois générations qui représentent des époques particulières et des comportements différents. Chez les hommes, les générations de 1911-1915 illustrent le déroulement du phénomène tel qu'il se produisait dans le deuxième quart du XXe siècle: une intensité assez forte avant l'âge de 18 ans par rapport aux autres générations; par la suite, on observe une intensité réduite qui s'associe sans doute au mode de vie encore largement rural à l'époque. Les générations 1941-1945 présentent à tous les âges, à l'exception du début, une intensité cumulée plus forte: il s'agit des générations qui ont quitté le foyer à la fin des années 1950 et au début des années 1960. Finalement les générations 1956-1960 amorcent un virage et partent avec une intensité ralentie. Ce sont les années 1970. Chez les femmes, les générations retenues montrent une évolution semblable pour les générations anciennes, mais les générations de 1956-1960 n'ont pas, comme chez les hommes, commencé à reporter à plus tard le moment de quitter leur famille. Il est à noter comme le montrait le tableau 1 que les variations s'atténuent grandement lorsque l'observation se fixe à l'âge de 30 ans. Avant d'interpréter les fluctuations, on examinera en détail le rythme du déroulement du phénomène car, en définitive, elles en sont le reflet.

c) Calendrier des départs observés jusqu'à l'âge de 30 ans

Etant donné la quasi-universalité des départs avant 30 ans, le rythme auquel ils se produisent devient le phénomène le plus significatif à étudier. On sait déjà que l'âge au mariage, souvent retenu comme indicateur du début de l'âge adulte, s'est considérablement abaissé surtout à partir de la fin de la Deuxième guerre mondiale. Peut-on en conclure que l'âge au départ de la famille d'origine s'est comporté de la même façon?

D'après le graphique 2, l'âge moyen au départ s'est légèrement abaissé; l'écart entre les points extrêmes de la courbe est de 1 an chez les hommes de 1,4 ans chez les femmes. Par ailleurs, on remarque que, pour toutes les générations, il existe un écart entre les sexes qui tend à s'élargir à partir des générations 1946-1950 alors qu'on observe une légère remontée chez les hommes et une stabilisation chez les femmes. Les moyennes, on le sait, cachent souvent des variations dans les modalités du déroulement des événements. Le graphique 3 présente divers indicateurs décrivant la distribution des départs selon l'âge. Examinons d'abord le comportement des jeunes hommes:

- on observe d'abord une baisse de l'âge avant lequel 25% des départs (1er quartile) se produisent pour les générations de 1916-1920 jusqu'à celles de 1931-1935; cet âge passe de 19,3 à 17,7 ans; ensuite il remonte à 18,5 ans et se stabilise;
- l'âge médian subit, quant à lui, une baisse continue allant de 22,3 à 20,5 ans pour les générations de 1911-1915 à 1941-1945; ensuite, on voit une légère remontée;
- enfin l'âge au-delà auquel il ne reste que 25% des départs (3e quartile) a diminué de 25,4 à 23,0 ans; dans ce cas, la baisse se poursuit jusqu'à la génération 1951-1955. A cause de cette baisse de l'âge au dernier quartile, l'intervalle

interquartile s'est resserré; cela signifie que l'étalement est moins marqué chez les générations les plus jeunes: auparavant 50% des départs s'étalaient sur une période de 7 ans; cette période s'est réduite à 4,5 ans.

Peut-on interpréter ces variations? On peut tenter de le faire en les associant à des événements qui ont marqué la conjoncture socio-économique. On peut assez facilement soutenir l'hypothèse que, selon les conditions socio-économiques au moment où les générations atteignent les âges où l'on devient adulte, la propension à quitter la maison familiale sera plus ou moins forte. Les générations les plus anciennes atteignent l'âge au départ en pleine crise économique de la fin des années '20 - début des années 1930. Sans préjuger du comportement des générations qui les ont précédées, on peut croire que ce difficile contexte a pu les retenir au foyer plus longtemps, d'autant plus que le monde rural dans lequel bon nombre vivaient à l'époque se prêtait bien à ce retard.

Les générations qui ont suivi (générations 1921-1925 et 1925-1930) ont bénéficié de conditions économiques plus favorables, mais ont sans doute été influencées aussi par l'appel au service militaire requis par la Seconde guerre mondiale; à partir des générations 1931-1935, ce sont les conditions de l'après-guerre qui prévalent; le développement industriel et l'urbanisation, soutiennent la poursuite de la baisse de l'âge au départ; avec les générations nées dans les années 1940, on atteint la période de la démocratisation de l'enseignement; la poursuite généralisée des études ramène à plus de 18 ans l'âge où 25% des départs se sont déjà produits.

Pour les femmes, les modalités du départ sont un peu différentes, à l'exception de l'âge avant lequel 25% des départs se produisent qui est très rapproché de celui des

hommes et qui en suit la tendance générale. Si le service militaire ne les concernaient pas, on sait que l'industrie de guerre a fait appel à leurs services.

Les autres indices de la tendance centrale se distinguent surtout par leur niveau: l'âge au départ des femmes est systématiquement plus faible d'au moins un an. Par contre, on n'observe pas de retournement de la tendance: l'âge médian et le dernier quartile poursuivent leur baisse. On tentera à la section suivante d'expliquer ces différences par la nature des motifs qui sous-tendent les décisions des jeunes hommes et des jeunes femmes au moment de leur départ, la conjoncture socio-économique étant la même pour les deux sexes. Avant d'y arriver, examinons les générations qui n'avaient pas encore 30 ans au moment de l'enquête et dont le comportement a marqué le paysage familial des années 1980.

Le graphique 4 présente la proportion cumulée des départs avant chaque anniversaire pour trois groupes de générations. On y compare le comportement observé jusqu'à l'enquête chez les jeunes qui n'ont pas encore 30 ans à celui des générations nées en 1956-60, les dernières à être observées complètement jusqu'à 30 ans. Chez les hommes, la tendance amorcée depuis plusieurs générations se poursuit: à 20 ans, moins de 30% de la génération née en 1966-1970 ont quitté le foyer comparativement à 37% pour la génération de 1956-1960. Chez les femmes, la génération née en 1961-1965 amorce le retournement qui s'était produit beaucoup plus tôt chez les hommes: à 20 ans, le pourcentage cumulé des départs n'est plus que de 40% pour les femmes nées en 1966-1970 contre 53% pour celles nées dix ans plus tôt. Il s'agit là d'une baisse suffisamment importante pour que la perception populaire en soit modifiée; la statistique confirme l'impression des parents: les jeunes restent à la maison plus longtemps que leurs parents ne sont restés, eux qui font partie des

génération nées dans les années trente et qui ont quitté leur famille relativement tôt en moyenne.

En bref, l'analyse de l'évolution de l'âge au départ des jeunes adultes montre les traits suivants: l'examen des distributions montre que, des générations nées de 1910 à celles nées à la fin des années 1950, la proportion des départs qui se produisaient après le 24^e anniversaire s'est réduite de 40 à 20% chez les hommes, de 22 à 17% chez les femmes. Par ailleurs, la proportion des départs très précoces s'est peu modifiée, surtout chez les femmes. C'est donc par un raccourcissement de la période où les départs se produisent que les modifications se sont réalisées: d'une part, le prolongement des études et le retard consécutif de l'entrée sur le marché du travail sont associés à la stabilisation des départs très précoces; d'autre part, la montée de l'individualisme permise par la hausse générale du niveau de vie ainsi que la presque disparition du monde rural a soutenu la réduction de l'importance des départs tardifs. Quant aux tendances très récentes qui se sont manifestées au cours des années 1980, on peut avancer qu'elles coïncident avec une situation économique précaire, mais aussi elles s'associent à une transformation très profonde des modes de formation des couples où le mariage traditionnel a subi un recul marqué. Dans ce cas, les départs très précoces continuent de régresser et il est encore trop tôt pour prédire une forte recrudescence des départs tardifs; présentement, tout se joue autour de l'âge médian.

d) Le départ du foyer d'origine: les motifs invoqués

L'Enquête sur la famille et les amis permet, non seulement d'établir l'âge au dernier départ, mais aussi de connaître la raison principale qui a provoqué ce départ.

La question se présentait comme suit:

"Quelle était la raison principale de votre départ?

Était-ce...

Parce que vous alliez vous marier?

A cause d'un emploi?

A cause de vos études?

Parce que vous désiriez être autonome ou avoir votre propre logement?

Pour une autre raison?"

Les motifs qui sont retenus par l'enquête présentent quelques incertitudes quant à leur signification; la plus importante réside dans le fait qu'on ne sait pas si les répondants qui sont partis pour aller vivre en union libre ont déclaré "mariage" ou "autonomie". Cette incertitude ne crée pas de problème important pour les générations plus anciennes, mais rend difficile l'interprétation pour les plus jeunes.

Le graphique 5 présente pour les hommes et les femmes l'évolution des variations de l'importance relative des raisons qui motivent le départ de la famille d'origine. Précisons tout de suite que ce graphique doit se lire en deux temps: les générations nées en 1961 et après qui sont âgées de moins de 30 ans; les générations nées avant 1961 qui avaient au moins 30 ans. C'est ainsi que l'on constate que chez les moins de 30 ans, le mariage est un motif très peu invoqué, alors que la poursuite des études et le désir d'autonomie prédominent. Chez les générations nées avant 1961, la comparaison fait ressortir les changements suivants: chez les hommes, dans les générations nées avant 1936, les contraintes liées à l'emploi et le mariage expliquent de 60 à 75% des départs; les études et le désir d'autonomie ne jouent qu'un rôle marginal; on notera avec intérêt que les générations de 1911 à 1920 ont invoqué une assez forte proportion "d'autres raisons"; il s'agit sans doute des

départs pour l'armée liés à la Seconde guerre mondiale; d'ailleurs, le fait que ce trait ne caractérise pas les distributions chez les femmes confirme cette hypothèse. Chez ces dernières, on remarque plutôt une augmentation de l'importance relative de l'emploi, ce qui est cohérent avec ce que nous savons de l'histoire de l'activité des femmes dans l'industrie à l'époque de la guerre. Par ailleurs, le mariage représente à lui seul 60% des motifs de départ des jeunes filles.

Pour les générations nées après 1935, le mariage devient la raison la plus fréquemment invoquée par les hommes, mais c'est au profit des études et la progression du désir d'autonomie que l'importance relative de l'emploi diminue. C'est avec la génération de 1956-1960 que l'autonomie devient le motif le plus populaire. Chez les femmes, le mariage recule au profit des études et des désirs d'indépendance dès les générations de 1946-1950; de plus, chez elles, l'emploi, à part la période de guerre, n'est jamais un motif très important. Le contraste entre les sexes est donc bien marqué: pour toutes les générations, le mariage est plus fréquemment invoqué par les femmes que par les hommes; de façon systématique, l'emploi et le désir d'autonomie sont mentionnés plus souvent par les hommes; les deux sexes évoquent également les études depuis la démocratisation de l'éducation.

Les graphiques 6 et 7 illustrent avec plus d'acuité encore les contrastes entre hommes et femmes: lorsqu'elles quittent avant 20 ans, le mariage constitue un motif fréquent chez les femmes; il est rarement invoqué par les jeunes hommes. Notons toutefois que lorsque le départ a lieu entre 20 et 29 ans, le mariage est invoqué par plus de 50% des hommes dans la plupart des générations.

En bref, l'examen des motifs qui sont invoqués pour expliquer le départ des jeunes montrent que chez les hommes le mariage n'a jamais dominé lorsqu'on considère l'ensemble des départs; cependant, il prend de l'importance lorsque les départs sont plus tardifs. Au contraire, chez les jeunes filles, le mariage est le motif dominant; si au fil des générations les désirs d'autonomie se manifestent davantage et ont fait reculer le mariage, l'emploi n'a pas progressé comme motif de départ chez les femmes.

e) L'analyse des retours au foyer et des facteurs associés au départ: les limites de l'Enquête sociale générale

La littérature que nous avons présentée montre à l'évidence l'importance de l'étude des retours au foyer familial d'une fraction croissante des jeunes qui ont déjà quitté.

L'Enquête sociale générale (cycle 5) aborde la question mais de façon trop partielle pour qu'une analyse intéressante puisse en être faite. La première lacune vient du fait que les questions pertinentes ne sont adressées qu'aux répondants qui, ayant quitté et étant revenus, habitent encore avec leurs parents au moment de l'enquête. On ne peut donc dégager une image complète du phénomène à partir de ce sous-groupe.

Par ailleurs, même l'étude de ce sous-groupe est à toutes fins pratiques impossible, car les nombres de cas sont trop faibles: 196 et 175 cas pour les hommes et les femmes respectivement dont bon nombre ont plus de 30 ans.

Il semble donc nécessaire de revoir la stratégie de collecte afin de saisir ce phénomène dans son ensemble en tenant compte de l'histoire complète des départs et des retours ainsi que des motifs qui justifient ces mouvements.

Les facteurs associés aux variations dans le rythme du départ constituent un autre champ d'analyse important. Il pourrait s'agir des facteurs qui caractérisent la famille d'origine aussi bien que le jeune adulte qui quitte ses parents. Nous avons tenté d'examiner quelques-uns de ces facteurs dont l'instruction, l'origine culturelle, et le revenu. Malheureusement, aucun lien systématique n'a pu être mis en évidence par une analyse simple. Si les données permettent une analyse plus fouillée que nous n'avons pu réaliser dans ce cadre, elles restent insatisfaisantes pour l'analyse du comportement des générations plus âgées, car nous ne possédons l'information que sur les caractéristiques au moment de l'enquête, et non au moment du départ.

f) Conclusion

Les objectifs de cette étude visaient à faire le point sur les connaissances acquises au sujet des modalités du départ des enfants de leur foyer d'origine et à tracer le portrait de ce phénomène au Canada grâce à une première exploitation de l'Enquête sociale générale sur la famille et les amis.

Il s'agit d'une période importante dans le déroulement de la vie des individus à laquelle les chercheurs ont porté, somme toute, peu d'attention. Tant sur la scène internationale qu'au Canada, ce phénomène reste encore peu connu. C'est en Australie que les travaux les plus intéressants ont été faits. Longtemps masqué par la prédominance du mariage comme motif justifiant le départ, ce dernier événement dont les causes se sont diversifiées au cours des dernières décennies mérite en lui-même des efforts supplémentaires quant à la conceptualisation de sa signification et quant à l'interprétation de ses variations. Le contraste entre les

sexes, le retournement récent des tendances ainsi que l'intensification du processus d'aller-retour sont des domaines à explorer et constituent des avenues de recherche prometteuses pour comprendre les mécanismes par lesquels les jeunes adultes s'intègrent dans la société.

Il apparaît donc pertinent de poursuivre plus à fond la recherche entreprise ici et, éventuellement, d'entreprendre une étude qui reposerait sur des données collectées à cette fin.

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TABLEAU 1


Pourcentage cumulé des derniers départs avant 30 ans pour
les générations de 1911 à 1960, Canada 1990

	hommes	femmes
1911-15	90.2	88.9
1916-20	89.2	94.4
1921-25	89.9	96.0
1926-30	91.0	93.6
1931-35	92.8	93.8
1936-40	90.7	95.4
1941-45	92.3	90.3
1946-50	87.6	93.8
1951-55	92.5	91.6
1956-60	89.1	91.5

Source: Calculs inédits faits à partir de l'Enquête sociale
générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis

GRAPHIQUE 1a


Pourcentage cumulé des derniers départs selon l'âge pour certaines générations masculines, Canada 1990



Source: Calculs inédits faits à partir de l'Enquête sociale générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis

GRAPHIQUE 1b


Pourcentage cumulé des derniers départs selon l'âge pour certaines générations féminines, Canada 1990



Source: Calculs inédits faits à partir de l'Enquête sociale générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis

GRAPHIQUE 2


Age moyen au dernier départ pour les générations de
1911 à 1960, Canada 1990



Source: Calculs inédits à partir de l'Enquête sociale
générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis

GRAPHIQUE 3


Indices de tendance centrale de l'âge au dernier départ
pour les générations de 1911 à 1960, Canada 1990



Source: Calculs inédits faits à partir de l'Enquête sociale
générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis


GRAPHIQUE 4

Pourcentage cumulé des derniers départs selon l'âge pour
certaines générations, Canada 1990



GRAPHIQUE 5


Raisons du dernier départ pour les générations de
de 1911 à 1975, Canada 1990



Source: Calculs inédits faits à partir de l'Enquête sociale
générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis


GRAPHIQUE 6

Raisons du dernier départ pour les personnes ayant quitté avant 20 ans, générations de 1911 à 1975, Canada 1990



Source: Calculs inédits faits à partir de l'Enquête sociale générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis

Raisons du dernier départ pour les personnes ayant quitté
entre 20 et 29 ans, générations de 1911 à 1970,
Canada 1990



Source: Calculs inédits faits à partir de l'Enquête sociale générale. Cycle 5: La famille et les amis

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**Work, Family and Commuting Systems:
Implications of Recent Trends in Canadian Resource Industries**

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The last decade has seen a reevaluation of the roles and interrelationships of work and families. The concepts of the family, work and employment have been subject to review and redefinition, and recent analysis has led to a greater recognition of the interrelationships and continuities between the worlds of paid employment and families. This paper examines one relatively new and unconventional form of paid employment, long distance commuting (LDC), which involves a significant separation of home and workplace. This system, it is argued, challenges workers, their families, employers, labour groups and governments to think about and respond to the relationships between paid employment and families. As such, it provides insights into these relationships which appear to have relevance to other employment and family settings.

The paper is based largely on the authors' research into the use of LDC by the two largest users of the system, the offshore oil and gas and mining industries. It focuses mainly on Canadian research, building on earlier work for the Demographic Review Secretariat, Health and Welfare Canada (Storey and Shrimpton, 1986), and including surveys carried out for Energy, Mines and Resources Canada and the Australian Mines and Metals Association (AMMA) and major studies for the Environmental Studies Research Funds (Storey *et al.*, 1989) and Labour Canada (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989b). It also makes use of material about the Scottish, Norwegian and Australian offshore oil and gas industries, the Australian mining industry and some Australian onshore gas operations.

The next section of this report describes the characteristics and increasing use of LDC by the offshore oil and mining industries. This is followed, in Section 3.0, by a short description of the demographics of the LDC labour force, concentrating on the gender, marital status, family structure and ethnicity of the employees. Section 4.0 then provides an overview of the reactions of LDC workers and their partners to the distinctive LDC work pattern, including a summary of the major advantages and disadvantages from a family life perspective. This leads into, in Section 5.0, a review of worker, family, employer, labour and government responses. Section 6.0 discusses the implications of this for thinking about relationships between paid employment and families.

2.0 THE USE OF LONG DISTANCE COMMUTE SYSTEMS

2.1 Introduction

Long distance commuting employment is all employment in which the work is so isolated from the workers' homes that food and lodging accommodations are provided for them at the work site, and schedules are established whereby employees spend a fixed number of days working at the site, followed by a fixed number of days at home (Hobart, 1979:2)¹. It is thus a relatively new variant on the traditional theme of going away to work in a resource industry. It is, however, a unique form of work organization, differing from daily commuting systems in that the workers are away from, and then at, home for extended periods, and from seasonal or temporary migration-to-work systems by the year-round regularity of the rotational work pattern.

While long distance commute systems are used by other industries, the first and largest user is undoubtedly the offshore oil and gas industry, where the nature and location of the workplace required that workers spend several days or weeks working and living offshore. However, the last decade have seen a rapid increase in the use of this system by other resource industries, and particularly the mining industry, where it has become the preferred method of providing the labour force at remote mines, replacing the increasingly problematic and expensive use of resource towns. This section reviews the use of rotational work systems by these two industries.

2.2 The Offshore Oil Industry

Offshore oil and gas activity requires the use of LDC labour during the exploration, development and production phases. In the first of these, workers alternate between periods of work on drilling rigs, supply boats and seismic vessels, and periods at home. In the latter stages of the development phase an LDC labour force will be involved in the installation and start-up of production platforms and ancillary facilities. The system may also be used to provide labour at onshore construction and fabrication sites, depending on the size of the project and the local availability of labour. Lastly, production and maintenance workers will be required on offshore installations, and on vessels involved in pipeline and well maintenance, supply and stand-by activities, etc..²

¹ The term 'fly-in' is commonly used to refer to all mining operations using LDC. However, the Hope Brook gold mine in south-west Newfoundland uses a boat to transport the majority of its labour force to and from the mine, while the Jasper and Emerald Lake gold mines use bus transportation. Cominco use a hovercraft to move materials for their SNIP gold deposit in northwestern B.C. and for labour when weather conditions prevent an air commute. In this paper fly-in is used only to refer to those LDC mines using fixed wing or helicopter air transportation.

² The oil industry also uses LDC for the operation of some onshore oilfields; for example, the approximately 1,200 workers operating oil and gas fields in the Cooper Basin in the interior of Eastern Australia fly there, on a 14/14 (i.e. fourteen days at the worksite followed by fourteen away from it) schedule, from Adelaide and Brisbane.

The offshore petroleum industry is both the earliest significant, and current largest, user of LDC. Offshore energy production can be traced back as far as the late nineteenth century, but the number of workers involved only became significant with the expansion of onshore activity into the Gulf of Mexico in the 1950s (Gramling, 1986:180). The post-Second World War period has seen a progressive move into deeper waters and increasingly inhospitable climates, fuelled by energy price rises in the 1970s, the discovery of gas fields in the southern, and then oil in the northern, North Sea, and the development of new exploration and production technologies. Offshore petroleum activity is now found in most parts of the world, and has been continuous in Atlantic Canada since 1966.

In some cases offshore oil activity involves a labour force several thousand strong. In the mid-1980s the labour force on petroleum installations off Louisiana, the major area of industry activity in the Gulf of Mexico, was estimated at 21,847 (Centaur, 1986). The total 1989 employment on oil and gas related installations and vessels in the northern United Kingdom sector of the North Sea was estimated to be about 25,000 (Scotland, 1990). When the southern sector and Norwegian, Dutch and Danish territory are included, the total North Sea offshore labour force exceeds 50,000. At peak, in the early 1980s, there were about 4,000 offshore oil and gas workers in Atlantic Canada.

The rotations used vary for different types of workers, different employers and in different parts of the world, and change over time. The stay offshore is typically a multiple of seven days, with 7, 14 and 21 being most common. Twelve hour shifts are the norm, although some specialized employees may be on other schedules or on-call 24 hours a day (and some United Kingdom North Sea construction workers are reported to consistently work 15 hour days (Oil Industry Liaison Committee, 1991)). Some positions normally only require work during a day shift, but most involve both day and night shifts; in the case of fourteen day and longer work patterns there is commonly a mid-rotation split shift when employees change from night to day shifts, or vice versa.

Most offshore workers are on symmetrical rotation pattern; that is, they spend the same number of days away from, as at, the offshore workplace. However, some workers are on asymmetrical pattern, spending more time away from, than at, the workplace. The most notable example of this is the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. Norwegian labour legislation limits the number of hours that can be worked in a year, and leads to a pattern where 14 days periods of work offshore alternate with periods of 21 and then 28 days away from the workplace. In the case of both symmetrical and asymmetrical patterns, it would be a mistake to equate the non-work period with time at home, since some of it is taken up with the work-related commute to and from the offshore.

The offshore oil and gas industry does not solely use rotational work schedules for its offshore activities. Most notably, the development of offshore fields commonly involves major construction activities at coastal locations, including the building of production platforms and facilities associated with oil and gas pipeline landfalls. The locational requirements for such activities are often such that they occur in sparsely populated regions which can provide little local labour. For example, the Hibernia platform construction site in Eastern Newfoundland is projected to employ, at peak, 3,600 workers. Free workcamp accommodations will be provided for the estimated 3,000 of them who live more than 50 miles from the site (Mobil Oil Canada Ltd., 1991).

However, even when the projects are located adjacent to relatively large population concentrations (as, for example, with the Condeep concrete platform construction site in the Norwegian city of Stavanger), the size and nature of the required labour force may still require the use of commuting labour. In this and other regards these projects are typical of other major non-offshore oil related construction exercises, such as building hydro dams and power stations. However, there is a paucity of information on the workers at such offshore oil industry construction sites, or indeed those in other industrial sectors. Accordingly, the rest of the discussion of the use of LDC labour by the oil and gas industry focuses on offshore operations.

2.3 The Mining Industry

Since the early 1970s, sparsely populated countries have seen rapid increases in the use of LDC by the mining industry. There are now fifteen operating LDC mines in Canada, 36 in Australia, and others in Alaska, Louisiana, Columbia, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. A number of international trends have fuelled this rapid growth, reducing the relative costs of LDC and increasing those of the main alternative strategy for providing skilled labour at remote sites, the construction of a new mining town. These trends may be summarized under five main headings: limitations of resource towns, technological change, changes in labour requirements, changes in regulatory policies and international investment trends.

Limitations of Resource Towns:

- high start-up and closure costs;
- lack of economic diversity;
- lack of alternative employment, especially for women, in a society in which two-earner families are now the norm;
- instability in employment levels;

- limited and unpredictable life-span of major employer;
- socio-demographic imbalances; and
- limited health, educational, social, recreational and retail services.

Technological Change:

- cheaper and more reliable transportation and telecommunications systems.

Changes in Labour Requirements:

- an increasing preference for a young, educated, easily-trained, flexible, and commonly urban labour force; and
- avoidance of workers wedded to traditional work practices and approaches to labour relations.

Changes in Regulatory Policies:

- more stringent environmental constraints, and complex and expensive environmental impact review processes, favouring compact, low-impact, development options;
- higher mining town servicing requirements; and
- concern to hire natives, reflected in affirmative action programs and other requirements.

International Investment Trends:

- reluctance to invest in base metals mines because of depressed prices in 1980s and high capital costs;
- investor preference for more politically stable countries, which tend to be sparsely-populated and have few skilled workers; and
- investor preference for precious metals, favouring low-cost, short-life operations.

The mining industry has become Canada's largest user of the LDC system. The first Canadian 'fly-in' (to use the industry's term, although recent mines have included ones which use road and marine transportation for the commute) mine was Asbestos Hill, in Northern Quebec, which opened in 1972. To date this system has been used at a total of 22 mines (see Table 1) in the Northwest Territories (NWT) (5 mines), Saskatchewan (4), British Columbia (4), Ontario (3), Quebec (2), Alberta and Newfoundland (1 each). Long distance commuting has been most commonly used for gold mines (14, or 64% of all LDC operations), but also for uranium (3), gold/silver, silver, lead/zinc, coal and asbestos (1 each) mines. Fifteen of these mines are still in

operation and three more LDC mines are currently being developed; two in the NWT (a uranium and a gold mine) and one in Saskatchewan (uranium). In total, current Canadian LDC operations employ over 3,400 workers.

The Canadian mining industry has seen a consistent and rapid growth in the use of LDC, with 19 mines opening since 1980 and nine since 1987. In the late 1980s LDC accounted for almost one-third of new metal mines openings, and no remote mine has opened using the alternative development strategy, construction of a mining town, since the late 1970s.

A variety of rotations are used at Canadian LDC mines (Table 1). The majority use the shorter patterns, with a 7/7 rotation (i.e. seven days at the mine, followed by seven away from it) being the most common, worked by 45% of all current LDC miners. It is used at all the Saskatchewan mines and at Detour Lake (Ontario) and Lac Shortt (Quebec). The 14/14 pattern has shown recent growth, being used at the recently-opened Golden Patricia, Golden Bear and Colomac mines, as well as at Lupin and Hope Brook. It now accounts for 36% of the LDC workforce. Very short rotations (4/3 and 5/2) also seem to be increasing, while longer and asymmetrical rotations are in decline.

The longest Canadian rotation is that used at a mine which is exceptional in many ways. Cominco's Polaris lead/zinc mine is located on Little Cornwallis Island in the High Arctic, and is the most northerly base metals mine in the world. It was developed on the basis of Cominco's experience at the Black Angel mine in Greenland, which opened in 1974; the extreme remoteness of that operation required the use of an asymmetrical rotation involving very long periods at the site. Its labour force had widely-dispersed homes (most lived in Canada and Denmark), and Polaris workers have their homes in all regions of Canada, with a few living in the Caribbean and England. This is made possible by the transportation policies (the company provides a chartered shuttle between the minesite and Resolute, on nearby Cornwallis Island, and pay air travel costs between there and any commercial airport in Canada) and the long, asymmetric, rotation. The most common notional pattern at Polaris (in fact there is considerable flexibility) involves 63 days at the mine and 21 at home.

Growth in LDC mining in Australia has been even more recent and dramatic; 41 mines are known to have opened since 1980, 30 of them since 1987. Gold operations comprise 33 (80%) of these mines. Of the remainder, two are diamond mines, two are lead/zinc mines, and there is one each of uranium, silica, talc and tantalum. The largest concentration (31 mines) are in Western Australia, with six in Queensland and three in the Northern Territory (Storey and Shrimpton, 1991).

Table 1: Characteristics of Current and Former Canadian Mines Using LDC

Mine	Deposit	Province	Opened/Closed	Number of LDC Employees	Rotation Days in/out	Remaining Years of Expected Life
1. Asbestos Hill	asbestos	Que.	1972-83	c. 400	70/14	-
2. Rabbit Lake	uranium	Sask.	1975	350	7/7	> 20
3. Coal Valley	coal	Alta.	1978 ¹	335 ²	n.a.	n.a.
4. Cluff Lake	uranium	Sask.	1980	260	7/7	> 20
5. Camsell River	silver	NWT	1980-85 ³	200	28/28 ⁴	-
6. Baker River	gold	BC	1981-83	47	14/7 ⁵	-
7. Lupin	gold	NWT	1982	448	28/14 14/14	15-19
8. Polaris	zinc,lead	NWT	1982	275	63/21 ⁶ 42/28 42/21	15-19
9. Cullaton Lake	gold/silver	NWT	1983-85	130	7/7 42/21	-
10. Key Lake	uranium	Sask.	1983	425	7/7	15-19
11. Detour Lake	gold	Ont.	1983	350	7/7 ⁷ 4/3	10-14
12. Salmita	gold	NWT	1983-87	25	14/14 ⁸ 35/21	-
13. Lac Shortt ⁹	gold	Que.	1984	183	14/7 7/7 5/2 4/3	1-3
14. Star Lake	gold	Sask.	1987-89	45	7/7	-
15. Hope Brook ⁹	gold	Nfld.	1987	273	14/14 4/3	7-9
16. Emerald Lake	gold	Ont.	1988	85 ¹⁰	4/4	n.a.
17. Golden Patricia ⁹	gold	Ont.	1988	192	14/14	4-6
18. Lawyers Property	gold	BC	1988	65	14/14 4/4	4
19. Golden Bear ⁹	gold	BC	1989	111	28/14 14/14	4-6
20. Johnny Mountain ⁹	gold	BC	1989-1990	133	28/14 14/14	1-3
21. Colomac ⁹	gold	NWT	1990	342	14/14	n.a.
22. Jasper	gold	Sask.	1990	80 ¹¹	7/7	3

- Workers were bused in 5 days per week for eight hour shifts from 1977-1978. A daily helicopter commuting system was used 1978-1982 with workers rotating on a 4/4, 12-hour shift system. Since 1982 the company has used a daily bus commuting system but workers still rotate on the 4/4, 12-hour shift system.
- 1986 employment which was about 60% capacity.
- Operations began in 1970 but a rotational system was not adopted until 1980.
- The original rotation was 54/30 for hourly workers and 36/20 for staff. In 1984 the rotation changed to 28/28 for all employees.
- 1981 rotation for all personnel was 21/7. This changed in 1982 to 14/7 with the exception of administrators who remained on 21/7.
- A majority of hourly, paid and corporate staff work 63/21, native workers can opt for 42/28, senior management staff work 42/21.
- Mine staff work 3 weekdays first week, 4 days second week at mine site, except accounting personnel who are located in Timmins.
- Mill workers worked 14/14, production employees worked 35/21.
- Data are from 1989 survey. Data for all other mines are from a 1987/1988 survey.
- Of the total workforce, 55 will commute on a daily basis from River Valley and area, the remaining 30 will live on site during their 4/4 rotation or 4/3 rotation in the case of mill operators.
- Half are Cameco, and half contractor, employees.

In total, these mines employ about four thousand workers. A range of different rotation patterns are used between and in different mines, but data are not available on the numbers using the various patterns. However, unlike Canada, it appears that asymmetrical schedules are the norm, with employees spending longer at the worksite than away from it. Of 35 operating mines for which work pattern data are available, only twelve (34%) use a symmetrical system (seven using 7/7 and six using 14/14) for all or some of their labour force. (However, this includes the huge Argyle diamond mine, where all of over eight hundred workers, representing about 17% of the entire Australian LDC mining labour force, are on 14/14 or 7/7 rotations.) The commonest patterns are 14/7 (used by 16 mines, or 46% of those for which there are data) and 21/7 (10 mines, or 29%). One or both of these patterns are used by 22 mines, or 63% of those for which data are available. Some mines use highly asymmetrical patterns. Seven (20%) use a 42/7 pattern, and two each use 7/1 and 13/1 schedules. These work/non-work ratios of 6/1, 7/1 and 13/1 compare with a ratios of only 2/1 and 3/1 at Canadian mines with asymmetrical patterns.

Canada and Australia, given their large unpopulated areas and important minerals sectors, are the largest global users of LDC. The United States has one LDC mine operating, and others planned or under development, in Alaska. Its only other LDC operation is a sulphur mine in Louisiana; this is interesting primarily because it is located offshore and functions in essentially identical fashion to nearby oil platforms. However, both its managers and workers regard themselves as being in the mining industry, with its distinctive management and work cultures.

Long distance commute mines have also been identified in Columbia, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and Papua-New Guinea. Very little is known about the distribution of the places of residence of the workers at these mines, or other aspects of their operations. However, there is some evidence of different rotation and transportation policies being used for 'locals' and 'expats', with the latter spending extended periods in a major regional city or their country of origin. Such a system is also used for the expatriate management personnel at third world mines which do not otherwise use an LDC system.

3.0 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ROTATIONAL WORKERS

3.1 Gender

Surveys of LDC oil and gas workers in Norway, Newfoundland, Australia and the United Kingdom show a range from 4% to 0.1% of workers being women, although the number of women working offshore in the United Kingdom and Norway has seen slow increase, especially on production platforms.³ A number of reasons for these low levels of female employment have been described, including the attitudes of, and discrimination by, training institutions, management and, to a lesser extent, male workers (Lewis *et al.*, 1988a). However, the presence of women in traditional occupations on the Norwegian offshore platforms has generally been welcomed by male employees, and has contributed to a 'normalisation' of the work place and a lessening of differences between onshore and offshore life (Heen, 1988:81).

Women are mostly concentrated in administrative, catering and cleaning positions. At a sample of Australian offshore oil and gas operations surveyed by the Australian Mines and Metals Association (AMMA) (see Storey and Shrimpton, 1991), women comprise 19% of administrative, and 11% of catering and cleaning workers, but less than 0.1% of extraction and processing workers. Pollard reports that at the Hadson operation 'particular effort was not put into recruitment of women' and the need for a more diverse social mix was not recognised (Pollard, 1990:18). None of the nine companies responding to the AMMA survey reported increases in female employment.

Table 2 presents data on the gender, marital status and ethnicity of employees at eleven of the Canadian LDC mines in operation in 1990. These mines employed a total of 3,465 workers. All mines provided gender data, and at these 92% of the labour force are men and 8% women. This, and the policies of particular companies, suggest that the mining industry is generally more amenable than the oil industry to the employment of women.

The proportion of women in the Canadian LDC workforce varies significantly between mines. Johnny Mountain (British Columbia) did not employ any women on site. The next lowest female employment rates are at Hope Brook (Newfoundland) (1%) and Golden Bear (British Columbia) (7.5%). The highest proportions of female workers are at Polaris (Northwest Territories) (15%), Cluff Lake (Saskatchewan) (13%) and Key Lake (Saskatchewan) (12%). The high percentage at Polaris may be partially explained by a company policy that encourages the hiring of couples.

³ For example, Hellesoy (1985:99) found that women comprised 17% of the workforce on the Statfjord A production platform.

The women at LDC mines also work mainly in traditional female occupations, including secretarial work, cleaning and catering. This is reflected in a questionnaire return from Golden Bear, which noted that even the low level of female participation in the labour force at that mine was a recent phenomenon; in a change of procedures they 'contracted... catering out to a catering (company) thereby increasing the number of women employed.' Women comprised 47% of the workers in the 'others' (principally catering and cleaning), and 21% of those in 'administration' at eight Canadian LDC mines surveyed in 1987 (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989a:31). Conversely, women are proportionately under-represented in the mine (where they comprised 3% of workers) and mill production work (6%). However, there is a considerable variation in the number and type of jobs performed by women, including their employment in underground and surface mines, at the different operations.

Overall, Australian LDC mines appear to employ more women than do Canadian mines. Seven mines surveyed by the AMMA have a total of 1,418 employees, of whom 189 (13%) are women. Unlike Canada, all of the surveyed mines employ women. The highest proportions are at the Granny Smith gold mine (18%) and Argyle diamond mine (17%), while Kidston has the lowest percentage of women employees (7%). The AMMA survey showed women employed in all job categories; the highest percentages are in the 'other (catering, cleaning)' (29%) and 'administration, sales, etc.' (26%) categories; these account for more than half of all women employed at these mines. Much smaller proportions are found in the processing (7%), extraction (9%) and construction (13%) categories.

Kidston is the only mine responding to the AMMA survey to report that the number of women employees is increasing. Pollard (1990:11) reports that BHP Minerals have had difficulty recruiting women at the Cadjebut (Western Australia) mine, despite an equal employment opportunities policy and attempts to encourage applications from women and couples. The Horseshoe Lights (Western Australia) mine also encourages the employment of women and couples, not least because 'management felt the presence of women created a stabilising effect on the operation.' (15) Canadian mines' managers have also noted that having women in the labour force improves retention rates. Willson (1991:13) concludes that 'the industry's acceptance of, first, female workers and, second, working partners, has been a great success. The presence of women has enhanced all aspects of life at remote mines, improving morale, safety, productivity, cleanliness and language, and opening up a whole new qualified labour force.' Other reasons mines managers have given for hiring women include human rights grounds and the fact that they take better care of equipment.

Table 2: Selected Labour Force Characteristics: Current Canadian Mines Using LDC
Percent Values

Mine	Province	Women	Native	Single ¹	Married ¹	Separated ¹ Divorced Widowed
Rabbit Lake	Sask.	8	27	25	75	0
Cluff Lake	Sask.	13	42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lupin	NWT	7	11	35	50	15
Polaris	NWT	15	9	34	59	7
Key Lake	Sask.	12	26	25	65	10
Detour Lake	Ont.	5	8	23	77	0
Lac Shortt ²	Que.	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Hope Brook ²	Nfld.	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Emerald Lake	Ont.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Golden Patricia ²	Ont.	6	22 ³	33	57	10
Golden Bear ²	BC	3	18	25	70	5
Johnny Mountain ²	BC	0	6	10	90	0
Colomac ²	NWT	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Mean		7.7	16.5	27.5	65.7	6.2

1. Estimated

2. Data are from a 1990 survey. Data from all other mines from a 1987/1988 survey.

3. Projected

3.2 Marital Status and Family Composition

It was assumed by some early writers on LDC that most of the workforce was single.⁴ However, this has not proved to be the case, with married workers forming the majority of the labour force at almost all operations. However, most research into LDC work has not collected detailed data on the family types involved, and most of the data discussed here is from self or company-reported information on basic categories. There has been little study of extended, blended, homosexual and other family forms.

Married workers comprise 61% of the labour force of British and Dutch offshore oil and gas operations, with only 32% single and 6% widowed, divorced or separated (Sutherland and Cooper, 1986:125). These are very similar to the marital status figures for the Australian offshore

⁴ See, for example, Douglas (1984:17).

labour force: 62% married, 29% single and 9% separated and divorced. The equivalent statistics for Newfoundland offshore oil exploration labour force were 55%, 37% and 8% respectively (Fuchs *et al.*, 1983); the lower proportion of married workers than in Britain, the Netherlands and Australia likely reflects the older and more mature nature of activity in those regions. Further support for this comes from the high proportion of married workers (67%) on Norway's Statfjord A production platform; however, it also had a high proportion (10%) of separated/divorced workers (Hellesoey, 1985:101).

The majority of the Canadian LDC mining workforce, approximately 67%, are married, with a further 27% single (never married) and 6% widowed or divorced (Table 2). These figures show some differences from the 1981 Canadian metal mines labour force (76% married, 21% single, 3% widowed or divorced [Canada, 1984]), with LDC mines showing higher proportions of single and widowed, separated or divorced workers. Bearing in mind that the data are only estimates made by mine human resources personnel, and that they are incomplete, it appears that LDC in general is slightly more attractive to single (never-married and otherwise) rather than married workers.

A significantly lower percentage of Australian LDC miners, 55%, are married. This is largely because of the Argyle and Bow River diamond mines, which report only 25% and 45% married respectively. Overall, the percentages single (never married) and widowed, divorced or separated are about twice the Canadian figures, 37% and 8% respectively. Personnel at the Bow River mine estimated that a quarter of their employees were widowed, divorced or separated.

While it is the case that these data show that relatively high proportions of LDC offshore oil workers and miners are separated and divorced, it does not necessarily follow that this is a consequence of the work system. It may be that a 'foreign legion syndrome' is responsible, with this type of work attracting employees who have experienced a separation or divorce. For example, while 6.5% and 25% of Key Lake and Polaris miners respectively are divorced or separated, only 4% and 9% had divorced or separated subsequent to starting LDC work. Only half of the Key Lake workers, but all of those at Polaris, with its longer asymmetrical rotation, thought the LDC pattern was wholly or partly responsible (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989b:167-169).

Few data are available on LDC family characteristics, but those that are suggest that they are generally typical of the families of workers in conventional employment. The Newfoundland family life study offshore oil workers ranged in age from 22 to 52 years, with a mean of 34 years; this is somewhat younger than for the provincial labour force as a whole, but this is not surprising given that this is a relatively new industry with local residents mostly concentrated in junior

positions. The spouses/partners⁵ were 21 to 49 years, with a mean of 31 years, and the couples had been living together for an average of nine years, and had been in LDC work for five. Only 16% had no children at home, and those who did had, on average, 1.75 children. The mean age of the children at home was eight years (Storey *et al.*, 1989:31-34).

The workers at the Labour Canada study LDC mines, and their spouses, are a little older, likely because they include workers from all levels of seniority. The workers at Key Lake and Polaris averaged 37 and 38 years of age respectively, with the spouses at both averaging 38 years. The LDC workers at Key Lake had been living with their partner for an average of twelve years, of which four had been at spent working at the mine. The Polaris workers had been with their partners longer (fifteen years) but at the mine for a shorter period (three years).

Despite having been with their partners longer, the Polaris miners had slightly fewer children. Twenty five percent had no children, and they had an average of 1.6; the equivalent figures at Key Lake were 23% and 1.7 children. But there were still significant numbers with larger families; 30% of married Key Lake workers, and 25% of those at Polaris, had three or more children (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989b:171).

3.3 Native Workers

Generally speaking, few native workers have been involved in the offshore oil industry. There are few natives resident in the regions bordering the North Sea and Gulf of Mexico, and there was little native involvement in the short-term exploratory program off Labrador, and there are no cases where native land claims have extended offshore. The most notable exception has been the Beaufort Sea exploration program, which has employed significant numbers of native residents of some native communities. Thus, for example, Gulf Oil employed between 54 and 90 residents of Coppermine, NWT, during the period 1972 to 1979 (Hobart, 1989:32).

At the ten Canadian LDC mines surveyed for the Energy, Mines and Resources Canada inventories, approximately 18% of 2,727 employees are natives (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989a). The proportion of native workers per mine varies from 42% at Cluff Lake to 5% at Lac Shortt (Quebec), although a return of 'not applicable' from Hope Brook reflects the fact that there are very few natives on the Island of Newfoundland. The Saskatchewan operations generally show a higher proportion of native workers than other mines, and all of them currently aim to have a 50% native labour force by 1995 (Gitzel, 1991; Babcock, 1991).⁶

⁵ The Newfoundland offshore oil family life and the Labour Canada LDC mining studies use a 'married/common law' category for questions on marital status. This report uses the terms spouse and partner as short form for this twin category.

⁶ This appears to be a feasible target given the fact that recent data show 49% of the labour force at the Jasper (Saskatchewan) gold mine are natives, and the figures for Key Lake and Rabbit Lake are now 36% and 33% respectively (Babcock, 1991:24).

The variations among Canadian mines may be explained by several factors of which the most important are the available labour force, government-established requirements or targets (often included in the terms of the Surface Lease Agreement), and transportation, recruitment and training policies. Transportation policies include the use of northern commute networks to fly native workers between the mine and their home communities. In some cases natives have been offered the possibility of working different rotation patterns, but few have chosen to take up this option.

Aboriginal workers only make up 0.3 and 2% of the workers at the Australian LDC oil and gas and mining operations surveyed by the AMMA. None of them reported increases in the number of Aboriginal employees. Most of those currently employed are at the Argyle mine, where they comprise 6% of the labour force. The mine has recently put an Aboriginal training program in place. Similarly, Pollard (1990:12) notes that BHP Minerals, in conjunction with the Western Australia Department of Employment and Training, have introduced a basic skills program to encourage Aboriginal employment at the Cadjebut mine. Of the sixteen Aboriginal people hired, eight remain in permanent positions. Another relatively common Canadian initiative, the use of a northern native commute network, is reported as being used at the Cape Flattery (Queensland) silica mine (O'Faircheallaigh, pers. com.,1991).

Horseshoe Lights, a Western Australian mine surveyed by Pollard, has no Aboriginal employees (1990:15). She concludes that 'while Aboriginal populations are often located in the vicinity of fly-in/fly-out operations, they typically do not benefit from the operations.'⁽²⁴⁾ However in the case of at least one operation, the Narbarlek (Northern Territory) uranium mine, this was because of a decision by the Aboriginal population to have no involvement (Robinson and Newton,1988:335).

The LDC work system clearly has some distinctive impacts on native workers and their families. Unfortunately, little research has been undertaken into these, and the rest of this paper focuses on the implications of LDC for non-native families.⁷

⁷ See, on this issue, Hobart (1979,1989) and Hanson (1991).

4.0 WORKER AND SPOUSAL ATTITUDES TO LDC EMPLOYMENT

4.1 Introduction

Some research has suggested that LDC has a generally positive effect on family life. For example, Jackson claims, on the basis of study of the Kidston mine in Australia, that 'the family's satisfaction with the wage earner's job seems to be radically improved' by the LDC system (Jackson, 1987:164). Other research, from both Australia and Canada, suggests that, while there are some advantages, his conclusion overstates the case. This is especially so when the research specifically seeks the opinions of the workers' spouses.

This section provides, first, a brief overview of research findings on the overall attitudes of offshore oil and mine workers and their spouses to LDC employment and, second, a summary of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the system from a family life perspective. It is based largely on surveys of Newfoundland offshore oil and gas exploration workers and their spouses, and of married Key Lake (Saskatchewan), Polaris (Northwest Territories) and Leaf Rapids (Manitoba) miners and their spouses. These and other studies indicate that the system is viewed as problematic by some of those involved, or considering becoming involved, in LDC work.

It should be emphasized that this conclusion results from research which has concentrated primarily on one family model; that consisting of a male LDC worker living with a female spouse or partner, who may or may not be in paid employment, together with any children they may have living at home. As was noted above, there are few data on female or male single-parents or on heterosexual couples where the LDC worker is female, and there is only anecdotal material on homosexual couples. It is interesting to note, in this context, that there is strong evidence that one minority type, the heterosexual couple who both work at an LDC operation, are generally those happiest with the family life implications of the system. Indeed, at least one LDC mining company actively seeks to hire such couples, and some others seek to provide special accommodations for such couples (Shrimpton and Storey, 1991c).

4.2 Overall Attitudes to LDC Employment

4.2.1 *LDC Workers and Spouses*

As part of the study of Newfoundland offshore oil workers and their spouses, they were presented with a series of vignettes generally representative of negative, neutral and positive responses to the work pattern and its impact on their lives. Respondents were asked to indicate, on a three point scale, how closely they identified with each of the vignettes and, overall, which of the three they were most like.

The responses showed that about one-fifth of the workers identified most strongly with the negative vignette (Table 3). Three-quarters of them identified primarily with the positive vignette, although this was more the case with supply vessel than drilling rig employees; some rig workers expressed very negative attitudes to the impacts of the work on their lives. However, compared to the offshore workers the spouses (in this case, all women) were significantly more likely to self-identify with the negative vignette; this was the case with 39% of them. Only 38%, as against 76% of the offshore workers, self-identified with the positive figure.

The vignettes used to establish the attitudes of Newfoundland offshore oil workers and their spouses provided the basis for some used in the later study of Canadian LDC mines. The overall responses for the mine workers and spouses are presented in Table 3, while the data for the separate mines are shown in Table 4. In comparing the mining with the oil industry workers, while similar percentages are negative, the oil workers are somewhat more likely to be positive. However, the reverse pattern is apparent with the spouses, with those married to oil industry workers being significantly more likely to be negative, and less likely to be positive.

This may relate to strongly 'traditional' concepts of the family, and high unemployment rates, in Newfoundland. The latter makes it very difficult for people to leave employment that pays well, whatever the negative impacts it may be having on the worker and his or her family.⁸ It should be noted in that regard that the vignette data are the responses of offshore oil workers and spouses can be said to have 'survived', and perhaps adjusted to, LDC work. Others may have quit LDC because of its negative aspects. However, overall, it does appear that many LDC workers and their spouses in both the oil and mining industries are generally positive about the system and its financial and other benefits.

There is no significant difference between responses from the Key Lake and the Polaris married miners or their spouses (although the very small sample size in the case of Polaris spouses makes identifying such differences unlikely). Overall, only about one fifth of workers are generally negative about the pattern, with two-thirds being generally positive, while the workers are somewhat more positive than the spouses. However, while only 20% of the married workers and 27% of the spouses responding self-identified principally with the negative vignettes, 57% of the former and 60% of the latter felt **some** level of self-identification with them, and it is clear that the work pattern is problematic in some ways for virtually all of those involved.

⁸ This phenomenon has been described, in an Australian context, as the worker being trapped in the job by 'golden handcuffs.' (N. Butcher, pers. com.)

Table 3: Vignette Responses, Offshore Oil and Mining Industries

Response	Offshore Oil Workers				LDC Mine Workers			
	Workers		Partners		Workers		Partners	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Negative	18	18	58	39	23	20	35	27
Neutral	5	5	34	23	19	16	22	17
Positive	76	76	56	38	74	64	75	57
N	99		148		116		132	

Table 4: Vignette Responses, Key Lake and Polaris Mines, 1988

Response	Key Lake				Polaris				Total			
	Workers		Partners		Workers		Partners		Workers		Partners	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Negative	19	19	34	27	4	22	1	20	23	20	35	27
Neutral	16	16	21	17	3	17	1	20	19	16	22	17
Positive	63	64	72	57	11	61	3	60	74	64	75	57
N	98		127		18		5		116		132	

Another question posed by the Labour Canada survey asked the Polaris and Key Lake miners to express their preferences between LDC and working in a small mining town. When only those with first hand experience of both are considered, only about 40% stated an unequivocal preference for their current, LDC, situation. In contrast, 32% of Key Lake and 25% of Polaris miners state a preference for the mining town option (Table 5).

The labour mobility survey was also interesting in terms of the reasons given for favouring the small mining town and LDC options. Those expressing an unequivocal preference for the first mostly did so because it was considered better for family life. However, those preferring the LDC option also mostly did so for family reasons. The difference was between different priorities and meanings for family life; for the first group it involved the husband being home every night and easily available to care for the wife and children, while for the second the emphasis was on allowing family members to live in a larger community with its health, education, recreation and employment opportunities, and being able to have extended periods of 'quality time' with them.

Table 5: *Preference of Mining Community and LDC Options, Key Lake and Polaris Mines, 1988*

	Key Lake						Polaris					
	Conventional Mine		LDC		Total		Conventional Mine		LDC		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
LDC	25	40	34	56	59	48	8	40	8	67	16	50
Mining Community	20	32	11	18	31	25	5	25	0	0	5	16
Depends	17	27	16	26	33	27	7	35	4	33	11	34

4.2.2 *Prospective LDC Workers and Spouses*

A study of implications of LDC for labour force mobility (Shrimpton and Storey, 1991b) evaluated the difficulties and advantages involved in making the transition from work in a small mining town to work at an LDC mine. It included a survey of the residents of Leaf Rapids a small mining town in Manitoba. It showed that they generally know relatively little about LDC operations and their impacts on miners and their families; however, their overall assessment of the system seems to be very negative. This has potential implications for the mining labour market in that these miners are likely to be unwilling to move to LDC work even though that form of employment is becoming more common and mining town operations continue to close. There seems to be a danger, were these individuals to follow through with their stated intentions, of a significant loss of trained and experienced workers from the Canadian mining labour force.

A sample of the miners and spouses living in Leaf Rapids were asked a hypothetical question about what they would do if the mine there closed. (While the question was hypothetical, the closing of the nearby mine in Lynn Lake served to remind respondents that it was grounded in reality.) Respondents chose between four options: move to work in another mining town, move to work at an LDC mine, move and quit the mining industry, or stay in Leaf Rapids and quit the industry. The first of these was ranked first by 22 (85%) of 26 respondents, while six preferred to quit the industry (five of whom would move out of Leaf Rapids) (Table 6). None had LDC as their first choice option; indeed this ranked, overall, as the least favoured alternative.

Table 6: Worker and Community Choices if Leaf Rapids Mine Closed: Miners, 1990

Rank	Work/Community Options			
	Move to Mining Town	Move to LDC	Stay in Leaf Rapids and Quit Industry	Move and Quit Industry
1 st	22	0	1	5
2 nd	3	10	3	7
3 rd	1	5	7	7
4 th	0	7	10	3
unspecified	2	6	7	6

Of course, not all these options may be available. In particular, no new mining towns are being opened in Canada, and few existing ones are expanding their labour forces. In the case where the only choice was between the remaining options (i.e., LDC or leaving the industry) two-thirds expressed a preference for the latter.⁹

4.3 Family Life Advantages and Disadvantages of LDC Employment

4.3.1 Advantages

Income and Employment: Most LDC employees and spouses valued the work for the income and, in high unemployment regions, employment it offered. While LDC work generally does not pay higher than average hourly rates, the system does involve long hours, many of which may be paid at overtime rates. The period living at the workplace allows few opportunities for spending this income, with virtually all accommodation, food and other subsistence costs being paid by the employer. The family income and savings benefits afforded by the system were especially large in those few cases where a couple both worked at an LDC operation.

The income benefits are clearly greater for those workers on long asymmetrical patterns. Thus, while only 10% of Key Lake miners included the income as one of the main advantages of the system, it was cited by 50% of those at Polaris (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989b:160).

⁹ However, these are, of course, hypothetical responses, and having to choose between LDC work and a reduced income or unemployment may overcome reticence about the LDC work system.

Separation of Work from Family Life: Some, especially managerial and professional, LDC employees value the opportunity to clearly separate the worlds of work and family. The latter was 'out of sight and out of mind' during periods at the worksite. Conversely, time at home normally involved a total escape from work concerns and relationships, although some management personnel do have to have periodic telephone contact with their opposite numbers at the worksite.

Quality Time: Many LDC workers and spouses value the extended periods as a family afforded by the schedule. Male LDC workers commonly express pleasure at being able to spend days with children, albeit this is mostly in the form of camping trips and similar outings, rather than day-to-day childcare. Some couples also enjoy such periods together, especially if they share a recreational interest. In addition, for some couples the times spent together were 'periodic honeymoons.'

It seems reasonable to think that the periods of time together would be a greater advantage for those on symmetrical work patterns than for those who spend a majority of the time away. However, perhaps because of the attractiveness of those relatively short periods spent at home, the differences between Key Lake and Polaris are modest. The time at home was seen as a major benefit by 39% and 34% of the workers at the two mines respectively (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989b:160).

Independence: Many spouses of LDC workers enjoy the independence that the work pattern can afford them. However, such independence can be highly problematic for some spouses and LDC workers; some long-term LDC spouses speak of the need to 'learn to be' independent. However, this may be difficult for psychological reasons and the threat it poses to established gender relationships in the family; furthermore, especially in rural communities, it may violate social norms (see Section 4.3.2).

Services and Facilities: Long distance commuting employment allows workers and their families some, and often considerable, choice of residential location. The company transports the worker to and from one or more 'pick-up' points, and the infrequency of the commute is such that the worker may choose to travel some additional distance between there and his or her home. However, in most cases the majority of LDC families choose to live in urban centres, and there is a general pattern of migration by them to such centres. This is largely because such centres provide a wider range of health, social and recreational services and facilities for use by the worker (when away from the LDC work) and his or her family members.

Family Employment: The spouses and other members of LDC workers' families may engage in paid employment. Some certainly see such employment as a constructive use of the time their spouse is away, and of maintaining an independent existence. However, the LDC worker's absence may also make them a 'part-time single parent', severely constraining the options with respect to paid employment. Unfortunately, few studies have made any attempt to compare the participation rates of the family members of LDC and non-LDC workers, and hence it is not possible to judge, in this respect, the economic impacts of the system for individuals and communities. However, there is some evidence that employment patterns among LDC-workers spouses are distinctive.

The basis for this is the desire of many couples to maximize the compatibility of their work schedules. This places a premium on spousal employment which is flexible in its schedule, including temporary, 'supply', and self-employment. However it should be cautioned that the great majority of LDC spouses are women, and most temporary and supply positions have traditionally been held by female workers. Such positions, and traditional opportunities for women's employment in general, are most commonly available to those living in urban settings.

Of the 150 spousal respondents in the Newfoundland family life study (Storey *et al.*, 1989) 33% were in paid employment. This compared to a province-wide married women's participation rate, for the 20-44 age group, of 48%. However it is unclear to what degree the difference reflects the impacts of the work pattern, other demographic variations, the fact that the family already has one relatively remunerative source of income in a province with high unemployment rates, or other factors. Of those offshore workers' spouses with jobs, 75% were working full-time and 25% part-time. The main occupations held, in declining order of frequency, were secretary, office clerk, nurse/nursing assistant, retail clerk, fishplant worker, federal government employee, teacher and cook (48).

Spousal participation rates were much higher in the case of the Canadian LDC mineworkers. Among the Key Lake and Polaris spouses 53% and 45% respectively (the latter as reported by their partners) held a paid job. Of these 61% and 56% respectively were full-time. The largest occupational groups, as reported by the Key Lake spouses, were office and clerical, health services, retailing and teaching. Again, many of these offer the possibility of working a regular part-time schedule or, as with 'supply' nursing and teaching, of only working at selected times (173).

Solberg (1985) has studied the effects of long term periodic father/husband absence working in the offshore oil industry on 23 families living in the Rogaland County of Norway. Twelve of the spouses held part-time, but none full-time, paid jobs. Solberg found that: 'Most [8 of 13] of the women who do not work outside home have children younger than seven years old (the start of school age). However this is also true of almost half of the women holding jobs.'(332)

No information is available on how these participation rates compare with those of the spouses of Norwegian non-LDC workers. However on the basis of the survey and interviews Solberg concludes that:

our data do not suggest that the husband's commuting has one-sided negative effects on their wives' job participation... Rather, it seems as if oil-commuting may make it both worse and easier for women to have work outside home (332).

Solheim (1988) also finds a mix of advantages and disadvantages, which often lead to a decision to choose part-time employment. She notes that:

most offshore wives we interviewed state that the main difficulties of having a job with a husband offshore were not related to the period of absence, but to the period when he was at home. [Despite these difficulties]... the majority of offshore wives who were working outside the home, either full-time or part-time, preferred to work than to be a housewife all the time. We found no instance of a woman quitting work because of her husband's offshore schedule, but quite a few who had started working after the offshore engagement had begun. At the same time the decision to take a job usually entailed some negotiation between spouses, and many of the women stated that they preferred part-time work in order to minimise the possible conflicts caused by their absence at work during the husband's period onshore (154).

Secondary Employment for LDC Workers: In addition, rotational work schedules present the possibility of the commuting worker holding a second job. This was relatively uncommon among the Newfoundlanders surveyed for **The Steel Island** and the family life study. Just over 10% of workers in the former study had secondary paid employment (Fuchs *et al.*, 1983:126), while among the married workers in the family life study only fourteen of 99 respondents sometimes engaged in secondary paid employment, and only one did so regularly. Fishing and carpentry were the most commonly noted secondary occupations among these married workers (Storey *et al.*, 1989:46).

It seems that secondary work was somewhat more common among Norwegian offshore workers, likely reflecting the lower unemployment rates there and the common use of asymmetrical schedules which mean that workers are at home for a majority of the time. Unfortunately Aase only has data about joint family enterprises; there is no information on other forms of secondary employment. However, '19% of the households run some private business in addition to wage labour in the North Sea...[of which] one-half...are family based, run jointly by the commuter himself, his wife, and school-going children.' (Aase, 1990:13)

Solberg (1985) has undertaken research on married offshore workers living in one urban and one rural Norwegian community. However, in addressing the question of 'what do the men do at home' (334) she makes no reference to secondary paid employment in family or other businesses.

This may be because of the focus on family impacts and hence on the workers' involvements in household maintenance, childrearing and other unpaid domestic work. However, while relatively few Newfoundland offshore workers hold second jobs, 60% report having activities which take them out of the home, during their periods onshore, on a regular basis (Storey et al., 1989:122); it may be that secondary employment performs an important function in this regard.

The likelihood of engaging in secondary paid employment clearly increases with the proportion of the time spent at home. This is greatest among Norwegian platform workers (who may have an average of 24 days at home for every 14 days offshore) and least among Polaris miners (who, on average, only get three and a half weeks at home for every nine weeks at the workplace). The impacts of this are indicated by the Key Lake and Polaris questionnaire returns. Polaris miners were more likely not to have a second job, spending more of their time at home recovering from the long periods at the mine and the long journey home, engaging in leisure activities, and seeing family and friends. Only one respondent (3%) 'regularly' engaged in secondary paid employment, while 16% did so 'sometimes'. (However, it should be noted that the 19% overall involvement is still higher than among either of the samples of Newfoundland offshore workers, again suggesting that local unemployment rates may be influential.) The comparable figures for the Key Lake workers were 12% and 19% respectively, for a total of 31% having some level of involvement in secondary employment (Storey and Shrimpton, 1989b:163).

The type of secondary work involved is clearly constrained by the LDC work schedule. Among the Key Lake and Polaris workers:

Construction and related occupations are most common, often drawing on the same skills used at the mine, such as heavy-equipment operations and electrical trades; the seasonal and periodic nature of construction activity makes it particularly suitable for intermittent involvement by workers. Agriculture is the second most common activity but this usually represents a regular commitment, often to working on a family (of the worker or his/her parents) farm...

Other regular secondary employment includes automobile appraisal and repairs, two Key Lake workers who own and manage apartment buildings, a safety officer who works as a paramedic, and a senior mine engineer who works in mining exploration. Occasional secondary employment includes gun repair, computer programming, clerical work, waiting, barkeeping and truck driving (164).

Combining LDC work with family farming seems to be a conscious strategy in Saskatchewan, where a government official has described LDC mining as a 'de facto agricultural support program.' Other family members can maintain the farm during those weeks when the miner is away. Furthermore, most Saskatchewan LDC miners get three or more weeks vacation; a single week off results in a three week period at home which is very valuable if it can be taken during periods of peak agricultural activity.

Work in family agricultural activity is also relatively common among Norwegian offshore workers. Aase concludes that 'oil and agriculture... complement each other'(16), albeit in the context of patterns of inheritance:

In Norway, agricultural subsidies are arranged so that they encourage production units corresponding to 1.5 man-years, assumed to be the "typical" family farm. The marginal returns to labour input beyond 1.5 man-years are decreasing. This arrangement creates difficulties in the generational takeover of the farm. When the heir is in his or her early twenties and in need of income-yielding occupation, the parents still have twenty more productive years to go. The farm not being able to feed two nuclear families, the son or daughter has to find alternative occupation until father retires.

The dilemma has been resolved by children settling in town and not returning to the farm when the parents grow old, thus contributing to the decreasing size of the agricultural labour force.

Another way of adaptation in Western Norway has been through long distance commuting. The heir and his family build their own house on the farm, and the young man works on hydroelectric construction sites in the mountains somewhere, or, as we have seen, in the North Sea. When he reaches forty or so, the time has come to take over the farm from the aging parents (15).

Unfortunately Aase does not cite any sources on this phenomenon, or indicate how common it is.

A similar phenomenon has been reported in Western Australia. A number of employees at the Bounty LDC gold mine come from low density cattle farms within a couple of hundred kilometres of the operation. They contribute both labour and some of their mining income to the upkeep of the farm, and will take over running it on the retirement or death of their fathers (Dunlop, pers. com.,1991).

This work on the family farm seldom takes the form of waged or salaried employment; it represents an investment of labour and income in an asset which will later be inherited. Workers at LDC operations may spend their time at home in other forms of unpaid labour, including subsistence pursuits. For example, while only a relatively small proportion of Newfoundland offshore exploration workers have part or full time jobs, the majority (58%) of those surveyed by Fuchs *et al.*, 'utilize their free time to pursue subsistence activities such as firewood cutting, hunting and fishing.'(1983:126-127) Such subsistence activity may be facilitated by both the LDC work pattern and the income from it. For example, Hobart notes how the periods away from LDC exploratory drilling employment allowed Coppermine residents to continue to hunt, and the fur harvest increased as 'oil company earnings enabled workers to buy more skidoos, boats and other equipment, making them more efficient resource harvesters.'(Hobart,1989:32)

4.3.2 Disadvantages

Telecommunications: Problems with respect to telephone links between workers' homes and the work place are a matter of great concern to employees at LDC operations and to their families. Telephone calls can diminish loneliness and help prevent or resolve domestic and emotional problems; just the possibility of phoning home, or of the spouse or other family members phoning the worker, reduces stress for all concerned.

Communications facilities for business activities are similar at most Canadian LDC operations. The main differences in communication systems are in terms of what is available to the employees. At Polaris all costs of personal telephone communications are borne by the employee. Telephones can be installed in each worker's room for a monthly rental fee and all calls are billed to that number on a monthly basis. As all outside calls are long distance, telephone bills are often very high; monthly bills of \$500 or more are reportedly commonplace. For workers experiencing domestic or marital problems, the costs can be very high.

At most other Canadian LDC mines the situation is different primarily because there is a greater concentration of workers' homes in and around the location of the company headquarters, which is usually served by 'tie-lines' from the mine. At Lupin the company has made available a number of direct lines to Edmonton for employee use at particular times. Calls are limited to fifteen minutes so as to make the phones accessible to others. For those living outside Edmonton, where long distance rates apply, the cost of the call is charged from Edmonton and arrangements can be made for the employee to pay for such calls through pay deductions.

No such arrangements are in effect at the third Labour Canada case study mine, Key Lake. Instead it is widely acknowledged and recognized that the tie-lines are used only by senior employees, who may have a telephone in their office and/or room. Other employees have to use communal pay-phones, and most pay long distance rates for all calls. The differentials in the privacy of the telephoning environment and the cost cause considerable resentment, especially among married workers.

Pollard reports similar problems at the Horseshoe Lights gold mine in Western Australia:

A major concern... was the opportunity to have easy access to a telephone. A number of public telephone booths were provided... (but) the difficulty of discussing important matters while other people were waiting to use the telephone, and the expense of long distance calls, were identified by some staff. The need for easy telephone contact was also identified in the interviews with partners at home, especially where joint decisions needed to be made.'(Pollard,1990:16)

However, while 'the importance of telephone contact was a major concern' at the Hadson hydrocarbon operation, the company paid the cost of calls home for a set period of time, and an emergency line allowed access to employees at all hours (Pollard,1990:18).

When Polaris and Key Lake workers were asked to rate communications services, they ranked them last and seventh respectively out of the nine aspects considered. While 69% of Polaris and 49% of Key Lake workers respectively rated them as 'excellent' or 'good,' 6% and 20% thought them 'poor' and 6% and 9% 'bad.' Clearly communications costs and arrangements were seen as being relatively unsatisfactory in comparison with other aspects of the camp and camplife, especially at Key Lake.

These same problems apply at Canadian offshore oil and gas operations, and are exacerbated by the offshore location and, during exploration drilling, by commercial security of information concerns. The only telephone links will likely be radio telephone and Inmarsat (satellite telephone network), both of which are problematic for personal calls. The former is not confidential, while the latter is very expensive. The confidentiality problems with both modes are exacerbated when, as is common, the only telephones are located in a relatively public telecommunications room. While some exploration companies assisted employees in minimizing these problems, others effectively prevented personal calls except in emergencies. This was viewed as highly problematic by the employees and their families (Storey *et al.*,1989:129-133).

Transportation: Many workers and spouses have concerns about air safety, especially where, as is normal practice in the offshore oil industry, helicopters are used. These concerns may be overstated (though nevertheless real and stressful for those who are afraid of air travel), especially among mine workers. However, there have been a number of North Sea helicopter crashes (most notably the death of 45 men in the 1986 Sumburgh disaster), and the deaths of five employees of the Johnny Mountain (British Columbia) mine and their pilot in a February 1990 helicopter crash indicates the potential for disaster in the mining industry.

Transportation in the offshore oil industry is also particularly problematic given the greater likelihood that workers will be delayed because of bad weather, technical problems and 'bumping' for more important personnel or freight. Partings and reunions are the most stressful times for all family members (Clark and Taylor,1988), and a delay of departure or arrival can greatly exacerbate this. The study of the Newfoundland offshore oil industry found that flight delays 'bumping' were a particular stressor for the employees and their families, whether they affected the departure or arrival.

The rotation patterns and, where provided, vacations allow employees to spend scheduled and planned periods away from the workplace. However, there are various other circumstances under which a worker may need to take a special leave. These include family bereavements, domestic emergencies, and marital crises. The LDC system poses particular difficulties with respect to each of these.

The problems are least severe in the case of the operations using short rotations and frequent flights. For instance the collective agreements for unionized Canadian LDC mines contain a number of provisions which specify the circumstances under which leaves will be granted, their duration, whether or not they will be paid, and how transportation will be provided. However, many Canadian operations do not have such formal policies, and in some cases they would be inappropriate. In the case of an emergency situation at Polaris it may well take a worker three or four days to get home, with the possibility that weather or other flight delays making the journey even longer than this.

At operations which have frequent charter or company-owned air transportation, the marginal cost of flying out an additional worker will be relatively small. In the case of Polaris or offshore operations, however, any absence will result in substantial transportation costs which **may** be absorbed by the employer. Thus the more remote operations present problems, in the case of an emergency or bereavement, of time cost, transportation cost, and delays in reaching home.

Absence for Important Events: The absence of the LDC worker at the time of major holidays (Christmas, New Year's, etc.) and family events (e.g. birthdays, anniversaries, graduations) commonly causes considerable distress for all concerned. When asked how often such absences happen, 46% of Newfoundland offshore workers and 39% of Key Lake miners replied 'often' and 49% and 51% respectively replied 'sometimes.' Only the remaining 5% and 10% replied 'almost never.' The work pattern may be somewhat more problematic in this regard for the Newfoundland workers because, unlike the miners, they do not get vacation time in addition to their scheduled periods at home.

Certainly, none of the Polaris respondents, with their asymmetrical schedule involving six week periods at the mine, responded 'almost never.' However, while the percentage who considered that this problem occurred 'often' (56%) is higher than in the other cases, this is perhaps lower than one might expect. This may be because these miners have, on average, fewer children than the Newfoundland and Key Lake workers.

Decision-Making: In most two-parent families, decisions are made by the male parent or jointly. The involvement of one spouse (usually the male) in long distance commuting work will disrupt this, especially when there are crises or other developments needing a rapid decision. The spouse at home may make the decision her or himself, or be able to consult the LDC worker, or a friend or

relative. The net effect, though, is some adjustment and/or renegotiation of decision-making, which is commonly problematic for one or both spouses. For example, one wife in the Steel Island noted how 'when he's away I have to look after the whole family for a month. Then, when he comes back, I've got to drop being boss. That creates conflict sometimes.' (Fuchs *et al.*,1983:122) In the Newfoundland family life research 59% of the spouses and 63% of the offshore workers agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: 'when the man is an offshore worker, it is the woman who takes over' at home (Storey *et al.*,1989:80).

Child Discipline: The single largest area of tension noted by the respondents to the Newfoundland family life research was child discipline. Problems related to specific decisions made and inconsistencies between the approaches of the two parents, with one or other being thought to be too lenient, either in general or with respect to particular issues (Storey *et al.*,1989:113). Similar concerns have been expressed by others involved in LDC work.

Worker Behaviour: To the degree that the LDC work and accommodations environment and culture is non-familial, workers will have difficult adjusting to the home environment. This will be reflected in inappropriate behaviour in such areas as language, noisiness, tidiness, cleanliness, inconsiderateness and authoritarian approaches to decision-making. While only limited consideration has been given to the topic, there is no evidence that problems with alcohol, or domestic violence, are particularly prevalent among LDC workers; in the former case the fact that most LDC workplaces and accommodations are 'dry' (in the case of offshore rigs and platforms) or control drinking (in the case of mines) may contribute.

It should be noted, in this context, that there is a significant mythical component to outsiders images (and to some degree, self-images) of oil workers' behaviour. For example, Fuchs *et al.* describe how the supposed tendency of Newfoundland offshore workers 'to spend their earnings on things which give them quick prestige such as flashy cars and rounds of drinks,'(126) resulted in some disapproval and resentment. However, most workers in the Newfoundland exploration industry have been shown to use their earnings to increase their financial security. Solheim argues that the Norwegian image of oil workers is overly influenced by the survival of stories from the 1970s 'Texas period' in the North Sea, with the worker commonly being portrayed 'in the media and in common talk - as privileged and irresponsible, reckless and slightly immoral, with lots of loose money and idle time.' She believes this image is no longer generally valid (159).

LDC workers may be viewed as privileged in other, just as mythical, ways. For example, most LDC workers find it very difficult to explain to others that they do not in fact work fewer hours or have more leisure time. Similarly, the frequent flights to and from work and the remote workplace may present images that are much more exciting and exotic than the reality experienced by the worker.

Community Involvement of LDC Workers: One impact of LDC is the removal from the community, for a significant part of the year, of the worker. This may limit his or her participation in both formal and informal social networks. He or she may not be able to participate both in activities which require regular attendance (e.g. team sports, church groups, and serving on the local council, school board or executive of other community groups) and in occasional community festivities (e.g. school graduation ceremonies and church fetes).

This affects both the community, which loses the contribution the worker makes, and the worker, who may suffer social isolation. Norwegian offshore workers often describe the latter as 'falling out of the system' or 'getting out of step with society'(Solheim,1988:157), while a Newfoundlander noted how 'offshore work puts you apart from your friends.'(Storey *et al.*,1989:99) Similarly, a divorced Key Lake foreman described how the work pattern 'deteriorates relationships... you lose contact with friends and general happenings.'(Storey and Shrimpton,1989b:163)

Spousal Isolation: The problems may well be worse for the spouse; certainly both the Newfoundland family life study and the Labour Canada LDC mining study showed the spouses to find the work pattern more problematic than did the LDC workers. Solheim (1988) found considerable evidence of social isolation among the wives of offshore workers living in rural Norway:

The period of absence [of the commuting worker] is characterised by isolation and lack of social contact. This is most pronounced in rural communities, where fairly strict rules of conduct control and restrict the social space of a married woman who is alone (149).

In rural communities it is the family rather than the individual which is the core of the social network, and the wife will be excluded from much of this network when she is alone. She may be engaged in certain types of community organisations: church, choir, and voluntary social work, but there is very strong social control as to what are legitimate social activities for a single married woman. To 'roam about' without purpose is much frowned upon, and the women have to be concerned all the time about not appearing idle and 'loose.' Conventions regarding visiting and social calls are also heavily restricted by the familial rules of conduct in the Norwegian countryside. A single woman cannot easily visit a home where both the husband and wife are present, at least not in the evenings or at weekends, times that are marked off as 'family time.' With the exception of very close kin, many rural women state that they cannot normally visit friends and neighbours when their husbands are away, unless the other woman is alone too (156).

The importance of close relatives is reflected in responses from the wives of Newfoundland offshore oil workers, of whom 86% would turn first to relatives for help with household tasks, while 48% would turn first to relatives if suffering depression while their spouse was offshore. However, in the latter case, 49% would turn first to a neighbour or friend, presumably reflecting cultural differences between Norwegian and Newfoundland (Storey *et al.*,1989:115).

Solheim has noted that urban settings are less problematic for the wives of Norwegian offshore workers.¹⁰ This is because it is easier for the wives to move back and forth between life with and without their spouse since cities and towns provide

a greater variety of social arenas and relationships in which women can participate as *individuals* during the periods of their husbands' absence. Many of the urban offshore wives lead a fairly active social life when they are alone, both in relation to their jobs and other spheres. Mechanisms of social control are more flexible in the towns, and women tend to experience their social commitments as a matter of personal choice and preferences, rather than the imposition of specific cultural rules. (1988:156)

The Newfoundland family life study did not differentiate between the impacts on the social lives of offshore workers wives in rural and urban communities, but 65% of the women responding lived outside of the St. John's metropolitan area. Overall, the responses to questions about social activities support the findings of the Norwegian research:

Women are more likely to visit relatives and friends, entertain at home, go dancing or go to the movies, clubs and bars when their partners are onshore... When the man is offshore, individual activities, especially those usually confined to the home - TV watching, reading, household work - show increased frequencies. Most women would never visit a bar alone or even entertain at home without their husbands being there...[and] many women feel they cannot attend social events without their partners (108).

Solheim notes one Norwegian exception to this general pattern of social isolation, which 'may indeed be a consequence of it.'(157) This is the 'girlfriend club',

an institution we do not find in the same form in urban areas. It is formally constituted, usually with meetings every fortnight in the home of one of the members, with quite elaborate rituals in respect of food and hospitality, and attendance is obligatory. Most of the rural offshore wives we have interviewed belong to one such club, and this is one of the few social obligations which is kept regardless of the husband's presence or absence (157).

In Newfoundland, Fuchs *et al.*(1983) state that 'most women in rural areas will likely have a support group of other women and family friends who are able to ease the loneliness and provide practical help when needed'(123), and, as has been seen above, respondents to the family life study rely on relatives and friends in time of need. However, there seems to be no equivalent of the 'girlfriend clubs', and few of the family life study respondents 'indicate any frequent involvement in organized social activities with other women such as bingo or "going out with the girls"'(107) during their husbands' absence.

¹⁰ However, the advantages of living in an urban centre are not such that the problem of isolation of oil wives is restricted to rural areas. For instance, 'housewives with small children, wherever they live, cannot easily leave the home in any case.'(Solheim,1988:149)

It should be noted that while these impacts of the work pattern on contacts with relatives and friends are very clear to the oil wife, and have effects on the community as a whole, they may not be widely recognised (especially in communities with few offshore workers).

In the local community, people... tend to view the offshore family as fixed and unchanging. The real discontinuity of the wife's situation is masked by the fact that the husband is so often present. This creates the illusion of a 'normal' and very self-sufficient household. 'What does she need help for - he is hardly ever away' seems to be a standard reaction of local residents (Solheim, 1988:149).

This is in contrast to the periodic husband absences, for instance in construction work or the merchant marine, that are relatively common in rural Norway and Newfoundland.

Just as many community members may be oblivious to the problems that the wives of commuting workers experience, so may their husbands. To the degree that this is the case, or that he is unwilling to confront or deal with the situation, no attempt will be made at amelioration.

5.0 RESPONSES TO LONG DISTANCE COMMUTING EMPLOYMENT

5.1 Introduction

Working at an LDC operation is clearly in many important ways a very different experience to employment at a conventional operation and most other work situations. It involves spending considerable amounts of time in what is, to a considerable degree, a 'total institution', and it requires a regular transition between this work-oriented environment and other, very different, community and home environments. These elements of LDC work have broad implications for the organization of work and the workplace, for unionism, and for the work and private lives of all those directly and indirectly involved with the system. As such they challenge workers, families, employers, unions and governments to innovative responses. This section reviews some of these responses as they relate to family life.

5.2 Workers and their Families

The potential advantages and disadvantages of LDC work, from the perspective of workers and their families, have been described above. The vignette data on the Canadian oil and mining families indicate that, on balance, the LDC schedule is more problematic for the workers' spouses than for the workers themselves. This section discusses why this is the case and examines the ways in which families may respond.

When any spouse and/or parent moves to a new job, there is almost inevitably a need for adjustment to, or coping with, the new situation. This will be particularly the case if it involves a move to an unconventional work situation, such as an LDC schedule, especially if the family has well-established patterns of behaviour based on previous, conventional employment. This is likely one of the reasons why the Leaf Rapids residents, used to family and community life in a small mining town, responded so negatively to 'fly-in' mining as an alternative form of employment (Section 4.2.2). Conversely, there is evidence that LDC is more acceptable for those with previous experience of unconventional work schedules (such as those of trawler crew), or those who establish a family subsequent to, or at the same time as, becoming involved with LDC work.

In any case, there will be a need to adjust and or cope. This was reflected in the comments of some Newfoundland offshore workers' wives when asked to give advice to a hypothetical woman whose husband was first starting offshore work: 'I would tell her that she will find the loneliness the worst... but after a while she will adjust, as will her family, but it will take time.' 'You have to learn to be independent... to be a single parent.' However, another of these wives, whose husband had been working on the rigs for five years, replied: 'I don't think you ever really adjust to it - you accept it.'

The LDC workers also have to deal with the new pattern and its implications, but this seems to be less problematic for them, with family life issues being of less concern. Thus, while the Newfoundland family life study questionnaires and interview schedules were designed to focus on the relationship between work and the family, male respondents wrote and spoke mainly about the work itself and particularly about questions of safety and pay. All but two respondents to a question on what advice they would give to a hypothetical married friend who was just taking an offshore job concentrated exclusively on the advantages and disadvantages of the work itself: 'put home life out of your mind, concentrate on work, take it one day at a time.' The impacts of the work pattern on other family members were rarely acknowledged by the men who, while listing some of the adjustments necessary as a result of their intermittent absence, saw these as incumbent on the spouse and children rather than themselves. The women and children were expected to adjust to the returning worker, rather than vice versa (Lewis *et al.*, 1988b:171).

These low levels of concern about the impacts on the spouse and children were mirrored in some of the joint spousal interviews. A number of men expressed amazement at some of their spouse's descriptions of the impacts of the schedule on their lives, whether in terms of issues and concerns, or their emotional responses to these. (Reciprocally, many wives had only the vaguest of ideas about the lives of their husbands between the times when they left home and when they returned there. However, some do not want to know more for fear of increasing their own anxieties.)

The point here is that most offshore workers do not see, and are uncomprehending of, the two social realities at home; that when he (or, rarely, she) is present and that when absent. The family onshore have to deal with the changes between them on a regular and ongoing basis in a single setting: 'In a certain sense the wife is also commuting back and forth between a single and a married state; a shift which entails different forms of behaviour, different social networks and activities, and different values.' (Solheim, 1988:159)

The Newfoundland study identified three ways in which the onshore spouses dealt with this:

Some women seem simply to 'carry-on', trying wherever possible to prevent intermittent spousal absence from interfering with their routines and concerns, perhaps with the support of a close friend or relative. A second option is to try to do everything during the period the spouse is away, including all aspects of 'his' role which require attention; many of these women then go 'into reverse' on their partners' return - passing back to him the various duties and responsibilities which in their view are rightly and properly his. The third option is to place life 'on hold', to minimize all activities and concerns during the husband's period offshore in order to activate them fully when the spouse is at home.

However, these patterns are by no means as distinct and simple as they appear:

The woman's internal conflicts cannot be separated from those of her spouse, or from those which may be present within the family as a whole. She may, therefore, be pulled in several directions at once, by forces which vary in strength and persistence. This is not to deny that other members of the family are placed under similar strains, but the evidence suggests that it is the female spouse/mother who is most active in conflict management of various kinds. Of course, we know that this is a feature of wives in many family settings within our culture... [but] we argue here that it is particularly marked (Lewis *et al.*, 1988b:186).

Unfortunately, much of the early literature on 'spousal intermittence' analyzed the problems that some women had with these tensions using models focusing on the inadequacy or even pathology of the individual woman (see Storey *et al.*, 1989:9), rather than as seeing them as **family** issues.

The position of the onshore spouse as part-time single parent has also been discussed by Forsyth and Gramling (1987). Using a construction of reality approach based on Berger and Kellner (1964), they see it leading to the exclusion of the LDC worker from the 'traditional' nuclear family because 'it becomes impossible to maintain the absent members' active role in the construction process.' However, they too argue that new interaction patterns are available, which 'while quite different from the 'traditional' nuclear family, are patterns of adaptation rather than pathology.' (Gramling, 1989:57)

Forsyth and Gauthier (1991) have further extended this analysis, developing a typology of six adaptations/familial structures among two parent Louisiana oil families: alternate authority, marginal father, contingent authority, conflict, replacement father and egalitarian. However, they conclude that 'regardless of the strategy used, working offshore is problematic for families.' (197) In particular there are difficulties related to disagreements with the rules associated with the chosen strategy, dissatisfaction resulting from the strategy being imposed by the power of one family member, and a failure to agree on a strategy. These are exacerbated by the limitations the schedule places on opportunities for negotiation (198-199).

It should be noted here that there are two further options for dealing with the impacts of the work pattern on the family. The first is for the LDC worker to give up his or her job. Some clearly do this, and, for example, turnover rates were quite high at Canadian LDC mines during the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, they declined, even at new mines, in the mid 1980s as alternative employment options increasingly dried up. Similarly, one spouse of a Newfoundland rig worker, in response to a question asking her to advise a hypothetical new compatriot, wrote: 'I'd tell her she is lucky with jobs so hard to come by. She will get used to it and it will bring them

closer together.’(Lewis *et al.*,1988:170) In any case, there are obvious problems associated with the study of former LDC workers and their families, and no data are available on the use of this option.

The other option is to quit the relationship. As has been noted above (Section 3.2), there is little information on the degree to which LDC work results in divorces, especially because it appears that unmarried people, and especially the separated and divorced, are attracted to such work. The only research to specifically address this question only found evidence of the LDC pattern causing a significant number of divorces at the Polaris mine, with its asymmetrical schedule involving very long periods (normally 63 days) at the workplace. However, the relatively small sample size involved means that more research is required into the situation there.

The above discussion focuses on adjustment to, and coping with, the LDC system. It largely describes reactive responses used to deal with, and perhaps mitigate, specific negative aspects of the new work pattern and/or the change it requires. However, the worker’s and family’s reaction to the new work system may improve over time as the potential advantages become more apparent. Thus, for example, the LDC worker may find he or she can now engage in hobbies, sports activities and other pastimes which were impossible or inconvenient with a conventional work schedule. Some of these may, and commonly do, involve other family members.

Another relatively common adjustment, whether undertaken at the time of hiring for LDC work or subsequently, involves a change in the place of residence. There are a wide range of possible reasons for such a move, but two of the most common are to provide the perceived advantages of life in a major urban centre to the LDC worker (when at home) and family, and to allow the family easy access to the support of relatives during the period the worker is away. A desire to be near friends and relatives was among the reasons given by six of thirteen Polaris miners who had moved since commencing LDC work. In four of the cases the main reason was to allow the miner’s family access to relatives. In three of them the initiative is clearly expressed as that of the commuting worker: ‘moved family closer to home and relatives’, ‘moved to Kelowna so my wife could be close to her parents and sister’, and ‘put family near relatives.’ In the last and most extreme case it seems the miner’s spouse made the decision: ‘my wife moved back to England because she was lonely waiting 9 weeks at a time; she is now among her own family.’ This is obviously a more important consideration where the rotation is, as at Polaris, long and asymmetrical with the greater period spent at the worksite. Certainly, none of the Key Lake miners cited this as a reason for moving.

5.3 Employers

From the managerial perspective, there is similarly a need to recognize and respond to the particular characteristics of the LDC system. While personnel policies and management styles vary at different LDC operations, there are some elements of management policy which appear to encourage a safe, compatible and productive work environment. These include: an open-door management style; delegation of responsibility where possible; avoidance of regimentation, encouragement of interaction between workers and management, inviting and recognizing employee participation in decision-making; avoidance of 'blue-collar/white collar' divisions; keeping employees informed of company planning; consistent application of company policies and explicit recognition of the particular consequences of the LDC system for the personal and family lives of all concerned (Shrimpton and Storey, 1989b).

Concern about the last reflects the fact that some managers, most notably in the mining industry, have increasingly recognized both that the home life problems of many LDC workers are in reality work problems, and that domestic problems have reciprocal impacts in the work place. The worker brings home work-related concerns and stress, and the commuting system commonly generates its own tensions in domestic and personal life.¹¹ These tensions are in turn brought back to the work place, where it is recognized that they may affect productivity, safety and other management concerns. As Sutherland and Cooper conclude, on the basis of their North Sea petroleum industry research, family-related job dissatisfaction 'ultimately leads to reduced mental well-being, physiological ill health and possibly increased vulnerability to accidents. In organisational terms it results in poor performance and reduced productivity.' (1986:154-155)

A number of specifically family-oriented personnel policies have been adopted by some LDC operations in an attempt to address this issue. These include:

- the hiring of couples;
- site visits by family members and close friends (including visits to semi-submersible rigs and drill ships when they are in port);
- special arrangements to keep families together at Christmas and other holidays;
- social events for workers and families in those cases, as with LDC operations in Saskatchewan or Western Australia, where there is a concentration of workers' homes in one city;

¹¹ Indeed, all policies which improve the quality of life at the workplace are indirectly beneficial for the family.

- cheap, convenient and private telephone links between the work site and home; and
- counselling programs, and preferably employee assistance programs (EAPs), which are directed towards both workers and their families.

With respect to the last, the Key Lake mine has an EAP which might better be described as an EFAP (employee and family assistance program). Eleven percent of referrals were primarily concerned with the problems of workers' family members, and a further 16% were marital problems, involving both the worker and his or her spouse (Coates, 1991). Kidston gold mine is reported to have 'someone available' in the Atherton head office 'if wives need help', but there appears to be little demand). The Moomba hydrocarbon project also provides two full-time support staff who provide support and advice to families. This can be initiated by either the spouse, or by the employee calling from Moomba. These staff are regarded as having high levels of credibility. Other support is provided by informal links between the families, the great majority of whom live in the Adelaide area. At one stage all wives got together two or three times a year, but 'this has now fallen through with a change in general management.' (Lightfoot, 1990:23,28)

Another important consideration from a family life perspective is the accommodation arrangements. This includes the quality and design of the accommodations units, the assignment of rooms, catering arrangements, and the formal provision of recreation facilities and programs, but just as important is the overall social environment that is created. While this encompasses aspects of all of the above, it is also an independent reflection of the management approach to accommodation and related arrangements.

The key consideration, especially at operations with long rotations, is the need of workers to create a 'home' at the site. At Polaris, this not only includes attempting to provide single accommodations and encouraging couples to work there, but extends to allowing employees to bring pets (excluding dogs) to the camp. In the past pets have included cats, rabbits, snakes and birds. Other ways in which employees have personalized their rooms include growing plants hydroponically.

Separation of work and non-work life, insofar as it is possible, is important in helping workers deal with the LDC pattern. Having the accommodation unit at some distance from the work area, as at Polaris and Key Lake undoubtedly encourages this. At both mines this is taken a step further in that the accommodations have been decorated using colours and graphics that provide a contrast to the functional style and relative starkness of the work areas.

However, the social environment is also a function of the management approach and style. This includes such things as: avoidance of regimentation and an 'institutional' residential environment; minimization of worker/staff and ethnic divisions; a positive attitude toward employment of women and couples; and the involvement of workers in decision-making about housing, recreation, alcohol and other accommodations-related matters.

Another issue which has implications for the family is the rotation length. Workers generally find that stress and fatigue increases over the length of the period away. This is especially the case in the offshore oil industry, given the particular pressures and tensions at the workplace. For example, most of Newfoundland rig workers in the family life study were on a 21 days offshore/21 days away from work pattern, while supply boat workers were on 28/28 or 30/30 patterns. When they were asked their preferences, a majority (52%) of the rig workers, but only 6% of supply boat crew, wanted a shorter rotation. This difference in preferences likely reflects the differences in the work and work cultures, with the supply boats being viewed as more familial, and the fact that part of their crews' periods of work are spent in harbour, with easier contact with family and friends.

There has been a general trend to shorter rotation lengths in both the offshore oil and mining industries, but this largely reflects concerns about the safety implications of long periods of stressful work, or administrative concerns (Shrimpton and Storey, 1991c:12). Such reductions in rotation lengths are not without their costs, both to the employers and workers. For the former, transportation costs significantly increase; a change from a 21/21 to a 14/14 rotation increases transportation costs by about 50%. For the latter, more time is spent commuting, including flying which may be a significant stressor. Furthermore, as has already been noted, partings and reunions are times of particular stress for all family members. It is not clear to what degree a greater frequency of contact reduces this stress, counter-balancing the increased number of partings and reunions.

While the policies and practices discussed above can serve to make the LDC work system more compatible with the personal and family lives of employees, it will still not be an appropriate employment choice for all types of worker and family. Some companies seek to address this through their selection procedures; however, these often focus on the characteristics of the worker alone, including such things as attitudes to teamwork, familiarity with work away from home, and flexibility (see Storey and Shrimpton, 1991:19). However, a number of LDC mines have included interviews with prospective employees' spouses and partners as part of their initial hiring process. This serves both to allow management to assess the ability of the family to deal with the system, and ensures a pre-employment orientation to its characteristics, allowing couples to more efficiently and knowledgeably self-select into, or out of, this form of employment.

From a management perspective, such pre-employment programs have the advantage that by improving the self-selection process they reduce the strains on those workers who are hired and subsequently leave because the work system does not suit them and/or their families. Pre-employment programs also reduce worker turnover and hence training and other costs, while even those workers who do become long-term employees, and their families, may find stress levels reduced because there is less of a conflict between their expectations and reality.

While various of the family sensitive policies and practices described above have been adopted at various LDC mines, they are rare at offshore oil and gas operations, at least in Canada and the UK North Sea sector. In some cases this reflects the remote and often hazardous nature of offshore operations. In others, especially with older vessels and installations, it reflects the physical characteristics of the work places, with their limited space and facilities. However, the authoritarian and individualistic culture of the offshore oil and gas industry also appears to be a critical factor in limiting the introduction of such practices.

This was exemplified by the contrasting replies of two rig operating company personnel officers when asked whether schedules could not be organized to permit all workers to have either Christmas or New Year's at home. While one recognized (but had not previously thought of) the merit of this, the second replied tersely that 'we hire workers, not families.' The latter attitude led to a recommendation, in Storey *et al.* (1989:163), that stressed the need for a greater 'management awareness of the importance of the work culture in determining both worker morale and family adaptations to offshore work.' Such an awareness is indicated by the adoption of a number of the above practices on Norwegian offshore oil and gas production platforms.

Adopting such approaches and practices as part of the management strategy for LDC operations is one thing; implementing them is another. The role of the manager of the operation and other senior staff is clearly crucial in this regard. Long distance commute operations require managers with somewhat different skills than those who work at conventional oil and gas and mining projects. They must still, of course, have as a first priority the running of a safe and efficient operation. However they also have a much wider role to play in ensuring the mental health of the men and women who work there and their families, whose well-being is directly or indirectly an important contributing element to a safe and efficient operation.

Maintaining the innovative management approaches that LDC operations require can also be difficult. While a number of mining companies have recognized their importance, as has been shown by the approaches used in setting up such mines as Rabbit Lake, Polaris and Argyle, there have been a number of cases where subsequent changes of management (for example, the introduction of managers with experience only of conventional operations), or corporate cost-cutting, have undermined these approaches.

5.4 Labour

The impacts of LDC on unionism have generally been shown to be negative, whether in terms of organising an operation, operating a local, or holding a strike.¹² This clearly limits the degree to which the labour movement can act on behalf of the interests of LDC workers, whether directly in respect of family life matters or with regards to work matters which may rebound on the family.

Four of the thirteen Canadian LDC mines in operation in 1990, Cluff Lake, Key Lake, Detour Lake and Hope Brook, were unionized. The United Steelworkers of America is the union at all but the first, where workers are represented by the Energy and Chemical Workers. These mines are among the larger LDC operations, and while they represent only 31% of all LDC mines, they account for 38% of the existing LDC labour force. This contrasts with an overall estimate of 50 to 60% for the Canadian mining labour force as a whole.

No data are available on the organization of Australian LDC mines or hydrocarbon operations, and there seems to be less union concern about this issue than is the case in Canada. Newton (1986:75) indicates that, while the consensus among the five major unions involved in mining was that a daily commute or company town are preferable to LDC, the union most familiar with it, in the hydrocarbon industry, favoured it. More recently, a representative of the Australian Workers Union interviewed by Pollard noted an employee preference for symmetrical rotations and expressed a number of concerns; however, he also expressed overall worker satisfaction with the system (Pollard, 1990:29). Similarly, a representative of the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union of Australia, which has membership at two Northern Territory gold mines (Granites and Tanami), has stated that LDC mines have not posed any greater concerns than conventional operations (J. Lawrence, pers. com., 1990). However, there are indications that some Australian mining companies consciously use the LDC system and hiring policies to minimize labour force militancy.¹³

The offshore oil industry in Newfoundland and United Kingdom has always been antipathetic to, and largely successful in discouraging, unionization. Only a few Newfoundland catering workers were, for a short time, unionized. In the United Kingdom it is only the offshore construction sector that has significant union membership, as an extension of powerful onshore unions. Attempts to organize production workers and contracting companies have been strenuously resisted by the offshore operators. However organized labour, with the support of the government,

¹² For a detailed discussion of these impacts with respect to LDC mining, see Storey and Shrimpton, 1989:145-156.

¹³ For further discussion of the reasons for low levels of organization of LDC mines see the companion paper (Storey and Shrimpton, 1991).

plays an important role in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. Of approximately 17,000 Norwegian offshore workers, 12,440 (73%) belong to unions (see Oil Industry Liaison Committee, 1991).

Even where operations are unionized, LDC presents particular difficulties for organized labour. The entire worksite, including the accommodations and means of access (helipad, airstrip or highway) are under company control, and at any one time a large part of the workforce (half, in the case of operations with a symmetrical rotation) are at home in what are commonly widely-dispersed communities, while those at the workplace are split between those on day and night shifts. Access to the site has to be negotiated with the employer, and it is difficult to hold meetings or votes, achieve group solidarity, or provide union training. In the case of a labour dispute, it may be difficult to picket, prevent the use of non-union workers, or maintain solidarity among the dispersed workers. There is also no 'community' support, in the form of support from the spouses and children living in a single industry town that has proved so important in numerous labour disputes.

These factors make it difficult for unions to be effective in addressing both work and family concerns. Furthermore, the latter may be, from a union perspective, 'out of sight and out of mind.' Family life related matters seem more likely to be addressed by unions in, for example, a small mining town setting, where they are immediately apparent to union officials and can be expressed easily and directly by members of the workers' families at union hall meetings, social events, etc..

Lastly, union officials may not recognize the particular implications of LDC work for families. Conventional collective bargaining priorities may emphasize, for instance, issues around the length of the workday and workweek. However, this may be a relatively low priority for workers at an oil platform or LDC mine, with their relatively limited opportunities for the constructive use of time off at the workplace. Conversely, union officials at a Canadian LDC mine were wholly ignorant of the major issue of concern for the labour force, inequitable policies with respect to telephone links with home.

5.5 Government

The role of governments with respect to the family life implications of LDC has been limited. National, state, provincial and territorial governments have generally welcomed its use by the mining industry since the use of this option saves it from the infrastructural, social and political costs associated with the opening and closure of single resource communities. It has also been welcomed for the opportunity it presents for dispersing the homes, and incomes, of resource industry workers, especially when this can be used to bring industrial employment to the native residents of northern

and remote regions. However, some regional and municipal governments are concerned about the degree to which the employment, income and business benefits of new LDC operations 'fly-over' their jurisdiction, with most employees living in, and most purchases made from, distant metropolitan centres.

The main roles of government would seem to be threefold. First, it is necessary to ensure that LDC workers have equal rights to collective representation as other workers. Unions are in a position to have both direct and indirect benefits for LDC families, whether by the existence or threat of an organized workplace. Second, there is a need to review labour legislation and enforcement procedures to ensure that they are appropriate to LDC operations. This may involve a revision of some work hours and health and safety standards legislation (permissible noise and air quality standards, for example, are commonly based on a conventional workweek), and new arrangements may have to be made to ensure access for inspections (these are seldom unanticipated given the employers control of the means of access).

Lastly, there is a role for government in recognizing and anticipating the particular family related impacts of LDC. This may be in terms of ensuring that it is able to make direct and appropriate provision of, in particular, social services, to the families. However, it may be better, given the low density of LDC families in almost all locations, for government to require of companies wishing to use LDC that they implement an effective employee and family assistance program and similar family sensitive practices.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

This paper has focused on one unconventional, and increasingly used, form of employment. It principally discusses research into the two largest current users of the system, the offshore oil and mining industries, but its advantages for industry and, to a lesser degree, governments are such that there is growth in its use by the hydro, forestry, fishing and construction industries. The numbers of workers and families involved are such as to justify the review of its impacts, and responses to them, that has been presented.

Further to this, however, examination of long distance commuting employment provides further insights into both the family life impacts of other non-conventional work schedules, and general relationships between employment and the family. The former are seeing rapid increase, with extended workdays, shiftwork, split shifts and irregular patterns becoming commonplace. The latter are normally discussed only in terms of conventional work patterns and different family types. This paper has considered these relationships in the context of one highly unconventional work pattern, albeit it has been concerned primarily with families with two parents, with or without children, with the male in LDC employment. (As was noted above, there are few data on other family types.)

The research on LDC employment describes some of the linkages between the worlds of employment and families, and some of the reactions to them. It also indicates the types of responses and interventions that may be appropriate. These may broadly be placed in six categories; those

- (i) That improve the compatibility of the work organization and family life. This includes such things as improved telephone links and transportation arrangements between work and home, and optimizing the rotation pattern from a family life perspective.
- (ii) That improve the compatibility of the work culture and home life. This involves making the workplace and accommodations more familial and less alienating, thereby decreasing the contrast between the two, and includes changes to both the physical and social environment.
- (iii) That assist family members to get used to what will often initially be stressful because it is alien. This involves making them all aware of what to expect (in terms of the LDC work, its impacts, and likely reactions) and how others have dealt with such matters.
- (iv) That assist family members to identify and assess the potentials of the new work situation. Many of these will seldom be immediately apparent.

- (v) That improve pre-employment self-selection. Despite the types of initiatives described above, there will always be some families who will find a particular LDC schedule, LDC in general, or indeed any work situation, highly problematic. An effective information and orientation program should serve to allow all family members to effectively evaluate the impacts prior to deciding to take the job.
- (vi) That provide assistance, perhaps in the form of an EFAP or other referral and counselling program, or through networks and support groups, to those employees and family members requiring them.

The range and variety of these responses is reflected in the options for implementing them. Clearly, there is scope and a need for action on the part of industry (whether voluntary, or achieved through collective bargaining or government intervention), governments, organized labour, professional associations and the community, and for self-help. The involvement of all is required, given both the nature of the issues that must be addressed and the limitations of each of these players.

This paper has described, then, relationships between LDC employment and families, and presented some conclusions as to what types of response are appropriate in addressing aspects of the work that are problematic for families and how these might be implemented. These responses have been identified and developed on the basis of a work pattern which may be considered relatively uncommon and extreme, but it is clear that many of them are equally applicable to other, more common and conventional, work systems. This seems to provide further evidence of the value of the new approaches which are being taken to the analysis of employment, families, and their interrelationships.

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